Giles of Rome (who died in 1316 as archbishop of Bourges) was one ofthe most productive and influential thinkers active at the end of the13th century, who played a major role also in the political events ofhis time. Giles of Rome was an extremely prolific author and left avery large corpus of writings, encompassing commentaries on Aristotle,theological treatises, questions, and sermons. In the last couple ofdecades, a research group originally led by Francesco Del Punta(Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy; died in 2013) has beendevoting a lot of energy to the project of publishing hisOperaOmnia and deepening our knowledge of his thought. Although thisgroup has produced extremely significant results, enriched by thecontributions of other scholars, an assessment of Giles’ whole work isstill in progress. For this reason, the present entry only aims atproviding insight into an ongoing process of research.

• 1. Life
• 2. Logic and Rhetoric
• 3. Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge
• 4. Natural Philosophy
• 5. Between Philosophy and Medicine
• 6. Ethics and Political Theory
• Bibliography
  • Primary Sources
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life

Born in Rome most probably in the fifth decade of the thirteenthcentury, Giles was the first outstanding theologian of the relativelyrecently founded Order of the Augustinian Hermits. Nothing more isknown about his origins: the statement that he belonged to the famousRoman family of the Colonna seems to go back to Jordan of Saxony’sLiber Vitasfratrum (second half of the 14th century), but iscompletely missing from contemporary, 13th-century sources. From Giles’will we know that he was sent to Paris to study in the convent of hisOrder. At the beginning he must have followed the courses either of asecular master or of a theologian belonging to a different Order, asthe Augustinian friars did not have a regent master at the time.Probably he was a pupil of Aquinas’ in the years 1269–1272. Hecommented on the Sentences at the beginning of the 1270s. In followingyears he most probably wrote also a large number of his commentaries onAristotle.

The year 1277 marked a turning-point in his career: Giles wasinvolved in the condemnation of the heterodox Aristotelianism issued bythe Parisian bishop Etienne Tempier, although the process against himmust be distinguished from the famous decree of the 7 of March 1277, asRobert Wielockx has shown. After 1277 Giles must have abandoned Paris,but his presence is attested in Italy not earlier than 1281. Beforeleaving Paris he completed his De regimine principum, which isdedicated to the young Philip, the future Philip the Fair.

Between 1281 and 1284 Giles played an important role in thegovernment of his Order, taking part in various chapters held in Italy.At the provincial chapter of Tuscania (nowadays in Lazio, Italy) in1285 he acted as vicar of the prior general of his Order, Clement ofOsimo.

In 1285, Giles’ doctrine was examined again; after recanting only apart of what had been previously condemned in 1277, he was allowed toteach again; by 1287 he is referred to as a master of theology. Hisuniversity quodlibeta go back to this period, from the academic year1285/86 to 1292/93 (Pini 2006, Wielockx 2014). This success enhancedGiles of Rome’s authority even more in his Order, whose generalchapter of Florence decreed that Giles’ works (even future ones)should be considered as the official doctrine of the Order, to bedefended by all Augustinian bachelors and masters. In 1292, at theGeneral Chapter of Rome he was elected prior general of his Order.

Benedict Caetani’s election to the papal see marked a furtherradical change in his career, as Boniface VIII appointed him archbishopof Bourges in 1295. As a matter of fact, Giles was very often absentfrom his see, spending extended periods of time at the papal curia. InhisDe renuntiatione, he defended the legitimacy ofCelestine’s abdication, and, consequently, of Boniface’ selection. When the contrast between Boniface VIII and Philip IV reachedits most critical point, he continued to side staunchly with the pope.An important sermon defending the papal position has beendiscovered by Concetta Luna, and Giles’De ecclesiasticapotestate undoubtedly ranks among the sources ofUnamSanctam.

