Simon of Faversham († 1306) was a thirteenth-century Britishscholar, mainly known as a commentator on Aristotle’s logic andnatural philosophy. He is considered a modist, among other thingsbecause of his use of the notions ofmodi praedicandi andmodi essendi in his commentary on Aristotle’sCategories (cf. Marmo 1999). Simon’s work as anAristotelian commentator heavily relies on Albert the Great’sparaphrases on the Aristotelian corpus. His question-commentariessometimes portray key medieval discussions in a somewhat undevelopedstate, but also offer uniquely developed discussions, for instance hisdiscussion of the Meno paradox in his commentaries onPosteriorAnalytics and his treatment of empty reference. In the placeswhere his discussions are well developed, he exhibits goodphilosophical analysis and resourcefulness. Simon’s works arealso of great historical interest because they represent an importantstage in the development of thirteenth-century philosophical ideas.His corpus is relatively unexplored, and although an important part ofit is extant, a large part is also unedited.

• 1. Life
• 2. Writings
• 3. Logic
  • 3.1 The Subject Matter and the Division of Logic
  • 3.2 Signification
  • 3.3 Truth and Empty Reference
• 4. Psychology
  • 4.1 Definition of the Soul and Body/Soul Relation
  • 4.2 Metaphysics of the Intellect
  • 4.3 Intellection as Abstraction and Apprehension
  • 4.4 Dreams and Divination Through Dreams
• 5. Metaphysics
  • 5.1 Universals and the Principle of Individuation
  • 5.2 Essence and Being
  • 5.3 Predication of Being
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature (edited)
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life

Simon of Faversham was born circa 1260 in Faversham, a seaport town inKent, England.^[1] He became master of arts at the University of Oxford, but then taughtat the Arts faculty of the University of Paris in the 1280s, whereprobably most of his works were produced, even if he may have revisedsome of them after his return to Oxford in 1289. Later in life, Simonbecame a Doctor of Theology at the University of Oxford. After hisreturn to England, he held several clerical offices: sub-deacon atCroydon in 1289, and deacon at Bocking and rector of Preston in 1290.Simon became chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1304. In 1305,archbishop Winchelsey named him archdeacon of Canterbury, the highestecclesiastical appointment in England for non-priests. After giving upthis post, Simon was named rector of Reculver, but soon after he losthis appointment to the candidate of the Papal curia. Simon died in1306 in a trip to the Papal curia, where he was going to fight theloss of his appointment.

2. Writings

Simon’s philosophical corpus consists mostly of commentaries ontheCorpus Aristotelicum. His logical works are undoubtedlythe most thoroughly studied, and consist of the followingcommentaries:

• 1.Quaestiones libri Porphyrii (=In Isag.)
• 2.Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum (=InCat.)
• 3.Quaestiones libri Perihermenias (=InPerih.)
• 4.Quaestiones super librum Priorum
• 5.Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum (tworedactions)
• 6.Dicta super librum Topicorum
• 7.Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum (two series ofquestions)
• 8.Sophisma ‘Universale est intentio’
• 9.Quaestiones super universalia

Most of these are edited. 4, 6 and 9 are only extant in manuscriptform, but there are partial editions of 4 and 6.^[2]

Simon’s works on Aristotle’s natural philosophy areconsiderably less studied, and consist of the followingcommentaries:

• 10.Quaestiones super libro Physicorum (two series ofquestions)
• 11.Quaestiones super librum De anima (=In Dean.)
• 12.Quaestiones super parva naturalia herein
  • 12.1Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia;
  • 12.2Quaestiones super libro De longitudine et brevitatevitae;
  • 12.3Quaestiones super libro De iuventute et senectute;
  • 12.4Quaestiones super libro De inspiratione etrespiratione
• 13.Recollectiones super librum Meteorum
• 14.In De generatione et corruptione (doubtful)
• 15.Quaestiones super librum De motu animalium

Most of these are extant only in manuscript form. Only 12.1 has beenfully edited (Ebbesen 2013). The questions onDe anima III(Sharp 1934) are also edited, although only from one manuscript.Finally, there are partial editions of 10 and 15.^[3]

3. Logic

3.1 The Subject Matter and the Division of Logic

Like most thirteenth-century commentators on thelogica vetus(Boethius’s Latin translations of Porphyry’sIsagoge and Aristotle’sCategories andDeinterpretatione, together with Boethius’s commentaries onthese texts), Simon of Faversham begins his commentary with aprologue, which treats of the subject matter of logic and the divisionof logic, corresponding to the division of Aristotle’sOrganon into eight(!) treatises.^[4]

Like other masters from the last quarter of the thirteenth-centurysuch as Radulphus Brito, Simon considers the subject matter of logicto be the methods of knowledge acquisition (modi sciendi):the intellectual operations whereby we can proceed from somethingknown to the knowledge of something unknown. These methods aredefinition, division, and, most importantly, the syllogism (InIsag.: prologue). Accordingly, logic is neither a purelytheoretical science, as it does not consider essences or quiddities,nor a purely practical science, as its aim is not practical action. Asa science, logic is instrumental to the proper functioning of thetheoretical sciences (In Isag.: q.1).

