[Editor’s Note: The following entry replaces and includesmaterial from the former entry titledBradley’ Moral and Political Philosophy.]

F.H. Bradley’s moral philosophy remains a source for debatesamong the historians of philosophy; its rich—andunder-researched—material has much to offer not only to thehistory of philosophy but also to contemporary normative ethics andmeta-ethics (especially moral psychology). Luckily, after a period ofneglect, there is a revival of interest in Bradley’s ethics. Newattempts are made to reconstruct and reinterpret his ideas, givingthem a well-deserved place within the current debates.

As a moral philosopher, Bradley is mostly interested in the questionabout good personality. The problem of the right action does not havea central role in his works (even though it is possible to reconstructa theory of moral action based on his writings). He asksWhat sortof person am I to become? rather thanWhat should I do?The type of answer that Bradley gives to this question with his theoryof self-realization indicates that he is developing a version ofnon-instrumental ethical idealism, according to which the goal ofmoral life is the realization of the moral ideal for its own sake.Ethical Studies is mainly concerned with coming to understandmoral agency and personhood, and this, among other things, entailslaying bare the structure of volitional choice.

The best source on Bradley’s ethics isEthical Studies,the philosopher’s first major book. The book was first publishedin 1876, followed by a second edition with Bradley’s commentsfor revision in 1927. (All references in this article are to the 1962paperback edition with R. Wollheim’s introduction). Here, hediscusses a wide range of topics relevant to moral philosophy(including, the freedom of will, justification of morality, moralduties, obligation). But by far the major contribution of this book isin moral psychology with its discussion of moral selfhood (cf. Keene1970), moral ideals, and moral motivation. The book is also valuablefor its critical analysis of the key claims of consequentialism,hedonism, Kantianism, and Hegelianism. Many classic arguments againstthese theories originate fromEthical Studies.

Bradley’s minor works in psychology offer additional insightsinto his approach to ethics. As D. Crossley (1989b: 59) notes, thesearticles explore in detail concepts and ideas which are only brieflyintroduced in the book. Most interesting for ethicists is the reprintof Bradley’s articles titledCollected Essays (1935)and especially the articles: “On Pleasure, Pain, Desire, andVolition” (1888); “The Definition of Will(I–III)” (1902–04, relevant to the discussion ofmotivation, desire, conation, wish, needs, pleasure, and pain);“Some Remarks on Conation” (1901, desire and conation);“Can a Man Sin against Knowledge” (1884, the nature ofmoral judgment); “On the Treatment of Sexual Detail inLiterature” (desire); “On Mental Conflict andImputation” (1902, desire and personal identity).TheCollected Works of F.H. Bradley (1999) is a treasure trove ofpreviously unpublished works by Bradley, including moral psychologyand normative ethics: “Notes towardsEthical Studies[c. 1874–1875]” (Vol. I); “On Morality [1877 or1878]” (Vol. I); “MS BK Z: Chiefly on Psychological Topics[c. 1893–1902]” (Vol. II); “MS BK W: The FinalCommonplace Book [1915–1924]” (Vol. III). Another sourceis “XXV. Goodness” of “Appearance and Reality”and it is of primary interest to those who study the evolution ofBradley’s views as well as the way the ethics of later Bradleyfits in the context of his metaphysics.

• 1. Background and Influences
• 2. “My Station and Its Duties”
• 3. Moral Self as a Precondition for Moral Responsibility
• 4. Moral Relevance of Desires
• 5. Integrity
• 6. Moral Ideal
• 7. Moral Development
• 8. The Limits of Morality
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
  • Secondary Literature
  • Bibliographical Material
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Background and Influences

The writings of the Oxford Idealists, F. H. Bradley and his teacher T.H. Green, reflect the influence of Kant and Hegel on English moralphilosophy in the latter part of the nineteenth century. To the extentthat either draws on other sources it is to Aristotle that they turnrather than to British moral philosophers such as Butler, Hume orReid. Despite the undeniable influence of Aristotle on Bradley’sthought in general, the extent to which Aristotle’s ethics hasinfluenced Bradley’s moral philosophy is open for debate. Forexample, virtue never became for him a central topic. We won’tfind in hisEthical Studies an account of virtue or a theoryexplaining which specific character traits count as virtue.Aristotle’s influence is apparent, however, from the fact thatBradley, alongside Green (1883), offers a type of perfectionistaccount of morality that is articulated in terms of the concept ofself-realization (Stern 2017; Hurka 1993; Crossley 1977). One evidenceof that is Bradley’s claim that all moral duties areself-regarding duties; another is his tendency to connect moralprogress with the realization of the truth of human nature. Giventhis, Bradley’s approach falls under the category of what T.Hurka (1993), callsperfectionism in the narrow sense whichsees perfection as excellence defined by human nature.

Bradley’s philosophy is commonly categorized as idealism.However, even though it is often clear what this term refers to inmetaphysics (most often, either to an ontological claim that realityis mind-dependent or an epistemological claim that our knowledge ofthe world is determined by the structure of the mind itself), it isless clear what the termidealism refers to in ethics. Ifidealism is used in the sense of theidealist ethics (Mander2016, 2013)—as a means to describe a set of views commonlyshared by philosophers who consider themselves metaphysicalidealists—then, despite the fact that Bradley certainly is ametaphysical idealist (it is less certain, however, which of the twoabove-mentioned metaphysical claims he accepts), to say that hedevelops an idealist ethics raises more questions than answers, sincehis moral views diverge greatly from those of other metaphysicalidealists.

Metaphysical idealists are preoccupied with the nature of ideas, i.e.,cognitive constructs that are either the representations of the worldor the internal structures of the mind itself that precede andprecondition any experience and knowledge of the world.Bradley’s idealism, on the other hand, is focused on a differentconcept altogether:ideals, i.e., normative concepts thatexpress standards of perfection. Given the central role of ideals inBradley’s ethics, it makes sense to tag his moral theory asethical idealism. Long after Bradley, one version of ethicalidealism was developed by N. Rescher (1987) who proposed a kind ofinstrumental ethical idealism. Its central thesis is thatideals, despite being unrealistic and unachievable, have theinstrumental value of motivating agents to strive for higher, moreambitious goals and achieve more than they otherwise would. Incontrast to Rescher, for Bradley, the moral ideal is the goal initself. Hence, we can tag his version of ethical idealism asnon-instrumental ethical idealism.