Giles’ prestige decreased after Boniface’ death, and even morewith the rise of Clement V to the papal throne. Before being electedpope, Betrand de Got, as archbishop of Bourdeaux, had had seriousconflicts with Giles. This unfavorable change, however, did not preventGiles from playing a significant role in the debates of his time.Around 1305–6 he took part in a commission which examined and condemnedthe eucharistic doctrine of John of Paris, a former adversary of Giles’during the conflict between Philip the Fair and Boniface. In thediscussions concerning the Templars which eventually led to thesuppression of the Order, Giles sided with Philip the Fair, attackingthe Templars and devoting a whole tract,Contra exemptos, tothe thesis that their exemption from episcopal jurisdiction was thecause of their abuses (Jordan 2005). During the Council of Vienne Giles was asked todraw a list of errors extracted from the works of Peter John Olivi:three of them were officially condemned by the Council. On December 22,1316 he died at the papal Curia at Avignon (For further details see DelPunta-Donati-Luna 1993, Briggs 2016).

Relying on manuscript evidence and other sources, Giorgio Pini (2005)could identify which kind of theological and philosophical works Gilesread, studied and had copied for himself during his long intellectualcareer. Pini distinguishes three main periods. In the first one,before 1277, quite unsurprisingly, he reads Aquinas (not only theCommentary on the Sentences of the Dominican master, but also hislater works), Aristotle (e. g. in these years Giles owns and annotatesa copy of theNicomachean Ethics), Avicenna and Averroes. Heis also very well acquainted with the works of Ps. Denis theAeropagite. In the second period (1277–1285), when forced to leave theacademic milieu, Giles widens his interests. He studies many works ofAnselm’s (while most theologians of his time were very selective intheir knowledge of this author), and makes acquaintance with works byAugustine, such as Confessions andSoliloquia, that werequite unusual readings for an academic theologian. In the this period(from his return to the Parisian Faculty of Theology [1285] to hisdeath) Giles studies almost entirely the available works by Augustineand acquires also rare treatises by Proclus. Giles’ increasingattention for Augustine is mirrored in his mature works and willinfluence also the theological orientation of his own Order in thefollowing decades (Pini 2012).

2. Logic and Rhetoric

After René Antoine Gauthier identified in the master GuillaumeArnauld the real author of theLectura supra logicam veteremattributed to Giles of Rome (Tabarroni 1988), interest in logicalworks focused mainly on his Commentaries on theSophisticiElenchi and onPosterior Analytics. In his treatment ofthefallacia figurae dictionis Giles proves to be a brilliantand original representative of “modistic logic”, who baseshis solutions mainly on the semantics ofintentiones(Tabarroni 1991). This does not imply, however, that he always agreeswith the Modists. One of the most relevant disagreements regardssignification. He doesn’t think that signification is the essentialform of the linguistic sign. On the contrary, sharing a a much morewidespread view in his times, to him, the signification ofe.g. a name is a concept (or more precisely a definition),which in turn signifies the thing. This signification is not natural,but conventional. The linguistic sign signifies in a natural way onlyits mental image, which is essential to human acts of speech (Marmo2016). Alessandro Conti (1992) investigated Giles’ Commentary onPosterior Analytics as an example of his theory of truth,which brings to completion Aquinas’ shift from Augustine’s influenceto the Aristotelian approach. Bertagna (2002–2004) investigatedthe structure of this commentary, while Longeway (2002) and Corbini(2002) drew scholars’ attention to Giles’ epistemic logic. Giles ofRome also authored the most important Commentary on the Rhetoric ofthe Latin medieval tradition, which earned him the honorific title ofexpositor of this book and influenced all later medievalcommentaries. Costantino Marmo studied Giles’ approach to thedifferent translations to which he had access and showed how hedeveloped Aquinas’ theory of passions in commenting on the relevantportions of Aristotle’s text (Marmo 1991), trying to solve someproblems left open by Aquinas. It has been suggested that Gilesconsiders rhetoric to be a sort of “logic” of ethics andpolitics: this brilliant interpretation needs, however, furtherdevelopment and articulation (Staico 1992). Janet Coleman (2000) alsomaintained that Aristotle’s rhetorical method determines the substanceof Giles’De regimine principum, but one should also takeinto account also Lidia Lanza’s (2001) remarks. Marmo (2016) pointedout that if rhetoric is themodus sciendi more apt to moralsciences, this does not imply that it contributes to moral orpolitical knowledge, since this is derived from the principles properof ethics or politics.

3. Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge

Traditionally, Giles was described as a “faithful”disciple of Aquinas’. Nowadays such a judgment is not acceptedby scholars. After Concetta Luna argued persuasively in favor of theauthenticity of theReportatio, it became clear that Giles,already in the first stages of his career, develops his positionstaking Aquinas’ teaching as a starting point for his ownreflection, but criticizes and corrects the doctrines of the Dominicanmaster in many aspects. Luna could also establish that Giles reworkedhisLectura on the Sentences (handed down to us as areportatio) into anordinatio only for the first twobooks. However, while the first book was completed shortly after theLectura, that is, during the years 1271–1273, thesecond book had to wait for completion until 1309. Luna gatheredimpressive evidence suggesting that theOrdinatio of thethird book that goes under the name of Giles is, in fact,spurious. Broadly speaking, Giles’ “philosophicalproject” tends to discuss critically Aquinas’ position inorder to improve the solutions he offered, without, however, trying todiscard them radically. Recently, Katherine König-Pralong showedthat this is the case for the debate about the natural desire forknowledge: although defended in in the context of a discussion withHenry of Ghent, Giles’ position does not coincide with that ofAquinas. According to him, in fact, human beings possess a naturaldesire for knowledge that is satisfied by a limited understanding ofseparate substances (König-Pralong 2014). The same holds truealso for one of the most famous topics of his discussion with Henry ofGhent, the distinction between “essence” and“existence”. In this case, Giles radicalizesAquinas’ doctrine of the real distinction, asserting thatexistence must be conceived as a “res addita”[thing added] to essence (Pickavé 2016). Although the finalresult of his theory was considered closer to Avicenna’ssolution than to that of Aquinas, Giles nevertheless develops itstarting from Aquinas’ own position (Wippel 1981), as emergesalready from his Questions on the Metaphysics (Conti 2014). Theconnection of this issue with the discussion with Henry of Ghent aboutthe concept of “creation” was investigated in depth byGiorgio Pini (1992), who could show how Giles, while defending Aquinasand thereby the possibility of using some Aristotelian principles inan orthodox account of creation, goes beyond the positions of theDominican master, e. g. asserting the identity of“esse” and “creatio”(seealso Porro 2014, Cross 2016). Giles advocated the compatibility ofAristotelian doctrine with Christian faith also in his commentary onthe short treatiseDe bona fortuna attributed to Aristotle,but in reality consisting in a compilation of passages taken from theEthica eudemia and theMagna moralia. Theinterpretation of the concept of “bona fortuna” in thosetexts implied problemas connected with contingency, necessity and theinterplay between divine causality and natural events. AsValérie Cordonnier (2104) showed, Giles’ solution wasattacked by Henry of Ghent as leading to necessitarism.

As to the debate about the unicity of substantial form, Giles’position evolves during time. If we leave aside theErroresphilosophorum, since the authenticity of this work has beencontested with serious arguments (Bruni 1935, Koch 1944, Donati 1990b,Luna 1990), we can notice that Giles changes his position from theContra gradus et pluralitatem formarum (between the end of1277 and the beginning of 1278), where he, against Henry of Ghentdenies plurality of forms for every compound (Wilson 2014), to laterworks, where he takes a more cautious stance in particular concerningman. The principle of individuation is identified, as in Aquinas, with“materia signata quantitate”, that is, matter designatedby its dimensions. According to Giles, who criticizes also Richard ofMediavilla on this point, matter is pure potentiality and thereforecannot be distinguished into different kinds. For this reason, hecannot accept Aquinas’ doctrine that the incorruptibility of celestialbodies derives from the peculiar nature of their matter (Donati1986). In Giles’ opinion celestial bodies are not incorruptiblebecause their matter is different from the matter of sublunar bodies,but rather because theirquantitas materiae cannot change itsdeterminate dimensions. This is but one application of Giles’ famousdoctrine of “indeterminate dimensions”. ModifyingAverroes’ doctrine in this respect, Giles argues that a portion ofmatter, in order to be able to receive a form, needs to possessalready a sort of quantity. Such quantity, however, should not beidentified with the determinate dimensions a body possesses, but israther aquantitas which remains the same during processessuch as rarefaction and condensation. Giles’ notion ofquantitas materiae, which is not only generically extensionor three-dimensionality, but seems to represent an unchangeable given“amount” of matter pertaining to a body, has beenconsidered comparable, some differences notwithstanding, to the modernnotion of mass (Donati 1988, Donati-Trifogli 2016).

