Plutarch of Chaeronea in Boeotia (ca. 45–120 CE) was aPlatonist philosopher, best known to the general public as author ofhis “Parallel Lives” of paired Greek and Roman statesmenand military leaders. He was a voluminous writer, author also of acollection of “Moralia” or “Ethical Essays,”mostly in dialogue format, many of them devoted to philosophicaltopics, not at all limited to ethics.

Plutarch's significance as a philosopher, on which this articleconcentrates, lies in his attempt to do justice to Plato's work as awhole, and to create a coherent and credible philosophical system outof it, as Plotinus will also do later (204–270 CE). Two movesare crucial in this regard. First, Plutarch respects both theskeptical/aporetic element in Plato (as marked by the tentativenesswith which Socrates and the other main speakers in his dialoguesregularly advance their views) and the views apparently endorsed bythe main speakers of the dialogues, which were widely regarded asPlato's own doctrines (e.g. Diogenes Laertius 3.51–2). Second,Plutarch focuses primarily and quite strongly on theTimaeusfor his understanding of Plato's “doctrines,” and hisinterpretation of this dialogue shapes his understanding of the entirePlato. Plutarch maintains a literal interpretation of theTimaeus, according to which the world has come about in timefrom two principles, the creator god and the “IndefiniteDyad”. While the Dyad accounts for disorder and multiplicity,such as that of disordered matter before the creation of the orderedphysical world, of which pre-cosmic stage Timaeus appears to speak intheTimaeus, god accounts for order and the nature andidentity of objects and properties in the world.

This metaphysical dualism is further strengthened by the assumptionof two mediating entities through which the two principles operate;the Indefinite Dyad operates through a non-rational cosmic soul, whilegod through a rational one. This is the same soul, which becomesrational when god imparts reason from himself to it. As a result ofgod's imparting reason to the world soul, matter ceases to move in adisorderly manner, being brought into order through the imposition ofForms on it. The postulation of a non-rational pre-cosmic world soul,inspired mainly byLaws X (but absent from theTimaeus), allows Plutarch to dissolve the apparentcontradiction in different works of Plato that the soul is said to beboth uncreated (eternal) and created. For in his view the first soulof the sensible world, the world soul, is created only in the sensethat god, the demiurge of theTimaeus, makes it rational. Thepostulation of a non-rational pre-cosmic soul also allows Plutarch toaccount for the existence of badness in the world, because in his viewresidual irrationality abides in the world soul even when it becomesrational, which is accounted for by the fact that the world soul isoriginally non-rational in the sense that its movement is such,i.e. disorderly, and reason is an element external to it.

This dualism (non-rational-disorderly-badvs. rational-orderly-good) pervades also the sensible or physicalworld, since the human soul, being derivative from the world soul, hasa rational and a non-rational aspect too, as theRepublicproposes. In this spirit Plutarch distinguishes both in the world andin human beings three aspects, body, soul, and intellect. The soul'sconcern with the body gives rise to the non-rational aspect, whichamounts to disorder, vice, or badness, while the co-operation betweensoul and intellect promotes rationality, that is, order, virtue,benevolence. In an attempt to accommodate the diverse strands ofethical thought in Plato (e.g. in theGorgias,Protagoras,Republic,Phaedo,Theaetetus,Timaeus), Plutarch is the firstPlatonist to distinguish different levels of ethical life, which wecould term political and theoretical respectively, depending onwhether virtue pertains to the soul as organizing principle for one'sdaily life, or to the intellect as one's guide to knowledge of theForms (which include virtues) and of the intelligible realm moregenerally.

• 1. Life and works
• 2. Plutarch's Platonism
• 3. Logic/Epistemology
• 4. Metaphysics
  • 4.1 First Principles
  • 4.2 Fate and what is up to us
  • 4.3 Theology
• 5. Psychology
• 6. Ethics and Politics
• 7. Poetics and Educational theory
• 8. Influence
• Bibliography
  • Primary Sources
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and works

Plutarch was born in Chaeronea, a city of Boeotia in central Greecearound 45–47 CE. This date is inferred from Plutarch's owntestimony (On the E at Delphi 385B), according to which hebegan studying at Athens with a Platonist philosopher named Ammonius(see Dillon 1977, 189–192, Donini 1986b), when Nero was inGreece (66/67 CE). (This assumes that he was not more than twentyyears old at the time.) We know little about Ammonius and his school,that is, also of Plutarch's institutional affiliation (the evidence ofOn the E at Delphi 387F has been much debated; seee.g. Donini 1986a, 209–212, 1986b, 108–119, Opsomer 1998,21-25, 129-131). The main evidence about Ammonius' philosophical viewsis his speech as a character inOn the E at Delphi(391E–394C), on god, being, generation and corruption as well ashis contributions to the discussion inOn the Obsolence ofOracles (410F–414C) regarding divine justice and providence(Dillon 1977, 189–192, Opsomer 2009, 142–179). Thisevidence can be reasonably considered indicative of Ammonius'engagement with metaphysics, which must have stimulated Plutarch's owninterest in metaphysical questions. Plutarch must have stayed inAthens not only during his studies with Ammonius but considerablylonger, so as to become an Athenian citizen (Table Talks628A). According to this testimony, he also visited Rome(Demetrius 2) and Alexandria (Table Talks 678A; seeRussell 1973, 7–8). However, Plutarch spent most of his life inhis native city and in nearby Delphi. There must have been two reasonsfor this; first, Plutarch's strong ties with his family, whichapparently was wealthy enough to support his studies and travels(Russell 1973, 3–5), and, second, his own interest in thereligious activity of Delphi. The latter is testified to by the factthat Plutarch served in various positions in Delphi, including that ofthe priest of Apollo (Table Talks 700E), and also in hisseveral works concerning Delphi and the local sacred rituals (Onthe E at Delphi, On Oracles at Delphi, On the Obsolescence ofOracles; see Stadter 2005). These works demonstrate intimateknowledge of Delphi, its traditions, and activities. Plutarch musthave died after 119 CE, the date at which he was appointed procuratorof Achaea by Hadrian (Eusebius'Chronicle).

Plutarch was a prolific writer. The so-called Lamprias catalogue, anancient library catalogue (preserved mutilated), supposedly compiled byPlutarch's son Lamprias, lists 227 works, several of them nolonger extant (Russell 1973, 18–19). Plutarch's works divide intophilosophical and historical-biographical. The latter, the so-calledLives (Bioi) of distinguished Greek and Roman menexamined in pairs, demonstrate Plutarch's historical andrhetorical abilities, also showing his interest in character formationand politics (Russell 1973, 100–116). Plutarch's philosophicalworks, many of them dialogues (set in Delphi or Chaeronea), cover halfof his literary output. In modern times they have been published underthe collective termMoralia, a term first given to acollection of eleven ethical works preserved in a 14^thcentury manuscript (Parisinus Graecus 1672). When the collection wasaugmented by many other writings preserved in other manuscripts ontopics ranging from metaphysics, psychology, natural philosophy,theology, logic, to philosophy of art, the name was retained with themisleading implication that Plutarch's philosophical works areessentially or primarily ethical.

Among Plutarch's works, several serve polemical purposes. He wrote anumber of works against the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies. Againstthe Stoics are mainly the worksOn the Self-contradictions of theStoics (De stoicorum repugnantiis),On the CommonNotions against the Stoics (De communibus notitiis),On the Cleverness of Animals (De sollertiaanimalium), andOn Moral Virtue (De virtutemorali). Plutarch's main works against the Epicureans are:That One Cannot Live Happily Following Epicurus (Nonposse suaviter vivere secundum Epicurum),AgainstColotes (Adversus Colotem),Is ‘LiveUnnoticed’ Well Said? (An recte dictum sit latenteresse vivendum). All these works are marked by the use of adistinct polemical tone against assumed adversaries, and ofrecognizable polemical strategies. They are often captious and in manyinstances betray a less than fair engagement with the views beingopposed (see Warren 2011, 290–293 and Kechagia 2011,135–294 for a vindication of Plutarch's polemics inAgainstColotes).

It is worth considering why Plutarch engaged in writing so manypolemical works against the two main Hellenistic schools ofphilosophy. One reason for Plutarch's preoccupation must be that theearly Stoics and Epicureans both strongly criticized Plato. TheEpicurean Colotes, for instance, Plutarch's target in theAgainstColotes, was critical of Plato's dialogues in hisAgainstPlato's Lysis andAgainst Plato's Euthydemus (meager fragmentsof which are preserved in Herculaneum papyriPHerc. 208,PHerc. 1032), while he also criticized theRepublic's myth of Er and the implied view of an immortalhuman soul (Proclus,In Rempublicam 2.109.11–12,111.6–17; see Kechagia 2011, 53–132). Another reason forPlutarch's engagement was the fact that both Epicureans and Stoicsdrew freely and extensively for their own purposes on Plato withoutacknowledging it and despite their criticism of Plato. This holds trueespecially for the Stoics (see Babut 1969a). They were inspired by theTimaeus, for instance, in their adoption of two principles,god and matter, but their god, unlike that of Plato, is immanent inthe physical world and bodily, and he alone, without the Forms,suffices for the formation of matter. The Stoics were probably guidedto their view that only bodies exist by passages in theSophist (246a-247c) and in theTimaeus (31b-32c,49d-e, 53b-c). For Plutarch, though, this is an utterly mistakenreading of theTimaeus (De communibus notitiis1073D-1074E). Plutarch's polemics were, then, motivated by his desire toadvocate Platonism against what he regarded as misguidedinterpretations and criticisms on the part of Epicureans andStoics. This defense of Platonism was of vital importance forPlatonism at Plutarch's time, since both Stoicism and Epicureanism werestill thriving, mainly in virtue of their ethics. Plutarch wanted toshow that Stoic and Epicurean ethics rest on mistaken assumptionsabout human nature and reality, which render their ethical doctrinesuseless (De virtute morali,De Stoicorumrepugnantiis 1041E-1043A,De communibus notitiis1060B-1073D). Plutarch's polemics were fuelled by the view he shareswith Hellenistic philosophers that the end of philosophy is to supportethical life (see e.g.De profectibus in virtute); if aschool's ethical ideal is unrealizable or, worse, unworthy of human nature,this for Plutarch (as for Antiochus, Cicero,De finibus 5.13,5.89) is evidence that the entire philosophical system is afailure. As in the rest of his philosophical works, in his polemicaltreatises too, Plutarch aims to show that Plato's philosophy makesgood sense as a whole, that is, it does justice to the world and humannature and can bring human beings to happiness (see below, sect. 2),but in his polemical works Plutarch aims especially to demonstratethat departure from Plato results in self-contradictions, of which heaccuses the Stoics in particular (Boys-Stones 1997a). Two furtherfeatures of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy appear to annoy Plutarchconsiderably: first, their dismissal of the aporetic/dialecticalspirit that Socrates embodies, and which Plutarch regards as centralto philosophy, and second, that Stoics and Epicureans alike adopt acorporealist or materialist metaphysics, rejecting the intelligiblerealm (that comprises god, Forms, immaterial souls), which wasessential to Platonism. The central line permeating Plutarch'srelevant criticism is that Stoics and Epicureans contradict our commonnotions (see e.g.De communibus notitiis 1073C-1074F) and donot do justice to things themselves (De profectibus invirtute 75F-76A). Ironically, perhaps, Plutarch's polemicalwritings are chiefly of interest—but also of very greatvalue—for the many quotations they contain from Stoics,Epicurus, and other authors whose works were not preserved into moderntimes, and for his references to and paraphrases of their views inother passages of works available to him but not to us. Were it notfor Plutarch, our grasp of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy would bemuch less extensive than it is, and our ability to reconstruct andappreciate their ideas much reduced.