As was commonly the case at this time in the thirteenth century, Simonalso holds that logic is about logical intentions (cf.InIsag.: q.2). But his logic of intentions is not nearly asdeveloped as that of the later Parisian master Radulphus Brito.Logical intentions are notions that can be applied to the knowledge ofwhat things are essentially, i.e., quiddities. According to Simon, theintellect forms these intentions from the ways things presentthemselves to it (i.e., fromapparentia). Thereafter, theintellect attributes different intentions to different thingsaccording to different properties. For instance, after having noticedthat some ways of being are common to several things, the intellectforms the logical intentionspecies, after which theintellect can apply this intention to the concept of man and expressthis act with the assertion ‘man is a species’.Consequently, despite not being a theoretical science, logic isultimately grounded in the properties of the things from which logicalintentions are taken (In Isag.: q.2).

As regards the division of logic, which is more precisely a divisionof the syllogism, Simon’s commentary is noteworthy in oneregard: following in the footsteps of Giles of Rome and the Arabiclogical tradition, Simon considers rhetoric and poetics to be parts oflogic, i.e., to function by way of syllogisms. Different types ofsyllogism are demarcated based on the varying degrees of certainty ofthe premises (In Isag.: prologue). Hence, if the premises areaccepted as mere suspicion (suspicio),^[5] the syllogism is rhetorical and the conclusion will also be acceptedas mere suspicion (a syllogism dealt with in theRhetoric).If it “proceeds from fictitious premises that portray horror orpleasure” (In Isag.: prologue), the syllogism is poeticand the conclusion will be accepted as an estimation(aestimatio) (a syllogism dealt with in thePoetics). If the syllogism proceeds from acceptable premises,the syllogism is dialectical and the conclusion will be an acceptablebelief (a syllogism dealt with in theTopics). If it proceedsfrom the indubitable indemonstrable principles proper to a givenscience, the syllogism is demonstrative and the conclusion will becertain and infallible knowledge (a syllogism dealt with in thePosterior Analytics). Finally, if it proceeds from knowledgethat seems acceptable, but is not, the syllogism is sophistical andthe conclusion will be an error (deceptio) (a syllogism dealtwith in theSophistical Refutations).

In addition to this division of syllogistic reasoning into five types,logic also studies the formal underpinnings of syllogistic reasoning,which is analysed in terms of the moods and figures of Aristoteliansyllogistic developed in thePrior Analytics.

Finally, logic is also concerned with the simple notions out of whichsyllogistic premises are composed. In theCategories, thosesimple notions are considered insofar as they are related to thecategory of being. In theDe interpretatione, those samenotions are considered insofar as they are the subjects and predicatesof mental compositions and divisions, i.e., mental assertions (InIsag.: prologue).

3.2 Signification

Simon also contributes to the medieval discussion about thesignification of words—whether they signify things orconcepts—a discussion prompted by Aristotle’s claim in thefirst chapter of theDe interpretatione that words signifyconcepts. Simon clearly opposes the Boethian tradition, which defendsthe immediate signification of concepts, and sides with those whoclaim that words signify things.^[6]

Following a division first attested in Porphyry, Simon divides wordsinto words of first and second imposition. Words of first impositionare given as names of essences, which have being independently of aknowing subject. Words of second imposition are given as names oflogical intentions, the being of which depends on a knowing subject.Words of second imposition clearly signify concepts, so thecontroversy does not concern them. Rather, it concerns words of firstimposition, such as ‘human’ and ‘stone’.

For Simon, words of first imposition do not signify a concept but anessence. His argument goes as follows:

1. ‘X’ signifiesx if and only if‘x’ occasions the concept ofx in the listenerand expresses the concept ofx in the speaker (cf.De int. 1 and 3).
2. ‘Human’ does not occasion the concept of the conceptof human in the listener, nor does it express the concept of theconcept of human in the speaker. If it did, real predicates such as‘run’ could not be verified of any human because obviouslythe act of running cannot be attributed to the concept of human.
3. Therefore, ‘human’ does not signify the concept ofhuman; and generally, ‘x’ does not signify the concept ofx.
4. On the contrary, ‘human’ occasions the concept ofhuman in the listener and expresses the concept of human in thespeaker.
5. Therefore, ‘human’ signifies the human essence; andgenerally, ‘x’ signifiesx—an essence.

It is remarkable that, in Simon’s view, ‘x’signifiesx only if both the expression-condition for thespeaker and the understanding-condition for the listener are met. Thisdouble condition for signification, typical of the last quarter of thethirteenth century, represents a break with the moreexpression-oriented notion of signification common in the second andthird quarters of the century (Marmo 1999).

