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1.The ELV-AKT project based at the IHPST Paris is a Franco-Polish cooperation involving among others digitalizations, editions and translations in XML/TEI of manuscripts of both Twardowski and the philosophers of his School which will be hosted onelv-akt.net. The original manuscripts are located at the Library of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Warsaw and at the Polish Academy of Sciences (see Likus 2000). Manuscripts recentlyedited are the German lecturesLogik 1894/5 (by Arianna Bettiand Venanzio Raspa, see Twardowski 1894/5), andDieUnsterblichkeitsfrage (1895) (by Michał Sepioło, seeTwardowski 1895). The first set of notes of Twardowski's lectures inlogic in Polish given in Lvov is contained inLogik 1895/6. Ofthese notes there exist an unpublished draft edition and an Englishsummary by Arianna Betti (Twardowski 1895/6). See bibliography of primary works below. See also theoperations on the ELV-AKT site.

2. On method as unifying factor among Twardowski's students, Dąmbska wrote:

The philosophers of the Lvov group were not united by anycommon doctrine, by a uniform world-view. Not the content ofphilosophy but rather the method of philosophizing and the commonlanguage were the factors which formed the foundation of the spiritualcommunity of these people. This is why the School could producespiritualists and materialists, nominalists and realists, logiciansand psychologists, natural philosophers and art theorists(Dąmbska 1948, 17).

3.To be sure, Twardowski splits phenomena of love and hate into two classes: feelings and manifestations of the will, see Twardowski 1897b, 143–144.

4. That Twardowski's position is original can be seen from the fact that in Höfler and Meinong 1890—a text Twardowski quotes as providing a distinction between object and content—objectless presentations are still accepted. On this point Brentano held a position similar to Höfler and Meinong's (see Rollinger 2009), but since that position was only known through Brentano's unpublished lectures, it seems safe to conjecture that Twardowski treated Höfler and Meinong as proxy for Brentano himself or at least to refer to the state of the art of Brentanian research. See for more Betti 2013.

5.Twardowski will come back to the difference between modifying andattributive adjectives also in 1923, in a talk published a few yearslater (see 1927b). For a systematic treatment developing Twardowski'sanalyses, and a history of the notion of modifying terms, see Schaar2015, chapter 2.4.

6. This is due to the fact that whereas an act, as a mental event, is a real object, which, in Brentanian terms, means that it can cause something or be caused by something, the content, instead, is a non-real object—it does not cause anything and is not caused byanything. It is not the case that the act causes the content: it is the act that can be caused—by some other event in the mind.

7. The point is in particular directed against the position that acceptspresentations whose objects are possible (such as the presentation ofa golden mountain), but not those whose objects are impossible, such as the round square.

8. The formal parts are in any case inseparable parts of the object of presentation: they are merely distinguishable in it.

9. Although Twardowski does not quote Bolzano's name, once we keepin mind that Twardowski's truthbearers are Brentanian judgmentsinstead of Bolzanian propositions in themselves, his debts to Bolzanoare apparent, as he even uses some of Bolzano's examples in theWissenschaftslehre. The idea that a sentence can express different judgments and the consideration that sometimes we just do not know which judgment is expressed by the sentence, is,mutatis mutandis, also to be found in Bolzano.

10. “The early Twardowski endorses a form of psychologism in the sense thatpsychology is to provide the basic concepts of philosophy, that themethod of inner perception plays a central role, and that the questionwhat a concept means is not clearly separated from the questionconcerning the concept’s origin” (Schaar 2015, 23).

11. This has made Ingarden date Twardowski's antipsychologistic turn to 1902 (Ingarden 1948). There is however evidence that the discussion of Husserl'sProlegomena in Poland around 1904, especially Łukasiewicz's strong anti-psychologistic attitude, played a role in Twardowski's change of heart. A safer dating is perhaps 1908/9, when, in the manuscript ‘Psychology of Thinking,’ Twardowski explicitly says thatthe position that logic depends on psychology is untenable.

12. Note however that what gets preserved is, strictly speaking, not the judgment, but the spoken sentencep.