Much of Bradley’s attention inEthical Studies wastaken up with critical analyses of utilitarianism—the dominantethical theory of the day—and the hedonism to which it waswedded, whether that view advanced the primacy of pleasure either inthe form of a psychological account of motivation or as the felt statethat right actions aim at maximizing. Indeed, Bradley not only had todispense with the claims of the older utilitarians, such as Benthamand Mill (cf., e.g., Crossley 2000; MacNiven 1984), but also had toface the new defense of utilitarianism advanced by Henry Sidgwick, whopublished hisThe Methods of Ethics (1874) virtuallysimultaneously with Bradley’sEthical Studies (1876).For a greater part of the twentieth century Bradley’s criticalattacks on hedonism and utilitarianism were considered to be the mainsubject of his book. Despite the central role of Bradley’sarguments in the debate against utilitarianism and hedonism,over-emphasizing their role in the structure of the book led many tooverlook the main topic ofEthical Studies, i.e., moralself-realization and an entire set of relevant topics, such as themoral self and moral action (incl., moral responsibility andmotivation).

In his opposition to utilitarianism, Bradley is often seen as aneo-Hegelian. Even though it is true to a certain extent that Bradleywas inspired by Hegel, it is less obvious to what extent he had beeninfluenced by Hegel’s ethics or his dialectic method. It isworth noting, however, that Bradley himself denied being a Hegelian oremploying Hegelian methodology in any systematic way. The assumptionthat Bradley uses Hegelian dialectic as the main argumentative methodinEthical Studies most likely originates from R.Wollheim’s introduction to the second edition of the book andhas persisted ever since. Wollheim himself does not prove his claim,and as a result it is difficult to know with certainty what he had inmind. The reason behind this interpretation of Bradley’s methodis the desire to clear Bradley from the accusation of traditionalismand show thatEthical Studies must be read beyond Essay V“My Station and Its Duties”. The identification ofBradley’s ethics with the theory of my station and its dutiesbecame a commonplace after Sidgwick’s review (1876) and R.Ross’ edition ofEthical Studies, which omitted EssaysI, VI, and VII (Bradley 1951). The good that Wollheim’s claimdoes is that it motivates the reader not to stop at Essay V, and toexpect that there is more to Bradley’s ethics than thediscussion of “my station and its duties”. The downside ofWollheim’s claim, however, is that it is too far-fetched and itblinds the reader to the main topics ofEthical Studies, itskey message, and keeps her confused as to the relation of its variousarguments as well as to the role of the final chapter, “IdealMorality”. As a result, there is a risk for the reader tooveremphasize the role of social morality (cf., e.g., Keene 2009) inBradley’s ethics and misattribute some of his centralarguments.

2. “My Station and Its Duties”

Since Wollheim wrote his introduction toEthical Studies,scholars such as Candlish (1978) and Nicholson (1990) arguedextensively against a popular (but poorly substantiated) view (e.g.,Krook 1959, Stebbing 1948, Santayana 1933, Sabine 1915, Rashdall 1907)that Bradley’s moral philosophy is reducible to a theory of“my station and its duties”. As a result, the reductionistview is no longer accepted, and Bradley is no longer associated withconservativism and communitarianism. However, the perception ofBradley’s ethics is not fully free from the Hegelian spell, andthere is still a lot of confusion concerning Bradley’s view onthemoral significance of compliance with social demands,justified by custom and tradition—when this is understood as anelement of “my station and its duties” theory. Thisconfusion is deeply rooted in the way the structure ofEthicalStudies is interpreted, what role Essay VI “The IdealMorality” is given in the overall flow of the book’sargument and how it is positioned relative to Essay V “MyStation and its Duties”.

Until recently, the predominant view among historians of philosophywas that

[t]he concept of “My Station and its Duties” is the coreof Bradley’s moral theory. The last two essays … aredevoted to further elaboration of this notion…. (Warnock 1960:12)

This results in something that can be referred to an“add-on” view, according to which the “my stationand its duties” theory, after acknowledgment of its limitations,ismostly accepted by Bradley withsome correctionsoradditions that are described in Essay VI (cf., e.g.,Wollheim 1969: 246–47; Candlish 1978: 163–4; Nicholson1990: 33–5; Mander 2011: 190–1). As a result, the conceptsof the ideal morality and the moral ideal are given lesser role in theoverall structure of the book, seen as a supplement to socialrequirements or as something to fall back onto, if the social normsturn out to be corrupt. This interpretation of Bradley is beingchallenged. For example, Babushkina (2019) argues that this“add-on” view of Bradley’s theory of Ideal Morality,is problematic, as it largely underplays the seriousness of theobjections that Bradley puts forth against the Hegelian “theoryof my station and its duties” in Essays V and VI. But evenputting this aside, were we to accept the “add-on”interpretation, it is still unclear how a supplementation of this sortcan make the theory of “my station and its duties”plausible asa moral theory. It is not surprising then, thatwhen accepting such reading ofEthical Studies, some scholarsdiscard Bradley’s moral theory altogether (Brink 2003; Banchetti1992; Bell 1984; Norman 1983; Daly 1963).

One reason for the confusion around the concept of “my stationand its duties” is the multiplicity of the meanings attached tothis expression inEthical Studies and the obscurity ofBradley’s style of writing. As Babushkina (2019) point out, thepopular “add-on” interpretation fails to take into accountthe distinction between “my station and its duties” as

1. a Hegel’s normative thesis (connected to the concept ofSittlichkeit) described and criticized in Essay V;
2. a related concept of positional duties or social commands (cf.Stern 2013), i.e., tasks that we have due to occupying a certainposition/role;
3. the revised “my station and its duties” thesis thatBradley accepts, according to which our moral obligations may coincidewith (but are not reducible to) our positional duties, where theobligation is constituted by what others have a reason to expect fromus from an ideal point of view (Essay VI).

Bradley does not explicitly define these three meanings of “mystation and its duties”, but the difference is clear from thecontext and flow of the argument throughoutEthical Studies.Acknowledging the difference between the concept of “my stationand its duties” in Essay V and VI reveals that far fromaccepting (with some corrections and supplements) the Hegelian theoryof Sittlichkeit, Bradley rejects the reduction of moral properties tosocial, leading to the conclusion that what is socially required fromus constitutes our moral obligation only when this social requirementis justified from the ideal point of view (given, of course,Bradley’s understanding of the nature the ideal).

An alternative to the popular “add-on” view, shifts theinterpretative focus from Essay V and the theory of “my stationand its duties” with its reductionist view of morality towardsEssay VI and the identification of the moral with the ideal (JamesBradley 1996; MacNiven 1996). For example, D. Ilodigwe writes thatBradley introduces the moral ideal as a concept

in terms of which the legitimate demands of these varied regions ofthe self [empirical, transcendental, and social] are realised

and denies that

the realisation of the social self necessarily [is] the realisation ofthe ideal self, except the social self is in conformity with its idealself. (2004: 68)

From this standpoint, the Ideal Morality chapter is the central partof the argument of the book, which culminates debate about the natureof the moral self.