Here is an overview of Plutarch's works, to give a sense of hisconception of philosophy and of what in Platonist philosophy especiallyhe valued.

Plutarch wrote relatively little in the field of “logic”in the ancient sense (logikê), which includesphilosophy of language and epistemology. This, however, does notnecessarily point to a lack of interest or knowledge on hispart. Quite the opposite is the case. Plutarch is particularlyattracted to epistemology because he considers this as a crucialaspect of Platonist philosophy. He seeks to defend the epistemology ofAcademic skeptics like Arcesilaus and Carneades and on these groundsto advocate the unity of the Academy against the criticisms ofAntiochus of Ascalon (1^st c. BCE; see below, sects. 2 and3). The Lamprias list of Plutarch's works contains one on Stoic logic(Reply to Chrysippus on the First Consequent, #152), and twoon Aristotle's:On Aristotle's Topics in eight books (#56),and aLecture on the Ten Categories (#192), all of them nowlost. The latter two are indicative of a reawakening of interest inAristotelian logic, beginning in the 1^st c. BCE, cultivatedmainly by Peripatetics such as Boethus and Andronicus, but alsocharacterizing Platonists of Plutarch's era, such as Eudorus andNicostratus, who set themselves in dialogue especially withAristotle'sCategories. Although the content of thesePlutarchean works remains unknown, we do have Plutarch's own claimthat Aristotle's doctrine of categories is foreshadowed in theTimaeus (De an. procr. 1023E;Timaeus37b-c), which suggests that he considered Aristotelian logic a welcomedevelopment of relevant Platonic ideas (Karamanolis 2006,123–125). Plutarch's interest in theTopics, on theother hand, must have been motivated by his interest in thedialectical methodology of arguing both sides of a question(Karamanolis 2006, 86–87; see further below, sect. 3), to whichtheTopics is devoted. Plutarch's works on epistemology covera broad spectrum of issues. The question of the criterion of truthmust have been central to works such asOn How We Should JudgeTruth (#225),What is Understanding? (#144),ThatUnderstanding is Impossible (#146), none of which is extanttoday. The lost workWhether He Who Suspends Judgment onEverything is Led to Inaction (#158) must have confronted thecommon accusation against skepticism voiced in its title. AmongPlutarch's surviving works important for understanding hisepistemology are thePlatonic Questions I and III,Against Colotes,On Common Notions, andOn theGeneration of the Soul 1024F-1025A (see below, sect. 3).

Plutarch paid special attention to “physics,”, which inantiquity included metaphysics, natural philosophy, psychology andtheology. His most important surviving works in metaphysics are thoserelated to the interpretation of theTimaeus, namelyOnthe Generation of Soul in the Timaeus (De animae procreationein Timaeo),On Isis and Osiris (De Iside etOsiride); from lost works of Plutarch relevant are the following:Where are the Forms? (#67),How Matter Participates inthe Forms: It Constitutes the Primary Bodies (#68),On theWorld's Having Come into Beginning According to Plato (#66),On Matter (#185),On the Fifth Substance(#44). Plutarch shows quite some interest in the explanation ofnatural phenomena in several surviving works, most importantly in:On the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon (De facie quae inorbe lunae apparet),On the Principle of Cold (De primofrigido), On the Cleverness of Animals (De sollertiaanimalism). Plutarch's interest in this area is apparentlymotivated by the wish to develop Platonist natural philosophy and alsooppose the Stoics, who were dominant in this field especially sincePosidonius (1^st c. BCE), and in Plutarch's age with hismuch older contemporary Seneca (ca. 1BCE–65CE), theauthor ofNaturales Quaestiones. Given the importance of godin the world's coming into being according to Plutarch, he isseriously engaged with theology, especially with questions pertainingto the relation between god and man, such as the issue of divination,divine justice and divine punishment, and so on, in:On Oracles atDelphi (De Pythiae oraculis),On the Obsolescence ofOracles (De defectu oraculorum),On the E atDelphi (De E apud Delphos),On Delays in DivinePunishment (De sera numinis vindicta), andOn theDaemon of Socrates (De genio Socratis Socratis).Plutarch'sOn the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus togetherwith the tenPlatonic Questions illustrate well his work as aPlatonic exegete (see Hershbell 1987, Ferrari 2001). Like the formerwork, most of thePlatonic Questions also deal withmetaphysics and psychology (Questions I and III are concernedwith epistemology, VII with physics, and X with language).

Plutarch's ethical works include some of theoretical orientation(e.g.On Moral Virtue, which refutes the Stoic theory ofvirtue) and some of practical one (e.g.On Control of Anger, OnCuriosity, How Could you Tell a Flatterer from a Friend),offering practical advice on how to attain virtue and build a goodcharacter. The tendency, however, to distinguish two altogetherseparate classes of ethical works (following Ziegler 1951,768–825) is problematic given the considerable affinitiesbetween them, yet Plutarch does use different styles in them,presumably targeting different audiences (Van Hoof 2010,264–265). Particularly representative of Plutarch's ethicalviews are the treatisesOn Moral Virtue (De virtutemorali),On Making Progress in Virtue (Deprofectibus in virtute),On Delays in Divine Punishment(De sera numinis vindicta),On Control of Anger(De cohibenda ira), andOn Tranquility of Mind(De tranquillitate animi). Plutarch wrote also works onaesthetics and education, which one could classify also as works ofpractical orientation. Plutarch, following Plato, evaluates poetryfrom the point of view of ethical education. In this category belongthe worksOn How the Young Man Should Listen to Poets (Deaudiendis poetis) andOn the Education of Children(De liberis educandis), the latter of dubious authenticity(Ziegler 1951, 809–811).

Finally, Plutarch wrote a number of works on aspects and figures of thehistory of philosophy, all lost, such asOn What HeraclitusMaintained (#205),On Empedocles (#43),On theCyrenaics (#188),On the Difference between Pyrrhonians andAcademics (#64),On the Unity of the Academy Since Plato(#63). The latter two could not have been merely historical, however; thehistorical perspective must rather have served to defend the point of view of theskeptical Academy, which Plutarch advocated as doing justice to theaporetic spirit of Plato's philosophy (see below, sect. 2).

2. Plutarch's Platonism

Plutarch lived in the wake of the revival of the dogmaticinterpretation of Plato begun by Antiochus and Eudorus in the1^st c. BCE, which in a way he continues. Plutarch, however,shows a more complex philosophical profile, apparently throughdeveloping the version of Academic skepticism defended by Antiochus'contemporary Philo of Larissa and also (slightly later) Cicero. Hestrives for a synthesis of the skeptical interpretation of Plato,defended by the Academic skeptics Arcesilaus, Carneades and Philo,with that of Antiochus' dogmatic interpretation, according to whichPlato held doctrines of his own. Thus Plutarch objects to thedistinction that Antiochus suggested between Socratic and Platonicphilosophy and the corresponding division of Plato's dialogues intoSocratic/aporetic and Platonic/doctrinal (Cicero,AcademicaI.15–17). For Plutarch, rather Plato accommodates harmoniouslyboth an aporetic and a doctrinal element in his philosophy. Accordingto Plutarch, the aporetic element in Plato encourages a way ofsearching for the truth without prejudices or a priori commitments,and this practically amounts to a dialectical inquiry, arguing eitherside of a given question; but this dialectical spirit does not denythe possibility of reaching firm conclusions, or even the possibilityof achieving secure knowledge. According to Plutarch, Plato hadreached such conclusions in his dialogues, which can be identified asPlato's doctrines and yet he still preserved the spirit of unceasinginquiry, embedded in the dialogue form itself, by not holding them ina way which closed off reconsideration and further inquiry. This iswhy Plutarch advocates an epistemology that integrates both thesuspension of judgment (i.e., the rejection of dogmatism) and adefense of the possibility of acquiring true knowledge (see below,sect. 3). On this basis Plutarch defends the unity of the Academy,going all the way back to Plato, which Antiochus had considered ashaving been disrupted with the advent of Academic Skepticism, in losttreatises, such asOn the Unity of the Academy since Plato,On the Difference Between Pyrrhoneans and Academics (seeAdversus Colotem 1121F-1122E,Platonic Question I;with Opsomer 1998, 127–133). Plutarch actually tried todisengage the term ‘Academic’ from implying exclusivecommitment to the skeptical construal of Plato. Suspension ofjudgment, he thinks, is rather an established method of philosophicalresearch followed by several illustrious ancient philosophers(Heraclitus, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato), rather than an innovationof Arcesilaus (Adv. Col. 1121F-1122A). For Plutarch, theAcademic both appreciates Plato's aporetic spirit and still values hisdoctrines. Similar in this respect appears to be the position of theanonymous author of the (1^st c. CE?)Commentary on theTheaetetus and of Plutarch's friend Favorinus, the addressee ofhisOn the Principle of Cold (cf. ibid. 955C, see Opsomer1997, Opsomer 1998, 26–82, 213–240).