Now, following the Avicennian idea that existence—mental oractual—is an accident of essences, Simon also makes clear that‘x’ does not signify essences according to their existencein the external world. In other words, ‘human’ does notsignify any particular human, but the human essence. This part of theargument goes as follows:

1. ‘X’ signifies the same thing the definition of‘x’ signifies.
2. The definition of ‘x’ does not signify a particularthing, but a thing only with regard to its essential features andregardless of accidents such as external or mental existence.
3. Therefore, ‘x’ does not signify a particularx, butx with regard to its essential features andregardless of accidents such as external or mental existence.

Consequently, Simon also holds that when the referents of a word offirst imposition are all destroyed, the word does not lose itssignification because for a word to signify, its significate—theessence—simply needs to be conceptualized, but an essence cancontinue to be conceptualized even after the destruction of all itsparticular instances.

3.3 Truth and Empty Reference

Simon also discusses whether truth is a property of thoughts or ofthings. He gives a solution typical of the period, according to whichtruth is above all a property of the knowing subject who is inpossession of a true belief (In Perih.: q.6).

Simon accepts the common medieval definition of a true belief as onethat is adequate (adequatio) with the way things are.However, unlike other thirteenth-century masters of arts (e.g., RobertKilwardby and Radulphus Brito), Simon maintains that this adequationconcerns the second, and composite, operation of theintellect—composition and division—as well as the first,and simple, one—the apprehension of essences (InPerih.: q.6). Hence, while other masters hold that adequation canonly obtain between composite items (i.e., composite thoughts andcomposite things), Simon holds that, since the intellectual graspingof an essence is naturally in agreement with this essence, it is alsosusceptible of truth (In Perih.: q.6). Regarding the truth ofcomposite items, however, Simon’s position is remarkablyelegant, as is evident in his discussion of empty reference in thecommentary on thePrior Analytics.

Simon’s position as regards empty reference is cruciallydifferent from the one held by modists such as Boethius of Dacia andRadulphus Brito, who claim that the truth-makers of essentialpredications, such as ‘the human is an animal’, are realthings in the external world, so that ‘the human is ananimal’ would be false if no human existed.^[7] Simon, by contrast, claims that it is true, supporting his claim withan elegant account of truth-determination. According to him, for anessential predication such as ‘the human is an animal’ tobe true, it suffices that the essences expressed by the subject andthe predicate are conceptualized and signified. They must beconceptualized because ‘the human is an animal’ expressesthe mental composition of the concepts of human and animal, whichevidently requires the human and the animal essences to beconceptualized (Ebbesen 1987: 159). They must also be signifiedbecause otherwise, ‘the human is an animal’ would have nosemantic content at all. However, ‘human’ and‘animal’ do not need to refer to or signify anything realin the external world.

The latter claim is shown as follows: assertions of the form‘S isP’^[8] involve the relevant mode of being of the significate of thepredicate (henceforth ‘of the predicate’). In assertionswhere real accidents are predicated (e.g., being white, running,etc.), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is actualexistence; therefore, their truth-makers must be things in theexternal world (Ebbesen 1987: 160). Likewise, in assertions wherelogical intentions are predicated (e.g., being a species or a genus),the relevant mode of being of the predicate is mental existence;therefore, their truth-makers are concepts. But in essentialpredication, the relevant mode of being is neither actual nor mentalexistence because essences are independent of any sort of existence;therefore, the truth-makers are simply the essences conceptualized andsubsequently signified by the subject and predicate (Ebbesen 1987:160). Therefore, ‘the human is an animal’ is true evenwhen no human exists, simply because being an animal is a definitionalpart of being human, that is, being an animal is a part of the humanessence.

4. Psychology

4.1 Definition of the Soul and Body/Soul Relation

Simon’s general psychology is standard Aristotelian doctrine, inmany aspects derived from Albert the Great’s and Aquinas’spsychological teachings. However, as we shall see, Simon sometimesconflates their views, which suggests that he was not entirely awareof their opposition. Simon holds that the rational soul is thesubstantial form of the human body because it is that on account ofwhich humans can perform their proper operation, i.e., intellection.However, unlike the substantial form of purely material things, thesubstantial form of a human being does not emerge from a naturalarrangement of matter but is given to the human body as its perfectionby an external source, i.e., by the first cause. Simon then describesthe soul both as the perfection (like Albert) and as the substantialform (like Aquinas) of the human body, but seems unaware of theconflict between Albert’s and Aquinas’s positions. ForAlbert, who wants to avoid psychological materialism, the soul is theperfection, and not the form, of the human body; a soul that is givento it by God. For Aquinas, however, who wants to make the rationalsoul the defining element of the human being, the soul must be theintrinsic substantial form of the human body, which isnonetheless separable after the body’s death. It remains unclearwhether Simon intentionally conflated the two views, and if so,whether he thought the two views could be somehow reconciled.

The rational soul has three faculties—vegetative, sensitive andintellectual—of which the sensitive and the intellectual arecognitive. The sensitive faculty is bodily because its operationsfully depend on bodily organs. It includes the externalsenses—touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight—as well asthe so-called internal senses—common sense,phantasia,and memory. By contrast, the intellectual faculty is separate, thatis, it is not bodily because it does not depend for its operation onbodily organs, even though it is occasioned by sensoryrepresentations. Accordingly, Simon, like Albert and Aquinas, rejectsthe position of those who, like Avicenna and Averroes, posit some kindof metaphysical separation of the intellect from the human body.