3. Moral Self as a Precondition for Moral Responsibility

The central role of the concept self-hood forEthical Studiesbecomes apparent already in the first essay of the book, where thesolution to the deadlock in the debate about the nature of moralresponsibility is suggested by Bradley through a revision of thestandard philosophical views on the moral self. This fact has beenfrequently overlooked in the secondary literature that tends to focuson social and political implications of Bradley’sEthicalStudies (cf., Brink 2003; MacIntyre 1966 [1998]; Bell 1984;Wright 1984; Hudson 1980; Copleston 1966; Milne 1962; Sidgwick 1954;Muirhead 1932). However, in the recent years, the centrality of thisconcept for moral theory has been more and more acknowledged byBradley scholars (notably, Mander 2016; Irwin 2009; Wilson 1999;Sprigge 1993; MacNiven 1987; Keene 1970), even though it is stillfrequent that commentators (cf. Wilson 1999; Stanley 1996; Nicholson1990; Sprigge 1984; Vander Veer 1970; Keene 1970; Wollheim 1969; Lewis1969) tend to not draw sufficient distinction between the moral andmetaphysical accounts of the self. The lack of conceptual clarity inthis respect may cause problems for the interpretation ofEthicalStudies. According to Bradley’s metaphysics—developedmuch later thanEthical Studies—the self is anappearance (which does not imply that it does not exist; for more onBradley’s metaphysical account of the self see Pugmire 1996; DeWitt 1984; Vander Veer 1970). Despite that, inEthicalStudies the self is treated as if it was real. The overallmessage of the book is that, even though the self is just a mentalconstruct, without it, ethics and moral life are impossible. Oneshould not merely superimpose the metaphysical views of later Bradleyon his earlier moral philosophy; an elaborate analysis that would makejustice to the original idea ofEthical Studies as well as toBradley’s complex ontology and epistemology ofAppearanceand Reality is required. One of the first to draw attention tothe apparent disagreement betweenEthical Studies andAppearance and Reality on the topic of the self was Wollheim(1969), who noted that if there is any context in Bradley’sphilosophy where we have to admit the existence of the self, it is hismoral philosophy. Wollheim, however, explains the apparentinconsistency between earlier and later Bradley not with reference tothe conceptual difference between the normative domain of ethics anddescriptive domain of metaphysics, but to the inherent contradictionin the metaphysical account of the self, thus, in the end, denying theuniqueness of ethics as a philosophical field of inquiry. This iscommon also to those researchers who ague for a naturalistic accountof the moral self inEthical Studies, either tracing it toHume and Hobbes (Basile 2003; Wilson 1999) or reducing it to a set ofhabits—both of which interpretations find their disproof in someplace inEthical Studies.

InEthical Studies, Bradley begins his discussion of moralityand the moral agent with an analysis of the ordinary person’sunderstanding of moral responsibility. The reason for thisstarting-point is revealed much later, when he argues that a moralagent begins with the development of self-consciousness. This, hesays, makes possible “imputation and responsibility, and herebegins the proper moral life of the self” (EthicalStudies, Essay VII [1962: 299]). If an action has any moralsignificance whatsoever then the person responsible (in the causalsense) can be held accountable (responsible in the normative sense).One could feel accountable, and with this goes a sense of liability tocensure or punishment. Being justifiably considered guilty and therebydeserving of censure or punishment requires the satisfaction of threeconditions: (a) the person held accountable must be the same person asthe one who did the act, (b) the act must have been thatperson’s, and (c) she must have had some understanding of themoral quality of the act. While not in a position to provide aphilosophical opinion on questions concerning personal identity orwhat constitutes an action, the ordinary person neverthelessrecognizes cases in which an accused person was “nothimself” or “did not mean to do it” or acted underduress, and sees these as mitigating circumstances. In sum, theordinary person’s view, as Bradley presents it, is Aristotelian:for the purposes of determining moral responsibility an act has to bethe agent’s in that its origin (arche) lies with or inthe agent in some sense—and the agent must not be acting undercoercion or in a state of non-culpable ignorance. These lastconditions reflect the common view that one cannot, in justice, holdsomeone accountable unless she had a measure of control over thesituation and thereby could be viewed as acting on her own freewill.

If we turn to philosophical theories, we find differing opinions aboutwhether we enjoy this sort of freedom from external influences, andBradley is interested in how—what he calls—the theories ofDeterminism and Indeterminism differ from the views of the ordinarypeople; not because he thinks the ordinary people will always becorrect about such matters—indeed, they likely have not thoughtmuch about such things—but because examining what the ordinarypeople say about moral matters reveals the deep structures of asociety’s moral thinking as that is embedded in its language andsocial institutions (or, in more modern terms, our moralintuitions).

Concerning the free will debate, our moral intuition is at odds withboth theories. Contrary to determinism, our intuition tells us that wecan and often do initiate actions—and on this point Bradleyportrays the ordinary person as accepting the thesis now called“agent causality”. What is omitted by the determinists areexplanations of behavior which appeal to the reasons of the agent,thereby ignoring Aristotle’s notion of final causality, orpurposely reducing it to efficient causality. Thus, denying theability of the agent to act upon reasons, the determinist is denyingthe autonomous nature of the moral self. The problem withindeterminism, on the other hand, is its claim thatnothing atall determines our actions. This conflicts with our belief thatit often is possible (and sometimes even morally required to be able)to predict what someone will do, because she has formed a certainmoral character and can be counted on to act a certain way when facedwith moral questions. In the end, Bradley shows that both theoriescannot make sense of responsibility and moral life because—eventhough for different reasons—they fail to account for theconcepts of the moral self. This sets up the stage for the rest of thebook which will be occupied predominantly with the task of accountingfor this concept. The most important ethical question, from this pointof view, is about the kind of self that one should realize in hermoral life; it is this question that allows Bradley to introduce hismost crucial concept—that of moral life asself-realization, based on the idea of the moral self as acreative, goal-oriented self-assertive process.

