In addition to being one of the most original and talentedphysicians, mathematicians and astrologers of his time, GirolamoCardano (b. 1501, Pavia, d. 1576, Rome) occupies an important place inthe history of Renaissance philosophy. His contributions range from acomprehensive account of order in all its various meanings (natural,human, and divine) to epistemological and methodological directionsconcerning the progress of knowledge, from an elaborate theory of theimmortality of the soul to a sophisticated analysis of the role ofpractical wisdom (prudentia) in such diverse human activitiesas medicine and political action.

• 1. Life and Philosophical Works
• 2. Life, Knowledge, and Nature
• 3. The Soul and the Order of Nature
• 4. Moral Philosophy: The Two Levels of Wisdom
  • 4.1 Divine Providence, Immortality of the Soul, and the Highest Good
  • 4.2 Prudence and Practical Wisdom
• Bibliography
  • Cardano’s works
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Philosophical Works

Girolamo Cardano was born in Pavia in 1501 from Fazio and ChiaraMicheri. Chiara delivered her baby in Pavia, in the house of familyfriends, and not in Milan, to defuse a possible scandal concerning theillegitimate birth. Fazio would marry Chiara and recognize Girolamoonly later in 1524, just before his death. After a difficult childhood,saddened by frequent illnesses and the harsh upbringing by hisoverbearing father, Cardano enrolled at the University of Pavia tostudy medicine in 1520 against his father’s wish. Fazio(1445–1524), a jurist and an accomplished practitioner of mathematicsand natural philosophy (in 1480 he had published an edition of JohnPeckham’sPerspectivacommunis (“GeneralOptics”), written around 1265), wanted his son to undertakestudies of law, but Girolamo felt more attracted to philosophy andscience. When, due to the ongoing war between France and Spain, theauthorities in Pavia were forced to close the university, Cardanoresumed his studies at the University of Padua, where he graduated inmedicine in 1526. For about six years, he practised as a physician inSaccolungo, a village close to Padua, where he met and married LuciaBandareni (1531). Three children were born from this marriage: GiovanniBattista (1534), Chiara (1537) and Aldo (1543). In the meantime,Cardano had been trying several times to become a member of the Collegeof Physicians in Milan, but his applications had always been turneddown, adding to his professional frustration and disappointment.Rejections notwithstanding, he moved back to Milan with his family in1532. He divided his time between practising medicine in Gallarate, atown nearby Milan, and teaching mathematics in the Piattine schools ofMilan, a charitable institution founded by the nobleman Tommaso Piattiin 1501 to improve knowledge of Greek, logic, astronomy, and mathematicsamong Milanese students from a poor background. Fazio, too, hadpreviously taught in this school. In the meantime, his reputation as asuccessful practitioner in medicine began to spread among the importantfamilies of Milan. In 1539 his application to become a member of theCollege of Physicians was finally accepted. Discontinuously, from 1543to 1551, he taught medicine at the University of Pavia, until 1552,when he went to Scotland to treat the Archbishop of Edinburgh, JohnHamilton, who was suffering from a particularly severe form of asthma.Back to Milan in 1553, he resumed teaching in Pavia in 1559. In 1560his son Giovanni Battista was executed charged with the murder of hiswife, Brandona Seroni, whom, against his father’s will, he hadmarried in 1557. This tragic event represented a turning point inCardano’s life and intellectual career. In 1562, he decided toleave Pavia, whose academic environment had become increasinglyhostile, to teach medicine in Bologna. As a result of mountingsuspicions that he was actively spreading heretical views, he wasarrested on 6 October 1570 and remained in prison until 22 December ofthe same year. In February 1571, before the Sacred Congregation led byAntonio Baldinucci, Cardano was required to acknowledge and reject hisserious crimes against the faith (abiuradevehementi), having been declared “vehemently suspect ofheresy.” He solemnly swore that he would no longer teach andpublish books until his death. In 1571 he went to Rome to serve aspersonal physician to Pope Pius V and then Pope Gregory XIII. Afterhaving been admitted to the College of Physicians in 1575, he died inRome, on 20 September 1576, devoting his last energies (from September1575 to May 1576) to write his autobiography,De vita propria,published posthumously by Gabriel Naudé in 1643.

