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1. For more on Clarke’s theory of necessity, see Yenter 2014(265–266), Sangiacomo 2018, and Jorati 2021.

2. See Schliesser 2014 (44 & 48) for a more modest reading ofClarke’s argument. See Henry 2020 for an argument thatClarke’s views on this matter depart significantly fromNewton’s views.

3. See especially Obligations 179–180 of 1706 edition; sermonpreached Oct 11 1709; Whiston 1730, 146; Sermon CXXI, 2.38–39.See also Snobelen 2004 (275–284) and Wigelsworth 2009(58ff).

4. Clarke is not clear on what exactly it is about consciousness thatrequires unity (Rozemond 2003, 175–177). Officially,consciousness is a reflexive act in which I recognize my thoughts asmy own and is therefore prior to memory, although Clarke sometimeswrites “consciousness” when he seems to mean“memory” (Thiel 2011, 231).

5. Note that Clarke’s use of the term “apriori” is not that which has been standard since Kant. Theargument isa priori not primarily because it is availableindependent of experience, but because it argues from the nature ofthe cause to the nature of the effect; this is in contrast with theargumenta posteriori which works from the effects —e.g., the design of the world— to the cause — e.g., thedesigner.

6. There is disagreement about the structure of Clarke’s argumentand how much of it proceedsa priori. Ferguson (1976, 26)claims that “Clarke employs four arguments—the threetraditional ones, the cosmological, the ontological, the teleological,and a further argument from the nature of space and time.” Morefrequently, scholars see a single argument, all of which is called theargumenta priori. Although the reconstruction provided herefollows traditional usage in calling the entire argument “theargumenta priori,” only the first stage isapriori. Midway through, Clarke appeals to the existence ofintelligent beings, which is ana posteriori claim, and thisushers in the transition from the metaphysical to the moral attributesof God. For more on this, see Pfizenmaier 78–81.

7. Clarke does not explicitly acknowledge that “something alwayswas” is ambiguous between a stronger,de re reading anda weaker,de dicto reading. Because the stronger,dere claim (this particular thing has always existed) seemsunwarranted by the argument thus far and the next step of the argumentis to establish that there is a single independent being, the moreplausible and weakerde dicto claim (some thing or another,perhaps a succession of various things, has always existed) can beassumed. See also Mary Shepherd’s assertion that Clarke (andLocke) “assumed that which was in question; namely, that everyexistence must have a cause” (Shepherd 1824, 36–37).

8. See especially Prop. 25 (W 4.150); Prop. 27 (W 4.151); and Prop. 34(“The Son, whatever his metaphysical essence of substance be,and whatever divine greatness and dignity is ascribed to him inscripture; yet in this he is evidently subordinate to the Father, thathe derives his being, attributes, and powers, from the Father, and theFather nothing from him”; 4.155). To the Father alone areascribed “independence and supreme authority” (Proposition27; 4.151). Every other attribute and power that can be ascribed tothe Father can also be ascribed to the Son, “but the titlesascribed to the Son, must always carry along with them the idea ofbeing communicated or derived” (4.153).

9. Although his Boyle lectures went through ten editions in thirtyyears, Dahm (1970, 176) finds only one translation during that time,into French.