Self-realization is a complex term which, in the boarder sense, can beseen as an attempt to translate the Kantian universalizabilityprinciple into the concrete reality of a person’s life. Theuniversalizability principle says that if a moral obligation appliesto me as a moral agent, then it applies to any other moral agent inthe same manner, or as Bradley puts it:

That does not mean that everybody does or has to do what I do, but itmeans that, if they were I, they must do as I have to do, or else beimmoral. (Ethical Studies, Essay VI [1962: 230])

As a principle guiding actions, it presupposes the distinction betweenthe moral self and my moral self: when the agent reflects upon herbeliefs, desires, commitments, and actions from the moral point ofview, she is reflecting upon her moral self. It is the object andsubject of moral evaluation; the bearer of responsibility and objectof blame and praise. My moral self is subject to change: with time, Imay become a better or worse person than I am now. My moral self isnot the same as your moral self, because the specific details of ourlives and circumstances, in which we make decisions and act, aredifferent. However, the reasons for which my moral self and your moralself can be both seen as moral selves are the same. The moral self isthe other side of the universalizability principle—that“me” to which any moral obligation applies to, regardlessof any specific circumstances of one’s life. In Bradley’sown words:

I call my act the realization of the universal will because anotherman in my case … must have acted as I did and would have beencommanded to do so. (“Miscellaneous Notes [c.1874–5]”, Bradley 1999: Vol. 1, p. 244)

And further:

The moral consciousness thus assumes its identity in all men.[…] The superior will … commands individual acts whichare ends without distinction of person if “person” meansthe private self. (“Miscellaneous Notes [c.1874–5]”, Bradley 1999: Vol.1, p. 245).

As such, the moral self is void of content. It is an abstractprinciple. Bradley’s concept of self-realization is, in a sense,a response to the question of how this abstract principle getsspecified and becomes a moral life of a concrete individual: how it ispossible for anyone to actually have amoral (as opposed toempirical) self. The answer lies in the link between our actions andwhat we are: as moral agents we cannot separate ourselves from how weact. As MacNiven says: “in acting … we createourselves” (MacNiven 1987: 50). Bradley pays a lot of attentionto the psychological machinery of moral action (including desires,volition, conation, beliefs) with the goal of explaining this link,and thus explaining how we create ourselves as moral agents throughactions. Sprigge interprets self-realization through another complexand controversial term of a concrete-universal:

In hisEthical Studies Bradley takes his departure from thepresumed fact that every individual is struggling for some kind ofself realization, and that this is the basic driving force of theattempt to live a morally good life. Such a life is not a means toself realization, but one main form of self-realization. By selfrealization Bradley seems to mean the giving some sort of overallcoherent pattern or structure to your life in which you can findsatisfaction, and such that all the details of your life are enjoyedas particular elements in that total pattern. One could perhaps saythat it is life in the light of an accurate self image with which onecan be satisfied. (Sprigge 1988: 117)

Representing moral self as a concrete-universal is conveying the ideaof goal-orientedness and structuring of internal states throughoutone’s life. This idea is encapsulated by the termpersonalprojects, which seems to be better situated for theinterpretation of Bradley’s idea of moral life asself-realization, also because it allows translating the idealistconcept of a concrete-universal into the language of present daydebates in moral philosophy. Projects are major pursuits that have keyrole in organizing and structuring an agent’s conduct over along period of time: projects “give shape and content”,“guide our lives” (Betzler 2013), and essentiallycontribute to its meaningfulness. Careers, hobbies, personalrelationships—all such endeavors that are devoted to asignificant cause and require a body of actions to pursue it, areexamples of personal projects. Bradley’s description of morallife is well-suited for such account of personal projects: my moralself is essentially a life-long endeavor that has two dimensions. Theone is reflective and normative dimension, where the agent forms anidea of her ultimate moral end; the causes she is to realize and whatis required to achieve them. This is a continuous process ofreflection upon her beliefs, desires, and actions, as well as hersocial roles and connections to others—the process that neverstops throughout one’s life. Though this process, the agent isconstantly updating and concretizing the ideal view of herself,or—in Bradley’s terms—her ideal self. The otherdimension is the practical one, i.e., the dimension of action.Identifying with her ideal self, the moral agent, is able to adjusther psychological states (beliefs and desires), as well as to alignher commitments, decisions, and actions. When the agent acts inaccordance with her view of what she ought to be, from the ideal pointof view, she is realizing herself and becoming her true self.

4. Moral Relevance of Desires

For Bradley, what drives self-realization are our desires, and throughthem, our volition. The central role of desire and other emotivestates for self-realization has been acknowledged by such Bradleyscholars as MacNiven (1987), Crossley (1989b), and Mander (2016,2011). MacNiven shows that Bradley conceptualizes desire as a separatestate of mind, distinct from pain and pleasure. Crossley discussesdesire mostly in the context of the concepts of feeling and immediacy;while Mander connects Bradley’s account to a more generalidealist views on desire. Bradley’s concept of will is, however,less discussed in the secondary literature, but it is important tonote that Bradley understands will not as a special faculty but as anidea that is being actualized. In Bradley’s own words, it is“the self-realization of an idea with which the self isidentified” (1902b [CE II.476]) or, to put plainly, will is whatyou are ready to do. This account of will, places special importanceon desire and emotive states through which ideas find their ways intoan agent’s decisions and actions.

Well before E. Anscombe (1957), Bradley described the differencebetween desire and belief via the metaphor of the “direction offit” (Mander 2016; Brink 2003). In theoretical pursuit, Bradleysays, our goal is to understand the object; we want neither to removenor alter the world of sensuous fact, but we want to get at the truthof it. The whole of science takes it for granted that the“not-ourself” is really intelligible; it stands and fallswith this assumption. So long as our theory strikes on the mind asstrange and alien, so long do we say we have not found truth; we feelthe impulse to go beyond, we alter and alter our views, till we seethem as a consistent whole. But when it comes to action, our aim isnot, leaving the given as it is, to find the truth of it; but“in practice … we want to force the sensuous fact tocorrespond to the truth of ourselves” (Ethical Studies,Essay II [1962: 73])

This presents two very different kinds of intentional mental states.In the case of empirical knowledge, we have a subject in thepsychological state of believing that something is true of the world;her belief has a propositional object as itscontent asBradley would call it. Since the goal is to correctly understand theworld, the subject is committed to altering her belief set until itaccurately represents the external physical world. By contrast, when Idesire to become a better person I must first have represented theself or person I wish to be under some description. This sort ofmental state also has a propositional object; e.g., in the statement,“I wish thatI were a more patient person” theitalicized proposition following the “that” is the objectof the mental state we call wishing. What we have here, inBradley’s terminology is anideal object which is thecontent of the wish. This is ideal because it is a mentalrepresentation of a state of affairs that does not exist at the pointthe wish is made.

