[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by David Linesreplaces theformer entry on this topic by the previous author.]

To paraphrase Alfred North Whitehead’s famous pronouncementabout Plato, Renaissance philosophy consisted, broadly speaking, of aseries of footnotes to Aristotle. Thanks to the“rediscovery” of Aristotle’s works in the twelfthand thirteenth centuries, philosophers had available to them a muchlarger corpus of his writings than for any other thinker of antiquityexcept Galen. In the famous Aldus Greek edition of 1495–1498,these writings (both genuine and spurious, in addition to works byGalen, Philo, Theophrastus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias) filled fivevolumes. Latin and vernacular translations had made nearly all ofthese works accessible for centuries. In addition, Renaissancethinkers could count on an extraordinarily rich commentary traditionfrom the Greek, Arab, Hebrew, and medieval Latin worlds. Individualcommentators such as Averroes, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinaswrote prolifically on Aristotle. Aristotle’s methodologicalprocedure for arriving at the truth and the stunning breadth of hisphilosophical explorations meant that “the Philosopher”was literally everywhere, undergirding intellectual endeavors andteaching not only in philosophy, but also in medicine, law, theology,and literary theory. Up to the seventeenth century, he remained theindispensable reference point (although hardly the definitive answer)for any philosophical exploration.

The importance of Aristotle notwithstanding, Renaissance philosophywas not the same as Aristotelianism, if one takes this label to denotea strain of thought representing an exclusive commitment toAristotelian notions and/or methods. This entry will show that itwould be exceedingly hard to find examples of such a“pure” dedication to Aristotle in the period c.1350–1650. As a result, it is better to interpretAristotelianism as the study of the writings then attributed (whetherrightly or wrongly) to Aristotle.

As scholars in the period already began to recognize, these writingsdo not form a coherent whole. Yet, despite their variable form(lecture notes by students or original treatises), the differentaudiences to which they were addressed (Aristotle’s students orthe broader public), the presence of pseudographs such as theProblems, the evolution within Aristotle’s ownthinking, faults of transmission and translation, and the variety ofperspectives adopted by Aristotle’s commentators, this large anddiversified corpus proved highly useful for the teaching and practiceof philosophy. This was in part because“Aristotle’s” writings cover a remarkably widescope: they address every branch of philosophy (logic, naturalphilosophy, moral philosophy, metaphysics) as well as topics moreclosely related to literary theory (rhetoric, poetics). The spuriousworks also deal with many other topics, including natural theology andmedicine.

This entry outlines the historical and historiographical dimensions ofRenaissance Aristotelianism before the rise of early modernphilosophy. It illustrates the variety of literary, linguistic, andinstitutional contexts through which Aristotle was approached.Additionally, it provides examples of some problems discussed intreatments of Aristotle and the complicated relationship thatinterpreters saw between Aristotelianism, other philosophicalcurrents, and the Christian religion. Given the vastness of aphenomenon that stretched from Constantinople through Western Europeand from there to its worldwide colonies, the topics and interpretersmentioned are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive.There is currently no exhaustive account of the features anddevelopment of Renaissance Aristotelianism, although Schmitt 1983a andMartin 2014 are excellent starting points.

• 1. Historiography
• 2. Historical Development(s)
• 3. Contexts, Languages, and Genres
• 4. Selected Fields, Topics, and Competitors
  • 4.1 Fields
  • 4.2 Reconciling Aristotelianism with Christianity
    • 4.2.1 Cosmology
    • 4.2.2 The Soul
    • 4.2.3 Moral philosophy
  • 4.3 Aristotelianism and Other Philosophical Currents
    • 4.3.1 Platonism
    • 4.3.2 Stoicism
    • 4.3.3 Epicureanism and Skepticism
    • 4.3.4 Late Anti-Aristotelianism
• 5. Sources, Reference Works, and Desiderata
• Bibliography
  • A. Primary Literature
    • Compilations
    • Bibliographies
  • B. Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Historiography

Traditional (and now largely outdated) accounts of Renaissancephilosophy used to depict Aristotelianism as a unified, static, andsterile current of thought that was based in the universities and wasbeaten into retreat by the rise of Platonism, academies, and a morehuman-centered philosophical approach (sometimes confusinglyidentified with “humanism”). This perspective, oftenderived from implicit anti-religious and anti-scholastic biases, beganto lose credibility in the 1950s and 1960s (and then, more rapidly, inthe 1970s and 1980s) thanks to the studies by Paul Oskar Kristeller,Bruno Nardi, Antonino Poppi, F. Edward Cranz, Charles B. Schmitt,Charles H. Lohr, and other scholars. Building on the magnificentachievements of historians of science such as Pierre Duhem and LynnThorndike, these scholars’ explorations of the commentarytradition highlighted the longevity and diversity of Aristotle’sinfluence. Lohr’s repertories of Aristotle commentators showedthat, far from disappearing, Aristotelian works were the subject ofrenewed interest in the Renaissance, such that

the number of Latin commentaries on Aristotle composed within thisbrief period [1500–1650] exceeds that of the entire millenniumfrom Boethius to Pomponazzi. (Lohr 1974: 228)

Cranz and Schmitt (1984) documented, through a repertory of printededitions, how influential Aristotle continued to be (see§5). Schmitt also strongly underscored the variety of Aristotelianinterpretations and approaches, suggesting that we should speak about“Renaissance Aristotelianisms” in the plural rather thanas a single movement (Schmitt 1983a: 10–33). No serious scholarnow ignores the importance of Renaissance Aristotelianism(s), evenwhile emphasizing other currents such as Platonism or Stoicism.(Epicureanism, by contrast, gained few followers in the period.) TheAristotelian tradition is now being examined from numerousperspectives, including the history of education, literature, art,translation, and religion.

2. Historical Development(s)

Aristotle’s thought had a somewhat delayed influence on theancient world and enjoyed its flowering only much later. Romanthinkers such as Cicero, as well as the early Church Fathers, knew(of) him, but it was Plato who clearly had the upper hand, even aslate as St Augustine of Hippo (354–430)—despite the workof Greek commentators such as Aspasius (second century A.D.),Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second to early third century),Plotinus (204/5–270), Porphyry (234?–305?), Iamblichus(242?–325), and Themistius (fl. c. 350) in intervening years.(Another important commentator was Johannes Philoponus[490–570], who however came a bit later.) Late antiquity sawBoethius’ (c. 475–526) influential translation ofAristotle’s logic into Latin, but Aristotle’s moresubstantialfortuna in the Latin West had to wait until thetwelfth and thirteenth centuries, with the rise of the universities.This may have been due to the need to find a suitable foundation forthe study of philosophy. In any case, the efforts to translate andcomment on Aristotle’s works extended to earlier commentariesproduced in the Byzantine and Arab worlds: thus, interpreters such asEustratius of Nicaea (c. 1050–c. 1120) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd,1126–1198) soon became highly influential in Latin translation.By around 1270 nearly all of Aristotle’s works—and severalspurious ones besides—had become available for study. (Thenotable exception was thePoetics, which—despite acommentary by Averroes—only became better known in the latefifteenth century.) These works were usually taught in philosophycourses, where they were grouped under the headings of logic, naturaland moral philosophy, and metaphysics. Starting in the fifteenthcentury, professors of humanities or rhetoric might teach, in additionto Latin writers such as Cicero and Virgil, Aristotle’sRhetoric andPoetics, as well as the spuriousRhetoric to Alexander.