After the condemnation of 1277, a significant change can be noticed inGiles’ position also in his solution of the problem of the eternity ofthe world. At the beginning of his career he admitted the theoreticalpossibility of the eternity of the world, although rejectingAristotle’s arguments proving the actual eternity of the world. Laterhe shifted to a more “ Augustinian” stance, rejecting thehypothesis of a creation “ab aeterno” andadmitting that it is possible to prove the temporality of creation,although he finds that no conclusive argument has been advanced so far(but see also Cross 2016). Giles was much more steadfast in hisopposition to another major tenet of “Averroistic”doctrine, that is the unicity of the possible intellect. He maintainedthat the possibility of actual knowledge on the part of the individualdepends necessarily on the fact that each body is informed by its ownintellective soul, which is its form. For the same reasons Giles alsorejected the unicity of the agent intellect, a doctrine he attributedto Avicenna (Del Punta-Donati-Luna 1993, Conolly 2007).

Giles’ account of knowledge is indebted to Aquinas, but, again,reveals many original features. In the first place, he insists on astrictly causal interpretation — be it direct or via a medium— of the cognitive process, both at the level of sensory andintellectual acts. Secondly, the Augustinian master doesn’t conceiveof the role of “intelligible species” orformalesexpressiones as he often writes, as essential to the process ofcognition in itself. As Giorgio Pini (2016) has shown, theintelligible species is necessary only when the object cannot bepresent in the intellect directly. Admittedly, this direct presence ispossible only in the beatific vision (after death) and most probablyin the cognition angels have of themselves. For human knowledge inthis life, on the contrary, intelligible species fulfill a necessaryfunction, as causal proxies, as Pini (2016) writes, mediating betweenthe object and the cognitive power. Difficulties for Giles’ accountemerge especially when it comes to defining the ontological status ofthe species. The interpretation of cognition in terms of causationseems in fact to imply, according to Giles’ own presuppositions, thatthe species belongs to the same kind of the thing it represents. Onthe other hand, the intelligible species is in the intellect, and thispresence is explained in terms of inherence of an accident (thespecies) in a substance. Giles himself is aware of this difficulty,since in one passage he claims that such species are in themselvesneither substances nor accidents. They can, however, be“reduced” to the kind to which the represented thingbelongs. Pini (2016) is right in pointing out that Giles’ answer seemsto raise more problems than it can solve.