An ideal object can represent a possible different state of the personcontemplating it, which presupposes, in addition to the ability torepresent possible future states, a degree of self-awareness. Anexample of this sort of self-consciousness is found in the addict whomay be very aware of how his desires are ruining his life. Once thissort of self-reflective awareness is achieved it is then possible tothink of changing things. In Bradley’s language this addict haspictured a better self that he might be, and if he comes to identifyhis satisfaction with realizing this better self there is apossibility of change. This situation sets up a conflict between theactual person the addict now is and the represented better person hewishes to be and this generates disharmony or what Bradley often callsa “felt contradiction”. The pain of this conflict movesthe individual toward resolving it. It is important to note that theaddict cannot move forward without having a determinate ideal object,a definite conception of the ideal self being represented. Withoutthis, identifying his satisfaction with realizing that state would beimpossible. Bradley writes:

The essence of desire for an object would thus be the feeling of ouraffirmation in the idea of something not ourself, felt against thefeeling of ourself as, without the object, void and negated ; and itis the tension of this relation which produces motion. (EthicalStudies, Essay II [1962: 68]; compare to Bradley 1888:17–18)

The introduction of the psychological tension into the explanation ofdesire could give the impression that Bradley is subscribing to thedispositional account of desire (cf., e.g., MacNiven 1987), accordingto which desire is a disposition to action, i.e., “trying toget” something or a “movement towards a thing”(Anscombe 1957). What is more likely, however, is that the referenceto the feeling of tension is a way to describe the emotive componentin the motivation by ideas. This fits well Bradley seeminglyparadoxical claim that “nothing is desired except that which isidentified with ourselves, and we can aim at nothing, except so far aswe aim at ourselves in it” (Ethical Studies, Essay II[1962: 68]). This quote should not be understood as a trivialnarcissism or an egoistic claim that I only desire the state of affairwhich is in my interests. Neither should this quote should beunderstood as a claim that the object of desire is always a belief.Bradley rejects such view because it can be applied to the mentalstates that are not, in fact, objects of desire—thus this viewfails account for desires as distinct mental states: “All myends are my thoughts, but all my thoughts are not my ends”(Ethical Studies, Essay II [1962: 67]). As Bradley notes, thefact that I can see a locomotive starting to move off the station doesnot imply that I desire the train to move.

What seems to be a most likely explanation of what Bradley had in mindwhen claiming that self is the only object of desire is expressed byanother idealist, J. H. Muirhead. He wrote that the propositionalcontent of desire contains a predicate of the desired self:

[I]t is indifferent whether we say […] I desire that object, orI desire myself to be in possession of that object. (Muirhead 1892:52)

In the same manner, Bradley aims to say that desire is always a desirefor a certain (future) state of myself; more broadly, theagent’s desires represent her ideal of her self. The claim thatthe self is the only thing she is able to desire, suggests that alldesires are somehow connected to her personal aspirations andcommitments. It is worth noting that such interpretation does notexclude other-regarding desires, i.e., desires for the well-being ofother people. Other-regarding desires can also be a part of personalcommitments, as long as one can explicate a connection between theobject of desire and the future state of the agent’s self. IfSally desires for her children’s well being, this may mean, forexample, that she aspires to be a happy parent whose children are welloff in life.

Another helpful concept is J. S. Mackenzie’s idea of desire asthe expression of one’s “point of view”,representative of a person’s character (Mackenzie 1901).Mackenzie’s “point of view” resemblesBradley’s concept of the “whole of ends”(Ethical Studies, Essay II [1962: 70]) which Mander (2016)interprets in terms of “ideal desire-sets”—the unityof life goals that personal projects provide. This implies a strongconnection between the object of desire and the desirer’s lifeprojects—or, as W. Mander puts it: when desiring an object

our very identity becomes bound up with it […] making itsrealization a realization of our own self. Our identity lies in therealization of our goals. (Mander 2011: 185)

To put it otherwise, desires are the driving force behindself-realization: the only thing we aim at in acting is to realizeourselves—or, better, the structure of practical reasoning andthe facts of moral psychology make it impossible that we could aim atanything else. This means that our choices and actions constitute whatwe are, and they do so by revealing what we identify with. You cannotescape self-realization, but you can choose and control what personyou will become as a result.

With this Bradley puts forward an interesting alternative to thedispositional account of desire, namely, a view that desire is theidentification of the self with the object. One aspect of thisidentification can be explained with the help of a narrative view ofdesire, according to which desire is essentially a story that theagent tells herself about the attractive properties of the object andas such, it reveals what an agent considers to be valuable (Airaksinen2012). Bradley calls the realized desire is an “utterance”of the self, or further says that the self feels“asserted” and “affirmed” in the object ofdesire (Ethical Studies, Essays I & II [1962: 33, 35,68]). In other words, desires that have led to actions reflect theagent’s value preferences and as such can be seen as narrativesabout the characteristics that the agents finds attractive. Thepsychological tension, which Bradley describes as a part of desire, isthen the agent’s feeling of contradiction between her idea ofher own future state, where she is has already become qualified inthis attractive way, and the her idea that her current state is notthus qualified. In a sense, the object of desire stands for the ideaof something that agents considers to be valuable, making the desireitself stand for acceptance of such value for the agent.

5. Integrity

Volitional choice therefore has a built-in normative feature in theform of an idea of a better state or self. But self-realization meansmore than this for ethical theory, for it purportedly represents theover-arching, ultimate goal of moral action, which entails some ideaof a perfect, ideal self that is being aimed at. But here is aproblem: how can anyone ensure that one is true to one’sideal?

Answering this is crucial for Bradley’s ethical theory not tofall victim to a criticism he made of Mill’s thesis about thequalities of pleasures (Utilitarianism, Chapter 2). Bradleyleveled a barrage of criticisms against any theory, utilitarian orotherwise, that imply that the moral moral self is the most satisfiedself and that satisfaction is the sign of being true to the moralideal. The central objection was that since pleasures are a“perishing series”, with each one passing away once it hasbeen experienced, it is not possible to accumulate a sum of pleasures,and since there are always more pleasures available than anyone hasexperienced, Mill’s moral goal of maximizing pleasant states wasmeaningless. But introducing the idea of qualitatively different kindsof pleasures that can be ranked suggests that perhaps the hedonistcan, after all, successfully articulate the self we should be aimingat. Perhaps the best self—the ideal moral self—is the onethat pursues the highest type of pleasure.