Early Italian humanists—defined here as literaryscholars—had an ambivalent attitude toward Aristotle andAristotelianism. In his famous workOn His Own Ignorance and Thatof Many Others (De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia),Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca, 1304–1374) attacked somecontemporary scholars for following Aristotle “blindly”,but also objected to Aristotle’s discussion of useless andpossibly false matters such as the crocodile’s ability to moveits upper jaw or the number of hairs on a lion’s head. He alsocriticized Aristotle’s treatment of virtue in theNicomachean Ethics, claiming that “his lesson lacks thewords that sting and set afire and urge toward love of virtue andhatred of vice” (Petrarch [CKR: 103]). Although professionalrivalry may have played a role, this attitude seems to have stemmedespecially from a clash of subjects and methodologies: Petrarch andhis literarily inclined colleagues prized eloquence and saw it as keyto the production of virtue. Some of them (including Petrarch) wereespecially taken by Plato, although few at the time (Petrarch was noexception) could read him in the original. This is not, however, tosay that they turned their backs on Aristotle: the humanist chancellorof Florence, Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444), not only wrote aLife of Aristotle (Vita Aristotelis), but heretranslated his moral philosophy (ethics, politics, and economics)into Ciceronian Latin, claiming that his works in Greek were“filled with elegance, delight, and a certain fathomlessbeauty” (Bruni,The Correct Way to Translate [1987:217]). Other scholars studied (and sometimes retranslated) his logicand works of natural philosophy. By the 1490s, Florence’s mostfamous humanist, the young Angelo Poliziano (1454–1494), wasteaching the whole range of Aristotle’s works at the Universityof Florence. His justification was that, as agrammaticus (aphilologist), he was competent in all fields of study. In the secondhalf of the fifteenth century, Bologna boasted at least two humanistswho taught, in addition to more literary and rhetorical works,Aristotle’sPhysics (the Hellenist AndronicusCallistus, dates uncertain) and hisDe interpretatione(Antonio Urceo Cortesi, or Codro, 1446–1500) (Lines 2023:186–191). The renowned Venetian printer Aldus Manutius issued aGreek edition of Aristotle’s complete works in five volumes(1495–1498). Likewise, Desiderius Erasmus (†1536) ofRotterdam had an interest in Aristotle and superintended a new Greekedition of his works (1516), although most of the donkey work was doneby Simon Grynaeus (Kraye 1990 and 1995).

In Central and Northern Europe, Aristotle’s works had exerciseda decisive influence on philosophy at least since thethirteenth-century contributions of Robert Grosseteste(†1253)—a key translator of Aristotle’s works andof various Greek commentaries—as well as Albert the Great (c.1200–1280) and Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), both of whomcommented on a wide range of his writings. The influence of Italianhumanism and of Martin Luther’s Reformation redirected (but didnot diminish) this earlier interest in Aristotle. The Wittenbergprofessor Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560) temperedLuther’s deep suspicions about the Stagirite’s views, andthe Protestant universities continued, as elsewhere, to haveAristotelian philosophy at the core of their arts curriculum.Universities such as Paris, Oxford, and Salamanca remained significantcenters for the interpretation of Aristotle. Likewise, the colleges ofthe Society of Jesus (established in 1540) and of orders such as theDominicans relied on the Aristotelian corpus for their ownphilosophical curriculum in their programs worldwide. Despite the riseof anti-Aristotelianism (see§4.3.4), students and scholars across Europe (and beyond, especially in theEnglish, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies) continued to engage withAristotle’s thought.

The same was true of universities, whose teaching of“Aristotle” endured long after the “newphilosophy” of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and RenéDescartes (1596–1650) had made its mark. This does not mean,however, that either masters or students were necessarily in agreementwith Aristotelian doctrines. Indeed, records of philosophical lecturesindicate that professors presented students with the ideas ofAristotle and expected them to know them (teaching perforce involvestransmitting established views), but then also incorporated in theircourses insights from recent or contemporary figures (Brockliss 1987;Lines 2023). Likewise, the schools of the religious orders were lessconservative than one might expect.

3. Contexts, Languages, and Genres

The universities and schools of the religious orders, however, were byno means the only contexts in which discussions of Aristotle tookplace. Several learned circles and more formal academies (includingthe Accademia degli Infiammati in Padua and the Accademia Fiorentina)explored Aristotle’s challenging philosophical works. Princelycourts might stage readings and discussions of his writings. (A famouscase is the court of the king of France, Henri III; see Yates 1947and, more broadly, Lines 2013). Popular works such as Leon BattistaAlberti’sBooks on the Family (I libri dellafamiglia) were based on (possibly fictitious) conversations amongfriends about Aristotelian moral philosophy—specifically theOeconomics, a work about household management then attributedto Aristotle—and Xenophon’sOeconomicus (Cabrini2007). Shakespeare’s plays at times deal with aspects ofAristotelian thought (e.g., ethics, poetics) that contemporaries wouldhave recognized.

This broad range of contexts was facilitated by a remarkably intenseeffort to make Aristotle’s ideas and writings accessible in thevernacular. Previous centuries had already seen translations oradaptations of Aristotle’s works in languages such as French andItalian (see, for instance, Brunetto Latini’sLes livres dutrésor, subsequently translated into Italian). In theRenaissance, this phenomenon blossomed: in addition to multiple newLatin translations (penned by figures such as the Greekémigrés Johannes Argyropoulos and Theodore Gaza),translations into French, Italian, Spanish, English, German, and otherlanguages greatly expanded the potential readership of these works(for the Italian case, see Lines & Refini 2014 and Bianchi,Gilson, & Kraye 2016; more broadly, Lines & Puliafito 2019).But one should be wary of interpreting this phenomenon in terms of aprocess of “democratization of knowledge” (Sgarbi 2022):at the end of the day, only people who could read, had alreadyreceived some training in philosophy, were highly interested andmotivated, and had some leisure and economic means were likely toapproach Aristotle’s works. Still, it is remarkable that peopletrained in manual crafts like Benedetto Varchi (1503–1565) andwomen like Camilla Erculiani (d. after 1584) not only did so, but alsowent on to write on Aristotle (Andreoni 2012; ErculianiLetters [2021]).

This expansion in languages and publics also found a parallel in agrowing number of genres that treated Aristotle’s writings.Again, the phenomenon was not unknown in previous centuries, whereliteral commentaries, question commentaries, and compendia (but alsovisual representations) provided multiple avenues of access to thePhilosopher. But the Renaissance saw an explosion of additional forms:letters, dialogues, orations, paraphrases, treatises, essays, studentdisputations, printed editions (also in Greek), and even literaryworks such as the tales of Marguerite de Navarre (Langer 1994) wereall added to the previous mix, as part of a widespread effort toreinterpret and, quite often, save Aristotelian ideas from the attacksthey were coming under. New discoveries or theories about theuniverse, physics, and the human body; geographical explorations;theological controversies (such as the meritoriousness of unaidedvirtue or the nature of the Eucharist); philological advances,including the recovery of several works from antiquity; the rise ofthe new philosophy—all of these in various ways questionedsignificant aspects of the received Aristotelian framework, producingan almost frenzied activity aimed at re-evaluating the Philosopher andseeing how much of his system could be retained in the light of newtrends and criticisms (Bianchi 2003; see below,§4.3.4).