In accordance with this conception of Platonism, Plutarch himselfwrites dialogues, which, like Plato's, are either dramatic(e.g.De cohibenda ira), narrated (e.g.De sera numinisvindicta), or mixed (De genio Socratis); see thetypology of Platonic dialogues in Diogenes Laertius 3.50). As inPlato, in Plutarch's dialogues too the speakers give long speeches infavor of a certain view (Russell 1973, 34–36). It is oftenunclear, however, with what view Plutarch sympathizes, despite thefact that sometimes he appears as character in some dialogues(e.g.On the E at Delphi). Besides, Plutarch, following Platoagain, often uses myths, metaphors, and analogies. The workOnIsis and Osiris is particularly interesting in this regard. In itPlutarch relates the myth of the two Egyptian deities, yet heinterprets it allegorically as a story informative about god, being,and creation (Ziegler 1951, 206–208). Of special interest arethe eschatological myths in Plutarch, as they integrate cosmological,psychological, and ethical considerations. This is the case with themyth narrated inOn The Face Which Appears in the Orb of theMoon, which centers on the role of the moon in the world and itsrole in the life of souls (see Cherniss,Plutarch Moralia,vol. XII, Loeb, Introduction). Analogous is the case of the workOn the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, where Plutarch setsout to defend divine providence, yet, following Plato's claim ofpresenting only a likely account (eikôs mythos) in theTimaeus, he claims to be offering only what seems likely tohim about divine actions (549E-F), and also like Plato, Plutarchstructures his work into argument (logos) and a narrative(mythos). These authorial practices present a problem for thescholar who wants to identify Plutarch's own philosophical views, justas they do with Plato's own dialogues. The works that unambiguouslypresent Plutarch's opinions on exegetical and philosophical mattersareOn the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus, andPlatonic Questions, while the others must be used withcaution, for the reasons given above, or because of their polemicalaim and tone (see Opsomer 2007).

Plutarch represents a synthesis also with regard to his philosophicalinterests. On the one hand he shares Antiochus' emphasis on ethics,yet on the other he focuses considerably on metaphysics, which wasrevived by Eudorus (end of 1^st c. BCE) and flourished withNeo-Pythagorean Platonists such as Moderatus (1^stc. CE). Like them, Plutarch (as noted above) pays special attention totheTimaeus, which from then on became the keystone ofPlatonism. Plutarch is particularly interested in the generation ofthe soul, and he devotes an entire treatise to discussing one shortpassage,Timaeus 35a1–36b5 (On the Generation ofSoul in the Timaeus; see Cherniss,Plutarch Moralia,Loeb vol. XIII.1, 133–149, Hershbell 1987). It is not anexaggeration to say that Plutarch's interpretation of theTimaeus shapes his entire philosophy. This is becausePlutarch apparently endorses the idea suggested in theTimaeus that the universe is a unified whole with humansbeing an integral part of this unity, which means that both thephysical world and natural phenomena as well as human beings and humansociety should be approached from a cosmic/metaphysical point ofview. In the case of natural phenomena, this means that explanationsshould make reference to intelligible causes (De primofrigido 948B-C) which account for the nature of things in theworld, while in the case of human beings, their nature and their finalend in life, that is, their happiness cannot be determined unless oneunderstands that the human constitution is similar to that of theworld, consisting of body, soul, and intellect (De facie943A, 945A,De virtute morali 441D). Plutarch systematicallyemploys the analogy between worldly macrocosm and human microcosm,suggested in theTimaeus, which is important also in Stoicism(see below, sect. 5, 6).

Plutarch is also familiar with Neo-Pythagorean and Aristotelianphilosophies. Interest in both Pythagorean ideas and Aristotelianismwere in vogue at the end of the 1^st century BCE and duringthe 1^st century CE, when Plutarch writes. There is a waveof Neo–Pythagorean treatises written at this time, such as thoseof ps–Archytas, Euryphamus, Theages (see Dillon 1977,341–361, 1988b, 119–122, Centrone 1990), while Plutarch'scontemporary Moderatus attempted to systematize Pythagorean ideas asbackground to Plato (he wrote a workPythagorean Doctrines inmany books; Stephanus Byzantius,s.v. Gadeira, Porphyry,Life of Pythagoras 48; Dillon 1977,344–351). Aristotelian philosophy, on the other hand, wasrevived by Peripatetics and Platonists alike during this period. Inthe Peripatetic camp this is the time when Andronicus of Rhodes wasactive, being responsible for a complete edition of Aristotle's worksat the end of the 1^st century BCE, while Xenarchus ofSeleukeia was critically engaged with Aristotle's physics. But alreadybefore them, Antiochus and Cicero had been well acquainted withAristotle's works, the former arguing that Aristotle was in essentialagreement with Plato, at least in ethical theory (Cicero,Academica I.17,De finibus V.12). Antiochus'students Aristo (of Alexandria) and Cratippus regarded themselves asPeripatetics (Index Academicorum col. 35.2-17 Dorandi), whilethe Platonust Eudorus did not hesitate to use Aristotle in order toidentify Pythagorean metaphysical principles in Plato (Alexander,In Met. 58.25–59.8 with reference to AristotleMetaphysics 988a8–17). Plutarch was familiar withseveral Aristotelian treatises from all periods of his writing career(cf.Adv. Col. 1115B-C) and, quite interestingly, hepreserves numerous fragments from lost Aristotelian works (see Ross,Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, Karamanolis 2006,89–92). Plutarch's attitude to Pythagoreanism and Aristotle iscomplex and sophisticated. Plutarch's cosmic principles, the One andthe Indefinite Dyad (De defectu oraculorum 428F-429A),allegedly found in theTimaeus, had long been consideredPythagorean in origin. Plutarch shows his familiarity withPythagoreanism in the second (and rather cryptic) part ofOn theGeneration of the Soul in Timaeus, where he seeks to explain thenature and role of numbers and ratios in theTimaeus makingrepeated references to Pythagoreans. Plutarch also integrates intoPlatonism other Pythagorean elements, such as number symbolism (DeE 387F,De def. or. 429D-430B), abstinence from meat(On the Eating of Flesh; De esu carnium), and a belief in therationality of animals (On the Cleverness of Animals, Beasts areRational; Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti), probably because heconsiders them implied in, or compatible with, statements made inPlato (e.g. in thePhaedo, Timaeus). With regard toAristotle, Plutarch is more cautious than Antiochus; he considers someof Aristotle's doctrines to be an articulation or development ofPlatonic philosophy (e.g. Aristotle's ethics, logic and science; seeTeodorsson 1999), and espouses them as being Platonic (e.g.Devirtute morali 442B-C, De an. procr. 1023E). However, healso criticizes Aristotle for contradicting Plato's presumed doctrines(e.g. on the Forms and on the constitution of the world;Adv. Col. 1114F-1115C; see Karamanolis 2006,85–126).

Hence it is wrong to portray Plutarch as an eclectic philosopher (e.g.Ziegler 1951, 940, F. Babbitt,Plutarch's Moralia,Introduction, vol. I, Loeb 1927, xiv, Becchi 1981), who occasionallycompromises his Platonism in order to carry out his polemic(Dörrie 1971, Donini 1988b, 131, 1999, 16–19). RatherPlutarch uses philosophers such as Aristotle only instrumentally inorder to advance through them what he perceives as Plato's doctrines(Karamanolis 2006, 92–109). Plutarch shares with Antiochus(Cicero,Academica I.17–19, 33–34) the view thatPlato's philosophy is subject to articulation and development throughhis successors in the Platonist tradition, but also tomisinterpretation and distortion. On this view, Xenocrates, Polemo andAristotle developed and articulated Platonic philosophy, though notwithout faults, while the Stoics and Epicureans were instead guilty ofsystematic distortion. Plutarch is not a populariser either (Babbitt op. cit.).Rather, Plutarch's work shows great complexity and sophistication andevinces the spirit of a meticulous interpreter, who ventures toadvance innovative views, such as on the creation of the soul, onhuman constitution, as well as on ethics and poetics (see below,sects. 6 and 7). It is also unfair to say of Plutarch that he was“no original thinker” (Ziegler 1951,938–939). Plutarch lived in an age in which philosophy had takenthe form of exegesis of classical philosophical texts, but throughthis exegetical process philosophers in late antiquity (such asPlotinus and the commentators on Plato and Aristotle) crystallize andvoice their own views on crucial philosophical questions. IndeedPlutarch takes some very interesting lines on metaphysics, psychology,and ethics, which became influential in later generations ofPlatonists, such as Plotinus and Porphyry (see below, sect. 4, 5,6).

3. Logic/Epistemology

Like the Hellenistic Philosophers and Antiochus, Plutarch appears tobe particularly sensitive to the question of how we acquireknowledge. Plutarch sets out to defend the interpretation of Plato'sepistemology maintained in the skeptical Academy. According to thisinterpretation, suspension of judgment (epochê) is thebest way to avoid overhasty commitment to opinions (doxai),since the appearances on which they are based can bedeceitful. Plutarch defends this epistemological position against theStoic accusation that such an attitude leads to inaction, making lifeimpossible, and also against the Epicurean claim thatsense-experiences are always true. Plutarch distinguishes betweenthree different movements in the soul, which are identical to thoseassumed by the Stoics, namely those of sensation(phantastikon), impulse (hormê), and assent(synkatathetikon;Adv. Col. 1122B). The first twoalone, Plutarch argues, against the Stoics, suffice to produce action(Adv. Col. 1122C-D). Since suspension of judgment does notinterfere with either perception/sensation or impulse, it does notaffect our actions but only eliminates opinions(ibid. 1122B). Consequently, Plutarch argues, suspension of judgmentsaves us from making mistakes (1124B) but does not prevent us at allfrom acting. Opsomer (1998, 88) has rightly noted that Plutarch'sargument is very similar to that of the Pyrrhonian skeptics. Plutarchrecommends suspension of judgment as a method of testing andevaluating knowledge obtained through the senses (Adv. Col.1124B). This is not only because the senses often deceive us (Deprimo frigido 952A,De E392E); the problem according toPlutarch rather is that the world is a place that cannot be knownperfectly. This, however, does not amount to dismissal of the senses,which is how Colotes criticized Plato(Adv. Col. 1114D-F). According to Plutarch, the senses are oflimited application because they can at best inform us only about thesensible world, which is a world of generation, of appearances, not ofbeing (De E 392E). For a Platonist like Plutarch, perfectknowledge can only be of being, and for that we need to transcend thesensible world and move our thought to the intelligible one (DeIside 382D-383A).

