Though the word “fatalism” is commonly used to referto an attitude of resignation in the face of some future event orevents which are thought to be inevitable, philosophers usually usethe word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anythingother than what we actually do. This view may be argued for in variousways: by appeal to logical laws and metaphysical necessities; byappeal to the existence and nature of God; by appeal to causaldeterminism. When argued for in the first way, it is commonly called“Logical fatalism” (or, in some cases, “Metaphysicalfatalism”); when argued for in the second way, it is commonlycalled “Theological fatalism”. When argued for in thethird way it is not now commonly referred to as “fatalism”at all, and such arguments will not be discussed here.

The interest in arguments for fatalism lies at least as much in thequestion of how the conclusion may be avoided as in the question ofwhether it is true.

• 1. Logical Fatalism: Aristotle’s argument and the nature of truth
  • 1.1 Aristotle’s solution
  • 1.2 Related solutions
  • 1.3 Rejection of the theory of truth
  • 1.4 A-theories and B-theories of time
  • 1.5 Truth and fatalism
• 2. Logical fatalism: Diodorus Cronus and the necessity of the past
  • 2.1 An Aristotelian solution
  • 2.2 An Ockhamist solution
• 3. Logical fatalism: Richard Taylor’s argument and the conditions of power
  • 3.1 An Aristotelian solution
  • 3.2 The conditions of power
• 4. The necessity of the past and Aristotelian solutions
• 5. Theological Fatalism: Pike’s argument and God’s omniscience
  • 5.1 An Aristotelian solution
  • 5.2 An Ockhamist solution
  • 5.3 Affecting the past
  • 5.4 A Boethian solution
  • 5.5 The nature of God’s knowledge
  • 5.6 Must God be omniscient?
• 6. Theological Fatalism: Molina, Plantinga and middle knowledge
• 7. The Idle Argument
• 8. Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Logical Fatalism: Aristotle’s argument and the nature of truth

The classic argument for fatalism occurs in Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.),De Interpretatione, chapter 9. He addresses the question ofwhether in relation to all questions it is necessary that theaffirmation or the negation is true or false.

What he says could be presented as an argument along the followinglines.

Suppose that (i)p is true orp is false and (ii)not-p is true or not-p is false.

Thenp is true or not-p is true.

Now suppose that in 1900 one person says that a sea-battle will takeplace on 1/1/2100, and another says that a sea-battle will not takeplace on 1/1/2100.

Then either what the first person says is true or what the secondperson says is true.

But, in that case, either it is necessary in 1900 that a sea-battletakes place on 1/1/2100, or it is necessary in 1900 that one does nottake place.

But the date of the predictions is irrelevant, and it is irrelevantwhether any prediction is actually made at all.

So it is necessary at all times that a sea-battle takes place on1/1/2100, or that a sea-battle does not take place on 1/1/2100.

But the argument can evidently be generalised.

So, everything that happens, happens of necessity.

First of all we need to be clear about what is meant by “necessity”here. What is at issue here is not logical necessity. It is ratherinevitability. When the occurrence of a sea-battle on 1/1/2100 is saidto be necessary at a certain date, what is meant is that at that datenothing can prevent a sea-battle from taking place on 1/1/2100. Inparticular, no one has the power to prevent it. Now Aristotle acceptsthat “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarilyis not, when it is not.” So, he accepts that, if a sea-battle isactually taking place on 1/1/2100, then on 1/1/2100 it is (in thissense) taking place of necessity. Nothing can then stop it happening,because it is happening. What this argument appears to establish,however, is that, if a sea-battle takes place on 1/1/2100, not only isit necessary then that a sea-battle takes place on 1/1/2100, but it wasalways necessary. No one could ever have prevented it. And the sameapplies to everything that can happen. So, in particular, no one everhas the power to do anything other that what they actually do.

So, is there anything wrong with the argument?

Well certainly there is a move which seems to require someexplanation: the move from truth to necessity. Why should it followfrom the fact that it was true in 1900 that a sea-battle would takeplace on 1/1/2100, that it was necessary that it should? This looks,indeed, suspiciously like a fallacious move from “Of necessity, if itis true that a sea-battle takes place on 1/1/2100, a sea-battle takesplace on 1/1/2100” to “If it is true that a sea-battle takes place on1/1/2100, a sea-battle takes place of necessity on 1/1/2100”. But suchsuspicions are probably ill-founded. It is more likely that the moveinvokes a certain form of the correspondence theory of truth: if whatsomeone says at a certain time is true, then the state of the world atthat time must be such as to make it true. But since what is,necessarily is when it is, the state of the world will be necessary.So, anything that is true is necessarily true.

However, even if this crucial move does not rest on a simplefallacy, the idea that the truth of what someone says is determined bythe state of the world at the time is questionable. We shall return tothis point.

1.1 Aristotle’s solution

First we should notice Aristotle’s solution. Aristotle is in no doubtthat not everything that happens, happens of necessity. He acceptsindeed (19a23–5) that “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and whatis not, necessarily is not, when it is not.” But he goes on to say,“But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything thatis not, necessarily is not.” So what is his solution? Here it must besaid that there is more than one view. (Aristotle,Categories andDe Interpretatione, 137–42). On oneview he rejects the move from truth to necessity. That may indeed bethe right move to make, but in what follows I shall take it thatAristotle actually offers a different solution, which, rightly orwrongly, I shall refer to as “the Aristotelian solution”. On thisview his solution is to deny that it is necessary that theaffirmation or the negation is true or false when this relates tothings that do not happen of necessity. That is to say, his solutionis that neither what the first person said in 1900 (“There will be asea-battle on 1/1/2100.”) nor what the second person said (“Therewill not be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100.”) was true. What each personsaid was in fact neither true nor false. So we may represent theAristotelian solution as one which rejects the law of bivalence:

The law of bivalence: every proposition is either true orfalse.