Cardano wrote and published a vast amount of works, in the mostdisparate fields of knowledge, especially medicine, mathematics,astrology and natural history. His strictly philosophical treatisesinclude:De arcanis aeternitatis (“The Mysteries ofEternity”, began at the end of the 1530s and published partiallyin the posthumousOpera omnia in 1663);De consolatione (“OnConsolation”, 1543);De sapientia (“OnWisdom”, 1544);De animi immortalitate (“On theImmortality of the Soul”, 1545);De subtilitate(“On Subtlety”, 1550, 1554, 1560), and its twin bookDererum varietate (“On the Variety of Things”, 1557);Theonoston (“Divine Knowledge”, written in themiddle of 1550s and published posthumously in 1617 and 1663);Deutilitate ex adversis capienda (“On Gaining Advantage fromMisfortunes”, 1561);Encomium Neronis (“Praise ofNero”);Dialectica (“Dialectic”),Deuno (“On the One”),Tetimseu de humanaconditione (“Tetim, or On the Human Condition”),De minimis et propinquis (“On Those Things which areSmallest and Closest to Hand”),De summo bono (“Onthe Highest Good”) andGuglielmus, sive demorte (“William, or On Death”), all published in 1562;Antigorgiasdialogus sive de recta vivendi ratione(“Anti-Gorgias, or On the Right Way to Live”),Hyperchen (“Being”) andDe Socratisstudio (“On the Earnestness of Socrates”), publishedin 1566;Proxeneta, seu de prudentia civili(“The Mediator, or Civic Prudence”, published posthumouslyin 1627 and 1663);Paralipomena (“Supplements”,begun in 1561 and published posthumously in 1663). Other works werepublished posthumously in theOpera omnia edited by the Frenchphysician Charles Spon (1609–1684) in 1666:Hymnus, seucanticum ad Deum (“A Hymn, or a Canticle to God”);Mnemosynon (“Memorial”);Norma vitaeconsarcinata (“A Patched-Up Rule of Life”);Deoptimo vitae genere (“On the Noblest Kind of Life”);DialogusHieronymi Cardani et Facii Cardani ipsiuspatris (“Dialogue between Girolamo Cardano and His FatherFazio”);De natura liber unicus (“A Single Book onNature”).

Generally speaking, Cardano’s philosophy is heavily influencedby characteristic trends of late scholastic Aristotelianism, with astrong penchant for Averroist interpretations. Cardano shows a greatinterest in Averroes’ opinion that one intellect would performintellective functions for all human beings. However, he tends toprovide a historicized version of this radical view, in that he looksat the one intellect as the varying amount of learning accumulated bymankind throughout the centuries rather than simply justifying it froma purely epistemological point of view (seen as the one intellectivepower that actualizes the life and knowledge of the sublunary world asa whole). Cardano’s philosophy also displays clear traces ofPlatonic influences, absorbed through the reading of MarsilioFicino’s recent translations and commentaries, especiallyPlotinus and Iamblichus. Together with his impressive knowledge ofastrological and medical literature, both scholasticism and Platonismgive a characteristically vitalistic slant to his cosmological views.Cardano’s philosophy has often been described as suggestive andrich in original intuitions, but cluttered and inconsistent as a whole.In fact, his philosophical work is yet another example, common duringthe Renaissance, of how different philosophical traditions (includingnot only Aristotelianism and Platonism, but also Epicureanism andStoicism, and not only Graeco-Roman, but also Christian and Arabicviews) could converge into one composite but coherent picture.Throughout his life, from his early endeavours in the 1540s (Deanimi immortalitate) to the last philosophical attempt(DialogusHieronymi Cardani et Facii Cardani andDe propria vita), Cardano demonstrated a distinctivecommitment to a certain number of philosophical issues: therelationship between oneness and multiplicity, with the notablecorollaries dealing with order and disorder, determinism and chance,life and decay; the view of the intellect as the ultimate principle ofreality and knowledge; a general theory of celestial heat, described asthe main formative agent in nature; the interplay of nature and thesoul in the organization of the universe; a general doctrine of theimmortality of the soul, seen as the foundation of both cognitiveclarity and moral certitude. As a whole, the originality ofCardano’s eclecticism lies in the unique way in which hecharacterizes the interdependence of life, knowledge and matter, inwhich a pronounced sense of reality and truth is constantly beingquestioned and jeopardized by a realistic view of human nature,mercilessly presented as prone to fear, delusion anddeceit.