Plutarch makes a sharp distinction between sensible and intelligibleknowledge, which corresponds to the fundamental ontologicaldistinction between sensible or physical and intelligible reality(Plat. Quest. 1002B-C). He appears to distinguish twodistinct faculties of human knowledge, the sensory and theintellectual, each of which grasps the corresponding part of reality(Plat. Quest. 1002D-E). The cognitive faculty forintelligibles, the human intellect, is external to the embodied soul(De an. procr. 1026E,Plat. Quest. 1001C, 1002F;cf. Numenius fr. 42 Des Places); the sensory faculty, on the otherhand, comes about when the soul enters the body (De virtutemorali 442B-F; see below, sect. 5), and provides the means fordealing effectively in daily life with our needs and circumstances inthe physical world as it appears to our senses. In Plutarch's view,human beings come to understand through the intellect by making use ofthe notions or concepts (ennoiai), apparently identifiablewith the Forms (Plat. Quest. 1001E), with which the intellectis inherently equipped. That is, the embodied soul recollects what itknows from its inherent familiarity with the intelligible realm, asPlato argued in the discussion ofanamnêsis orrecollection in theMeno (Plat. Quest. 1001D, 1002E;Opsomer 1998, 193–198). This knowledge of intelligibles issuperior to sensory “knowledge,” which can only remain atthe level of belief (pistis) and conjecture(eikasia;Plat. Quest. 1001C). Indeed, knowledge ofintelligibles can take one as far as to understand the divine realm(ibid. 1002E, 1004D). But we can achieve this kind of knowledge,Plutarch suggests, only when “souls are free to migrate to therealm of the indivisible and the unseen” (De Iside382F). This is the main task of philosophy for Plutarch. Philosophy inhis view must be inspired by the Socratic practice of inquiry, andthis practice amounts to the continuous search for truth, whichpresupposes that, following the example of Socrates, one admitsignorance (Adv. Col. 1117D,De adulatore et amico72A).

According to Plutarch, knowledge of intelligibles throughanamnêsis is not in tension with the Academicprescription for suspension of judgment; rather, knowledge can beadvanced by suspension of judgment, since the latter puts asideopinion (doxa) as well as egoism (philautia), bothof which prevent us from finding the truth(Plat. Quest. 1000C). To be in a position to carry out thissearch for truth, however, one must search oneself and purify one'ssoul, Plutarch argues (Adv. Col. 1118C-E). And he points outthat Socrates promoted precisely this practice, using theelenchus as a purgative medicine, trying to remove falseclaims to knowledge and arrogance from the souls of his interlocutors,and to seek truth along with them, instead of defending his own view(Plat. Quest. 999E-F, 1000B, 1000D; Opsomer 1988, 145-150,Shiffman 2010). Socrates, Plutarch claims, was in a position to dothat because he had purified his soul from passions (De genioSocratis 588E), hence he was capable of understanding the voiceof hisdaimôn, his intellect (see below, sect. 5).

Plutarch does not defend the Socratic-Academic epistemology only atthe theoretical level, but also applies it practically. Whilediscussing inOn the Principle of Cold whether cold is aprinciple rather than a privation and whether earth is the primarycold element, he defends suspension of judgment as the right attitudeto take on the matter (955C; see Babut 2007, 72–76 contraBoys-Stones 1997b). This is indicative of Plutarch's attitude tonatural phenomena quite generally. He maintains that natural phenomenacannot be understood merely by means of investigating their naturalcauses. The discovery of the immediate, natural causes, Plutarchargues, is only the beginning of an investigation into the first andhighest causes, which are intelligible (De primo frigido948B-C; Donini 1986a, 210-211, Opsomer 1998, 215–6). In otherwords, a metaphysical explanation in terms of the Forms and god, thecreator of the universe, must be sought (De def. or.435E-436A). This is what, for Plutarch, demarcates the philosopherfrom the mere natural scientist (physikos;De primofrigido 948B-C), a distinction further exploited by laterPlatonists (e.g. Atticus fr. 5 Des Places, Porphyry in Simplicius,In Physica 9.10–13; fr. 119 Smith). Plutarch is guidedhere by the dichotomy between natural and intelligible causes found inPhaedo 97B-99D andTimaeus 68E-69D (Opsomer 1998,183). Explaining the physical world through an appeal to naturalcauses alone is insufficient, Plutarch argues, since such an explanationignores the agent (god) and the end for which something happens in the world(De def. or. 435E). The fundamental ontological andepistemological distinction between the sensible and intelligiblerealms suggests to Plutarch an analogous distinction of correspondinglevels of explanation (Donini 1986a, 212, Opsomer 1998, 217). Plutarchmaintains that there are two levels of causality, physical andintelligible, and full understanding of natural phenomena requires thegrasping of both. While in the case of natural phenomena suspension ofjudgment maintains an unfailing spirit of research, in the case ofthe divine realm, where human understanding is seriously limited,suspension of judgment, Plutarch suggests, is due also as a form ofpiety towards the divine (De sera 549E; Opsomer 1998,178–179).

4. Metaphysics

4.1 First Principles

Plutarch's metaphysics rests heavily on his interpretation of theTimaeus. Plutarch maintains that the cosmogony of theTimaeus must be interpreted literally, which means that theworld had a temporal beginning (Plat. Quest. 1001B-C,Dean. procr. 1013C-1024C; cf.Timaeus 30a, 52d-53b).Plutarch argues against the interpretation of most Platonists of histime, who refuse to understand creation in terms of an actualgeneration (De an. procr. 1013E). He appears to believe thathis interpretation is the only way to understand Plato's claim thatthe soul is “senior” to the body (Timaeus 34c),and that it initiates all change and motion (De an. procr.1013D-F;Phaedrus 245c,Laws 896a-c). This literalinterpretation of theTimaeus also aims to solve the puzzleof how the soul in Plato is said to be both uncreated(Phaedrus 245c-246a) as well as created (Timaeus34b-35a;De an. procr. 1016A), and how the soul is said to bea mixed entity composed of indivisible being (i.e. intellect) anddivisible being (i.e. the non-rational pre-cosmic soul;Timaeus 35a;De an. procr. 1014D-E, 1024A). Plutarchtries to address these issues in a number of works (see above, sect.1), most importantly, of the surviving ones, inOn the Generationof Soul in the Timaeus, a commentary onTimaeus35a1–36b5, as I noted above.

Plutarch proposes the following interpretation. The cosmos is anordered entity that has come into existence at a certain point (whentime did not exist;Plat. Quest. 1007C) as a result of thecontact between god and pre-existing, disorderly matter. God puts thismatter in order (De an. procr. 1024C; cf.De Iside374E-F), which means that god cannot be the only cosmic principle,otherwise disorderly matter would be left unaccounted for. Plutarchpostulates two antithetic and antagonistic cosmic principles: the oneis God (the Monad or the One, the unitary eternal substance from whicheverything devolves; see below sect. 4.3), and the other is theIndefinite Dyad, both principles being eternal and uncreated (Dedef. or. 428E-F). God is the real being, unchangeable, simple(De E 392E-393B), and good (De def. or.423D)—the cause of order, intelligibility, stability, andidentity in the universe. This is why God is the object of strivingfor all nature (De facie 944E). The Indefinite Dyad, on theother hand, is the principle of non-being, multiplicity, disorder,chaos, irrationality and badness (De def. or. 428F). Thisprinciple is described as being identical with matter which is orderedby God (De def. or. 428F-429D) or by itslogos(De Iside 373A-C), yet the existence in it of an activeelement which is essentially disorderly and evil (De Iside369D–F; Dillon 1977, 206–8) seems to suggest that theIndefinite Dyad is regarded not merely as identical with matter, takenas the underlying element of all qualities, as is suggested inTimaeus 50e (De def. or. 414F).). These twoprinciples, God and the Indefinite Dyad, were allegedly accepted bythe ancient Pythagoreans (Diogenes Laertius 8.24–25; Diels-Kranz58 Βl), and by the Neo-Pythagoreans of Plutarch's time (SextusEmpiricus,Against the Mathematicians 10.261–284,Nicomachus,Introductio Arithmetica II.18.4; see Dillon 1977,342–3, 354), but they were also attributed to Plato (Plato,Parmenides 149d2, Simplicius,In Physica453.25–7), presumably by neo-Pythagorean Platonists (Eudorus inSimplicius,In Physica 181.7–30, Moderatus,ibid. 231.8–9; see Kahn 2001, 105–110 and Numenius inSEP). Plutarch identifies the two principles with the Limited and theUnlimited of thePhilebus (he also calls the Indefinite Dyadlimitlessness,apeiria;De def. or. 428F). The twoprinciples are constantly opposing each other in the form of goodnessand badness (De def. or. 429B-D,De Iside 369E;Dillon 1977, 203). Although God, the One, prevails over the Dyad(De def. or. 429C-D), order and goodness are always in dangerof being displaced by disorder and badness. Both the Indefinite Dyadand God relate to the universe through intermediaries, namely anon-rational and a rational world soul (see above), which operate asantithetic powers of the two antagonistic cosmic principles. Theresult of the interaction of the two cosmic principles through thesepowers is the cosmos in which humans live.

This interaction happens in stages. Before the world has come intobeing, the universe was animated by the non-rational world soul, whichaccounts for the disordered motion of matter. In Plutarch's words,“what preceded the generation of the world was disorder,disorder not incorporeal or immobile or inanimate, but of corporealityamorphous and incoherent, and of motivity demented and irrational, andthis was the discord of soul that has not reason” (De an.procr. 1014B; Cherniss' trans., altered). Plato speaks indeed ofthe receptacle as amorphous (Timaeus 50d7, 51a7), there is,however, no explicit mention of a non-rational pre-cosmic soul in theTimaeus, which is why Plutarch has been accused ofarbitrariness in this regard (Cherniss,Plutarch Moralia,Loeb vol. XIII.1, 140–147). It is wrong, though, to treatPlutarch as one might treat a modern commentator of theTimaeus, with conscientious scholarly attention to what isand is not made explicit in a text. Plutarch assumes that there is asingle “Platonic view” about the generation of the world,the first principles of reality, and the role of soul in the world'sgeneration, and he seeks support for his interpretation in manyPlatonic dialogues. He identifies the non-rational soul with the“disorderly and maleficent soul” ofLaws X (atestimony Plutarch himself considers unambiguous,De Iside370F), with the “limitlessness” of thePhilebus(26b), the “congenital desire” and “inbredcharacter” of thePoliticus (272d, 273b), and with thenecessity (anankê) and the generation(genesis) ofTimaeus 52d (De an. procr.1014D-1015A). None of these passages lend clear support to Plutarch'sinterpretation, since nowhere does Plato explicitly speak of apre-cosmic maleficent soul or other pre-cosmic soul-like entities:even the maleficent soul of theLaws is not pre-cosmic(Cherniss, ibid. 140). Yet Plutarch's interpretation does have meritsin imposing consistency on Plato's work as a whole in the followingsense. First, according to theTimaeus (35a) the demiurge(the creator god) does not create the substance of the soul, butcompounds the world soul by blending indivisible with divisible being,which Plutarch not unreasonably identifies with the divine intellectand the non-rational world soul respectively (Dean. procr. 1014D-E). This does justice to the nature of thesoul, which for Platonists is not subject to change andcorruption. Secondly, it was generally assumed that no motion ispossible without a principle of motion (cf. Aristotle,Deanima 402a6–7), and this traditionally is identified withthe soul in Platonism (cf.Phaedrus 245c-e); so thedisordered motion of matter before the creation of cosmos that Platoappears to postulate in theTimaeus needs to be accounted forby a soul (seeLaws 892a), which must, then, be a pre-cosmicone (De an. procr. 1015E).