4.2 Metaphysics of the Intellect

According to Simon, the intellect is the faculty of the rational soulwhereby it thinks. Simon, who follows the Aristotelian doctrineclosely, holds this faculty to be immaterial, passive, and separate.It is separate because it does not need to use a bodily organ in orderto perform its operation of intellection. It is also passive, but notin the sense that matter is passive. In fact, there are two senses inwhich something is said to be passive because it can receive formswith or without undergoing qualitative change. Like matter, theintellect receives forms because it needs an intelligible object onwhich to perform its proper operation. But matter is passive in afurther and more fundamental sense because when it is brought to actby a form, it undergoes qualitative change. The intellect, however,does not undergo qualitative change but is simply actualized.Accordingly, the intellect is passive because it is potential withrespect to the act of intellection. And precisely because it does notsuffer qualitative change when it is brought to act, the intellect ismanifestly immaterial.

The intellectual faculty, i.e., the intellect, comprises a passivecapacity—the possible intellect—and an activecapacity—the agent intellect, which is the intrinsic activeprinciple of the act of intellection (In De an.: q.13). Theproper operation of the passive capacity is apprehension, i.e., thereception of essences through the assimilation of intelligible forms.The proper operation of the active capacity is abstraction, i.e., theproduction of the intelligible forms that trigger the operation of thepossible intellect (In De an.: q.13).

4.3 Intellection as Abstraction and Apprehension

Intellection is the proper operation of an intellect that comprisesboth a passive and an active capacity. Hence, the psychologicalmechanisms of intellection include abstraction, performed by the agentintellect, and reception in the possible intellect (In Dean.: q.16).

The primary object of intellection is an essence presented to theintellect in the form of an intelligible species (In De an.:q.10). Since forms are material and particular in both external thingsand sensory representations (phantasmata), and since theintelligible object must be immaterial and universal, the intellectmust produce an immaterial object to represent those forms under theaspect of universality—the intelligible species. The intellectdoes this through the act of abstraction performed by its activecapacity, the agent intellect (In De an.: q.12).

The agent intellect endows the essence with intelligibility: throughits act of abstraction it makes universal and immaterial the materialand particular essence in the sensory representation (In Dean.: q.12 and q.16). Simon, however, wavers between differentdescriptions of the act of abstraction. On the one hand, he describesit as similar to the act of illumination, so that just as lightenables the eye to see and the visible object to be seen, so the agentintellect enables the possible intellect to think and the essence inthe sensory representation to be thought (In De an.: q.12).Consequently, he seems to consider intellection as similar to the actof vision. But the analogy with vision has its limits because thevisible object is visible in itself, whereas the essence in thesensory representation must be made intelligible by the agentintellect. On the other hand, Simon describes the act of abstractionas the extraction of an intelligible species from the sensoryrepresentation, a species that is ‘transferred’ to thepossible intellect, thus actualizing its act of apprehension (InDe an.: q.16). Later commentators would reject one or the othermodel of abstraction depending on the extent of their realism aboutessences. Thus, the Averroist master John of Jandun rejects theillumination model because there is no way for something that existsin a bodily organ to be made universal, whether by illumination orotherwise, while remaining in that organ. Radulphus Brito, in turn,rejects the ‘transferring’ model because it fails toexplain the transfer of a form from the material to the immaterialrealm. Again, it seems Simon is unaware of the conflicts each modelfaces, as well as of the difficulties that arise from holding them atthe same time.

4.4 Dreams and Divination Through Dreams

Since Simon’s commentary on theParva naturalia doesnot contain commentaries onDe sensu andDe memoria,the best place to reconstruct his views on the physiological andpsychological mechanisms of sensory cognition is his commentary onDe somno et vigilia, which also coversDe insomniisandDe divinatione per somnum. Question 13* of thiscommentary provides broad accounts of the physiological andpsychological mechanisms of dreams and divination in dreams (ed.Ebbesen 2013).

According to Simon, dreams are produced by the common sense fromimages (idola) sent to it by thephantasia. Dreams,however, have different origins, stemming either from the dreamingsubject or from celestial bodies. If from subject, they stem fromeither her body or her soul. Dreams stem from someone’s bodywhen the powers of a bodily organ are affected by choleric orphlegmatic humors (two of the four bodily fluids in Hippocraticmedical doctrine). When the organs are thus affected, thephantasia forms images that are in agreement with thosefluids and sends them to the common sense. A person is then able todream that she is on fire, for example, if the choleric humor isdominant. Dreams can also stem from someone’s soul when duringsleep the soul is affected by a memory, e.g., of a friend who is faraway. A person is then able to have a melancholic dream about herfriend.