In evaluating this Bradley stresses the relative, comparative natureof terms such as “higher” and “lower”. Theopposite terms such as “superior” and“inferior” invite us to ask, “in respect of what isA higher than, or superior to,B?” Bradleyinsists that if I say Sally is superior to Joan I must first becomparing them in terms of some characteristic they share—forexample, both are beautiful—and, second, I am positioning themon a scale, which is conceived in terms of two determinate termini. Wecan perhaps see the point here by imagining what happens when, havingsaid Sally is superior to Joan, we are next asked to rank Mary. IfMary is judged superior (in beauty) to both, then she is being placedbetween Sally and someone who is right at the top of the scale.Mill’s account of superior pleasures fails because he neverexplains what the scale is that is being used and so never explainswhat the “highest” kind of pleasure is. Whether thiscriticism survives scrutiny does not matter all that much as far asthe fate of hedonism is concerned, for Bradley’s attack onqualitative hedonism is nothing short of thorough and he thinks thereis no convincing case Mill can make in support of it. For example,Mill’s competent judges cannot say that this ranking just“feels” right, for that is to confess that the talk ofranking is meaningless since one could have just as well“ranked” them differently. And the ranking cannot be madein terms of Mary’s beauty, because that is the quality thatmakes Mary a candidate for placement on the scale in the first place;which leads Bradley to hold, as did most of Mill’s critics, thatunless the whole business really is nonsense, there must somecriterion other than pleasure being used and so Mill has given uphedonism. These, and some other arguments are independent of the issueabout knowing the upper limit end of the scale of pleasures. Thatissue is important, however, because it marks a problemBradley’s theory of self-realization should also have to face:namely, that talk of a “superior” or “better”or “more perfect” moral person would require anexplication of the upper limit of the scale these evaluations areemploying. This seems a reasonable demand, for even apart from thequestion of whether judging something to be better than something elseentails knowing what is best, Bradley’s thesis is not just thatwe try to become better with each choice and action, but that we wantto be the best possible, to be perfect moral agents.

Fortunately, Bradley has an answer. InEthical StudiesBradley tells us that as moral agents we should avoid “the lifeof an oyster” and that we should look to produce a self that isa concrete-universal whole in which all is related so as to render ita system rather than a mere collection of random acts andcharacteristics. In other words, this means two things. First,self-realization is the matter of a meaningful life, that is directedto a cause/s. Second, such causes—which for simplicity’ssake can be understood as commitments—should, in the end, form anon-contradictory narrative about ourselves. Aligning our desires andactions with these commitments is a matter of integrity. A life of amorally good person is that a perfect unity of“homogeneity” and “specification” (EthicalStudies, Essay II [1962: 74])—homogeneity in the sense ofeach desire should be directed to something in some way fulfills acommitment; specification in the sense of the commitment taking theshape of an action in the world.

In a sense, in most cases there is such a unifying narrative in a lifeof a person. To the extent that people consider the consequences oftheir actions they demonstrate that they do not see their actions asdisconnected from other things they have done and might do, and theysubordinate some ends to wider goals. That is, ordinary people notonly display a degree of prudence in making choices but also recognizethat the value of some actions is that they are means to moreimportant goals. In fact, Bradley claims that most people act withsome “ideal of life”, or some idea of what would make themperfectly happy, however vaguely expressed, and this orders theirlives, governing their choices and actions. In a word, normal lives ofmature adults are at least relatively systematic. Moreover, if aperson has become habituated to act in certain ways (i.e., hasdeveloped a disposition to act thus and so), then her actions willtend to be relatively consistent. In such cases, says Bradley, we aredealing with a “standing will” and it explains why thosewho know someone well can predict what this person will do with aconsiderable degree of certainty and why that person feels pleasedthat others know she can be counted on to act appropriately. Standingdesires are opposed to occurring desires (Ethical Studies,Essay VII [1962: 283]). The latter is an appetite, and it is atemporary identification of the self with an object, which appearsonly in the presence of the object. The former is a “relativelypermanent” identification with the object which is presentregardless the presence of the object. Standing desire can take formof an interest proper, if what the self permanently identifies with isthe object itself, or it can become lust, where the self is identifiedwith the pleasure from acquiring the object. Standing desires playessential role in the realization of the personal project, allowingfor certain values motivate us for a long period of time. Standingdesires are not the only ones that bring unity into one’sself-realization process. Habitual desires are a very powerfulmechanism. These are acquired through the repetitive identification ofoneself with a certain object (Babushkina 2022). Developing habits ofdesire is a part of the habituation of the self (EthicalStudies Essay I [1962: 53–55], Essay VII [1962:295–296]) which, according to Bradley, is at the core of aperson’s upbringing.

The problem with habitual desires, is that the self develops goodhabits through the same process that it develops bad ones: throughrepetition and choice patterns. Similarly, one can develop interest in(or standing desires for) something that is morally good and forsomething that is morally bad. That is to say that if the goal ismerely to achieve some unity of one’s self, there is noquarantine that what one achieves is moral self-realization. So, thechallenge for Bradley’s account of self-realization as a moralproject is to explain how the agent achieves the right kind of unity.Instead of giving an account of character traits that would be good inthemselves to pursue, Bradley appeals to the concept of the MoralIdeal to tackle this challenge: the moral self-realization is achievedthrough the identification of the self with the Moral Ideal.

6. Moral Ideal

The Moral Ideal is a difficult term to explain inBradley’s ethics, but not impossible if we take into accountthat, from the metaphysical point of view, the moral ideal is aconcrete-universal. This implies that we are dealing not with anabstract concept existing independently from real things, but with aconcept, embedded in things it represents. Concrete-universal isalways an instantiated concept; it cannot be described apart from theinstances that express it. This, in turn, means that the moral idealis not a phantasy or a plan in the head of a person, but aninstantiated unity of different elements of person’s life (incl.her desires, beliefs, commitments, actions). This also means thatthere is not much to say about the moral ideal apart frommymoral ideal or the ideal of my personhood, that is constructed basedon the elements of my life. The fact that moral ideal is aconcrete-universal, explains how a moral agent is able to achieve theunity of her personally through moral self-realization.

The closest Bradley comes to the explanation of the Moral Ideal iswhen giving a description of what he calls “the content of theideal self” (Ethical Studies, Essay V [1962: 219]).Under this general expression, Bradley lists three categories ofcommitments that are worth having, from the moral point of view(Babushkina 2016). One category consists of commitments to otherpeople. These constitute moral obligations that we have due to variousrelationships we are in and different types of social roles we play.These commitments are referred to by Bradley as “my station andits duties”. Another category of commitments that are worthhaving are those that we have to humanity as such; commitments totreating others in ways they deserve as human beings. Here we movebeyond mere social relationships between people, and to the obligationto treat all humans is a certain way. The third and last group ofworthy commitments are those to truth (e.g., scientific inquiry) andbeauty (artistic endeavors)—these Bradley tags as a non-socialaspect of the ideal self. Each of these categories, in themselves, arerather abstract; these are a result of an attempt to classify allthings that are worth striving for, and any aspiration can be a partof the moral ideal as long as it is universalizable. And it is onlythorough my taking certain commitments upon myself (i.e., identifyingwith the moral ideal), that I bring any concrete content into it.