Further, the existence of a pre-cosmic non-rational soul is suggestedalso if one considers the world soul and the human soul inconjunction. Already theTimaeus (34c, 41d-e, 69c) suggestsa relation between the two. Plutarch takes the human soul to bederivative from the world soul, which means that their natures aresimilar (De an. procr. 1025A-D; see below, sect. 5). InRepublic 4, in thePhaedrus and also in theTimaeus it is argued that the human soul has a rational and anon-rational aspect, fighting for dominance. And it is suggested thatorder and harmony is established in the soul when the rational aspectrules over the non-rational, yet the non-rational aspect is alwayscapable of revolting against rationality and creating disorder andbadness. Plutarch identifies the rational aspect with intellect, whichhe distinguishes from the soul, making the former the cause of orderand goodness while the latter the cause of disorder and badness(De an. procr. 1015E; see below, sect. 5). If the human soulreflects the nature of the world soul, then also in the latter evenwhen rationality prevails, when the cosmos comes into being, there isroom for disharmony and disorder. This is evidenced by occurrences ofbadness in the world, such as accidents, natural catastrophes, etc. Ifthere is no such non-rational aspect in the world soul, then eitherGod must be ultimately accountable for such phenomena, which is whatthe Stoics maintain – and this, argues Plutarch, hardly fitsGod's goodness (De an. procr. 1015A–B) – or theymust happen without cause, as the Epicureans maintain, which thendiminishes God's ruling power (ibid. 1015C). Better to think that suchoccurences are caused by the non-rational aspect of the worldsoul. Finally, a pre-cosmic soul is needed to play the role ofmediator between God and matter (De an. procr. 1015B, 1024C;cf.Timaeus 35a), which is required in order to maintainGod's transcendence, goodness, and purity, since matter, because ofits inherent disorderliness and badness, pollutes and taints, and thusis hardly worthy of God (cf. Numenius fr. 52.37–39 Des Places;see also below, sect. 4.3).

The first stage in creation is that God imparts his own intelligenceand reason to the pre-cosmic non-rational soul, making it into apartly rational thing (De an. procr. 1014C-D, 1016E-D,Plat. Quest. 1001B-C). Plutarch makes clear that therational world soul is “not merely a work but also a part of Godand has come to be not by his agency, but both from him as a sourceand out of his substance” (Plat. Quest. 1001C). Sincethe world soul, thus constructed, contains divine reason, which is a“portion” (moira) or “efflux”(aporrhoê) of God (De Iside 382B), it is notmerely a product of God but rather an inseparable part of him (Desera 559D,Plat. Quest. 1001C). That is, the world soulbecomes assimilated to God (homoiôsis;De sera550D). This does not entirely eradicate the world soul's initialnon-rationality (De an. procr. 1027A), yet the motionsproduced by the world soul become now (for the most part) harmoniousand orderly (De an. procr. 1014C-E). This means that matterceases to be disordered and indefinite. Matter now becomes stable and“similar to the entities that are invariably identical”(ibid. 1015F). Presumably Plutarch is referring here to thetranscendent Forms. He states that the cosmos comes into being whenthe soul disperses the semblances from the intelligible world to thisone (ibid. 1024C; cf.Timaeus 50c-e, 52d-53c). Plutarchappears to maintain that the world soul is capable of being molded byreceiving the intelligible Forms, which is how presumably the worldsoul becomes rational (De an. procr. 1024C). The world soul,then, transmits the Forms onto matter (De Iside 373A,DePyth. orac. 404C). This transmission seems to take a two-stageprocess, allegedly implied in theTimaeus. First, the Formsinform matter to bring about primary bodies, such as water and fire,asTimaeus 53b-d, 69b-c suggests (De an. procr.1025A-B,Plat. Quest. 1001D-E); second, the imposition offurther Forms on matter brings about compound material stuffs anddifferent kinds of objects, which make up the cosmos (DeIside 372E-F, 373E-F).

The precise role of Forms in Plutarch's interpretation of the creationremains obscure. Plutarch discussed this issue in treatises no longerextant, such as, for example,Where are the Forms?, yet therelevant surviving evidence is inconclusive (see though Schoppe 1994,Ferrari 1995, 1996b). Some insight can be gained from the myth of Isisand Osiris, which Plutarch presents as an analogy to the worldcreation in hisDe Iside et Osiride. Osiris is a divineintellect that brings everything into being by being sown in matter,that is, in Isis, the reasons (logoi) of himself (DeIside 372E-F), eventually producing Horus, i.e. the cosmos (ibid.374A,De an. procr. 1026C). Osiris is identified with thegood itself (372E), to which Isis always inclines, offering herself tobe impregnated “ with effluxes and likenesses in which sherejoices” (ibid. 373A). Apparently Osiris stands for thedemiurge of theTimaeus and also the Form of the Good of theRepublic (cf.De an. procr. 1017 A-B) —whichexplains why Osiris constitutes the object of desire by nature andIsis (De Iside 372E-F; cf.De facie 944E) and Isisstands for the receptacle (De Iside ibid.,Dean. procr. 1026C;Timaeus 49a, 51a). This suggests thatPlutarch probably maintained the existence of the Forms in God(cf.Timaeus 39e), as did several other Platonists in lateantiquity (e.g. Alcinous,Didascalikos 163.11–17, withDillon 1993, 93–96). This is supported by the fact that forPlutarch Osiris is both the intellect and thelogos presentin the world soul (De Iside 371A, 376C,Dean. procr. 1023C–D) and by Plutarch's claim that God is thetotality of Forms (paradeigma;De sera 550D; seeHelmig 2005, 20–26). However, it is not clear how for Plutarchthe Forms exist in God, since in Plutarch's view God, as Osiris, canbe analyzed into three elements, intellect, soul, and body (DeIside 373A). That Plutarch makes such a distinction with regardto God is also supported by his claim that “God is not senselessnor inanimate nor subject to human control” (De Iside377E-F) and also by his reference to the body of Osiris, whichsymbolizes the Forms immanent in matter (ibid.; Dillon 1977,200). Presumably, then, Plutarch assumes the existence of a divinesoul, guided by statements in PlatoPhilebus 30c,Sophist 248d-249a,Timaeus 46d-e, according to whichthe intellect, to the extent that it implies life, requires thepresence of the principle of life, namely soul (Plat. Quest.1002F).

There is a question, then, as to where in the divine creator thetranscendent Forms reside. We have reason to believe that Plutarchplaces the Forms not in the intellect of the divine creator asthoughts, as was assumed by several later Platonists (e.g. Alcinous,Porphyry), but rather in the soul (Schoppe 1994, 172–178, Baltes2001; against Opsomer 2001, 195–197). Syrianus testifies thisexplicitly (In Metaphysica 105.36–38), while we findthe same doctrine also in Atticus (frs. 8, 11, 35 Des Places;Karamanolis 2006, 169–170), who was said in antiquity to followPlutarch in the interpretation of the cosmogony of theTimaeus (Iamblichus,De anima, in Stobaeus 1.49.37,Proclus,In Timaeum 1.276.30–277.7, 325.30–326.6;Atticus frs. 10, 19, 22 Des Places). The reason for endorsing such aview presumably was that it allows one to maintain the uttersimplicity and order of the demiurgic intellect, so as to preserve Godas the source of intelligibility, and yet to distance God from thecreation, without, however, either creating gaps between god andcreation or destroying the unity of God. This was the path alreadytaken by Moderatus (Dillon 1977, 348) and later Platonists, such asNumenius and Plotinus, who postulated distinct divine hypostases. IfPlutarch endorsed the view that the Forms exist in the divine soul,this may explain why he sometimes speaks of God and the Forms as aunity (e.g.De sera 550D), and at other times as if they areseparate (De an. procr. 1024C-D,Plat. Quest. 1001E;Helmig 2005, 24–5). The reason may be that sometimes Plutarchspeaks of the divine creator in the strict sense, as an intellect, andsome other times in the wider sense, as an animated intellect (one ina soul). When Plutarch refers to being, the receptacle, andgenesis inTimaeus 52d2–4, identifying thelast with the non-rational soul, the receptacle with matter, and beingwith the intelligible realm, while he also mentions an intellect“abiding and immobile all by itself,” this is not evidencethat Plutarch adds arbitrarily a fourth entity, the divine intellect,as Cherniss (Plutarch Moralia, Loeb XIII.1, 143)argued. Apparently Plutarch understands “being” inTimaeus 52d2 as equivalent to “animal” inTimaeus 39e8, namely as that which comprises both the divineintellect (in a soul) and the intelligible Forms.

4.2 Fate and what is up to us

The antagonism between God and the Indefinite Dyad, between intellectand soul, between the rational and the non-rational aspect of theworld soul, and ultimately between goodness and badness is anentrenched feature of the world, according to Plutarch. He claims thatthe world contains both goodness and badness and he postulates twoantithetical principles to account for each one of them (DeIside 369C–D), since God can only be the principle ofgoodness (ibid; cf.Republic 379c,Theaetetus176a). And he criticizes the Epicureans and the Stoics, who postulateeither matter (the atoms) or god respectively as active principles ofthe world (De Iside 369A). Plutarch expresses his dualismalso in religious-symbolic terms: he equates the pair of good and evilprinciples with the Persian pair of gods Oromazes and Areimanius(De Iside 369D–E). Plutarch's pervasive dualism givesrise to problems, however. The constant presence and operation of thedisorderly, non-rational aspect of the soul in the universe (Dean. procr. 1027A), implies God's failure totally todominate. Plutarch appears to maintain that God's power is limited bythe necessity (anankê) imposed by matter. Yet, on theother hand, he does distinguish between the rule of nature, or fate,on the one hand, and divine providence on the other, arguing, againstthe Stoics, that God can dominate nature (De facie 927A-B)and can function providentially for us (De comm. not. 1075E,De Iside 371A,De defect oraculorum 413E–Ammonius speaking). The fact that God, by means of hislogos, with which he is often identified (De Iside373A-B), moulds the principle of disorder, the Indefinite Dyad,suggests to Plutarch the supremacy of God over any other force. Thisis actually one of the reasons why Plutarch defends temporal creation;if the world were eternal and God responsible for it, then God wouldbe the cause of both good and bad, while on Plutarch's interpretationof theTimaeus badness is accounted for by the evil worldsoul, which, as I said above, according to Plutarch is pre-cosmic (seeDillon 2002, 234; see also below, sect. 4.3).