4. Selected Fields, Topics, and Competitors

4.1 Fields

It is worthwhile outlining the most important fields and works of theRenaissance Aristotle, before discussing some important topics ofdebate.

Logic was the cornerstone of medieval and Renaissance Aristotelianism,both in providing principles that were foundational and in common withother disciplines (such as law, theology, medicine) and in beingconsidered a preliminary and basic subject. Of all the branches ofAristotelian thought, logic had the longest pedigree in Latin, sincetheCategories andOn Interpretation (along withPorphyry’sIsagoge) had been translated by Boethius inthe early sixth century (logica vetus); works that becameknown in the twelfth century—Topics, SophisticalRefutations, Prior and Posterior Analytics—were known asthelogica nova (Ashworth 1988). Together, the old and newlogic provided the essentials of a field that nearly everyone studiedat school and/or university or in the schools/colleges of thereligious orders. Or, at least, that was the idea. In practice, logicwas often approached through handbooks, such as the wildly popularSummaries of Logic (Summulae logicales, c. 1240) byPeter of Spain (the work continued to be widely used in the sixteenthcentury) and Paul of Venice’sSmall Logic (Logicaparva, c. 1396–1399). Furthermore, under the influence ofthe Dutch humanist Rudolph Agricola (1443/4–1485), theRenaissance saw a change in the teaching of logic, which often movedinto a closer relationship with rhetoric (Mack 1993; Lagerlund 2017;Knuuttila 2017).

After logic, students across Europe tackled the higher aspects ofAristotle’s philosophy. In Italy, thePhysics,Onthe Heavens, andOn the Soul would typically start offeach year of study of natural philosophy, with gaps being filled in bymany of the “minor” works such asOn Generation andCorruption, theMeteorology, and the works on animals,or even pseudographs such asThe Secret of Secrets orProblems. Also of interest was Aristotle’sMetaphysics, studied either on its own (especially inNorthern Europe) or as a complement to problems in natural philosophy(often the case in Italian universities). Moral philosophy (usually onthe basis of Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics, andsometimes extending—especially in Central and NorthernEurope—also to theOeconomics and thePolitics) might be taught in parallel with natural philosophyor immediately after it. This was a field that initially struggled tobe recognized as an official and required subject in the Italianuniversities and was taught more regularly elsewhere, particularly inuniversities founded on the Parisian model, including the JesuitCollegio Romano (Lines 2002).

The study of works such as theRhetoric, theRhetoric toAlexander, and thePoetics almost always took place incourses or discussions of rhetoric and humanities rather thanphilosophy. It was a study that developed especially insixteenth-century Italy and had to find creative ways to complementthe long-established role of Cicero (and theRhetorica adHerennium attributed to him) as a foundation for the teaching ofrhetoric in schools and universities (Mack 2011: 24–26,169–71).

All of these areas were approached both through the relevant works ofAristotle (initially only in medieval translations; from the fifteenthcentury also through fresh translations and occasionally through theoriginal Greek) and through a rich commentary tradition, in whichAverroes (and later, to some extent, the Greek commentators) played aconsiderable role, together with giants of the thirteenth-centuryLatin tradition such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas and laterinfluential interpreters such as Walter Burley (c. 1275–1344/5)and John Buridan (c. 1300–post 1358). Classroom teaching couldvary significantly depending on the specific branch of philosophy, thegeographical area, the chronological moment, and the preferences ofmaster and/or students, but usually consisted of a combinedexplanation of (and the solution of questions on) Aristotle’stext and his commentators. The presence within the Greek and Arabiccommentary traditions of Platonic, Neoplatonic, and fundamentallynon-Christian ideas (e.g., in the works of Averroes) meant thatstudents of Aristotle in the Latin West faced the conundrum ofreconciling these multiple points of view both with each other andwith Christian assumptions (§i;4.2). Furthermore, as anticipated above, new discoveries or theories (suchas Copernicanism or the rise of the “new science”) led toquestioning important aspects of the commonly accepted worldview,including the cosmological model that rested on the viewpoints ofAristotle and Ptolemy (§4.2.1).

The availability of important new works such as thePoeticsgave rise to significant debates and cultural changes, including onthe theory of playwriting. In other cases, figures critiqued and triedto replace wholesale Aristotle’s influence in specific fields.Mario Nizolio argued, in hisOn the True Principles and TrueMethod of Philosophizing against the Pseudo-Philosophers (Deveris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contrapseudophilosophos, 1553), against Aristotelian dialectic andmetaphysics. Petrus Ramus (†1572), a professor in Paris, spentmuch of his career trying to find ways to replace Aristotle’srhetoric and logic (Gilbert 1960; Couzinet 2015).

4.2 Reconciling Aristotelianism with Christianity

Ever since Thomas Aquinas’ synthesis of Christianity,Aristotelianism, and elements of Platonism, Western thinkers hadthought of Christian and Aristotelian doctrines as largely (althoughnot necessarily wholly) compatible. At the same time, they were quiteaware that Aristotle was not an infallible authority. They knew thatthere were areas, such as psychology (see below,§4.2.2), in which Aristotle’s teachings were at least potentiallyproblematic. Such fissures became increasingly evident as readers ofAristotle in the Latin West became more familiar with otherinterpretive traditions and with the writings of philosophers such asPlato (who in the Middle Ages had a significant indirect influence butwas known directly through only a handful of dialogues). Platonism hada particular resonance with Christianity because of Plato’steachings about the immortality of the soul and his acceptance byChurch Fathers such as Augustine. With the fifteenth-century influx ofmany Greek scholars to Italy (Plato was more highly prized thanAristotle in the Byzantine schools) and the subsequent Latintranslation of Plato’s complete works by the Florentinephilosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), some began to seeAristotle as less useful than his teacher for the development of aChristian philosophy. A significant uptick in the activity ofscientific publishing and Aristotelian commentary also highlightedvarious areas in which Christian and Aristotelian viewpoints seemedmore divergent than they had previously appeared. Such an awarenessled to moves to contain and correct Aristotle’s impious orpotentially dangerous teachings. These included the famous 1513 papalbullApostolici regiminis (issued during the Fifth LateranCouncil), which clarified Christian dogma on the soul and instructedprofessors of philosophy to rebut arguments that were contrary toChristian doctrine.

4.2.1 Cosmology

The traditional geocentric picture of the universe (elaborated byPtolemy, second century A.D., but largely indebted to Aristotle) sawan immobile earth at the center, above which were the perfect andunchangeable heavenly spheres, governed by an unmoved Mover. Thisviewpoint had been fully accepted by Christian thinkers andpopularized through writings such as Dante Alighieri’sDivina commedia (Divine Comedy). Although there wasno specific scriptural endorsement of it, there seemed to be no reasonnot to accept it, and it made sense of language in the Biblesuch as the sun “standing still” when Joshua needed moretime to defeat his enemies (Joshua 10:12–14). A significantchallenge to this system was the 1543 workDe revolutionibusorbium caelestium (The Revolutions of the HeavenlySpheres) by the Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus(1473–1543), who argued instead for a heliocentric model on thebasis of multiple observations and mathematical calculations, as wellas this model’s congruity with certain religious andphilosophical assumptions. Famously, Copernicus’ theory wastaken up and defended by scientists and mathematicians such asJohannes Kepler, Tycho Brahe, and Galileo Galilei, whose observationsseemed to prove the existence of comets as new celestial phenomena(thus questioning Aristotle’s cosmology, according to which theheavens were unchanging) and the rotation of the earth around the sunand its own axis. The Catholic Church saw Copernicanism as contrary tochurch teaching (1616) and prohibited Galileo and others from publiclysupporting it (1633). Nonetheless, the Church was not able to containthe growing consensus around heliocentrism, particularly in Protestantlands. Nor was it able quickly enough to silence the speculationsabout the infinity and multiplicity of the universe put forward byeccentric but vocal figures like Giordano Bruno (burned at the stakein Rome in 1600).