It is to be rejected in particular in relation to such propositionsas, “there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100”; that is, in relation topropositions about future contingents, about what is neither necessarynor impossible. (For the view that Aristotle does not reject the lawof bivalence see Whitaker 1996.)

Though Aristotle does not explicitly say so, it seems that he wouldalso accept that if a sea-battle takes place on 1/1/2100, then what thefirst person said would then be true, and if it does not, what thesecond person said would then be true. So we may represent theAristotelian solution as holding the following:

Some propositions are true at some times and not atothers.

Are there any objections to this solution?

One objection is that the solution appears to require the rejectionof the law of the excluded middle in addition to the law of bivalence.Now it is true that it involves the rejection of one form of thelaw:

LEM1: in the case of any proposition,p, eitherp is true or not-p is true.

But another form of the law is:

LEM2: in the case of any proposition,p, eitherp or not-p.

Does it involve the rejection of this? One might think it does, on thegrounds that “p” is equivalent to“p is true”. So LEM1 and LEM2 stand or falltogether. Or one might think like this: “porq” can be true only if eitherp is trueorq is true (or both are). But, wherep is aproposition about a future contingent it is not true, whether thecontingent state of affairs comes about or not; neither is itsnegation true; so the disjunction, “p ornot-p” is not true.

As a matter of fact, though, this is not what Aristotle seems tohave thought. He says (19a28–32):

Everything necessarily is or is not, and will be or willnot be; but one cannot divide and say that one or the other isnecessary. I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or notto be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for a sea-battleto take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place.

So, on the assumption that he would have accepted that “there will orwill not be a sea-battle tomorrow” is equivalent to “there will be asea-battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow”, hewould, it seems, have accepted LEM2. How could this be? Well, whatstops its being true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow is thatthere is nothing yet to determine that it is true. But there issomething to determine that there will be or will not be a sea-battletomorrow; in the nature of things one or the other must occur. So itis now true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or there willnot be a sea-battle tomorrow.

This suggests adopting the following rule for determining thetruth-value of complex propositions some of whose constituents areneither true nor false. One considers in turn each of the possible waysin which things may turn out, and works out what truth-value thecomplex proposition would then have. If it turns out to be true inevery case, it is true; if it turns out to be false in every case, itis false; otherwise it is neither true nor false. (van Fraassen1966)

Of course this is not a wholly cost free line to take. Apart from thefact that it means that “p” and “pis true” are not in general interchangeable, it also createsproblems for truth-functionality. We normally think of“or”, “and” and “not” as beingtruth-functional. That is to say, we think that the truth-values of“p orq”, “pandq” and “not-p” are determinedby the truth-values of “p” and“q”. But if we adopt the Aristotelian solution,and accept the way outlined just now of determining the truth-value ofa complex proposition, “or”, for instance, will not betruth functional. In some case “p orq”will be true when neitherp norq is true (when, forinstance, “q” is “not-p”),and in some case it will not be (if, say, “p” is“there will be a sea-battle tomorrow” and“q” is “there will be a football matchtomorrow”). (If one thinks in terms of there being a thirdtruth-value, indeterminacy, say, in addition to truth and falsity, theposition will be that, whenp andq are both indeterminate, sometimes “p orq”is true, and sometimes it is indeterminate.). Similarly “p andq” will be false in the one case and indeterminate in theother.

However, this objection might not seem very pressing compared with thethreat of fatalism. If accepting a lack of equivalence between“p” and “p is true” and afailure of truth-functionality for “or” and“and” were the only alternative to accepting fatalism,most people would find it easier to accept these theoretical oddities,if oddities they are.

But there is another objection to the Aristotelian solution whichmakes it harder to accept — the way we treat bare predictions. Ifsomeone had said in 1972, “Red Rum will win the Grand National nextyear”, surely, we would think, he was right. Not right in 1973, butright in 1972. That is to say, surely what he said was true, when hesaid it; not just later. Of course, we would not have known in 1972that what he said was true; nor, presumably did he. Nor, of coursewould we have supposed that there was anything inevitable about thevictory; these things, we naturally suppose, are a matter of chance.But, of course, this objection to the Aristotelian solution is also anobjection to the argument for fatalism which was based on theassumption of bivalence. We are, effectively, rejecting the idea thatif what someone says at a time is true at that time, then the state ofthe world at the time must determine that it is true. What we seem tobe quite prepared to accept instead is the idea that for what is saidto be true at a time it is sufficient if the state of the worldwill sometime be such as to determine that it is true.

There is another problem about the theory of truth which theAristotelian argument seems to be invoking. If the theory really isthat the truth of what is said depends on the state of the world at thetime of the saying, does not that raise a problem for statements aboutthe past? Suppose someone says that a dinosaur stood on this spotmillions of years ago. For this to be true, must the present state ofthe world be such as to determine that it is? Some people have indeedthought this; and they have thought that, just as some propositionsthat were not true come to be true, so also some that were true ceaseto be true. (Łukasiewicz 1967) But this is even further from what weare naturally inclined to say. A more attractive alternative, if wewished to retain something like this theory of truth, would be to saythat what happened in the past counts as part of the present state ofthe world, because the past, like the present, is necessary. But it isnot clear why that should be enough to make it part of the presentstate of the world. Perhaps it would be better to take the view simplythat something is true at a time only if it is necessary at that time.But then we would need some argument for this position which wentbeyond the simple thought that what is said is made true by the way theworld is at the time it is said.