The problem however remains. It becomes more serious if we move fromthe cosmic macrocosm to the human microcosm. If disorder,non-rationality, and badness are cosmic forces, producing what is badin the world, the question is how they relate to the bad or the vicecaused by human beings. Plutarch distinguishes three causes, fate,chance, and ourselves as causes of what is up to us, all of which playa role in what happens to us (Quaest. Conv. 740C-D). Thefirst two kinds of causes need some explanation in view of Plutarch'smetaphysical principles. Presumably, fate amounts to God, chance tothe non-rational part of the world soul, since the latter can bringabout events not planned by God which are disorderly and evil.Plutarch's distinction amounts to three classes of events. Some eventsare fated (or planned by God), some happen by chance (or through theoperation of the non-rational aspect of the world soul), while thereis a third class of events for which we, humans, are the only causes(De tranq. an. 476E). We can, Plutarch says, decide what todo, how to live our lives, but not how life will turn out in terms ofdesired or intended outcomes of our actions (ibid. 467A-B; Eliasson2008, 130–141). He criticizes the Stoics for violating thisdistinction, arguing that the Stoic notion of “that which is upto us” coincides with the Stoic notion of fate (De Stoic.repugn. 1056E-D). In view of that evidence Plutarch may appear todefend human freedom, but the problem remains, since it is stillunclear how the human's participation in the intelligible realmthrough soul and intellect, sharing the characteristics of the(originally non-rational) world soul and the (naturally rational)divine intellect, shapes one's character and accounts for one'sactions in life.

4.3 Theology

The issue of human freedom becomes more complex in view of Plutarch'sconception of god and his theory of divine providence. This is animportant aspect of Plutarch's philosophy. Plutarch distinguishessharply between God or the divine (theos, to theion) andgods, and the question is how the plurality of gods is to beunderstood vis-à-vis the first God. This is not entirely clear(Ziegler 1951, 940). Plutarch appears to maintain that the first Godcan take different names, yet he is to be distinguished from thedeities of the Greek pantheon (such as Asclepius inAmatorius758A-B), who are to be identified with the lesser gods. In theOnthe E at Delphi Apollo is presented as the supreme God(393D-394A), while elsewhere it is Zeus who is described as thesupreme God, creator of the universe (De facie 927B).According to Plutarch the first God constitutes a unity of uttersimplicity, a unity including all divine beings in it (DeIside 377F), and is identified with the Good and with Being(De E 393B–D; see Opsomer 2009,158–160). Apparently Plutarch identifies the highest principlewith the Form of the Good of theRepublic and with thedemiurge of theTimaeus (see Ferrari 2005, Brenk 2005), atendency that Numenius and Plotinus will resist later. God rules overthe world and provides for it, but being supreme(anôtatô;Plat. Quest. 1000E),father of gods and men alike, he remains transcendent. This becomesclear in Ammonius' speech inOn the E in Delphi, where God issaid to be “beyond everything” (epekeina toupantos; 393B), but also in theOn the Obsolescence ofOracles, where Lamprias defends the possibility of God beingprovident over many worlds, provided that these are of a finite number(426E). This means that God is not immanent in the world, and yet heis its creator. God's transcendence is maintained by delegating to theworld soul some mediatory demiurgic performance (see above, sect. 4.1;cf. Opsomer 2005, 94–5). This resonates with Plutarch's moregeneral view (inspired by Plato), according to which the soul has amediating role between the intellect and the body or sensible reality(see below, sect. 5).

Apart from the world soul, the creator God also needs some furthermediation with the sensible world if his transcendence is to bemaintained—this is already suggested in the distinction betweenthe demiurge and the lesser gods in theTimaeus(42e). Plutarch acknowledges the existence of divine entities inferiorto the first God or the One but also to gods, namely the“daimones.” They are said to be “by natureon the boundary between gods and humans” (Dedef. or. 416C). Placed in the moon, these lesser gods mediatebetween the first God and human beings, thus extending God'sprovidence to them (Dillon 1977, 216–8). Plutarch explores atradition going back to Empedocles, to Plato (Symposium202d–203e,Phaedo 107D, 113D,Republic 427b,620d,Timaeus 90a-d), and to Xenocrates, by whom he appearsto be particularly influenced on this matter (De Iside 360E,De def. or. 416C–D). The precise role of the demonsbecomes an interesting issue in view of the fact that Plutarch speaksof two kinds of demons, good and bad, and indeed he claims that demonsexhibit different degrees of virtue and vice, as is the case with mentoo (De def. or. 417B,De Iside 360E). Plutarchprovides us with evidence according to which the role of demonsconsists in communicating God's will to humans, bestowing them withprophetic powers and inspiration (Amatorius 758E,Degenio Socratis 580C,De facie 944C–D), in takingcare of humans when they are needy (Amatorius 758A–B),in taking care of the sanctuaries and the sacred rites (Dedef. or. 417A–B), but also in punishing humans and avenginghuman bad acts (ibid.). The latter is the role of the bad demons. Forapparently Plutarch maintained that proper punishment is nevervengeful. This emerges when Plutarch discusses the question of divinepunishment in his workOn the Delays of the Divine Vengeance(De sera numinis vindicta).

In this work Plutarch examines an issue with which philosophers of hisage are seriously concerned, namely that of theodicy. Even if God isnot responsible for occurrences of evil (see above, sect. 4.2), thereis a question of why these are not always punished promptly by God. Inhis treatiseOn the Delays of the Divine Vengeance Plutarchaddresses the question of whether the delays of divine punishment speakagainst the existence of divine providence (550C) and he replies thatthis is not the case. God, he argues, acts on reason, not onpassionate anger or impulse (551A, 557E), thus avoiding errors, and bydoing so, Plutarch continues, he sets the model for our own actions(ibid.). On the other hand, Plutarch argues that human wickedness isnot always to be punished, because it of itself ruins the life ofthose who act thus, and this is already a sufficient punishment(ibid. 556D-E). Besides, Plutarch suggests, the punishment of thedivine does not have to be obvious; this can actually take place inthe afterlife of the soul, as is suggested inRepublic 10, soPlutarch claims that “it is one and the same argument…that establishes both the providence of god and the survivalof the human soul” (560F; see also below, sect. 5).

5. Psychology

Plutarch, as a Platonist, regards soul as responsible for all life andall motion of any kind. The world and all living beings havesoul. While in Plato soul sometimes includes (or is even restrictedto) intellect (e.g.Phaedo 94b) and sometimes not (e.g.Phaedrus 247c,Timaeus 69c–e), Plutarchdistinguishes sharply between soul and intellect. For Plutarch soul isessentially non-rational and yet receptive of reason that stems fromthe intellect (De virtute morali 441F). Plutarch criticizesthe Stoics who analyze the nature of man in two parts only, body andsoul, for disregarding the intellect (De facie 943A–B;see Alt 1993, 94–6). For Plutarch the threefold distinction ofthe individual person (body, soul, and intellect) has its equivalentin the universe at large. As the human soul is intermediary betweenbody and intellect, similarly, Plutarch claims, the world soul isintermediary between earth and sun (De facie 943A, 945A,De virtute morali 441D; see Deuse 1985, 45–47, Opsomer1994). In both the human being and the world, the intellect isexternal to the soul (cf.Phaedrus 247c–d); the worldsoul is informed by the reason of the creator god, the demiurge, whilein the case of humans the intellect amounts to the“daimôn” assigned to each of us (Degenio Socratis 591E), which is whatRepublic 620d and,especially,Timaeus 90a-d suggest. Ultimately both the worldsoul and the human souls are informed by reason and become rational bycoming into contact with the divine intellect. Plutarch argues thatall ensouled beings, including animals, exhibit the presence of thedivine intellect (De Iside 382A–B). However, as I saidabove (sect. 4.1), an element of non-rationality always remains insouls (De an. procr. 1027A), but Plutarch claims that thishappens in different degrees, depending on how much a soul partakes ofintellect (De genio Socratis 588 D, 591D–E). On thisbasis Plutarch argues, against the Stoics, that animals also share inreason (De sollertia animalium esp. 960B). The extent towhich a soul partakes of reason largely depends on the training andthe habits of that soul itself. Strong emotions, for instance,distance soul from intellect and increase its non-rationality (Degenio Socratis 591D; see Dillon 1977, 212–213).

Plutarch maintains that there is a constant interaction betweenintellect, soul, and body. This interaction manifests itself both at apsychological and at an ethical level. The soul as such accounts forthe senses, while the intellect accounts for intelligence (De an.procr. 1026D–E). Clearly, though, perception is an activityinvolving both the senses and the notions residing in the intellect(see above, sect. 3). It is the intellect that gives order to thesense impressions and accounts for understanding. Analogously, theinteraction of soul and body gives rise to non-rational movement orpassion, while the interaction between intellect and soul brings aboutrational movement, harmony and virtue (De sera 566A–D,591D–F; see Dillon 1977, 194). Plutarch actually suggests thatthe soul that is devoid of intellect comes close to beingquasi-corporeal (De sera 566A; Teodorsson 1994,120). Regarding the embodied soul, Plutarch appears to be guided byAristotle's view in theDe anima (see alsoPhaedo82d–e), arguing that the soul uses the body as aninstrument. The soul, he argues, develops faculties, such as thevegetative, the nutritive, the perceptive, when associating with thebody, so that it can carry out the functions of an animated body(De virtute morali 442B, 450E, 451A,Plat. Quest.107E–1009B; Karamanolis 2006, 111–113, Baltes 2000). Thiscoordination of the body is such that we sense and understand, andthis is possible because the soul is informed by the intellect (Degenio Socratis 589A).