2. Life, Knowledge, and Nature

Cardano’s cosmological views belong to a long-establishedsystem of astro-biological doctrines whose origins go back toAristotelian physics, Hippocratic vitalism, and fundamental assumptionsunderlying the tradition of astrological and meteorological learning,reshaped through a series of Hebrew and Arabic mediations. His accountof the supralunary world combines elements from Neoplatonic philosophyand Christian theology. In line with many of his contemporaries,Cardano maintains that there is a clear division between thesupralunary and sublunary world. The life of the universe is the resultof varying degrees of celestial energy overflowing from the One, i.e.,God. From God to matter, cohorts of the most disparate souls mediatebetween these two extremes. From a material point of view, theconnective element between heaven and earth is celestial heat. Theprincipal constituents of the sublunary world are matter (earth, waterand air), celestial heat, and a wide variety of souls (spanning fromdemonic minds to substantial forms understood as specific principles oflife).

In line with the principles of Greek ontology (and showing anevident interest in the Renaissance recovery of Parmenides’philosophy), Cardano maintains that nothing comes out of nothing;rather, all things derive from something, and this something cannot beinfinite (Hyperchen, OO, I, 284b;De natura, OO, II,284a). Aristotle called this something “hyle or primematter,” but Cardano prefers to discard this notion of anintermediate entity between being and non being, replacing it with theview of the elements (earth, water and air) as the material startingpoint and celestial heat as the efficient active principle, “forotherwise the elements would be completely redundant if there wereprime matter” (De natura, OO, II, 284b). The elements,which represent the first level of organization in matter, are three(and not four as demanded by Aristotelian and scholastic physics):earth, water and air (De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 9a). Asfor fire, Cardano considers this to be a product of celestial heat,which is one of the various streams of vital energy flowing from thesupralunary sources of life and knowledge and which pervade theuniverse as one living organism. Innate heat of a celestial origin isthe active element that mediates between the state of utter immobilitywhich characterizes intelligible substances and the incessant mobilitythat defines the life of material beings. Through an exercise inintrospective analysis, Cardano enumerates three principles thatregulate both our inner life and the life of all created things: one“is moved and does not move, resulting from the heavyelements;” another “moves, and it is not moved, that is,the soul;” the third, finally, “is moved by the soul”and moves the body, i.e., the innate heat (Theonoston, OO, II,304b). To the question of whether the soul can be identified withcelestial heat, Cardano replies that, unlike the latter, the former isincorporeal, does not occupy any place and therefore is never inmotion. Also, that which is in motion does not have that level ofself-stability that is necessary for a being to be able to perceive(sentire) or to think (intelligere)(Theonoston, OO, II, 304b).

In Cardano’s metaphysics, matter and form are complementary,in that in nature there cannot be matter without form, and forms arealways with a body. Forms represent the primordial stage in the processthrough which the created universe becomes one living being. Thedifference between souls and forms is that souls, albeit involved inthe animation of bodies, remain nevertheless unaffected by corporealreality. Up on a higher level, minds are souls that are completelyindependent of matter, bodies and motion. However, even within theontological sphere of the minds, there are varying degrees ofembodiment. While the highest celestial intelligences are whollyseparated from the material cosmos, demonic substances, albeitincorporeal, can affect the corporeal world through forces(vires) and influences (influxus) of various kind.One of these is “that force which is connected to demons,regardless of whether this power is corporeal and depends on humours,or it is incorporeal.” Cardano maintains that it is throughforces of this nature that “the parts of the universe are arousedby demons, stars or some other hidden cause”(Paralipomena, in OO, X, 446b–447a. See alsoDesubtilitate, OO, III, 670a). The principle that in a way collectsand administers all these currents of celestial energy is the soul ofthe world (anima mundi). In Cardano’s system ofastro-biological determinism, the universal soul keeps the whole cosmostogether and performs paramount operations in accordance with theoriginal plan devised by God and implemented by the planetaryintelligences, for “all things are influenced by the higherheaven and are moved at the command of the soul of the world.”The soul of the world, which “cannot be understood withoutGod,” directs the work of nature, and, “in the process ofgenerating things, produces supercelestial lives andmultiplicity” (De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 6a). Inthe sublunary world, the major operations of life and generation areperformed by nature, understood as a source of teleological activitysupervised by the intellect and the soul of the world (Desubtilitate, OO, III, 360a; ed. Nenci, 63). The complexrelationship between soul and nature, and the role played by celestialforces, is a crucial point in Cardano’s philosophy (OnCardano’s cosmological views, see Ingegno 1980, 1–78, 209–271;Maclean 1984; Grafton 1999).