4. Natural Philosophy

Studies concerning Giles’ natural philosophy focused mainly on histreatment of some pivotal concepts of Aristotle’s Physics. CeciliaTrifogli opened new perspectives in this field, devoting her attentionto the notions of place and motion (especially in the void, seeTrifogli 1992), underlining that “Giles’ emphasis on therole of place in the description of motion seems to lead to aquantitative and relational notion of place. Giles, however, does notcompletely substitute the Aristotelian notion of place for that ofplace as distance. Place as distance is only one of the two notions ofplace which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related tomaterial place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and thelocated body that cannot be founded on distance alone” (Trifogli1990a, 350). Giles’ distinction was referred to as an oppositionbetween material place (the limit of the containing body) and formalplace (distance from the fixed points of the universe)(Donati-Trifogli 2016). Trifogli also investigated Giles’ notions oftime and infinity, emphasizing that his whole approach to naturalphilosophy is distinguished by a tendency towards a metaphysicalinterpretation of Aristotelian concepts, as opposed to a physical andquantitative one (Trifogli 1990b, 1991). For example, Giles conceivesof time not as a quantity pertaining to every kind of motion, butrather as the same thing as motion, seen under a different aspect. Hisconcept of time rests in fact essentially on a broad notion ofsuccession, which allows him on one hand to retain the unity of theconcept of time, but, on the other hand, to acknowledge the existenceof different times (Trifogli 1990b, Donati-Trifogli 2016) Gilesdistinguishes between two kinds of duration: extrinsic duration is thetime of celestial motion, and is obviously one in number. Intrinsicduration depends on the different motions taking place in thesublunary world and is therefore plural (Donati-Trifogli 2016). Asimilar attitude emerges also from the analysis of Giles’ controversyon angelic time with Henry of Ghent (Porro 1988, Porro 1991, but seealso Faes de Mottoni 1983). Both authors thought that the time inwhich angels exist, unlike sublunar time, is a discrete succession ofinstants. Giles and Henry disagreed, however, on the relationshipexisting between angelic and sublunar time. In particular, Henryrejected Giles’ thesis that more instants of angelic time cancorrespond to one and the same instant of sublunar time. Thisdifference of opinion rested in part on diverging concepts of angelicmotion, which can be istantaneous according to Henry, but notaccording to Giles.

5. Between Philosophy and Medicine

In 2008, Romana Martorelli Vico published the first critical editionof Giles’De formatione corporis humani in utero. With thiswork, completed between 1285 and 1295, Giles took a stance in the muchdebated question of the respective roles of male and female parents inconception. The Galenist view, going back to Hippocrates, was thatboth male and female contributed sperm, so that the offspring couldhave characteristics from both parents. On the contrary, Aristotle hadheld that only the male alone contributed sperm containing an activeand formal principle to conception, while the female provided only thematter of the fetus. Giles was well acquainted with these differentpositions and with the efforts to reconcile the diverging approachesofmedici andphilosophi, which could be traced back toAvicenna. Leaning on Averroes’Colliget, however, Gilesrejected any attempt to attribute a formal role to the female sperm,even if it is conceived as subordinate to the male one. On the contraryhe maintained that it can contribute only in a passive way toconception, while what was called “female sperm”, i.e., thevaginal secretion, has a subservient, helpful but by no means necessaryfunction. It helps the male sperm to inseminate female matter, but doesnot add anything essential to the new being. In this way, Gilesintended to stress the superiority of the philosophical, theoreticalapproach to such problems with respect to the traditions of medicallearning, even when the latter seemed to be supported by empirical evidence(Hewson 1975; Martorelli Vico 1988). Empirical evidence such as theresemblance of the offspring to the mother was e.g., explained away asan example of stronger resistance of female matter to the action ofform (Martorelli Vico 2002). After conception the human embryo begins adevelopment which goes through different stages. Comparing these stagesto the embryos of various animals Giles, like Thomas Aquinas, supportedan interpretation of the fetal development which would be exploitedmany centuries later by the so-called “recapitulationtheory” (Hewson 1975, 99). Giles maintained, however, that“the organic fetal body is not to be called a pig, a bear, or amonkey, but something immediately disposed to becoming man”(Hewson 1975, 100). This position apparently implies that human lifedoes not fully begin at the moment of conception. Although such athesis can be brought to bear on the moral judgment concerningabortion, Giles does not seem interested in tackling from this point ofview an issue which would become central for what nowadays is calledbioethics.

6. Ethics and Political Theory

In the debate on the respective roles of intellect and will in thedetermination of human action Giles’ position underwent an evolution,while he seems to be in search of an intermediate position, a sort ofcompromise between the theory of Henry of Ghent and that of Geoffreyof Fontaines. Giles maintains, in fact, that will is a passive potencyand can not “move” itself, but always needs an object, a“bonum apprehensum”. This starting point however, does notrule out its freedom, because will, even if is moved“moved” by its object, can determine itself and otherpotencies with regard to action. This view of Giles’ is consistentwith his mature interpretation of the relationship existing betweenknowledge and will in the sinner. Committing a sin implies anignorance of the real good, but this ignorance is not the primarycause of the wrong behavior, because it is an effect of the will,which, affected bymalicia, corrupts the judgment of thereason (Macken 1977, Eardley 2003, Pini 2006, Eardley 2016, but seealso Cross 2016).