For Plutarch, the proximity of soul as such to body in its operationsas living body is evidence for the superiority of theintellect. Inspired by passages in Plato such asPhaedrus247c andTimaeus 30b, 90a, Plutarch argues that intellect isas superior to soul as soul is to body (De facie 943A). Inhis view, the intelligent part of the human soul is not subject tocorruption (De genio Socratis 591D-F) and Plutarch identifiesit with one's true self. He argues that one's self is neither that invirtue of which we sense nor that in virtue of which we desire, butrather that in virtue of which we reason and think (De facie944F–945A; cf.Timaeus 90a-d). Plutarch actually goesso far as to distinguish two kinds of death, first when intellectleaves soul and body, second when soul leaves body (De facie943A–B; see Donini 1988b, 140–143, Brenk 1994, 15). Theseparation of intellect from soul and body happens “by love forthe image of the sun…for which all nature strives”(De facie 944E). The ascent to the sun as the goal ofintellect symbolizes the human being's imitation of, and assimilationto, the divine, and is a frequent theme in Plutarch (De Iside372D-E,De E 393D–F,De sera 556D; see Brenk1994, 10–14, Becchi 1997). This is illustrated in the mythpresented inOn Delays in Divine Punishment of a certainAridaeus, who like Er in theRepublic, died but has come backto life to narrate his experience after death. The death of Aridaeusamounts to the fall of the intelligent part of his soul (tophronoun;De sera 563E–F, 566A), through whichhumans partake of the divine (564C), with the soul remaining behind(allê psychê) as an anchor in the body (564C;cf. 560C-D). The latter is the non-rational part of the soul, which issuch because it is bound to the body(sômatoeidês; 566A) and inclines the entire soultoward earthly concerns, preventing the soul from going very far away(566D). This is very similar to what Plotinus maintains later inEnn. IV.8.8.1. However, in hisOn the Soul that isonly fragmentarily preserved, Plutarch speaks of the separation ofsoul from body and recounts the story of a certain Antyllos who haddied and then his soul had been released again (fr. 176 Sandbach). Inthis context Plutarch claims that the doctrine of the incorruptibilityof the soul is an ancient one (fr. 177 Sandbach), a claim which maywell be a criticism of the Epicurean doctrine of the mortality of soul(cf.Non posse suaviter vivi 1103F; see Bonazzi 2010,78–83). Inspired by thePhaedo, Plutarch argues thatthe very task of philosophy is to prepare us for the separation fromthe body, which amounts to a life without bodily needs that heconsiders as the “true life”, which in his view theEpicureans ignore (Non posse suaviter vivi1105C–E). After death, Plutarch claims, souls go through theprocess of reincarnation, which, as in Plato, is a form of punishmentfor wicked souls (De sera 567D-F). While all intellects liveeternally, those of noble souls become divine (daimones) andoperate as guardians of humans (De genio Socratis 593D-594A;see further Dillon 1977, 219–224). Such evidence suggests thatfor Plutarch both intellect and soul are immortal though in adifferent way, a doctrine we find also later in Porphyry (fr. 453Smith).

6. Ethics and Politics

Plutarch shares the view of Hellenistic philosophers that philosophyis a way of life. He is much concerned to advocate the life accordingto Plato, and to show that such life is possible and indeed happy (Adv.Col. 1107E,Non posse suaviter vivi 1086C-D). Hecriticizes Stoics and Epicureans for proposing misguided ethical ideals(e.g.An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum 1129F-1130E).Plutarch's strong concern with ethics is reflected also in hisLives, which focus on the character of a historical figure.Central to these is how man's nature (physis) can beeducated so that a certain state of character is formed(êthos; Pericles 38,Alcibiades 2.1,Desera 551E-F, 552C-D; Russell 1973, 105-106, 117). Plutarch'sespecially strong interest in ethics among the sub-fields of philosophyis characteristic of his age. The two most prominent ofPlutarch's Stoic contemporaries or near-contemporaries, Epictetusand Seneca, devote most of their attention in their writings to ethics,and this is the case also with the Peripatetic Aristocles of Messene(1^st c. CE?), the author of some eight books on ethics (Sudas.v. Aristocles). To some extent, this especially stronginterest in ethics goes back to Antiochus (1^st c. BCE).Plutarch and the Peripatetic Aristocles identify ethical formation asthe ultimate goal of philosophy, yet Plutarch at least differs from Antiochus inthat he founds his ethics on metaphysics, largely based on hisinterpretation of theTimaeus outlined above (sect. 4.1). It is because Plutarchmaintains the existence of an intelligible world, which has shaped thesensible world including humans, that he rejects the ethics of bothStoics and Epicureans. On the basis of thePhaedrus and theTimaeus, Plutarch maintains that both the human intellect and thehuman soul stem from the intelligible realm, the indivisible and thedivisible being respectively, which shapes our human nature accordingly(cf.Plat. Quest. 1001C).

Plutarch argues that the crucial difference between the Platonic andthe Stoic understanding of virtue is grounded in their differentconceptions of soul as the source of human agency (De virtutemorali 441C-E). While for the Stoics soul is reason only,Plutarch defends the conception of soul outlined in theRepublic (esp. book 4), which presents the soul as consistingof rational and non-rational parts. As explained above (sect. 4), thisfits well with Plutarch's interpretation of the creation of theworld, according to which the pre-cosmic non-rational world soul isinformed by the reason (logos) of the divine demiurge, yetthis is not sufficient to eliminate its natural non-rationality. Thenon-rational aspect of the human soul accounts for emotions and bodilydesires (Opsomer 1994, 41). In fact, however, Plutarch does not lumptogether bodily desires and emotions as constituting anundifferentiated non-rational part. Given the theory ofRepublic 4, Plutarch distinguishes spirit, as responsible foremotions, from appetite, which is responsible for bodily desires. But heclasses them together to the extent that both are dependent uponreason, sensitive to, and nurtured by, it (De virtute morali443C-D;Plat. Quest. 1008A-B). Plutarch describes virtue(without mentioning appetite) as the state in which reason succeeds inmanaging emotion and drives it in the right direction (De virtutemorali 443B-D, 444B-C, 451C-E), while vice arises when emotion isnot properly informed by reason (443D). Plutarch defines virtue as thestate in which emotion is present as matter and reason as form (440D),a definition inspired byNicomachean Ethics 1104b13–30 (cf.Aspasius,In Ethica Nicomachea 42.20–25). Plutarch'sdefinition of virtue matches his account of how the world came intobeing, when matter was informed by reason. As with the world soul,similarly with the human soul in Plutarch's view, the impact of reason is possible becausethe soul, or part thereof, can heed what reason dictates.

Interestingly, Plutarch does not refer to theTimaeus to support his theoryof the tripartite soul, but rather to Aristotle (De virtute morali 442B-C), whomPlutarch, like most ancient and modern commentators, recognizes asadopting essential aspects of Plato's doctrine. The essentialfeature that Aristotle shares with Plato is the belief in rational andnon-rational aspects of the soul. This accounts for unself-controlledactions that, Plutarch thinks, prove how mistaken is the Stoicconception of human agency as deriving from reason alone. Plutarch alsorelies largely on Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethics withregard to the nature of virtue. He describes virtue as being an extremeof excellence (akrotês), which however lies in a mean,determined by reason, between two opposite emotions (De virtutemorali 443D-444D;Nicomachean Ethics 1107a6-8). Plutarchargues that there can be no virtue without some emotion. Without someamount of fear, Plutarch contends, there can be no courage, forinstance (De virtute morali 451E-452A); courage, he claims, is the virtuethat one acquires when, in a state of fear, one manages tosubordinate fear to a goal set by reason, such as fighting forone's country; in this sense, emotion is an ally to reason inconstituting virtue (cf.De tranq. animi 471D). Plutarchsuggests this specifically in the case of anger becoming bravery(De ira fr. 148 Sandbach). Anger, when moderated and guided byreason, can also motivate reasonable and due vengeance (Desera 551A-B).

Since virtue is the state (hexis 443D) in which emotion isguided by reason, it follows that virtue requires training in how tomake emotion right. Plutarch devotes an entire treatise to thatsubject (De profectibus in virtute). He defends, against theStoics, the view that progress in virtue is possible (ignoring therelevant views of Epictetus,Dissertations I.4 and Seneca,Letters to Lucilius 75.8). Education in virtue can beprovided by parents and teachers, by the example of the virtuousactions of the people around us (De communibus notitiis1069A), by the law of the cities (De virtute morali 452D),and also by philosophy, poetry and history (De profectibus79B-80B). Plutarch tries indeed to offer such an education in virtuethrough his writings that have practical orientation, such asOnthe Control of Anger, On Curiosity, How Could you Tell a Flattererfrom a Friend, Precepts of Marriage, To an Uneducated Ruler (seeVan Hoof 2010), which are similar in spirit with the works ofPhilodemusOn Property Management, On the Good Ruler according toHomer and Seneca'sLetters to Lucilius. Plutarchmaintains that the pervasion of emotion by reason should be thorough,which is why he claims that the temperate person is less virtuous thanthe practically wise one (phronimos), who does the goodwithout wavering (De virtute morali 445C-D;cf.Nicomachean Ethics 1151b23–1152a3), as a temperateperson might. To the extent that virtue reflects the operation ofreason in the human soul, which is capable of following reason,virtue, Plutarch argues, is natural to us. He argues that natureitself attracts us (oikeiousa) to things which are naturalfor us to strive for, but these include also life, health, beauty,which Plutarch considers as completing happiness(symplêrotika, De communibus notitiis1060B-E). Plutarch censures the Stoics because they argue that thefinal human end is to live in accordance with nature, but, he claims,they contradict themselves when they admit only virtue as being good,neglecting all other things which are, by everyone's admission, goodfor us, such as health. Plutarch, like Antiochus, maintains that thehuman final end includes the satisfaction of primary demands of thebody, a doctrine Plutarch finds in Aristotle, Xenocrates and Polemo(De communibus notitiis 1069E-F).

This, however, is not the only conception of happiness that Plutarchadvocates. While he argues against the Stoics that a life of thinkingonly, devoid of all affection, cannot be happy (De tranq.animi 468D), he also defends an alternative end for human life,which consists in a life oftheoria (an Aristotelian termmeaning contemplative knowing) or, in Plutarch's words,epopteia (a religious term referring to the final visionachieved in initiation ceremonies for mystery religions;DeIside 382D-E; cf.Quaestiones Convivales718d). Formally, the end that Plutarch advocates for human beings is,as he says, a life similar to god (De sera 550D-E). This endis suggested in the several eschatological stories found in Plutarch'swork, which suggest that a human being can transcend the sensibleworld and become united with the divine (see Alt 1993,185–204). This doctrine, which has its roots in thePhaedo, theTheaetetus andRepublic X, isagain to be understood against Plutarch's interpretation of thecosmogony of theTimaeus. The “younger gods” oftheTimaeus imitate the demiurge in constructing humanbeings' and the other animals' bodies and souls (40b-d, 42e), and thisis also the case with nature, which strives to imitate the creator andbecome like him (De facie 944; Helmig 2005,21–23). This assimilation with god (homoiôsis)amounts to the complete domination of the intelligible aspect ofhumans over the sensible one. Humans are invited to follow the cosmicexample and in this sense to live in accordance with nature too. Toachieve this, one should let his intellect rule and get beyond havingany emotions. This amounts to having and exercising theoreticalvirtue alone, which pertains to the intellect (Non posse suavitervivi 1092E). The practical virtues that pertain to the embodiedsoul are achieved, according to Plutarch, through the subordination ofemotion to reason (Tyrwitt frs. p. 68 Sandbach). Plutarch'sdistinction between a life of happiness through theorizing orcontemplation and a practical life of happiness is made in hisOnMoral Virtue, apparently inspired by the relevant Aristoteliandistinction inNicomachean Ethics. Plutarch suggests that histheoretical ideal does not only require a distinct kind of virtue butalso determines a distinct kind of happiness. In this Plutarchanticipates Plotinus' distinction of two kinds of ethical life, apolitical and a theoretical one. For Plutarch, however, thetheoretical ideal of the philosopher involves a political dimensiontoo, which is to help their fellow citizens and the city with hisreasoning, as is suggested in theRepublic, and he criticizesboth Stoics and Epicureans for refusing to engage in politics (DeStoic. rep. 1033A–1034C,Adv. Col.1126B–1127E,Ad Princ. Inerud. 780C–F).