It is worth noticing some other solutions which are closely relatedto the Aristotelian solution, but avoid some of the problems.

1.2 Related solutions

1. (Prior 1967). One could agree with Aristotle that “there willbe a sea-battle tomorrow” is not true, even if it turns out thatthere is a sea battle; but instead of saying that it is neither truenor false, one could say that it is false. What is more, one could saythat the negation, “there will not be a sea-battletomorrow” is true. Then we could retain the law of bivalence,and the equivalence between “p” and“p is true”. Effectively we would be treating“p” as equivalent to “it is necessarythatp”. And we would, no doubt, distinguish between“there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow”, where this isthe negation of “there will be a sea-battle tomorrow” and“there will be no sea-battle tomorrow” which, like“there will be a sea-battle tomorrow”, is false. One mighteven say that “there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow” isambiguous; it could be equivalent to “it is not necessary thatthere will be sea-battle tomorrow” or it could be equivalent to“it is necessary that there will be no sea-battletomorrow”. Certainly it is in favour of this view that one wouldretain the law of bivalence and also the truth-functionality of“or” and “and”. But there would be a heavyprice to pay. Now we should have to say what the person said about RedRum was false.

2. (Lucas 1986) One could make use of Reichenbach’s distinctionbetween the time of the utterance of a proposition, the time of thereference point and the time of the event. (Reichenbach 1947) Onecould then say that the truth of what is said depends not on the stateof the world at the time of the utterance, but on the state of theworld at the time of the reference point. One may then say that thereference point of the utterance in 1972 of “Red Rum will winthe Grand National next year” is 1973, not 1972. So, it wastrue. (Whereas, if someone had said “Red Rum is going to win theGrand National next year”, the use of “is going to”rather than “will” might perhaps have meant that thereference point was the time of the utterance, rather than the time ofnext year’s Grand National. So what was said would not have beentrue.)

3. (Tooley 1997) One could distinguish between truth at a time,which depends on the state of the world at the time, and truthsimpliciter, which does not. One could then allow that theprediction about Red Rum was true, as long as we are talking abouttruthsimpliciter. Also, where truthsimpliciter wasat issue, we could retain the law of bivalence and the equivalencebetween “p” and “p istrue”.

1.3 Rejection of the theory of truth

But finally we should not forget that, even if we wish to retain acorrespondence theory of truth, we can reject the idea that truthdepends on the state of the world at the time of the utterance of aproposition or even the state of the world at the time of thereference point. We can say that it depends on the state of the worldat the time of the event spoken of; or, more generally, that itdepends on the state of the world at the times spoken of, if any(Westphal 2006). The solution we prefer is, however, likely to berelated to the view we take about the nature of time.

1.4 A-theories and B-theories of time

On a B-theory of time an event’s being past, present or future issimply a relational matter; it is simply a matter of its occurring ata time which is earlier than, or simultaneous with, or later than sometime which is taken as the reference point – the time at which Iam having this thought, say. On an A-theory, on the other hand, thatthis time (or this event) is now is an absolute (if temporary) factabout it. But, in addition, a B-theory will typically hold that alltimes are equallyreal, whereas, typically, an A-theory willhold either that only the present and the past are real (type 1), orthat only the present is real (type 2). So, on a B-theory, there canbe future facts to make propositions about the future true; but, on anA-theory of type 1, a proposition about the future can be made trueonly by present and past facts together with timeless facts; and, onan A-theory of type 2, propositions both about the future and aboutthe past, can be made true only by present facts together withtimeless facts. And, evidently, on either type of A-theory aproposition may be true at one time, but not true at another,depending on what facts exist at the time. (For a fuller description of the A-theory and B-theory, see the Section 5 of the entry ontime.)

1.5 Truth and fatalism

Aristotle’s problem seemed to have arisen as a result of a theory oftruth according to which, if a statement is true at a time, there hasto be a state of the world at that time which makes it true. However,it has been argued that, if every meaningful statement is either trueor false (once and for all), that alone implies fatalism; the veryfact that a statement is true is enough to make what it describesunavoidable (Taylor 1983, Chapter 6). Suppose, for example, that Johnshaved one morning. Then the statement, “John shaved that morning”, istrue. But, it is argued, that means that John did not have the powernot to shave; because to have that power would be to have the power torender a true statement false. But no one has such a power; no one hasever succeeded in making a true statement false.

Now the final claim is certainly true, on the assumption thatmeaningful statements have just one truth-value. No one has everbrought about a situation in which a statement which was true isfalse; that is, a situation in which (a) there is a statement whichwas true and (b) that statement is now false. However, to have thepower to render a true statement false, one does need to have thepower to bring about such a situation. It is enough that (a) thereshould be a statement which is true, and that one has the power merelyto bring about a situation in which (b) that statement is (and alwayswas) falseinstead. So for John to have had the power torender false the true statement, “John shaved that morning”, it isenough that he should have had the power not to shave instead ofshaving. Of course, he did not exercise that power; but, in theabsence of some other argument to the contrary, presumably he couldhave done; in which case he would have made the statement, “Johnshaved that morning” false instead of true. So, it seems that there isno simple move from truth to fatalism.