Dreams with their origin in celestial bodies give rise to thepossibility of divination in dreams. Such dreams originate from aninflux the human body receives from the celestial bodies. Thephantasia forms images in agreement with the influx and sendsthem to the common sense. When the organ of the common sense isaffected by those images, the common sense produces likenesses of thethings that will happen. Thus, thanks to this influx from celestialbodies, humans are able to foresee the future in dreams, for instance,future wars or bountiful harvests. According to Simon, who follows inAverroes’s footsteps, this sort of dream is divinely given tohumans because they lack cognitive access to future events that areuseful or harmful. The premonitory dream, however, does not provide anexact indication of the future event. In fact, the diviner mustinterpret her dream in order to judge what the dream is supposed toforesee. Since divination is part of astrology, a good interpretationrequires that one properly understand both the mechanisms of dreamsand of celestial bodies (Ebbesen 2013: 144). When properlyinterpreted, divination in dreams provides accurate information aboutthe future:

… it is infallibly true that the images formed by thephantastic power [i.e., thephantasia] are signs of sucheffects, and that these effects occur by necessity unless a strongermotion supervenes, which … hinders those effects …(Ebbesen 2013: 145)^[9]

So, unless something unexpected happens that changes the course ofevents, a properly interpreted dream originating from celestial bodiesis an almost certain indication that a useful or harmful future eventwill take place.

5. Metaphysics

Simon did not write a commentary on Aristotle’sMetaphysics, or, if he did, it did not survive. However, hispositions on some crucial metaphysical discussions can be found in hiscommentaries on Porphyry’sIsagoge andAristotle’sCategories. Here we will sketch his viewson two related issues: universals and individuals, and essence andexistence.

5.1 Universals and the Principle of Individuation

According to Simon, universality is a notion the intellect attributesto some things that exhibit the capacity to inform severalindividuals. Take, for instance, Socrates. Socrates presents himselfas a being endowed with reason and sensation. The soul realizes thatreason and sensation are found in multiple individuals, so it takesbeing a rational animal—being a human—as a unified thingthat essentially determines many individuals. So, on the one hand,being a human really inheres in Socrates and as such itexists only particularly. On the other hand, the intellect considersbeing a human as a unity that can occur in severalindividuals and as suchbeing a human is a universal, andmore specifically, a species. Following in the footsteps of Avicenna,Simon considers two modes of being of essences: a particular mode inindividuals and a mental mode as the content of concepts to which thenotion of universality is applied. In this sense, universals aremerely notional or intellectual, as everything that exists in theexternal world is particular:

… the human according to existence outside the soul is not aspecies, because according to external existence it is particular, butit is a species according to existence in the soul. In fact, theintellect grounds the intention of the species in the consideration ofthe nature of the human as one in many. (In Isag.: q.4)^[10]

In other words, universality is a mode of understanding things thatexhibit the capacity to inform several individuals:

… we must not posit a universal human because it existsuniversally. Rather, [human] is universal because it is understooduniversally, when [the intellect] sets aside all the individuatingconditions. (In Isag.: q.5)^[11]

It is also noteworthy that the essence need not actually informseveral individuals. Indeed, Simon also holds that the intellect canapply the notion of species to an essence instantiated in only oneindividual, as in the case of the sun and the moon (which wereconsidered to be species in his time). Simon grounds his position notonly in the examples of these celestial bodies but also via thefollowing argument:

1. If a species required several actual instances, this would beeither as regards essence or as regards existence.
2. Not as regards essence, because being instantiated in one or inmany is not included in the definition of an essence.
3. Nor as regards existence, because from the example of celestialbodies, it is evident that an essence can sufficiently exist in onlyone individual.
4. Therefore, a species does not require several actual instances ofthe essence. (In Isag.: q.26)

In sublunary beings, however, the species is in fact alwaysinstantiated in several individuals. Simon’s explanation of thisfact also reveals his position on the principle of individuation.According to him, in sublunary beings a single individual neverexhaustively actualizes all of matter that can be actualized by itsessence:

Why are there several instances of sublunary beings? … becauseall the matter pertaining to one species is not found in oneindividual. … But in superior beings all of the matterpertaining to one species is found in one individual. (InIsag.: q.26)^[12]

The multiplication of individuals of the same kind is caused by theexistence of chunks of matter that can be actualized by the sameessence through a quantitative division of matter (In Isag.:q.26). But this is only the principle of individuation of sublunarymaterial beings. Superior immaterial beings are fundamentallyindividual, as Simon tells us in his commentary onDeanima:

… particulars are twofold: some by matter, some by subsistence(the intelligences are particular in the latter way). Hence, I saythat my intellect is particular, not by matter, but by subsistence,inasmuch as it is a power subsistent per se and not the act of a body.(In De an.: q.8)^[13]

Simon seems to hold a twofold account of individuation: there isindividuation by the division of quantified matter through essence,which explains the individuation of material beings; and individuationby subsistence, which explains the individuation of immaterial beingssuch as celestial bodies, the intelligences, and the human intellect.Simon undoubtedly introduces his twofold account to circumvent theAverroistic solution to the question of the individuation of superiorbeings via the introduction of spiritual matter.