In some other areas closely related to cosmology such as the issue ofthe age of the world, opinion was set against Aristotle from an earlydate. Aristotle had argued inPhysics, VIII.1–10 thatthe world must be eternal, i.e., without a beginning. But this notioncontrasted so evidently with the biblical account of creation (andwith the interpretation of eminent Church Fathers such as Augustine)that it found few takers among orthodox Christians. The Fourth LateranCouncil (1215) elevated Augustine’s doctrine of creationexnihilo to dogma. Yet Aristotle’s (and Averroes’)espousal of eternalism did find some support. Biagio Pelacani da Parma(†1416), a professor at the universities of Pavia, Bologna, andPadua, was forced to recant his espousal of this position at thebishop’s court of Pavia in 1396. Nicoletto Vernia(1420–1499), a Paduan professor, likewise assumed the eternityof the world (Martin 2022). For other fifteenth-century thinkers, suchas Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and the Greekémigrés Gemistus Pletho, George of Trebizond, andCardinal Bessarion, the eternity of the world was an importantconcern, not least because late ancient Platonists accepted thisnotion. Since Plato, instead, had given an account of creation in hisTimaeus, there was an evident discordance among ancientauthorities. For the sixteenth century, the problem of the eternity ofthe world has not been well studied (Connell 2011, Dal Prete 2022).Nonetheless, we know that Niccolò Machiavelli was one of thosestrongly arguing for the eternity of the world (see hisDiscorsi II, 5; Sasso 1987), as was Giordano Bruno (e.g., inDe l’infinito, universo e mondi). Jesuits such asJacobus Ledesma took issue with this doctrine (Martin 2014:88–90), as did several Franciscans and Dominicans (both in andoutside of Italy), taking aim also at what was, in their view, a moregeneral inclination toward Averroism among sixteenth-century Italians.Similar criticisms were voiced in the Protestant camp. The Lutheranprofessor Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) proposed a metaphysicalapproach to the problem of the eternity of the world; the CalvinistOtto Casmann (1562–1607) also insisted that it could not be aproblem that had two different solutions (a philosophical and atheological one). An outlier was Julius Caesar Scaliger(1484–1558), who was convinced of the congruence betweenAristotle and Christianity and argued that Aristotle believed inGod’s creation of the world (Martin 2014: 83, 96–99).

Another important problem arose from Aristotle’s view that thereis no heavenly interference in the sublunary world. This notion hadconsequences for how the role of divine providence was interpreted;so, thinkers as varied as Melanchthon, Ramus, Francesco Patrizi daCherso (1529–1597), and the sixteenth-century Englishman RichardBostocke explored the topic in some detail—usually concludingthat Aristotle’s teaching in this area was not in accordancewith Christian faith (Martin 2014,ad indicem).

Renaissance Aristotelianism was therefore constantly engaging with theancient and medieval commentary tradition, and with Averroes inparticular.

4.2.2 The Soul

The overlaps between Aristotelianism and Averroism are again relevantin questions about the soul. Two long-standing problems in medievaland Renaissance discussions concerned the individuality andimmortality of a human’s rational intellect. Does each humanhave an individual soul, in which case how do we explain our commonthinking patterns and perceptions? And to what extent is anindividual’s soul tied to the body? On these matters, Christiandoctrine is quite clear: the soul is individual, and there is anindividual afterlife in store for every human being. (At death, thebody releases its soul; at the resurrection, the soul and body areagain joined together.) These teachings have much in common withPlato’s views (although the Christian position accorded the bodya more positive valence), but not with those of Aristotle andAverroes. Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism (the union ofform and matter) points to a close relationship between theintellective soul and the functions of sensation, which require abody. Indeed, he claims:

It’s clear that the soul is not separable from the body—orthat certain parts of it, if it has parts, are not separable from thebody. (De anima II.1, 413a3–5)

It seems therefore that the soul (including, presumably, its highestpart, the rational intellect) cannot survive the death of the body.Since forms in Aristotle are not universal as in Plato, the soul isindividual but not immortal. (It is worth noting, however, thatAristotle’s position was by no means clear, so that it could beinterpreted in several divergent ways; the materialist interpretationwas strongly held by his ancient commentator Alexander ofAphrodisias.) Averroes’ mature comments on Aristotle point to anagent intellect and a material intellect, each of which is a single,separate, and eternal substance. This position emphasizes thesoul’s immortality, but denies its individuality, since theintellective soul is not unique to each individual and, upon death,returns to the larger universal intellect of which it is a part. Itthus makes nonsense of the Christian belief in individualimmortality.

Historians of philosophy have classed the supporters of these twopositions as Alexandrists and Averroists respectively and have notedthe occasional voicing of these interpretations already in the MiddleAges: examples are the works of Siger of Brabant (c. 1240–1284)and various ecclesiastical condemnations (such as those of 1270 and1277 in Paris; Bianchi 1997). Yet it is in the fifteenth and sixteenthcenturies that these positions came to the fore most strongly, asindicated by the activity of professors at Padua and Bologna. Teacherssuch as Biagio Pelacani da Parma and Nicoletto Vernia in Padua (§4.2.1) and Alessandro Achillini (1463–1512) in Bologna promotedAverroes’ interpretations of the soul. But they had to contendwith rebuttals, not only from supporters of the orthodox Christianposition, but from followers of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Martin 2014:ch. 3).

The most famous Alexandrist was Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), aprofessor at Padua and Bologna. Pomponazzi’s treatiseOn theImmortality of the Soul (De immortalitate animae, 1516)caused an uproar. It stated that, from a philosophical perspective,there were no conclusive arguments for the soul’s immortality.This position was not altogether new, since—as Pomponazzihimself noted—John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) hadexpressed a similar view. Coming on the heels of theApostoliciregiminis bull of 1513, however, Pomponazzi’s treatiseshould have offered a convincing refutation of positions contrary toChristianity. Instead, it only offered a brief, half-heartedconclusion supporting the Christian position simply as a matter offaith. Furthermore, the treatise seemed to imply that a Christian viewof the soul, informed by Thomas Aquinas’ emphasis on itsimmortality and separability, was not necessary for a virtuous life,but had been introduced so as to preserve order in society. These andother aspects of the work led to intense debate and widespreadcriticism; Pomponazzi himself came under pressure to retract some ofhis statements, but the protection of powerful patrons allowed him tocontinue his teaching largely undisturbed until his death in 1525.Unlike hisOn Fate (De fato) andOnIncantations (De incantationibus), published somedecades after his death,On the Immortality of the Soul wasnever placed on the Index of Prohibited Books. It is notable, however,that the work’s only official sixteenth-century reprint came in1525; there it was accompanied by other works and by the criticalarguments of the Dominican friar Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli(Pomponazzi 1525; Spruit 2017). (An edition of Pomponazzi’streatise also appeared in 1534, but without indication of printer andwithout Javelli’s response.)