2. Logical fatalism: Diodorus Cronus and the necessity of the past

Diodorus Cronus (late 4th – early 3rd centuries B.C.E.) had an argumentfor fatalism, known as “The Master Argument”. Its conclusion was,“the possible is that which either is or will be”. We know thepremisses but, unfortunately we do not know the intermediatesteps. The premisses were (1) “Everything that is past and true isnecessary”, (2) “The impossible does not follow from thepossible”. (Kneale and Kneale 1962, 119)

I shall not try to reconstruct the way the argument actually went,but consider an argument to it which might have been akin, whichargues for fatalism on the basis of the necessity of the past. Theargument goes:

What is true of the past is necessary.

Suppose that there is a sea-battle on 1/1/2100.

Then it was true in 1900 that there would be a sea-battle on1/1/2100.

Then it was true of the past that there would be a sea-battle on1/1/2100.

So it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100.

Therefore, if there is a sea-battle on 1/1/2100, it is necessarythat there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100 (and impossible that thereshould not be).

Is anything wrong with this argument?

2.1 An Aristotelian solution

We could certainly make an Aristotelian objection to the argument.We could deny that if a sea-battle takes place on 1/1/2100, it was truein 1900 that a sea-battle would take place.

2.2 An Ockhamist solution

We could also question either the first premiss or the applicationof it.

Is what is true of the past necessary? Well certainly pretty welleveryone thinks that what happened in the past cannot be undone. Thepast cannot now be altered. For if one were to undo the past, thatwould mean that something which did happen did not happen; or, at thevery least, that it was true that something happened and then later wasnot true that it happened. Most people (but not such a large majority)also think that something else is impossible, namely affecting whathappened in the past or causing something to have happened in the past.(This is not the same thing, of course, as altering the past. If onecaused something to have happened, one would not thereby bring it aboutthat something that did not happen did happen.) But it is one thing tothink that one cannot make it true that there was a sea-battleyesterday, and quite another thing to think that one cannot make ittrue yesterday that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow.

This might be called the Ockhamist solution to the problem. WhatOckham (c1285–1347) says is:

Some propositions are about the present as regards both theirwording and their subject matter (secundum vocem et secundumrem). Where such [propositions] are concerned, it is universallytrue that every true proposition about the present has [correspondingto it] a necessary one about the past… Other propositions are aboutthe present as regards their wording only and are equivalently aboutthe future, since their truth depends on propositions about thefuture. (Ockham,Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge and FutureContingents, 46–7)

In the spirit of this we may say that some propositions about thepast are really (at any rate in part) about the future. And in thesecases they are not necessary. And we may then apply this to “it wastrue in 1900 that there would be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100.” This, wemay say, is (in part) really about 1/1/2100.

Propositions which are in this way verbally about one time,t, but are really (in part) about a later time, are often saidto express “soft facts” aboutt. Unfortunately it is not atall clear quite how the notion of a soft fact should be made precise.One might, for instance, say that if a proposition abouttlogically entails a proposition about a later time, it expresses a softfact aboutt. But if that is the correct account, it seemsthat many propositions expressing soft facts about the past will benecessary, even when they are partly about the future. For instance, aproposition which conjoins some plausibly necessary proposition aboutthe past with a law of nature to the effect that in these circumstancessomething in the future will ensue would seem to entail somethingabout the future; but since it is a conjunction of two plausiblynecessary propositions, it seems to be necessary itself.

However it seems there is one variety of proposition whichpresumably expresses a soft fact about the past, but is very plausiblynot necessary, namely a proposition which is equivalent to aconjunction where one of the conjuncts is plausibly wholly about thefuture, and where the other conjunct does not entail it. And, if theAristotelian solution is wrong, our example seems to fit this bill. Theproposition, “it was true in 1900 that there would be a sea-battle on1/1/2100” is plausibly equivalent to “there was such a time as 1900 andthere will be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100.” And this proposition will notbe necessary, if it is not necessary that there will be a sea-battle on1/1/2100.

Notice that this does not show that the fatalist is wrong. It couldstill be that the proposition that there will be a sea-battle on1/1/2100 is necessary. But it does seem to show thatthisargument does not show that fatalism is correct. The position seems tobe that, either the argument does not work, because the Aristoteliansolution is correct, or the argument does not work because, in theabsence of an independent reason to suppose that the proposition thatthere will be a sea-battle on 1/1/2100 is necessary, we have no reasonto suppose that the proposition, “it was true in 1900 that there wouldbe a sea-battle on 1/1/2100” is a necessary proposition.

3. Logical fatalism: Richard Taylor’s argument and the conditions of power

Richard Taylor argues that certain commonly accepted presuppositionsyield a proof of fatalism. (Taylor 1962) The presuppositions are:

1. Any proposition whatever is either true, or if not true,false.

2. If any state of affairs is sufficient for, though logicallyunrelated to, the occurrence of some further condition at the same timeor any other time, then the former cannot occur without the latteroccurring also.

3. If the occurrence of any condition is necessary for, thoughlogically unrelated to, the occurrence of some other condition at thesame time, or any other time, then the latter cannot occur without theformer occurring also.

4. If one condition or set of conditions is sufficient for (ensures)another, then the other is necessary (essential) for it, andconversely, if one condition or set of conditions is necessary(essential) for another, then that other is sufficient for (ensures)it.

5. No agent can perform any given act if there is lacking, at thesame time or any other time, some condition necessary for theoccurrence of that act.

6. Time is not by itself “efficacious”; that is, the mere passage oftime does not augment or diminish the capacities of anything and, inparticular, it does not enhance or decrease an agent’s powers orabilities.