5.2 Essence and Existence

In question 20 of his commentary on Aristotle’sCategories, Simon argues that substances are either compoundor simple. In addition, all created substances are a composition ofessence and existence. Compound substances are also composed of matterand form. The reason why all created substances are composed ofessence and existence is that existence is not part of their essence,but given to them extrinsically by the first being. Thus, Simonstrongly suggests that he is committed to a real distinction betweenessence and existence.

However, as John Longeway pointed out in an earlier version of thisentry, Simon changes his mind about this. This change is evident inquestion 49 of his second commentary onPosterior Analytics,where he addressed the question of whether existence is somethingadded to the essence. Here, Simon objects to Aquinas’s claimthat existence is something added to the essence with the followingargument:

1. If added existence is something real, then it is actual.
2. So, it is either a first or a second actuality.
3. Not a first, because a first actuality is not different from theessence.
4. Not a second, because a second actuality is an operation thatpresupposes actual existence.
5. Moreover, it cannot be a third actuality, because this iscontrary to Aristotelian doctrine (furthermore, it would lead to aninfinite regress, as Radulphus Brito would point out).
6. Therefore, added existence is not something real. (Longeway 2000:7–8)

Even so, Simon still holds that existence is something added tocreated beings. But how, if not as something real? Since we canunderstand what a thing is without considering its possible modes ofexistence (i.e., actual, mental etc.), it seems that there is indeed adistinction between essence and existence (cf. Longeway 2000: 9). So,the distinction is either notional or real. It is not real, as wasshown with the argument above. Therefore, the distinction must benotional: since the definition of an essence does not includeexistence at all, existence must be a notion added to the essentialdefinition, a notion that refers to the relation of a substance to itscause (cf. Longeway 2000: 10–11). Hence, we can think of asubstance as some kind of thing (e.g., a man) according to its essence(esse essentiae), but we can also think of it as somethingthat exists in a causally ordered reality, according to its being inan effect (esse in effectu) (cf. Longeway 2000: 13).

5.3 Predication of Being

Finally, in question 27 of his commentary on theCategories,Simon straightforwardly opts for the analogy of the predication ofbeing across the ten Aristotelian categories. Being is not univocallypredicated as the genus of the categories because it is not univocallypredicated of substance and accident. In fact, accidents do not havebeing without qualification because they only have being in relationto substances, and so their being depends on the being of substances.But being is not purely equivocal with respect to substance andaccident either, because accidents have being in a certain respectthanks to their relation to substances. Being, then, is analogous tosubstance and accident: it is primarily predicated of substances andsecondarily predicated of accidents.

Bibliography

Primary Literature (edited)

• Ebbesen, Sten, 2013, “Simon of Faversham,Quaestionessuper librum De somno et vigilia. An Edition”,Cahiersde l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin (henceforthCIMAGL) 82: 91–145. <available online>
• Longeway, John Lee, 1977, “Simon of Faversham’sQuestions on thePosterior Analytics: A Thirteenth-CenturyView of Science”, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.[Dissertation Abstracts International, 38(7):4211–A.]
• Ottaviano, Carmelo, 1930, “LeQuaestiones super libroPraedicamentorum di Simone di Faversham”,Atti dellaReale Accademia Nazionale die Lincei, serie 6, Memorie dellaClasse di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche, 3:257–351.
• Simon of Faversham, [SF-OL] 1957,Magistri Simonis Anglicisive de Faverisham Opera Omnia. Vol. 1:Opera logica,
  (1)Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii
  (2)Quaestiones super libro Praedicamentorum
  (3)Quaestiones super libro Perihermeneias
  edited by Pasquale Mazarella, Pubblicazioni dell’Institutouniversitario di magistero di Catania, serie filosofica, testicritici, 1, Padua: Cedam.
• –––, 1984,Quaestiones super libroElenchorum, edited by Sten Ebbesen, Thomas Izbicki, JohnLongeway, Francesco del Punta, Eileen Serene, and Eleonore Stump,Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
• Yokoyama, Tetsuo, 1969, “Simon of Faversham’sSophisma: Universale est intentio”,MediaevalStudies, 31: 1–14.