Debates about the soul did not cease with Pomponazzi. The topiccontinued to be a bone of contention both for followers of Pomponazzisuch as the Neapolitan Simone Porzio (1496–1544; Del Soldato2010) and the Paduan professor Giacomo Zabarella (1533–1589) andalso for several thinkers who sided against him. As we will see, someof these scholars were strongly influenced in their arguments by thedoctrines of ancient philosophers such as Plato (§4.3).

4.2.3 Moral philosophy

The challenge of bringing Aristotle in line with Christian assumptionsextended also to the sphere of moral philosophy (Kraye 1988, 1998).This was typically understood to consist of ethics, economics orhousehold management, and politics, branches that were approachedthrough theNicomachean Ethics, theOeconomics, andthePolitics respectively. (The authenticity of theOeconomics is doubtful; other works of ethics by“Aristotle” include theEudemian Ethics and theMagna Moralia, but the latter is again probably spurious.)From a Christian perspective, there were several problems withAristotle’s ethical theory. Chief among them was his view ofhappiness or flourishing (eudaimonia), which both assumesthat habituation can produce moral virtue without the intervention ofdivine grace and operates entirely in an earthly perspective, withoutconsideration of the afterlife or of God. The latter viewpoint isevident from the very opening of theNicomachean Ethics,which claims that

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, isthought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good(tagathon) has rightly been declared to be that at which allthings aim…. If then, there is some end of the things we do,which we desire for its own sake … , clearly this must be thegood and chief good. (I.1–2, 1094a)

Aristotle goes on, in the first book of theEthics, toexplore the best definition of this human good oreudaimonia,which “turns out to be the activity of the soul in conformitywith [the best and most complete] excellence”, accompanied bypleasure and external goods, and during the course of a completelifetime (I.7, 1098a16–18).

For Christians, identifying the ultimate good with an earthly activityor state amounts to idolatry, since only God can be our ultimate andhighest good. Thus, thirteenth-century thinkers such as Thomas Aquinasalready took issue with Aristotle on this point, claiming that, on thecontrary, “the last beatitude or happiness of any intelligentsubstance is to know God” (Summa contra Gentiles, III,25). (Other Christian interpreters who laid a stronger stress on thewill emphasized instead the goal ofloving God.) This didnot, however, mean that Aristotle’s considerations on ethicswere worthless—indeed, Thomas wrote a detailed literalcommentary on theNicomachean Ethics. It did, however, meanthat Christian interpreters noted Aristotle’s concern with onlyone aspect of the human experience. Nonetheless, unease aboutAristotle’s position continued and led Leonardo Bruni to offeran alternate rendering oftagathon in his translation of thework (1416/1417): instead ofbonum (or “thegood”, as the medieval translation had it), this becamesummum bonum (“the highest good”), in an evidentreference not to a human good but to God. (This rendering came in forsome severe criticism and was rectified by other translations, such asthat of Johannes Argyropoulos [c. 1415–1487], which insteadtranslatestagathon as “bonum quoddam” or“a certain good”.) Other interpreters tied the theme ofhappiness more closely to Christian concerns by highlighting itsreligious and otherworldly dimensions. Such an operation sometimesinvolved a Christianization of other pagan currents. A good example isLorenzo Valla’s (1407–1457) dialogueOn Pleasure(in its final version,De vero falsoque bono), whichidentifies Epicurean happiness with the enjoyment of God, both in thislife and in the hereafter (Nauta 2006: 152–90). He was followedby Bartolomeo Facio (before 1410–1457), whoseOn theHappiness of Life (De vitae felicitate) andOn HumanExcellence (De hominis excellentia) emphasized the blissof contemplating of God (Trinkaus 1970: I, 200–29), whileMarsilio Ficino highlighted the other-worldly dimension of felicity inhis letter “On Happiness”. These writers drew onphilosophical traditions outside of Aristotelianism in order toreinterpret and correct Aristotle’s concept ofeudaimonia (Lines 2019a).

Another cause for concern was both the framing and the content ofAristotle’s account of the moral virtues. As a pagan, he givesno space to the workings of divine grace, assuming that education andhabituation will, given enough motivation, produce the desiredqualities and help people achieve the golden mean, say between avariceand prodigality or fear and reckless courage (NicomacheanEthics, Book II). This created a difficulty especially forProtestant interpreters, who placed more emphasis than Catholic oneson the utter inability of unaided human effort to achieve the good.Love (the greatest of the Christian virtues) is missing in Aristotle,as is faith. Nor is there any place for other important virtues suchas humility. A description of the fruit of the Holy Spirit given bythe Apostle Paul is telling for its contrast with the pagan virtues:“The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience,kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control”(Galatians 5:22–23 ESV). Christian commentators might thereforeconcede the usefulness of the discussion of the virtues that Aristotledoes consider in Books III–V (the last one, justice, isespecially important in a political setting), while maintaining thatAristotle’s partial account needs to be supplemented by theChristian message. This was the case for Melanchthon. He and othersfound it problematic that the constellation of Aristotelian virtuesdoes not altogether map onto Christian ones. Nonetheless, the largerproblem was that Aristotle’s discussion was clearly incompleteand lacked the power of the gospel message to produce virtue in humanbeings. In this area, only the work of the Holy Spirit is sufficient.Despite all of this, Melanchthon holds that the civic dimension ofAristotle’s virtues is important and deserves to be studied(Melanchthon 1532: sigs. Aii^r–Bi^v).

The link Aristotle established between ethics and politics was alsoimportant from the perspective of the Christian Commonwealth. InAristotle’s understanding of ethics, virtuous lawgivers wereessential to help the young habituate themselves to the exercise ofvirtue. They would, in turn, be expected to continue to be virtuousupon taking office and promote virtue in others. Furthermore,Aristotle saw a continuity between the principles enunciated in theEthics and those discussed in thePolitics: it wassimply a matter of broadening the scope from the individual to thecommunity. All of this sat well with medieval assumptions (reliant inpart on the Old Testament: see Proverbs and Sirach, also known asEcclesiasticus) that saw rulers as paragons of both human virtue(justice, mercy, etc.) and godliness.On the Rule of Princes(De regimine principum) of Giles of Rome (†1316) isjust one of numerous mirrors-for-princes reminding monarchs of thestandards of behavior required. Writings by Italian humanists did notso much challenge this tie between virtue and princely office asextend the principle to republican constitutions, arguing for instancethat thepopolo itself needed to be virtuous in order togovern successfully and flourish. (This was an echo of biblicalconsiderations: see Deuteronomy 5:1–11.) Yet some of thesehumanist writers saw matters, not so much in the perspective of Greekthought, where moral virtues enabled political self-mastery and thepreservation of constitutions, but in the Roman one, which regardedthem as conduits to military power and glory. A particularly tellingexample is Leonardo Bruni’sHistory of the FlorentinePeople (Historiarum Florentinarum libri XII, finished in1442). In various ways, this work anticipates the Roman emphasis ofNiccolò Machiavelli’s (1469–1527) main politicalworks (The Prince orIl principe and theDiscourses on Livy orDiscorsi sopra la prima deca diTito Livio), with their concentration on political success(Hankins 2019: chs. 10 and 18–20). For Machiavelli, such successmight be secured by respecting the agreed personal and communalvirtues, but could also, if necessary, be pursued without them.