He then produces an argument to show (what most of us believe) thateither it is not in my power to read a headline saying that there wasa sea-battle yesterday or it is not in my power to read a headlinesaying that there was no sea-battle yesterday, at any rate if we makesome obvious assumptions about the relation between the headlines andwhat took place. LettingS be the act of reading a headlinethat there was a sea-battle, andS′ be the act ofreading a headline that there was no sea-battle; and lettingP andP′ be the propositions that there wasand was not such a battle, the argument goes:

IfP is true, then it is not in my power to doS′ (for ifP is true, then there is, or was,lacking a condition essential for my doingS′, thecondition, namely, of there being no sea-battle yesterday).

But ifP′ is true, then it is not in my power to doS (for a similar reason).

But eitherP is true orP′ is true

So, either it is not in my power to doS or it is not in my power todoS′.

The argument, he claims is sound, given the six presuppositions.

But suppose, his argument continues, we letO andO′ be the act of ordering a sea-battle and the act ofordering no sea-battle, andQ andQ′ be thepropositions that there will and will not be such a battle; and wesubstituteO andO′ forS andS′, andQ andQ′ forPandP′, and “tomorrow” for“yesterday” in the argument above, then (if we make someobvious assumptions about the relation between what we order and whathappens) we have a parallel argument which goes:

IfQ is true, then it is not in my power to doO′ (for ifQ is true, then there is, or willbe, lacking a condition essential for my doingO′, thecondition, namely, of there being no sea-battle tomorrow).

But ifQ′ is true, then it is not in my power to doO (for a similar reason).

But eitherQ is true orQ′ is true

So, either it is not in my power to doO or it is not in my power todoO′.

And this argument seems equally sound. And evidently it can begeneralised to yield the fatalist conclusion that it is never in ourpower to do anything other than what we actually do.

Are there any objections to his argument?

Well, one might certainly object to presupposition 6, on the groundsthat it does indeed seem to be the passage of time which makes adifference to my power to bring about or prevent a sea-battle on acertain day. Till the day is over, I may have the power, but after theday, I have not. However, presupposition 6 does not in fact seem toplay a significant role in the parallel arguments. So that cannot bethe whole story.

3.1 An Aristotelian solution

The objection that Taylor himself suggests is the Aristotelian one:we reject presupposition 1 (and also, presupposition 6, since weembrace the idea that a proposition may fail to be either true or falseat one time and come to be true or false later, as a result of the merepassage of time). We would also, presumably, need to amendpresupposition 5, so that it was not the lack of a necessary conditionfor an act which was problematical, but the existence of a conditionwhich was sufficient for the non-performance of the act.

Is that the only objection? Must we accept the Aristotelian solutionif we wish to escape the fatalistic conclusion?

3.2 The conditions of power

It seems that there is an alternative to the Aristotelian solution,because Taylor’s presupposition 5 seems dubious. A symptom of this isthat it seems to yield the fatalist conclusion a bit too easily. Forsupposing that I do not perform actS (whatever it is), thenit follows immediately that there is lacking a necessary condition formy performingS, namely the occurrence ofS. So, ifpresupposition 5 is right, it follows immediately that I never havethe power to perform any act which I do not actually perform. Ofcourse, that does not show that this conclusion is wrong; but itenough to make one question the presupposition which entails it. Andone might suggest that not only is this presupposition false, but thatit seems true because it is easily confused with another much moreplausible proposition (equivalent to Hasker’s PEP5; see Hasker 1989,115):

5′. No agent can perform any given act if there is lacking,at the same time or any other time, some condition which is necessaryfor the occurrence of that actand which it is not in his power tobring about.

And if we substitute that for Taylor’s presupposition 5, theparallel argument is no longer sound.

4. The necessity of the past and Aristotelian solutions

It is possible, it seems, to reply to the arguments for fatalism whichwe have considered so far, without appealing to the Aristoteliansolution. We can reject the theory of truth which is crucial toAristotle’s argument; we can reject the idea that all statements whichare about the past are necessary; we can reject Taylor’s account ofthe conditions of power. And we can do this without questioning theidea that we cannot affect the past, except, at any rate, in therather ill-defined collection of cases to which Ockham draws ourattention. However, it is open to the fatalist to argue that we haveno good reason for making the distinction we do between affecting thepast and affecting the future. So, if we accept that we cannot affectthe past, we ought also to accept that we cannot affect the future. Ofcourse, this cuts both ways. We might equally come to the conclusion,in the absence of a good reason for making the distinction, that sincewe can affect the future we can also affect the past; or, if thatseems outrageous, we could affect the past if natural laws did notprevent our doing so.

This objection by the fatalist is surely right about one thing.If we cannot affect the past, it would be good to knowwhy we cannot. One possible answer would be that which anA-theorist of time might give, namely that there is a fundamentalontological difference between the future on the one hand and thepresent and past on the other, which consists in the fact that thepresent and past are real or actual, while the future is not. And itis this fact, that the future is not real or actual, which means thatit is open, can be affected by what happens now; and it is the factthat the present and past are real or actual which means that theycannot be affected by what happens now. (Lucas 1989a, Tooley1997).

Such accounts, as we have noted above, seem to support theAristotelian solution. But they are not the only accounts. On someaccounts there is no such fundamental ontological difference betweenthe future and the present and past; the impossibility of affectingthe past lies not in the fact that the passage of time puts aconstraint on what can be caused, but rather in the fact that it isthe direction of causation which determines the direction oftime. (Swinburne 1994, Mellor 1981 and 1998) On yet other accounts theimpossibility is simply a fundamental metaphysical fact which is notopen to further analysis or explanation.