Giles of Rome exerted considerable influence also in other fields ofethics, such as the theory of virtues. The most developed expression ofhis position is not to be found in a Commentary on Aristotle, butrather in hisDe regimine principum, the most successful“mirror of princes” of medieval political thought, which isstill conserved in more than 300 manuscripts in its original Latinversion, to which many translations in European vernaculars must beadded. Written most probably between 1277 and 1280 theDeregimine is acknowledged to be one of the most successful attemptsat mediating Aristotle’s practical philosophy, and in particular his“ethical and political language” to the Latin West. Gileswas the first to structure a mirror of princes in three books along thelines of a scheme —ethica-oeconomica-politica — whichplayed an important role in the reception of Aristotle’s moral andpolitical philosophy in the Middle Ages (Lambertini 1988). The authortakes great care to give the impression that he is mainly relying onAristotle’s text, providing numerous quotations from theNichomachean Ethics, from thePolitics and from theRethoric. Scholars should not overlook, however, that hisreception of Aristotle is not as direct as it can seem and that Gilesis deeply influenced by a tradition in the interpretation ofAristotle’s practical philosophy. In this tradition Aquinas plays avery important role for Giles, so that, while Aristotle is theauthority who is quoted on almost every occasion, it is the unnamedAquinas who, with hisSententia libri Politicorum,Deregno,Summa Theologiae, exerts a really decisiveinfluence onDe regimine. While discussing particular topics,Giles skillfully adapts Aristotle to his own purposes. This emergeswith clarity in the first book, devoted to ethics, where Giles’classification of virtues is heavily dependent on theSummaTheologiae and, therefore, on Aquinas’ reinterpretation of theAristotelian heritage. For example, Giles here definesprudentia as avirtus media, sharing the nature ofmoral as well as of intellectual ones, a doctrine which can by nomeans be traced back to the Stagirite (Lambertini 1991, 1992, 1995,2000). In the second book Giles deals with the ethics of man as headof the family, covering many topics, from children rearing andeducation to the rule over servants. To this purpose, he exploits awide range of sources, and also medicine authors (Lambertini 1988,Martorelli Vico 2008). As Giles wrote his De regimine, thepseudo-AristotelianOeconomica were not yet available intraslation to the Latin West; still, he managed to discuss alsoeconomic topics, as far as they are relevant for the household of aroyal family or for a high-class household in general. Here he condemnsusury, criticizes other economic practices as not suitable for aprince, and insists on the primary role agricolture should play(Lambertini 2015)

The most famous example of this selective attitude towardsAristotle’s works, however, belongs rather to the field of politicaltheory. In the third book ofDe regimine Giles wants to provethat monarchy is the absolutely best form of government. The firstarguments he puts forward in favor of monarchy are not taken fromAristotle’sPolitics, but from Aquinas’De regno.Then some arguments against monarchy which could be read in thePolitics are presented as objections that Aristotle puts forthfor subsequent refutation. At the end, Giles states squarely thatAristotle supports monarchy as the absolutely best form of monarchy andcorroborates his assertion with an argument, which, in thePolitics, actually goes in the opposite direction (Lambertini1990). One could provide several other examples to show thattheDe regimine succeeded in presenting itself as asimplified exposition and explanation of Aristotle’s thought inpractical philosophy, but at the same time transmitted to Giles’readers a strongly biased interpretation of the Stagirite. The factthat theDe regimine was often used as a tool to have easieraccess to Aristotle’s political theory deeply influenced, therefore,the way the Latin West read and understoodAristotle’sPolitics in the Late Middle Ages (e.g. Lambertini2017). Recent codicological studies on the diffusion ofDeregimine’ manuscripts do in fact show that many possessorsof the manuscripts most probably used them for study (SeeOperaOmnia I.1/11,Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine;Briggs 1999). Giles’De regimine was also translated intodifferent vernaculars (Perret 2011, Papi 2016). Graham McAleer (1999)pointed to the fact that Giles’ Commentary on the Sentences has beenalmost neglected as a source for Giles’ political philosophy. Studyingdistinction 22 and 44 of the II book, he found that in these textsGiles’ account of the origin of political authority among human beingsafter the Fall diverges from what one can read inDe regimineprincipum and reveals a profound influence by Augustine, whileAristotle does not play the important role he had in Giles’ mirror forprinces. One should also take into consideration thatGiles’Ordinatio of the second book was completed in 1309,that is at least 25 years afterDe regimine and could witnessto an evolution in Giles’ thought. As a matter of fact, the muchearlierreportatio does not tackle such issues at all(Lambertini 2014).