Secondary Literature

• Christensen, Michael S., 2015, “Simon of FavershamQuaestiones super De motu animalium. A partial edition anddoctrinal study”,CIMAGL, 84: 93–128. <available online>
• Clerke, Agnes Mary, 1897, “Simon of Faversham”,Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 52: 263.
• Corbini, Amos, 2006,La teoria della scienza nel XIII secolo.I commenti agli “Analitici secondi”, Firenze:Edizioni del Galluzzo.
• De Rijk, L.M., 1968, “On the Genuine Text of Peter ofSpain’sSummule Logicales. II: Simon of Faversham (d.1306) as a Commentator of the Tracts I–V of theSummule”,Vivarium, 6: 69–101.doi:10.1163/156853468X00077
• Donati, Silvia, 1991, “Per lo studio dei commenti allaFisica del XIII secolo. I: Commenti di probabile origine inglese deglianni 1250–1270 ca.”,Documenti e Studi sullatradizione filosofica medievale, 2(2): 361–441.
• –––, 2003, “La discussionesull’unità del concetto di ente nella tradizione dicommento della ‘Fisica’: commenti parigini degli anni1270–1315”, inDie Logik des Transzendentalen.Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65, Berlin/NY:Geburtstag, 60–139.
• Ebbesen, Sten, 1977, “Can Equivocation beEliminated?”,Studia Mediewistyczne, 18:103–24.
• –––, 1980a, “GerontobiologiensGrundproblemer”,Museum Tusculanum, 40–43:269–88. (Contains extracts from Simon’squaestiones onDe longitudine et brevitatevitae.)
• –––, 1980b, “Is ‘Caniscurrit’ Ungrammatical? Grammar inElenchiCommentaries”,Historiographia Linguistica, 7:53–68. doi:10.1075/hl.7.1-2.06ebb
• –––, 1986, “Termini accidentales concreti.Texts from the Late 13^th Century”,CIMAGL,53: 139–49. <available online>
• –––, 1987, “Talking about what is no more.Texts by Peter of Cornwall(?), Richard of Clive, Simon of Favershamand Radulphus Brito”,CIMAGL, 55: 158–60. <available online>
• –––, 2010, “ThePrior Analyticsin the Latin West: 12th–13th Centuries”,Vivarium, 48(1/2): 96–133.doi:10.1163/156853410X489736
• Emamzadah, Parwana and Ana María Mora-Márquez, 2023,“Le syllogisme sophistique selon Simon de Faversham et Raoul leBreton: entre formalisme et pragmatique,”Archivesd’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du MoyenÂge, 90: 113–134.
• Glorieux, Palémon, 1923–1950, “Simon deFaversham”,Dictionnaire de théologiecatholique, 14: 2119–20.
• Grabmann, Martin, 1933,Die Aristoteleskommentare des Simonvon Faversham: Handschriftliche Mitteilungen, Sitzungsberichteder Bayerischen Akademie des Wissenschaft, Philosophisch-historischeAbteilung, Jahrgang 1933, Heft 3, Munich: Verlag der BayerischenAkademie der Wissenschaften.
• Green-Pedersen, Niels Jørgen, 1973, “On theInterpretation of Aristotle’s Topics in the 13^thCentury”,CIMAGL, 9: 1–46. <available online>
• –––, 1985,The Tradition of the Topics inthe Middle Ages, Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
• Lewry, Osmund, 1979, “The Commentaries of Simon of Favershamand ms. Merton College 288”,Bulletin de philosophiemédiévale, 21: 73–80.doi:10.1484/J.BPM.3.244
• Little, A.G. and Franz Pelster, 1934,Oxford Theology andTheologians ca. A.D. 1289–1302, Oxford: ClarendonPress.
• Lohr, Charles H., 1973a, “Problems of Authorship concerningsome Medieval Aristotle Commentaries”,Bulletin dephilosophie médiévale, 15: 131–36.doi:10.1484/J.BPM.3.161
• –––, 1973b, “Medieval Latin AristotleCommentaries”,Traditio, 29: 93–197.doi:10.1017/S0362152900008989
• Longeway, John, 2000, “Simon of Faversham andesse ineffectu”, talk presented at the 35th International Congresson Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan,May 5, 2000. [available online]
• Marmo, Costantino, 1990, “Suspicio: A Key Word tothe Significance of Aristotle’sRhetoric inThirteenth-Century Scholasticism”,CIMAGL, 60:145–98. <available online>
• –––, 1994,Semiotica e linguaggio nellaScolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270–1330. La semiotica deimodisti, Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo.
• –––, 1995, “A Pragmatic Approach toLanguage in Modism”, in Sten Ebbesen (ed.),Sprachteorien inSpätantiken un Mittelalter, vol. 3 of P. Schmitter (ed.),Geschichte der Sprachteorie, Tübingen: Gunter NarrVerlag, 169–83.
• –––, 1999, “The Semantics of theModistae”, in Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman (eds),Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, Copenhagen: TheRoyal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 83–104.
• –––, 2010,La semiotica del XIII secolo trateologia e arti liberali, Milan: Bompiani.
• Mazarella, Pasquale, 1957, “Simone di Faversham”,Enciclopedia Filosofica, 4: 632–633.
• Mora-Márquez, Ana María, 2015,TheThirteenth-Century Notion of Signification: The Discussions and TheirOrigin and Development, Leiden: Brill.doi:10.1163/9789004300132
• –––, 2019, “The Dialectical Constructionof a Notion of Truth in Some 13th-Century Masters of Arts,”Medioevo, XLIV: 39–56.