4.3 Aristotelianism and Other Philosophical Currents

In several cases, the questions explored in§4.2 about the compatibility of Aristotelianism with Christianity wereclosely joined together with the fluctuating fortunes of otherphilosophical currents from antiquity. One way of thinking aboutfifteenth- and sixteenth-century Aristotelianism is as an attempt toprovide an alternative synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christianityto that supplied by Thomas Aquinas. There were, however, notabledifferences and challenges. First of all, philosophers such asPomponazzi argued that philosophy and theology should both operate inautonomous spheres rather than mutually influence each other, asThomas thought. Secondly, the number of sources to integrate was bothfar greater and more differentiated than that at Thomas’disposal. This section focuses on the second phenomenon and offers abrief outline of the interplays between Aristotelianism andRenaissance Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism. It alsocomments on the rise of anti-Aristotelianism.

Initially Renaissance thinkers thought of antiquity as subscribing toa common set of ideas with only minor variations, so that differenceswere only superficial andin verbis (a matter of words). Asthey became better acquainted with the multiple traditions of thoughtfrom antiquity, however, they came to realize that differences ranmuch deeper. This posed a number of challenges to the enterprise ofbaptizing pagan philosophy, but in some cases, it also revealed thateffort to be largely futile. One positive outcome was, at times, amore critical attitude toward all ancient philosophical currents.

4.3.1 Platonism

The direct influence of Plato’s writings had been limited in theMiddle Ages to just a few dialogues: theMeno, thePhaedo, and the initial part of theTimaeus. Duringthe fifteenth century, many more of his writings appeared in Latintranslation, greatly expanding his direct influence (Kraye 1988:349–59). Scholars debated—often vehemently—therelative superiority of Aristotle or Plato (see, for example, thecontroversy between George of Trebizond and Bessarion after 1458;Monfasani 2021: 339–60). The full scope of Plato’s thoughtemerged from Marsilio Ficino’s watershed Latin edition of hisworks in 1484. (Translations of the Greek commentaries would follow.)As mentioned in§4.2.2, it seemed straightforward to integrate Plato’s teachings on thesoul with Christian views, an operation encouraged by the example ofinfluential Church Fathers such as Augustine. (Christians found someof Plato’s other views, such as the community of wives andproperty, rather harder to swallow; see Hankins 1990.) Ficino himself,though trained as a scholastic philosopher, was a major architect ofthe operation of bringing Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Christianityin line with each other, as testified by his important workPlatonic Theology (Theologia Platonica). Hisapproach was aided by his view of a perennial philosophy of which boththe pagan and Mosaic traditions took part (Schmitt 1966). His exampleenjoyed many followers. In Paris, Jacques Lefèvred’Étaples (c. 1460–1536) produced a large number ofcommentaries on Aristotle that offered a pious reading of thephilosopher, often by resorting to a reframing of his ideas by turningto the more palatable Plato. In Italy, the kinsmen Alessandro andFrancesco Piccolomini were likewise keen to see the two philosophersas complementary, rather than opposites. When Alessandro(1508–1579) published his second, retitled version of hisvernacular treatment of Aristotle’sEthics (Dellainstitutione morale libri XII, 1560), he added toAristotle’s books one on love and followed it immediately with atreatment of marriage and family. He was thus supplementingAristotle’s ethical writings with a modified and Christianizedversion of Plato’s theory of love. Francesco (1523–1607),for his part, was extremely aware of (and reported on) thecontemporary debate about what to do with Plato in hisAComprehensive Philosophy of Morals (Universa philosophia demoribus, 1583: 274–275). In contrast to those who thoughtthey needed to exalt one ancient philosopher over the other (MarioNizolio [1498–1566], for instance, or Francesco Patrizi daCherso, and their preference for Plato), he described each philosopheras providing an indispensable eye and, therefore, ensuring correctvision. In his own treatise, in which God and a Christian afterlifetake center stage, he modeled how ancient and Christian sources couldbe combined effectively (Lines 2002: 281–285). A similarinclination toward reconciling Plato and Aristotle can be seen in theSpanish humanist Sebastián Fox Morcillo (c. 1526–1560)and the Oxford professor John Case (1540/41?–1600). Case’sMirror of Moral Questions on all the Ethics of Aristotle(Speculum moralium quaestionum in universam ethicenAristotelis, 1585) treats Plato respectfully even when Aristotledoes otherwise. This sympathy may be due in part to Case’sdesire to show that Aristotle’s teaching on the soul accordswith Christianity (Schmitt 1983b). Likewise, in the seventeenthcentury the so-called Cambridge Platonists—including prominentpersonalities such as Henry More (1614–1687) and Ralph Cudworth(1617–1688)—drew on several philosophical traditions, suchas Aristotelianism and Stoicism, in addition to Platonism, while alsogiving careful consideration to issues bordering on theology, such asthe existence of God and the immortality of the soul (Kraye 1998:1290–93).

Although from a Christian perspective it seemed possible to combineAristotelianism and Platonism (as seen above, the operation was notuncommon), it was harder to make Aristotelianism agree with otherphilosophical schools. Such currents therefore functioned more asalternatives than as possible complementary systems.

4.3.2 Stoicism

Stoic ideas circulated in the Renaissance both indirectly (through theinfluential works of Cicero) and, more directly, through the genuineand spurious writings of Seneca and through theEnchiridionof Epictetus. The latter work, first translated into Latin in thefifteenth century, became especially popular in the often-printedrendering of Angelo Poliziano. The Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives(1493–1540) was a severe critic of Aristotelian ethics,preferring the tenets of Plato and, especially, the Stoics. He claimedin hisOrigins, Schools, and Merits of Philosophy (Deinitiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae, 1518) that he did notthink that there was any truer Christian than the Stoic sage.Nonetheless, Stoicism tended to have a hard time being accepted bythinkers (such as Erasmus and Michel de Montaigne [1533–1592])who noted its austerity, focus on virtue alone, and problematicattitude toward suicide (which the sect condoned). Such points made itdifficult to consider it compatible with Christianity (Kraye 1988:367–70; Kraye 1998: 1286–90). The key figure in makingStoic philosophy more acceptable was the Flemish humanist JustusLipsius (1547–1606). Lipsius provided a new edition of Seneca(1605), preceded by hisGuide to Stoic Philosophy(Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam, 1604) and hisStoicPhysiology (Physiologia Stoicorum, 1604). He went togreat lengths to show how close Stoicism was to Christianity (Papy2001) and had a significant influence on contemporaries such as theSpaniard Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645), who went even furtherdown the same path, but praised later Stoics above Seneca (Lines &Kraye 2013: 43–47).

4.3.3 Epicureanism and Skepticism

Quevedo, however, also had a strong interest in Epicureanism. Indeed,he thought of the two philosophies as broadly similar (and compatiblewith Christianity). He was one of the few in the Renaissance not tomisrepresent the philosophy of Epicurus as a beast-like dedication tothe senses and therefore something to be abhorred. In the process,however, he made Epicurus into a believer in the afterlife (largelybecause he was, again, keen to accommodate pagan philosophy with theChristian message). In hisDefense of Epicurus against CommonlyHeld Opinions (Defensa de Epicuro, 1635), Quevedo wasdrawing on sources that had become newly available in the fifteenthand sixteenth centuries: Book X of theLives of Philosophersby Diogenes Laertius, Lucretius’ poemDe rerum natura,and Sextus Empiricus. The absence of both Aristotle and Plato might beviewed as an attempt to create an independent space for philosophicaldiscussion: in other words, one free from the two dominant classicaltraditions but still loyal to Christian doctrine. Quevedo’s workwas not yet an explicit critique of Aristotle such as that of hisnear-contemporary Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655). Gassendi’sParadoxical Exercises against the Aristotelians(Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos, 1624)shows him rejecting Aristotle’s essences and universals, as wellas other aspects of his philosophy; since everything we know comes tous through the senses, but the senses are not reliable, it followsthat our knowledge is uncertain as well. Thus, Aristotle’smethod turns out to be faulty. Gassendi’s marriage ofEpicureanism and skepticism contributed much to making Epicureanphysics and ethics acceptable and even fashionable. Epicureanismbecame a direct threat to Aristotelianism (Kraye 1998: 1293–98).Another earlier and important attack on Aristotelianism from a skepticviewpoint was that of Francisco Sanches (1551–1623), whoseThat Nothing is Known (Quod nihil scitur, 1581)strongly targets the methods and conclusions of Aristotle and hisfollowers (Popkin 2003).