While in theDe regimine Giles carefully avoids anyreference to the thorny problem of the relationship between secular andecclesiastical power, his later writings which are relevant forpolitical theory deal first and foremost with ecclesiological problems.This holds true for his treatiseDe renuntiatione papae(1297–1298) where Giles defends the lawfulness of Celestine’sabdication against the arguments put forward by the Colonna cardinalsin their first appeal against Boniface VIII. From the point of view ofthe history of political thought it is relevant that Giles argues thatpapal power, although of divine origin, is conferred on a particularindividual by a human act, namely, by the election of the cardinals.Here Giles is countering the Colonna arguments that papal dignitycannot cease to reside in a pope until he dies, because the pontificatedepends on God’s will, and stresses the fact that divine intention inthis case becomes effective through the mediation of human agents, thatis, through the consent of the electors and of the elected. Ajurisdiction which is given by the consent of men, however, can also beremoved by their consent through a reverse procedure. This does notamount to saying that the pope can be deposed (except in case ofheresy), because, according to Giles, the pope is above the law and hasno earthly authority above him. He can however, depose himself, thatis, abdicate. Just as for his election the consent of his electors andof the elected was necessary, so also for the removal of the pope fromoffice his consent is decisive (Eastman 1989, 1990, 1992). In this wayGiles could dismiss arguments against the validity of Celestine’sabdication without admitting the possibility that the pope can bedeposed, e. g., by the Council, as Boniface’s adversariesmaintained.

Much better known thanDe renuntiatione is Giles’Deecclesiastica potestate, a treatise also composed in defense ofBoniface VIII. Most probably in 1302, Giles systematically expounded inthis work the views on the relationship betweenregnum andsacerdotium he had already put forward in a re-discoveredsermon held at the papal curia (Luna 1992, Lambertini 2006). The maintenet of his fully fledged argumentation is that the pope, supremeauthority of the Church but also of the whole of mankind, is the onlylegitimate origin of every power on earth, be it exercised — asjurisdiction — on persons, or — as property — onthings. In his plenitude of power, the pope possesses an absolutesupremacy both in the ecclesiastical and in the temporal sphere, anddelegates the exercise of the temporal “sword” to laysovereigns only in order to fulfill most properly his higher religiousduties. Any authority that does not recognize its dependence on thepapal power is but usurpation. In Giles’ view, there is no space evenfor a partially autonomous temporal order. Coherently, Giles maintainsthat no property rights are valid if they are not legitimated by papalauthority. Interestingly enough, such a claim is also supported byhis account of the origin of property, according to which property isnot a natural institution, but only the consequence of humanagreements, which lack any legitimacy unless they are recognized bythe supreme religious power (Miethke 2000, Homann 2004, Krüger2007). Scholarly discussion aboutDe ecclesiastica potestateis still open. Karl Ubl (2004) argues with strong arguments againstprevious assumptions, that Giles wrote in reaction to John ofParis’De regia potestate et papali. While previousscholarship stressed the affinity in form and content betweenDeecclesiastica potestate and the famous BullUnamsanctam, Francisco Bertelloni (2004) holds that one should notoverlook profound differences between the concepts of papal power thatinspire the two texts.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