It is, of course, possible that the fatalist challenge about thedifference between the future and the present and past cannot besuccessfully met. For instance, it could be argued (a) that the onlysuccessful answer would be one which appealed to a fundamentalontological distinction between the future and the present and past,but that (b) there is in fact no such distinction. (Shanks 1994;discussed in Oaklander 1998) But, as we have noted, even if thischallenge cannot be met, it does not show that the fatalist iscorrect. The possibility remains that we can, in principle, affect thepast.

5. Theological Fatalism: Pike’s argument and God’s omniscience

A problem which has been much discussed by philosophers, at leastsince the time of Augustine (354–430), is whether divine omniscience iscompatible with free will, and in particular with our having the powerto do other than we do.

One way of arguing for this incompatibility is due to Pike. (Pike1965)

Let us suppose that being omniscient involves being infallible, andbelieving thatp if and only if it is true thatp.

Let us also suppose that God existed in 1900, and that omniscienceis part of his essence.

Now, suppose that Jones mowed his lawn on 1/1/2000.

Then God believed in 1900 that Jones would mow his lawn on1/1/2000.

Did Jones have the power to refrain from mowing his lawn?

No. Because that would mean either (1) that he had the power to dosomething which would have brought it about that God had a false beliefin 1900, or (2) that he had the power to do something which would havebrought it about that God did not believe in 1900 that Jones would mowhis lawn on 1/1/2000, or (3) that he had the power to do somethingwhich would have brought it about that God did not exist in 1900. Andeach of these alternatives is impossible.

Are there any objections to this argument?

Naturally it would be possible to object to some of the suppositionsabout the existence and nature of God. I will return to them.

First we should notice that the argument depends on a certainprinciple about power which is very similar to the plausible amendedversion of Taylor’s presupposition 5:

If it is inS’s power to do something which wouldbring it about thatp, andp entailsq, andq is false, then it is inS’s power to do somethingwhich would bring it about thatq .

This seems plausible. One might, though, prefer to avoid all mentionof bringing about, and to rephrase the argument interms of counterfactuals. So, one would say instead, “…that wouldmean either (1) that he had the power so to act that God would have hada false belief in 1900, or …” (Fischer 1989, 8–11) However, theargument seems at least as plausible when rephrased in this way.

5.1 An Aristotelian solution

One might object to the conclusion that God believed in 1900 that Joneswould mow his lawn on 1/1/2000, on the grounds that propositions aboutfuture contingents are not true. So if God is omniscient in the wayassumed, he would not hold this belief.

5.2 An Ockhamist solution

Ockham’s answer to the problem of divine foreknowledge was to invokethe difference between propositions which are really about the past(those that express “hard” facts about the past) and thosewhich are verbally about the past but which are really in part aboutthe future (those that express “soft” facts about thepast). The crucial point was that, even if someone lacked the power todo something inconsistent with a hard fact about the past, one mighthave the power to do something inconsistent with a soft fact about thepast. To make such a solution work in the case of the problem posed byPike’s argument, it would be necessary to show, or at any rate to makeit plausible, that one of the alternatives mentioned above was in factopen to Jones, because what he would be bringing about would beinconsistent with a soft fact about the past, not a hard fact. Thedifficulty for this strategy, though, is to give an account of softfacts about the past, or at least a species of soft facts about thepast, which meets two conditions: (1) it makes it true that in one ofthe cases what Jones would be bringing about would be inconsistentwith a soft fact of the right sort, and also (2) it is such that it isplausible (at any rate in advance of any fatalist proofs to thecontrary) that in the case of soft facts of that sort it is inprinciple possible at a later date to bring things about which areinconsistent with them. (The Introduction to Fischer 1989, and many ofthe articles in it are relevant to these issues.)

It is easy enough to give an account of soft facts which fails,apparently, to meet the second condition. For instance we might say that aproposition expresses a soft fact about a time if it entails aproposition about another time. By that criterion “God infalliblybelieves in 1900 that Jones will mow the lawn on 1/1/2100” expresses asoft fact, because it entails that Jones will mow the lawn on 1/1/2100.But we can hardly go on to say that for that reason there is no problemabout Jones’s having the power to refrain from mowing the lawn, sincerefraining is inconsistent with a merely soft fact. To say that theproposition about God entails that Jones will mow the lawn is to statethe problem. It can hardly in itself constitute the solution. If it didwe could solve the argument for fatalism which is based on causaldeterminism simply by pointing out that, if determinism is true, thefact that Jones will mow the lawn is entailed by a proposition aboutinitial conditions and laws of nature, so that the latter is merely asoft fact.

It is also, as we have seen in connexion with logical fatalism, easyenough to delineate a species of soft facts about the past which domeet the second condition. An example would be a proposition which isequivalent to one conjoining “Jones will mow the lawn on 1/1/2000”with any proposition about the pastwhich does not entail it. But it is difficult to see how thisspecies of soft facts could fulfil the first condition.

Of course, the prospects of providing a solution would be satisfying if it could be made plausible that in some cases it isin people’s powers to do things which are inconsistent withhard facts about the past, not just soft facts. But to takethat approach is, in effect, to abandon the idea of an Ockhamistsolution, and to move on to the next solution.

5.3 Affecting the past

One possible solution is to suggest that Pike’s second alternative ispossible, without any appeal to softness of facts. According to thissolution, in some cases people have the power do things which areinconsistent with the actual facts about the past, even though they arehard facts. That is to say, in some cases people have the power toaffect the past. In particular the suggestion is that Jones had thepower to do something which would have brought it about that God didnot believe in 1900 that he would mow the lawn. (Anglin 1986) Theplausibility of such a solution will depend largely on the strength ofthe arguments for the impossibility of affecting the past.