4.3.4 Late Anti-Aristotelianism

Some of the strongest attacks on Aristotle and Aristotelianism cametoward the end of the sixteenth century in Italy (see Martin 2014:113–120). Francesco Patrizi’sPeripateticDiscussions (Discussiones peripateticae, 1571 and 1581)strongly questions the authenticity of the received Aristoteliancorpus, outlines the rise of numerous sects of divergentinterpretations, and by contrast endorses the accuracy ofAverroes’ interpretations. HisNew Philosophy of theUniverse (Nova de universis philosophia, 1591) outlinedthe ways in which Aristotle’s philosophy was inconsistent withChristian principles and pointed to the usefulness of Plato instead.Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576), Bernardino Telesio(1509–1588), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), and TommasoCampanella (1568–1639) promoted a brand of empiricist naturalismthat often relied on Epicurean, Hermetic, or astrological influencesand could stray into theologically questionable areas of pantheism andpansensism (Copenhaver & Schmitt 1992: 285–328). Theexperimental and mathematical approach of Galileo Galilei(1564–1642), along with his scientific discoveries, implicitlychallenged both Aristotelian physics and cosmology, while trying notto appear to disrupt traditional interpretations of Scripture. ThePaduan professor Cesare Cremonini (1550–1631) indicated numerousareas in which Aristotle’s philosophy disagreed withChristianity, although he insisted on his obligation to teachAristotle’s text, even in areas in which it was contrary toChristian dogma. The Italian innovators (novatores), togetherwith others like Francisco Sanches, are known to have influencedFrench thinkers such as Marin Mersenne (1588–1648) andRené Descartes (1596–1650), whose parting of ways withAristotle was perhaps less radical and momentous than they themselvesclaimed.

In England (unlike in Protestant Germany), several scholars wereprejudiced against Aristotelianism because of its historical ties withCatholicism and leveled what might seem to be unjust criticismsagainst it. Furthermore, several English writers, drawing on thewritings of the Dutch thinker Gerardus Johannes Vossius(1577–1649), contended that Aristotle had improperly identifiednature with God. Francis Bacon, in hisDe dignitate et augmentisscientiarum (1623, a Latin reworking ofThe Advancement ofLearning of 1605), noted that this perspective both unduly lookedfor final causes in physics rather than in metaphysics and ignored thegreatest final cause of all (i.e., God). The outcome, he thought, wasdetrimental to science. Here the distinctive position of Englishthinkers needs to be kept in mind, with the double threat theyperceived from both Catholicism and anti-Trinitarianism (Martin 2014:ch. 8).

Challenges to Aristotelianism also came from other modern developmentssuch as international law theory. This is particularly evident withregard to Aristotle’s views on slavery. HisPoliticswas written in a context in which owning slaves was widespread, and hejustified the practice through the concept of “naturalslavery” (Book I). During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,this conception went largely unchallenged: slaves (especially from theMediterranean and northern Africa) continued to be a common sight incities. It was only with the Spanish activities of conquest andenslavement in the New World that the practice was called intoquestion. At the famous debate of Valladolid (1550–1551), JuanGinés de Sepúlveda (1490–1573) and the DominicanBartolomé de Las Casas (1484–1566) argued for and againstthe doctrine of natural slavery respectively. Domingo de Sotosupported the doctrine, applying theius gentium to thecontext of the colonies. The point was not an academic one, since itconcerned the right of the Spanish crown to deprive Amerindians intheir colonies of their independence and property. However, as is wellknown, arguments for emancipation led to abolitionism only in thenineteenth century.

5. Sources, Reference Works, and Desiderata

Our current understanding of Renaissance Aristotelianism has beengreatly aided by several valiant (but nonetheless incomplete)bibliographical enterprises, which have provided the foundation formany modern studies of Aristotelianism. Lohr 1988– (stillmissing volume 4) is an attempt to register most medieval andRenaissance commentaries on Aristotle in Latin, including bothmanuscripts and printed editions. Arranged alphabetically by author,the entries give the incipits and explicits of manuscript works andprovide helpful biographical and bibliographical information,including secondary literature. Note that volume 2 (RenaissanceAuthors,1500–1650) in many cases does notreproduce the full secondary literature that was included inLohr’s original articles from the 1970s and 1980s (seeBibliography). It also does not include anonymous titles, and in a fewrare cases entirely misses out a significant author (such as UlisseAldrovandi). Given the focus on Latin, works in the vernacular are notconsidered.

At the other extreme of comprehensiveness is Risse 1998, which doesnot focus on Aristotelian works alone, but in principle includes allprinted philosophical works (not only commentaries) up to 1800. Rissedivides these into categories, so that all works of logic, forinstance, sit in the same volume. In each volume the entries arearranged chronologically and are accompanied by a minimum ofbibliographical information. Works of all kinds and languages jostleside by side. The result can be illuminating, but it is very hard tojudge from just a title whether a particular item, for example, is acommentary, a translation, or something else. A significant drawbackis that no manuscript information is given; moreover, given theevolution of digital bibliographical tools in recent decades, it islikely that many items have been overlooked.

There are also more specialized inventories. Cranz and Schmitt 1984gives a chronologically ordered list of editions of Aristotle in thesixteenth century. Again, the bibliographical details provided arescant, but can be useful to help trace, say, the multiple editions ofa particular work. It thus has several of the drawbacks and virtues ofRisse’s repertory. The most recent contender, Lohr 2023, followsthe standard order of the Aristotelian canon and then lists Latineditions by first year of printing and translator. This repertory,published posthumously, gives the reader a handy overview of thenumber of printed translations of each “Aristotelian”work. It rightly includes incipits and explicits for all items.Scholars may, however, find disappointing the lack of an index of suchincipits and, especially, the decision by the editors to limit thenumber of pseudographs originally included by Lohr. Nonetheless, thisvolume may serve as a useful basis for further research, not leastbecause its chronological span is quite broad (1450 to 1650).

Finally, some scholars have published more targeted repertories. In2006 Lawrence Green published a much-updated listing of printedRenaissance works on rhetoric (Green & Murphy 2006). This isanother mammoth and useful enterprise. Although it runs the risk ofbeing overtaken by newer cataloguing tools, it nevertheless allows theuser to compare, say, Cicero editions and commentaries with those ofAristotle. Green also tackled the problem of “ghosts” byphysically inspecting as many items as possible. Others have studiedthe reception of a particular Aristotelian work in a more restrictedgeographical context, such as the commentaries and other works on theNicomachean Ethics in the Italian peninsula (Lines 2002:472–539). Even here, though, there are limitations, such as afocus on Latin works only. That deficiency has now been addressedthrough an online, freely accessible database onVernacularAristotelianism in Renaissance Italy, c. 1400–c. 1650 (Other Internet Resources). This project, now in need of updating, has offered a differentperspective on some of the various linguistic engagements withAristotle during the period.