The most complete list of Giles’ works can be found in DelPunta–Donati–Luna 1993 together with the most reliable attempt atdating them (see also Donati 1990b as far as commentaries on Aristotleare concerned). The same article by Del Punta, Donati and Luna alsocontains the best available bibliography, which can be complementedwith Lezcano 1995, 32–50 and Lanza 2003.It is impossible to reproduce all thatinformation in the present entry. Standard older editions werereprinted in Frankfurt 1967–1970. Among the texts edited in our centuryI would mention the following:

• De ecclesiastica potestate, R. Scholz (ed.), Weimar 1929(New critical edition and revised English translation inR. W. Dyson,Giles of Rome’s On Ecclesiastical Power. A MedievalTheory of World Government., New York 2004
• De differentia ethicae, politicae et rhetoricae, ed. G.Bruni,The New Scholasticism, 6 (1932): 5–12.
• De renuntiatione papae, ed. J. R. Eastman,Lewinston-Queenston-Lampeter 1992.
• Errores philosophorum, J. Koch (ed.), Milwaukee,Wisconsin 1944.
• Priuncipium super Sententias, C. Luna (ed.), “Ilprincipum super Sententias di Egidio Romano e un principium superSententias anonimo”,La filosofia medievale traantichità ed età moderna. Saggi in memoria di Francescodel Punta, A. Bertolacci, A. Paravicini Bagliani e M. Bertagna(edd.), Firenze 2017, 381–410.
• Quaestio de medio demonstrationis, J. Pinborg (ed.),“Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie an derArtistenfakultät”,Die Auseinandersetzungen an derPariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert.(Miscellanea medievalia, 10), ed. A. Zimmermann, Berlin-NewYork 1976, 240–268.
• Quaestio de subiecto theologiae, C. Luna (ed.),“Una nuova questione di Egidio Romano ‘De subiectotheologiae’”,Freiburger Zeitschrift fürPhilosophie und Theologie 37 (1990), pp. 397–439.
• Super librum I Sententiarum (reportatio), C. Luna (ed.),“Fragments d’une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome surle premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 etParis, B. N. Lat. 15819”, Revue des sciences philosophiqueset théologiques, 74 (1990), 205–254; 437–456.
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• Of the planned critical edition, Aegidii RomaniOperaomnia, Firenze 1985– have already appeared:
  • III, 1,Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx, Firenze 1985
  • III, 2,Reportatio Lecturae superlibros I-IV Sententiarum,Reportatio monacensis, C. Luna (ed.),Firenze 2003
  • II, 13,De formatione humani corporis in utero,R. Martorelli Vico (ed.), Firenze 2008
  • I.1/1,Catalogo dei manoscritti, Città del Vaticano,Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, B. Faes de Mottoni and C.Luna (eds.), Firenze 1987.
  • I.1/3*,Catalogo dei Manoscritti,Francia(Dipartimenti), F. Del Punta and C. Luna (eds.), Firenze1987.
  • I.1/3**,Catalogo dei Manoscritti,Francia(Dipartimenti), C. Luna (ed.), Firenze 1988.
  • I.1/2*,Catalogo dei Manoscritti,Italia (Firenze,Padova, Venezia), F. Del Punta and C. Luna (eds.), Firenze1988.
  • I.1/2**Catalogo dei manoscritti, Italia (Assisi-Venezia),F. Del Punta, B. Faes de Mottoni and C.Luna (eds.), Firenze 1998.
  • I.1/5*,Catalogo dei Manoscritti,Repubblica Federaledi Germania (Monaco), B. Faes de Mottoni (ed.), Firenze1990.
  • I.1/11,Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine principum(Città del Vaticano- Italia), F. del Punta andC. Luna (eds.), Firenze 1993
  • I.6Repertorio dei sermoni, C. Luna (ed.), Firenze1990.

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• Bettina Holstein’s Ph. D. Thesis,A Commentary on the De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno by Giles of Rome on the Basis of MS Cambrai 487 (455).
• Entry onEgidio Colonna, Catholic Encyclopedia
• Entry onGilles de Rome, Arlima
• Text ofOn the Errors of the Philosophers, Giles of Rome, Medieval Studies at U. California/Davis

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