Now some such arguments seek merely to demonstrate thisimpossibility without offering any further explanation for it. And itmay be contended that most of the arguments of this sort which are atall compelling involve appealing to the obvious impossibility that anevent might prevent its own occurrence, and to the slightly lessobvious impossibility that an event might bring about its ownoccurrence. But, in reply to such arguments, it may be claimed thatthese impossibilities are not sufficient to rule out the possibilitythat one event might bring about an earlier event, as long as the worldis so organised as to avoid these impossible outcomes. If so, it is notclear why God should not have so organised it. And in particular it isnot clear why God should not have so organised things that it ispossible for us to do things which affect what beliefs he holds.

However, as we have seen, other arguments for the impossibility ofaffecting the past go further, and incorporate an explanation for theimpossibility. A successful defence against theological fatalism whichappealed to the possibility of affecting the past would have to dealwith these further issues.

5.4 A Boethian solution

Boethius (c480–524) offered a solution to the problem which in effectdenied the supposition that God existed in 1900 or believed anythingin 1900. (Boethius,The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V)God is, on this view, outside time; he is timelessly eternal. ThomasAquinas (1225–74) also offered this solution. (Aquinas,SummaTheologica, Article 13) The idea behind the solution is, ofcourse, that if God’s knowledge is not temporal there is no reasonwhy Jones should not have the power to bring it about that God knowsthat he refrains from mowing the lawn on 1/1/2000 instead of knowingthat he mows the lawn then, since possessing that power would notrequire having the power to affect the past.

There may be a number of problems about whether a personal God couldbe timeless, and how, if at all, he could relate to a temporal world,but it is worth noting one particular problem. The problem is that,although this solution does not appeal to the possibility of affectingthe past, it may be vulnerable to some of the considerations whichwould tell against that possibility. For suppose that we are unable toaffect the past, and that the explanation for this inability is that,whereas the future is not real, not actual, the past and present arereal and actual. Then it would seem that we would not be able to affecta timeless God’s beliefs because, not being future, they would be asreal as any past beliefs. (Adams 1987, 1135; Zagzebski 1991, 61) Orsuppose instead that the explanation for our inability to affect thepast is that, if our action brings anything about, that in itself wouldconstitute our action’s being earlier than the thing brought about.Then it might seem that the idea that we could bring about a timelessbelief would have to be dismissed; the very fact that a belief wasbrought about would make it later than whatever brought it about, andso not timeless. (Though there would be some logical space, perhaps,for a view that, whereas it was true oftemporal events that,if they were brought about, they must be later than what brought themabout, this was not true of events in general.)

Of course, such considerations need not be fatal to the Boethiansolution, because the view that the future is unreal, and the view thatthe temporal order is determined by the causal order are bothcontroversial. What it does seem to mean, though, is that there is lessroom than one might have supposed for the success of the solution if itis impossible to affect the past.(Rice 2006)

It is worth noticing a further potential awkwardness for the Boethiansolution. If it is really impossible to affect the past, then, even ifthe Boethian solution would mean that God could know that Jones wouldmow the lawn on 1/1/2000 without compromising Jones’s power torefrain, he could not, on the basis of this knowledge, bring aboutevents in the world before 1/1/2000, which he would not have broughtabout if Jones had refrained; for if he did, this would mean thatJones had the power so to act that things would have been differentbefore 1/1/2000; that is, he would have had the power to affect thepast.

5.5 The nature of God’s knowledge

Pike’s argument rests on the supposition that God’s omniscience involveshaving beliefs. But this may be questioned. (Alston 1986) Instead hisknowledge, in particular of our actions, may be thought as Russellianacquaintance knowledge; that is, as consisting of a simple cognitiverelation between the knower and what is known. (Russell 1912, Chapter5) The idea would be that, although in humans acquaintance knowledgegives rise to beliefs, God has just the cognitive relation to what heknows, without any consequent beliefs. This seems to have been the wayBoethius and Aquinas thought of it. (Boethius,The Consolation ofPhilosophy, Book V, Prose 6; Aquinas,Summa Theologica,Article 13)

How would this view about God’s knowledge affect the question ofwhether divine omniscience entails fatalism?

Both Boethius and Aquinas thought of God as outside time, but thisview about God’s knowledge could also be combined with the view thathe is inside time. In that case it seems that it would be be possibleto adopt an Ockhamist account of how his knowledge in 1900 might bedependent on what Jones does on 1/1/2000. Certainly it looks as if“God was aware in 1900 of Jones’s mowing the lawn on 1/1/2000” ispartly about 1/1/2000. And, given that this awareness is supposed tobe a simple relation, there is no question of producing an analysis ofthe proposition which represents it as a conjunction of propositionseach of which seem to express facts which do not depend on anythingJones can do. We should notice, however, the same awkwardness couldarise in connection with God’suse of his knowledge as arosefor the Boethian solution.If it is impossible to affect thepast, then God could not make use of his knowledge that Jones wouldmow the lawn on 1/1/2000 to bring something about before that date, ifJones had the power to refrain from mowing.

There is no reason, of course, why this account of the nature of God’sknowledge should not be combined with the view that the future isunreal. In that case God would not come to know of Jones’s mowing ofthe lawn before 1/1/2000, because there would as yet be no fact forhim to be aware of. But this would not compromise his omniscience,since, presumably, on this account of knowledge, omniscience would bea matter of knowing all the facts.

For that matter, the account could also be combined with both the viewthat God is outside time and the view that the future is unreal— as long as these two views themselves are indeedcompatible. In that case it would not be true before 1/1/2000 that Godtimelessly knows the Jones mows the lawn, but would be true on1/1/2000 and thereafter. Of course, a timeless being cannot change,but this would not involve a change in God, but merely a change inwhat he is related to. (The number 10 does not change when I refer toit.)