Although these tools can provide substantial advances for the study ofRenaissance Aristotelianism, many of its facets continue to be poorlyunderstood. Several other aspects require further research, includingthe following:

• the extent to which Aristotle’s thought was really followedin teaching contexts
• the effectiveness of both Catholic and Protestant ecclesiasticalauthorities in containing “heretical” interpretations ofAristotle’s writings
• the proportion between Latin and vernacular works onAristotle
• the development and significance of anti-Aristotelianism
• humanism and Aristotelianism
• women writers on Aristotle
• the role played by Greek scholars such as Johannes Argyropoulosand Theodore Gaza
• the influence of the ancient and medieval (Byzantine) Greekcommentaries
• the changes to Aristotelianism brought about by print
• the distinctive features of medieval and RenaissanceAristotelianism
• the language(s) and form(s) in which Aristotelianism wasexpressed

In addition to confronting some of these issues, future research oughtto edit or translate the most significant works on Aristotle producedin the Renaissance. Kraye 1997 already provides a helpful series oftranslated extracts of philosophical works, including fromcommentaries and other works on ethics and politics. More recently,Emidio Campi and Joseph McLelland supplied an English translation oftheEthics commentary of Pier Martire Vermigli (Vermigli 1563[2006]) and Luca Baschera and Christian Moser reedited the Latin text(Vermigli 2011), while Vittoria Perrone Compagni has produced a numberof commented Italian translations of Pomponazzi’s works. Thiskind of difficult (but indispensable) work will need to becomplemented by continuing attention to other features ofAristotle’s reception, including the cultural and institutionalcontexts in which it took place.

Bibliography

A. Primary Literature

• Aristotle,The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised OxfordTranslation, 2 volumes, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984.
• Bruni, Leonardo, “On the Correct Way to Translate”(“De interpretatione recta” [1424/1426]), in GordonGriffiths, James Hankins, and David Thompson (eds.),The Humanismof Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts, Binghamton, NY: Medieval andRenaissance Texts and Studies, 1987, pp. 217–229.
• Erculiani, Camilla,Letters on Natural Philosophy: TheScientific Correspondence of a Sixteenth-Century Pharmacist, withRelated Texts, Eleonora Carinci (ed.), Hannah Marcus (trans.),Toronto: Iter Press, 2021.
• Melanchthon, Philipp, 1532,In Primum, secundum, tercium etquintum Ethicorum commentarii, Wittenberg: Iosephus Clug.
• Petrarch, Francis,De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia,translated asOn His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others,inCKR: 47–133.
• Piccolomini, Francesco,Universa philosophia de moribus… in decem gradus redacta et explicata, Venice: FrancescoFranceschi Senese, 1583.
• Pomponazzi, Pietro, 1525,Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi etmere peripatetici, Venice: heirs of Ottaviano Scoto. Reprinted inhisTutti i trattati peripatetici, J. M. GarcíaValverde (ed.), Milan: Bompiani, 2013.
• Vermigli, Peter Martyr, 1563,In primum, secundum et tertiilibri Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, Zurich. Translated asCommentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethicc (The PeterMartyr Library, ser. I, v. 9), Emidio Campi and Joseph C. McLelland(eds.), Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2006.
• –––, 2011.Kommentar zur NikomachischenEthik des Aristoteles (Studies in Medieval and ReformationTraditions: Texts & Sources), Luca Baschera and Christian Moser(eds.), Leiden: Brill.

Compilations

• [CKR] Cassirer, Ernst, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and JohnHerman Randall, Jr. (eds.), 1948,The Renaissance Philosophy ofMan: Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives, Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.
• Kraye, Jill (ed.), 1997,Cambridge Translations of RenaissancePhilosophical Texts, 2 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803048

Bibliographies

• Cranz, F. Edward and Charles B. Schmitt, 1984,A Bibliographyof Aristotle Editions, 1501–1600, 2nd edition, Baden-Baden:V. Koerner.
• Lohr, Charles H., 1974, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors A-B”,Studies in the Renaissance,21: 228–289. doi:10.2307/2857156
• –––, 1975, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors C”,Renaissance Quarterly, 28(4):689–741.
• –––, 1976, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors D–F”,RenaissanceQuarterly, 29(4): 717–745.
• –––, 1977, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors G–K”,RenaissanceQuarterly, 30(4): 681–741.
• –––, 1978, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors L–M”,RenaissanceQuarterly, 31(4): 532–603.
• –––, 1979, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors N–Ph”,RenaissanceQuarterly, 32(4): 529–580.
• –––, 1980, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors Pi–Sm”,RenaissanceQuarterly, 33(4): 623–734.
• –––, 1982, “Renaissance Latin AristotleCommentaries: Authors So–Z”,RenaissanceQuarterly, 35(2): 164–256.
• –––, 1988–,Latin AristotleCommentaries, 5 volumes planned, Florence: Olschki and Florence:SISMEL.
  • Volume 1,Medieval Authors, 2 books, 1988.
  • Volume 2,Renaissance Authors, 1988.
  • Volume 3,Index initiorum, Index finium, 1995
  • Volume 5,Bibliography of Secondary Literature,2005.
• –––, 2023,The Aristotelian Tradition(1200–1650): Translations, Themes and Editions, ChrisophLüthy and Andrea Aldo Robiglio (eds.), 2 volumes, Florence:SISMEL,
  • volume II,Latin Aristotle Editions(1450–1650).
• Green, Lawrence D. and James J. Murphy, 2006,RenaissanceRhetoric Short-Title Catalogue 1460–1700, revised andexpanded edition, Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Risse, Wilhelm, 1998,Bibliographia philosophica vetus:Repertorium generale systematicum operum philosophicorum usque adannum MDCCC typis impressorum, 9 volumes, Hildesheim: G.Olms.

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• Akopyan, Ovanes (ed.), 2019, “Francesco Patrizi Da Cherso(1529–1597): New Perspectives on a RenaissancePhilosopher”, special issue ofIntellectual HistoryReview, 29(4): 541–617.
• Andreoni, Annalisa, 2012,“La via della dottrina”:le lezioni accademiche di Benedetto Varchi (Alla giornata 9),Pisa: ETS.
• Ashworth, E. Jennifer, 1974,Language and Logic in thePost-Medieval Period (Synthese Historical Library 12),Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel.doi:10.1007/978–94–010–2226–2
• –––, 1988, “Logic and Language:Traditional Logic”, inSchmitt et al. 1988: 143–172 (ch. 6).
• Bianchi, Luca (ed.), 1997,La filosofia nelleuniversità, secoli XIII–XIV, Scandicci: La NuovaItalia.
• –––, 2003, “Una caduta senza declino?Considerazioni sulla crisi dell’aristotelismo fra Rinascimentoed Età moderna”, in herStudisull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento, Padua: Il Poligrafo,pp. 133–183.
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• Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy c.1400-c.1650 (University of Warwick)
• Kuhn, Heinrich, “Aristotelianism in the Renaissance”,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition),Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/aristotelianism-renaissance/>. [This was the previous entry on this topic in theStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy – see theversion history.]

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