7. Poetics and Educational theory

Given Plutarch's concern for the education of character and of thecity as a whole, it is hardly surprising that he wrote works oneducation (On the Education of Children, De liberiseducandis, which is considered spurious, however, by Ziegler1951, 809–812) and especially on the effect that poetry has onthe education of one's character. His most important work in thisfield isOn How the Young Man Should Listen to Poets(Quomodo adolscens poetas audire debeat; De aud. poet.),while he also wrote a treatise on Homer (De Homero) that isno loner extant. In the former work Plutarch deals with the questionof how young people should read and understand poetry, since poetrycan be both beneficial and harmful, depending on itsinterpretation. Following theRepublic, Plutarch argues thatpoetry is a mimetic art; it imitates the character and lives ofvarious people, good and bad alike (De aud. poet. 17E-F,26A). In the course of this, Plutarch claims, poets tell lies andpresent obscene stories and images (ibid. 16A). Plutarch selectsexamples of such poetic habits mainly from theRepublic,focusing on stories from Homer in particular. Plutarch does notcondemn poetry altogether; he rather finds a convenient middlesolution. He tries to show how one should read the poets in the mostbeneficial way. In order to do so, Plutarch argues, first one shouldavoid reading the deliberate lies made in poetry, which canunnecessarily upset one (ibid. 17B; see Russell 1989, 303). Second,Plutarch recommends that the reader, especially the young one, shouldlearn how to read poetry allegorically, in such a way that this canhave a beneficial effect on one's character (ibid. 19E-20B; see Lamberton2001, 48-50). This is the approach that Plutarch himself applies tothe myth of Isis and Osiris in his work with that title. Plutarchillustrates the search for the correct (morally uplifting) meaning ofa poetic saying also in parts of theTable Talks(Quaestiones Conviviales 622C, 673C; see Russell 1989, 305). Theyoung man needs to learn the skill of how to recover and isolate thebeneficial elements of poetry and absorb them alone. In that waypoetry can guide one to virtue (ibid. 28E-F). Plutarch likens properlyeducated young men in their attitude towards poetry to the way beesselect the best from flowers (32E), a simile adopted by theChristians, Basil (To young men on the right use ofliterature 4.7–8), and Gregory of Nazianzus(Orationes 43.13.1). Such a use of poetry, Plutarch claims,prepares youths for their education in philosophy (Deaud. poet. 15F, 37B). This happens in two ways. First, poetrycan guide youths towards philosophy by familiarizing them with theconcepts that philosophers also use; second, poetry, as we have seen,when properly used, can guide to virtue, and this, Plutarch argues, isa requirement for philosophical education (De aud.poet. 36D-37B). Plutarch actually maintains that the best ofpoetry is nothing other than philosophy in disguise (ibid. 15F), andthroughout his work he tries to illustrate precisely this through aselection of verses from the most well known ancient poets. InOnMaking Progress in Virtue (79B-D) Plutarch goes so far as totreat poetry and history as complementary to philosophy in educatingone's character. Regarding the educative role of poetry, Plutarchappears to be influenced by the Stoics, who were using poetry ineducation, but he goes further than they in devising specificstrategies meant to turn young men into good readers of poetry (seeBlank 2011).

From this point of view, one may relate Plutarch'sLives tohis philosophical works (see Gill 2006, 421–424). Plutarchhimself says he wrote theLives for the improvement ofothers, assuming that the actions of virtue will instigate emulationin the reader (Pericles 1–2; see Russell 1973,100–101). Perhaps, then, theLives also aim to trainthe reader's character, and in such a way to prepare them for the lifeof philosophy. If this is the case, then theLives arecomplementary with Plutarch's ethical works of practical orientationthat I discuss in the previous section.

8. Influence

Plutarch exercised considerable influence on later Platonism. Hisemphasis on theTimaeus and on metaphysics and psychology setthe tone for the following generations of Platonists, in whichmetaphysical and psychological questions and the high authority of theTimaeus were prominent features of philosophicalinquiry. Plutarch's literal interpretation of theTimaeusitself was highly debated among Platonists. It was adopted by Atticus,but was resisted by most others, including Taurus, Porphyry andProclus. Later Platonists criticized Plutarch for a narrow-mindedinterpretation of theTimaeus, some of their criticisms(e.g. on the world soul), however, rest on an uncharitableinterpretation of Plutarch (see Opsomer 2001). Nevertheless,Plutarch's view that the world soul is created in the sense that itpartakes of reason and intelligence imparted to it by the demiurge, isendorsed by Alcinous,Didascalikos 169.33–42 andpresumably also by Numenius (fr. 45 Des Places; see Dillon 1993, 127).Plutarch's radical metaphysical and psychological dualism is shared byNumenius and Atticus, but is rejected by Plotinus and Porphyry. Thelatter, however, draws on Plutarch in his argument that animalspartake of reason (De abstinentia 3.6–7). Plutarch'stheory of divine providence and theodicy, as presented in hisOnDelays of the Divine Providence (De sera numinisvindicta) was influential among ancient Platonists and Christiansalike. Proclus, for instance, took over much from it in hisTenObjections Against Divine Providence (esp. 8 and 9). Despite thevagaries of judgment by later Platonists of Plutarch's work, Plutarchnot only set the agenda of questions for later Platonists, redirectingtheir attention to theTimaeus, but he was also influentialin terms of his interpretative strategy in approaching Plato'swritings, which aspired to take into account Plato's entire work andto treat it as a system still to be articulated. It is this strategythat leads Plutarch to distinguish hierarchies of being in Plato'swork and also levels of ethical life, a strategy that Plotinus willadopt and develop. Plutarch was highly influential also among earlyChristians, who approved of his literal interpretation of theTimaeus, of his theory of good and bad demons, and of hiseducational theory. His work was used by Clement of Alexandria, whofollowed Plutarch in writing a treatise with the title“Stromateis,” but also by Eusebius, Cyril of Alexandriaand the Cappadocean Church Fathers, especially Basil (see above,sect. 7).

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Cicero

• Rackham, H. (ed. and transl. in English),Cicero On the nature ofthe Gods, Academica, Cambridge Mass. and London 1933 (Loeb).

Gregory of Nazianzus

• Moreschini, C. et al. (ed. and transl. in Italian),Gregorio diNazianzo. Tutte le orazioni, Milano 2000 (Bompiani).

Numenius

• Des Places, É. (ed. and trans. in French),Numénius.Fragments, Paris 1973 (Les Belles Lettres).

Plato

• Duke, E. A., W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, D. B., andJ.C.G. Strachan (ed.),Platonis Opera, tetralogiae I-II,vol.I, Oxford 1995 (OCT).
• Burnet, J. (ed.),Platonis Opera, tetralogiae III-IX, vols.II-V, Oxford 1905-1915 (OCT).
• Cooper, J. M. (ed.),Plato Complete Works, Indianapolis 1997(Plato's works in English translation).

Plotinus

• Henry, P. and H.-R. Schwyzer (ed.)Plotini Opera, vols. I-III,Oxford 1964–1982 (OCT).
• Armstrong, A. H. (ed. and trans. in English),Plotinus, vols. I-VII, Cambridge Mass. and London 1966-1988(Loeb).

Plutarch

• Babbitt, F. C. (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch'sMoralia, vol. V, Cambridge Mass. and London 1936.
• Babbitt, F. C. (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch'sMoralia, vol. VI, Cambridge Mass. and London 1938 (Loeb).
• Cherniss, H. (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch'sMoralia, vol. XIII.1, Cambridge Mass. and London 1976 (Loeb).
• Cherniss, H. (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch'sMoralia, vol. XIII.2, Cambridge Mass. and London 1976 (Loeb).
• Cherniss, H. and W. Helmbold (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch's Moralia, vol. XII, Cambridge Mass. and London1957 (Loeb).
• De Lacy, P. and B. Einarson (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch's Moralia, vol. VII, Cambridge Mass. and London1959 (Loeb).
• Einarson, B. and P. De Lacy (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch's Moralia, vol. XIV, Cambridge Mass. and London1967 (Loeb).
• Sandbach, F. H. (ed. and trans. in English),Plutarch's Fragmenta, vol. XV, Cambridge Mass. andLondon 1969 (Loeb).

Porphyry

• Bouffartique, J. and M. Patillon (ed. and trans. in French),Porphyre, De l'abstinence, Livre I, Paris 1977;Livre II-III, Paris 1979;Livre IV, Paris 1995: (LesBelles Letters).
• Des Places, É. (ed. and trans. in French),Porphyre Viede Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella, Paris 1982 (Les BellesLettres).
• Henry, P. and Schwyzer, H-R. (ed.),Porphyrius, VitaPlotini, inPlotini Opera, vol. I, Oxford 1964(OCT).
• Smith, A. (ed.),Porphyrius Fragmenta, Stuttgart and Leipzig1993 (Teubner).

Proclus

• Kroll, G. (ed.),In Platonis Rem Publicam Commentarii, vols.I-II, Leipzig 1899-1901 (Teubner).
• Diehl, E. (ed.),In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, vols. I-III,Leipzig 1903–6 (Teubner).

Seneca

• Reynolds, L. D. (ed.),Seneca Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales,vols. I-II, Oxford 1965 (OCT).

Sextus Empiricus

• Bury, R. (ed. and trans. in English),Against the Logicians[Adversus Mathematicos 7–8], Cambridge Mass. and London1935 (Loeb).

Syrianus

• Kroll, W. (ed.),Syrianus,In Aristotelis MetaphysicaCommentaria, Berlin 1902 (CAG VI).

Stobaeus

• Wachsmuth, C., and O. Hense (ed.),Ioannis StobaeiAnthologium, vols. I-V, Berlin 1884-1923 (repr. 1974).

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Acknowledgments

The author thanks Christoph Helmig and Christopher Noble forsuggestions and remarks, and especially John Cooper for many valuablecomments and suggestions while preparing this article forpublication.