5.6 Must God be omniscient?

Of course the threat of fatalism, when it arises from God’s existence,could be averted by denying that God exists. But it could also beaverted by denying that God needs to be thought of as omniscient— at any rate if omniscience involves infallible knowledge ofall facts. It could be argued that God’s perfection does not requirethe infallible knowledge of all facts, but at most such knowledge ofall facts that could possibly be known infallibly. So, if it islogically impossible for someone to have infallible knowledge thatJones will mow the lawn and for Jones to have the power to refrain, itis no imperfection in God if he lacks such knowledge. (Swinburne 1977,172–8). It could also be argued that there is no need to attributeinfallible knowledge to God at all. (Lucas 1986 and 1989b)

6. Theological Fatalism: Molina, Plantinga and middle knowledge

Some philosophers, notably Luis de Molina (1535–1600) and AlvinPlantinga, have held that God knows not only what actual people willfreely do in the future, but what each possible free creature wouldhave freely done in each set of possible circumstances, if fullyspecific; and that he had this knowledge at the creation. (An actionis free in the required sense if not causally determined and notpredetermined by God.) Propositions about what a creature would do ina set of circumstances (possible as well as actual) are commonlycalled “counterfactuals of freedom”, and God’s knowledgeof them is called “middle knowledge”. (Molina,OnDivine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia); Plantinga 1974,IX))

If God’s knowledge of actual future actions would constitute afatalistic threat, his middle knowledge could not be less threatening,since, given middle knowledge, he would have knowledge of actualactions on the basis of his knowledge of the circumstances. In fact itseems that it is more threatening.

Of course, one way of avoiding the threat would be to deny thatthere are in general any facts about what people would have freely donein circumstances that have not actually arisen; there may be factsabout what they might have done, or what they would very probably havedone; but not what theywould have done. (Adams 1977; Hasker1989, 20–9) Indeed this seems to be quite plausible if we really thinkof people’s actions as undetermined. It may help us to see this if weconsider the tossing of a coin. Let us suppose that a coin is tossed onsome occasion, and it comes down heads; and suppose we then ask if itwould have come down heads again if we had tossed it again in exactlythe same circumstances. It seems plausible, if we think that how itlanded was undetermined, that the right answer is that it might havecome down heads and it might have come down tails, but that it is notthe case that it would have come down heads, nor the case that it wouldhave come down tails.

So one solution to the fatalistic threat posed by middle knowledge isakin to the Aristotelian solution. Since there are no facts of therelevant sort, God cannot have knowledge of them. But, because thereare no such facts, God’s lack of knowledge of how free creatures wouldfreely act is no bar to his omniscience.

Are there any other solutions?

It is difficult to see how there could be. In the case of actualactions, the solutions depended on suggesting ways in which it mighthave been possible for Jones to do something which would bring it aboutthat some fact about God was different; that is to say that theydepended on showing how some fact about God might be dependent on whatJones did. Now in the case of middle knowledge we know how such adependence would have to operate; it would have to operate by way ofGod’s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. So, could the truth ofcounterfactuals of freedom related to Jones be dependent on Jones’sactions? It seems that they could not be, because the facts that makethem true were available to God at the creation, before he had decidedto create anything, let alone Jones. So the facts, like God’s decision,must have been ontologically prior, it seems, to any act of Jones’s. Soit seems that it could not be in Jones’s power so to act that anyactually true counterfactual of freedom relating to him would not havebeen true. (Hasker 1989, 39–52; see Hasker et al. 2000 for a collectionof writings on middle knowledge.)

7. The Idle Argument

Aristotle mentions, as a corollary of the conclusion that everythingthat happens, happens of necessity, that “there would be no need todeliberate or to take trouble (thinking that if we do this, this willhappen, but if we do not, it will not).” (Aristotle,DeInterpretatione, 18b31–3)

This thought was spelt out in what was known as “the IdleArgument” (Bobzien 1998, Section 5). It went like this:

If it is fated that you will recover from this illness, then,regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult adoctor you will recover.

But also, if it is fated that you will not recover from thisillness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do notconsult a doctor you will not recover.

But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness or it is fated thatyou will not recover.

Therefore it is futile to consult a doctor.

The thought, presumably, is that it is futile, because what you dowill have no effect. If so, the reply given by Chrysippus (c280-c206B.C.E.) to this argument seems exactly right. (Bobzien 1998, 5.2) Theconclusion does not follow, because it may have been fated that youwill recover as a result of seeing the doctor. The corresponding replywould be equally apt if we substituted “necessary” for“fated”.

Some versions of the argument omit “it is fated that”. (Bobzien1998, 189). It goes without saying that the corresponding version ofChrysippus’s reply would deal with those versions of the argument.

This is not to say that fatalism does not pose any problem at allfor the rationality of deliberation. It is just to say that the IdleArgument does not show that it poses a problem.

8. Conclusion

There are a number of arguments for fatalism, and it seems that oneway of countering all of them would be to adopt the Aristoteliansolution, or something akin to it. It would be neat if it could be madeout that this was the only solution, so that the fate of fatalism wasinextricably linked to the fate of the Aristotelian solution. But itdoes not seem that this is so, except possibly, on the assumption thatan omniscient God exists, in relation to middle knowledge. But eventhen, the solution is only a poor relation to the Aristoteliansolution.

So it is possible that both fatalism and the Aristotelian solutionare wrong. And it is, of course, always possible, for all that has beensaid, that fatalism is correct.

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