Another important aspect of the moral ideal is its normative force. Asmy moral ideal, it sets the standard of perfection. As such, it doesnot prescribe the moral agent any specific actions, but it tells herwhat she should be. Understanding which commitments are morally worth,the person is able then to apply those to her unique life situation,depending what relationships she is in, what social roles she has, andwhat aspirations and interests drive her. These helps to form apersonalized moral ideal that will push forward her self-realizationproject.

7. Moral Development

Of interest to developmental psychology (cf. MacNiven 1996) ofmorality is Bradley’s account of the development of the moralconsciousness, that is based on the assumption that social contextprovides the script for our desires and that children internalizethese scripts while playing them out. At an early stage of mentallife, the child will experience pleasure from some object—say anapple—and transfers the pleasant sensation to the object, sothat it becomes part of the content of the apple, a part of what thatobject means to the child, or, better, a part of what the child seesin that object. The child generates an appetite for objects of thissort and in the presence of an apple the child will have a mixedreaction: a pleasant feeling because the object is seen as pleasant,but a painful feeling because she is not in possession of, orenjoying, the apple. This produces a felttension—“felt” because it is occurring at apre-cognitive level, before the child has beliefs about the object isor able to make inferences about the object based on past experience.This felt tension is desire and it moves the child to action, to tryto take physical possession of it. Bradley’s psychologicalaccount differs from the hedonist’s in that whereas hedonismholds that a particular pleasure is willed, Bradley claims that theideal object willed is a particular thing which has had a pleasantquality transferred to it and thereby attributed to the thing itself.Moreover, on Bradley’s account the will—once we get to thestage of having a fully developed self capable of having awill—is actually seeking the object willed because it representsthe satisfaction of the self following the process of identification.However, at this stage we have at best a very primitive precursor ofthe self and it can only be said to affirm itself. That is, it lacksthe developed consciousness necessary to representing ideal objects.Moreover, the child at this stage lacks the higher-order consciousnessneeded to see itself as realizing itself by attaining an ideal objectwith which it has identified its satisfaction. At this early stage weare only talking about appetite since the child desires the objectonly when it is present; at a later stage the child will gain a senseof these things as independent external objects that persist,ceteris paribus, and so can be desired in their absence.

The child also experiences other people and is eventually going torecognize them as individuals with independent wills—i.e., asothers who have their own plans and projects and as selves attemptingto realize themselves through their actions, and who, because of thesefacts, may oppose or confirm its own desires, oppose its will. Sinceinitially these others are going to be family members or care-giversthere will be a pre-conscious bond of affection between them and thechild. When the child acts in accord with the will of another,pleasure results from the affirmation from that other person, whileopposition is experienced as painful because it negates the bond ofaffection. This produces the felt tension similar to that which occursin the case of an inaccessible desired object: a tension between thepleasure associated with the presence of the care-giver and the painof being without the approval of that person. The main point here isthat the child will tend to be good (i.e., fit in with the norms andexpectations of the caregivers) solely because not doing so ispainful, not because the child has, at this stage, any goal it istrying to achieve by being good, nor even the ability to articulatewhy it acts as it does. As Bradley says,

The child is taught to will a content which is universal and good, andhe learns to identify his will with it, so that he feels pleasure whenhe feels himself in accord with it, uneasiness or pain when his willis contrary thereto, and he feels that it is contrary. This is thebeginning of personal morality. (Ethical Studies, Essay V[1962: 178])

As the child develops it learns the language of morality and therebythe moral perspective embedded in it. In this process the child learnsthe meaning of normative concepts and in doing so learns what theymean to others in the shared linguistic community. In this way thesocial community imparts a moral perspective. In fact, the communityintroduces the child to two levels of moral reflection: it impartsspecific moral values and norms through its institutions andpractices, and; it provides the moral concepts that are necessary tothe task of conceiving of ways to improve society, in this way makingpossible the move to the more comprehensive level of IdealMorality.

The above rehearsal glosses over several identifiable stages of moraldevelopment set out in Bradley’s moral psychology. These detailscan be ignored here, for the important point to note is that Bradleyattempts to supple a psychological account of moral development thatfills in the final part of his exposition of the theory ofself-realization by explaining how one comes to identify one’ssatisfaction with the achieving or realizing of particular moral ends.It is also important to note the roles he assigns to pleasure andpain. That these have a place in his moral theory indicates that theethical hedonists were not totally wrong about their importance, theirmistake being to think that promoting pleasure and diminishing painmarks the ultimate goal of moral activity. By contrast, Bradley arguesthat in acting morally we choose and will and act in terms of the ideaof a state of affairs which represents a superior self to be realized.We feel pleasure at the thought of that self with which we haveidentified because we feel affirmed by the thought of its realization.We feel pain at the felt contradiction between this and our actualself and pain at the thought of not being the superior self wedesire.

Bradley’s excursion into moral psychology represents an effortto explain the process whereby one identifies one’s satisfactionwith a particular ideal object, which is an essential element in thestructure of volitional action. He traces the transitions from earlystates of mental life through to the sort of consciousness exhibitedby a mature moral agent. From primitive appetites which involve aprecursor self that affirms itself through its desires we arrive at avariety of types of actions and of objects of volition and differentrelations between the self and the objects. Children move from thesimple desire to possess the object to the pleasure taken in theapproval of others, to self-conscious moral action. These stages alsoreveal the development of feelings and emotions and an increasingrange of types of object that one might take pleasure in. In otherwords, there is not only the fixation of desire on certain objects,but also an extension of the individual’s range of interests andthese move out beyond desired objects to an interest in other peopleand future events and so on.