• –––, 2021, “Thirteenth-CenturyAristotelian Logic: The Study of Scientific Method,”OxfordStudies in Medieval Philosophy, 9: 149–186.
• Murè, Dafne, 2013, “Suppositum between Logic andMetaphysics: Simon of Faversham and his Contemporaries(1270–1290),” inMedieval Supposition TheoryRevisited, E. P. Bos (ed.), Leiden-Boston: Brill,205–229.
• Novaes, Catarina Dutilh, and Stephen Read, 2008,“Insolubilia and the FallacySecundum quid etSimpliciter”,Vivarium, 46(2): 175–91.doi:10.1163/004275408X311258
• Novaes, Catarina Dutilh, 2008, “A Comparative Taxonomy ofMedieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences”,Historyand Philosophy of Logic, 29 (3): 261–277.
• Ottaviano, Carmelo, 1931, “Le opere di Simone di Faversham ela sua posizione nel problem degli universali”,Archivio diFilosofia, 1: 15–29.
• Pattin, A., 1955,De verhouding tussen zijn en wezenheid en detranscendentale relatie in de 2^e helft derxiii^eeeuw. Verhandelingen van de KoninklijkeVlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten vanBelgië; Klasse der Letteren, Verhandeling nr. 21. Brussels:Paleis der Academiën.
• Pickavé, Martin, 2008, “Simon of Faversham onAristotle’sCategories and thescientiapraedicamentorum”, inMedieval Commentaries onAristotle’s Categories, L.A. Newton (ed.), Leiden/Boston:Brill, 183–220.
• Pinborg, Jan, 1967,Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie imMittelalter, Münster, Aschendorff.
• –––, 1971a, “Bezeichnung in der Logik desXIII. Jahrhunderts”, in Albert Zimmermann (ed.),Albert derGrosse. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, Berlin–NewYork: De Gruyter, 238–81.
• –––, 1971b, “Simon of Faversham’sSophisma: Universale est Intentio: A SupplementaryNote”,Medieval Studies, 33: 360–65.
• –––, 1975, “Die Logik der Modistae”,Studia Mediewistyczne, 16: 39–97.
• Pini, Giorgio, 2002,Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: AnInterpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late ThirteenthCentury, Boston: Brill.
• –––, 2005, “Scotus’ RealistConception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late MedievalDebates”,Vivarium, 43(1): 63–110.doi:10.1163/1568534054068410
• Powicke, Frederick Maurice, 1925, “Master Simon ofFaversham”, inMélanges d’histoire du moyenâge offerts à M. Ferdinand Lot par ses amis et sesélèves, Paris: Champion, 649–58.
• Sharp, D., 1934, “Simonis de FaverishamQuaestionessuper tertium De anima”,Archives d’histoiredoctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 9:307–68.
• Tiné, Antonino, 1983,Il “Depredicabilibus” nel Commento ai Trattati I–IV di PietroIspano attribuito a Simone Anglice o di Faversham, Catania:Istituto dipartamentale di studi antichi e tardo-antichi.
• –––, 1990, “Simone di Faversham e lescienze”, inKnowledge and the Sciences in MedievalPhilosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress ofMedieval Philosophy (SIEPM), edited by Monika Asztalos, John E.Murdoch, and Ilkka Niiniluoto,Acta Philosophica Fennica, 48(2): 638–44.
• –––, 1996, “Simon of Faversham: Proemialla logica”, inAristotle in Britain during the MiddleAges.Proceedings of the SIEPM, April 1994, edited byJohn Marenbon, Turnhout: Brepols, 211–31.
• Vennebusch, Joachim, 1963,Ein anonymer Aristoteleskommentardes xiii.Jahrhunderts: Quaestiones in tres libros deAnima (Admont: Stiftsbibliothek, cod. lat. 367). Paderborn: F.Schöningh.
• –––, 1965. “DieQuaestiones in treslibros De anima des Simon von Faversham”,Archivfür Geschichte der Philosophie, 47: 20–39.
• Weijers, Olga and Monica Calma, 2012, “Simon ofFaversham”, inLe travail intellectuel à laFaculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca.1200–1500). VIII. Répertoire des noms commençantpar S–Z, Turnhout: Brepols, 99–111.
• Wolf, Friedrich Antonius, 1966,Die Intellektslehre des Simonvon Faversham nach seinem De-anima-Kommentaren,Inaugural-Dissertation. Bonn: Universität.
• Zimmermann, Albert, 1971,Verzeichnis Ungedruckter Kommentarezur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa1250–1350, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte desMittelalters, 8/9), Leiden/Cologne: E.J. Brill.

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Other Internet Resources

• Longeway, John, “Simon of Faversham,”StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/simon-faversham/>. [This was the previous entry on Simon of Faversham in theStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see theversion history.]
• Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin (CIMAGL)
• Faversham, Translations of many of the works of Simon of Faversham, by JohnLongeway (University of Wisconsin/Parkside).

Related Entries

Albert the Great [= Albertus Magnus] |Aquinas, Thomas |Aristotle, General Topics: logic |Giles of Rome |Henry of Ghent |Radulphus Brito |semiotics: medieval |Thomas of Erfurt

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation(Sweden) for their financial support.