An important feature of this developmental process is gainingknowledge of good and bad and the capacity to will both. The need forthis arises, first, at the formal level of the structure of volitionalaction, which entails the dualism of inferior and superior selves (orconceptions of these). To get beyond formal necessary conditions to anaccount of specific actions this formal structure has to be filled inwith some determinate content which explains what the nature of thesetwo selves is. At the level of social morality this may involve nomore than knowledge of what society demands of me—which I willidentify as the superior, good self I should be—alongside mytendencies to go my own way which marks the bad self that opposes thesocial norms. But there must be more than mere knowledge, for it isalso necessary, psychologically, that we actually feel the tensionproduced by the conflicting tendencies to be both good and bad. It isnot simply that one fails to comprehend fully the nature of moralaction without this, but that we also cannot feel the contradictionsthat will move us to action, and without action there is no morality.Hence, the common notion that moral agents are often viewed as havingto expend a great deal of effort on the internal struggle between thedesire to be good and a propensity to do things known to be bad iscorrect. In Bradley’s theory the ultimate moral end ofself-realization presents two pictures of the self, labels one ofthese “superior” and sets the moral task as realizing thatsuperior self in the face of the actual, inferior self. In this waymoral conflicts are always internal struggles. In acting morally I aimat realizing my good self, which I see as my true self. Yet I cannotin good faith say that my bad self is not myself, with the resultthat, as Bradley rather picturesquely puts it, “when I enter thelists against it, it is at my own breast that I lay my lance inrest” (Ethical Studies, Essay VII [1962: 277]). Thebattle against bad tendencies never ends, making the process ofself-systematization a never-ending process. We can never fullyrealize our moral ideal and become the perfect self we are striving tobe. But we can proximate it. As a result, self-realization is nevercomplete; it is as long and diverse as the life we live.

8. The Limits of Morality

It is not uncommon for secondary sources to assume that Bradleyequates moral, social, political, and religious domains; thisassumption leads to a lot of confusion concerning Bradley’sbeliefs. In most cases, such assumptions can be traced to exaggeratedpresuppositions about Hegel’s influence on Bradley. Suchpresuppositions apart, careful reading ofEthical Studiesreveals that Bradley makes a clear distinction between moralconsciousness and religion, on the one hand, and between moral, socialand political spheres, on the other.

Here are a few examples. Bradley finishesEthical Studieswith a brief consideration of religious consciousness, saying that“[m]orality issues in religion” (Ethical Studies,Concluding Remarks [1962: 314]). It is not difficult to notice certainHegelian overtones in this claim, which may lead one to believe thatBradley sees religion as a sort of “upgraded” morality.However, one must note that by itself the statement that“morality issues in religion” is not enough to point toBradley’s adoption of the dialectical move from the final partofThe Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1807): the structure ofEthical Studies does not follow Hegelian dialectics in anyconsistent manner. What is more likely is that Bradley tries todelineate the sphere of moral practice (i.e., actions and theirmotivation) and show its difference from the sphere of religiouspractice. Bradley only discusses religion in the chapter called“Concluding Remarks”, placing it outside the main body ofthe book. This shows that the discussion of religion lies beyond thediscussion of morality as such. And indeed, Bradley explains hischoice by saying: “[a]nd here we should close these Essays,since here we go beyond morality” (Ethical Studies,Concluding Remarks [1962: 313]).

Bradley further elaborates this distinction: thinking in moral termspresupposes a belief in the fundamental gap between reality and thedesirable/ideal. Once this gap is bridged there is no more need formorality (in this Bradley comes close to Kant). To the extent thatpeople have both a “good” and a “bad” self,they are a “self-contradiction”, and if these arenecessary to morality as Bradley’s suggests they are then theultimate moral end of action—self-realization as an infinitewhole—cannot be achieved. As he puts it,

we are a self-contradiction: we never are what we feel we really are;we really are what we know we are not; and if we became what we are,we should scarcely be ourselves. (Ethical Studies, Essay VI[1962: 234])

Morality really seeks its own demise for were the ideal self realizedthere would be nothing that remains to be actualized, at which pointmorality is at an end. “Morality aims at the cessation of thatwhich makes it possible” (Ethical Studies, Essay VI[1962: 234]). In the moral sphere, the opposition between what is realand what is ideal can never be overcome. Once they merge, it is nolonger the sphere of morality. Moral actions aim to change reality tomeet the ideal; while moral evaluations (in terms of right/wrong,good/bad) estimate how well we manage to change the word to becomeideal. An agent is motivated morally as long as she believes that theideal world does not yet exist (and hence the need to bring it aboutthrough actions); if the agent believes that the ideal world isalready real in some way (e.g., through God), she is no longermotivated morally but religiously. The sphere of religious practice,for Bradley, is characterized by this belief that what ought to bealready exists in the Absolute.

The tendency to read the identification of social/political and moralintoEthical Studies can also be traced to the convictionthat Bradley’s ethical theory is an updated version ofHegel’s social morality, and from the persisting belief thatBradley identifies the moral self with one’s station, and moralobligation with social requirements. This approach, however, overlooksmost of Bradley’s arguments against Hegelian-style bottom-upidentification of the real and the ideal, put forth in Essay V(Babushkina 2019). In contrast to Hegel, Bradley believes that moralpersonhood cannot be reduced to the social:

the moral man can to a certain extent distinguish his moral essencefrom his particular function … the content of the ideal selfdoes not fall wholly within any community, is in shortnotmerely the ideal of a perfect social being. (Ethical Studies,Essay V [1962: 205])

The core of Bradley’s argument is the claim that we cannotconclude anything about the moral character of the person solely fromthe diligence with which she performs what the society expects fromher: it is an open question whether the one who fulfills herpositional duties well is also morally good. We need an independentreason to determine whether her following social orders in thatspecific situation was a morally right thing to do; in the end, thestate may be in “a confused or rotten condition, so that rightand might do not always go together” (Ethical Studies,Essay V [1962: 204]). We are not justified to reduce moral norms tocustom and law: “[a] man can not take his morality simply fromthe moral world he is in” (Ethical Studies, Essay V[1962: 204]). Moral goodness is “goodness not of any particulartime and country” (Ethical Studies, Essay V [1962:205]) and it is incompatible with apparent cultural relativism of whatpeople happen to value.

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• Green, Thomas Hill, 1883,Prolegomena to Ethics, AndrewCecil Bradley (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, publishedposthumously.
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• Ilodigwe, Damian, 2004, “Bradley,Ethical Studies,and Dialectic: Self-Realisation and Its Equivocations”,Bradley Studies, 10(1): 65–87.doi:10.5840/bradley2004101/26
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• –––, 2009, “The Interplay ofBradley’s Social and Moral Philosophy”, in William Sweet(ed.),The Moral, Social and Political Philosophy of the BritishIdealists, Exeter and Charlottesville: Imprint Press,87–110.
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• –––, 1987,Bradley’s MoralPsychology, (Studies in the History of Philosophy 3), Lewiston,NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
• –––, 1996, “Metaphysics and Ethics inBradley’s Idealism”, in MacEwen 1996: 91–109 (ch.4).
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Bibliographical Material

• Ingardia, Richard, 1991,Bradley: A ResearchBibliography, (Bibliographies of Famous Philosophers), BowlingGreen, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green StateUniversity. Please note the volume contains occasional typos andmistakes in the references, but to this date this is the mostcomprehensive catalogue of literature on F.H. Bradley before 1991.

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