Regarding the hierarchical arrangement of the ontologicalprinciples, there is a certain oscillation in the way Cardanodistributes them along the various degrees of being, but by and largewe can say that God understood as the One represents the ultimatesource of order and activity in the universe, and all the rest emanatesfrom it in the form of increasingly more plural and less integratedentities, from intellects to souls, from the soul of the world toindividual souls, from the soul to nature, from celestial to earthlyanimals, from forms to scattered matter. InDe arcanisaeternitatis, Cardano lists fourteen genera of beings, a numberthat, in his opinion, “matches the structure of theuniverse:” three elements (earth, water, air), celestial heat,stones, plants, living creatures generated from putrescent matter(animantiaex putredine), quadrupeds, birds, fish,reptiles, human beings, demons, and God (De arcanisaeternitatis, OO, X, 8b).

Higher animals are divided into four main classes: quadrupeds,birds, fish and reptiles. In the diagram he attaches to his discussion,“the nature of the animals is connected to the human one only inone point,” which is located in the area corresponding to thequadrupeds. See Figure 1:

Figure 1.

However, the margin of interaction between human beings and therest of living creatures is ampler. In keeping with a number ofRenaissance philosophers, Cardano maintains that man is at the centreof micro- and macro-cosmic exchanges within the universe: “sincethe human circle corresponds to each single part of the whole domainof living beings, all the properties and natures that can be found inliving beings will also be present in human beings” (Dearcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 8a). InParalipomena, Cardano defines the human species as an amalgamof forms (totahumana species congeries quaedam est),a “mass” that is in constant evolution (succrescitatque decrescit):

this excellent human matter conceals the forms of all animals: theforms of the ox (although they do not feed on hay); of the snake (butthey do not kill with their bite); of the lion (but they have noclaw). By all means, the characteristics of the soul are exactly thesame (perhaps even worse); however, since these animal forms[concealed in the human nature] lack their corresponding bodilyorgans, they do not really seem to be the same (Paralipomena,OO, X, 446a).

Human nature includes all the forms of nonhuman nature, but they liedormant, as it were, in a state of virtual energy. Cardano always paysspecial attention to those aspects of human nature that seem toindicate a close link with animals and lower forms of life.Unsurprisingly, comparative analyses between humans and animals aboundin his works. Among the questions dealing with the relationshipsbetween human and nonhuman animals, Cardano is particularly interestedin exploring whether reason is an exclusive prerogative of human beingsor it should rather be seen as the result of biological development(De natura, OO, II, 283b–284a).

Above nonhuman and human animals, Cardano posits a universe teemingwith the most diverse kinds of incorporeal minds. He acknowledges thatto count the number of celestial substances populating the supralunaryworld would go way beyond the power of reason; and yet Denis thePseudo-Areopagite, “relying on Platonic arguments and the visionsof St Paul” divided them into nine orders. Within these ordersCardano identifies “seven natures.” The first nature is the“the infinite, or God,” eternal in itself. The secondnature is “the soul of all things or lives,” whichrepresents the first breaking up of the original unity; then comes thealready mentioned soul of the world, whose loss of ontological unityand independence begins to manifest itself, being “one principleresulting out of many and eternal ones because of somethingelse’s intervention.” The fourth nature is the soul whichmoves the universe, theprimum movens, not eternal in itself,but through eternal temporal succession. The fifth nature, the souls ofthe various planets, derives from the combined action of this primarymover and the soul of the world. Various orders of souls emanates fromthe fifth nature: “heroic” souls, minds that are capable ofhaving sense perceptions (mentessensiles) and thesoul that presides over all sentient lives (communissensilis). This last type of soul divides itself not only intoindividual beings, but also into parts, “for everything isalive.” The next nature, therefore, the sixth one – the“common and vital soul” (anima communis atquevitalis) – belongs to plants, lower animals and theelements. The last order is “the soul conceived in matter,”which “Plato called idea,” and Cardano simply characterizesas “life.” Relying on later Platonic authors, fromIamblichus to Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite, Cardano describes theuniverse as one single entity, seamlessly interrelated throughout itsvital expanse, placed between the two extremes of God, absoluteeternity and unity, and matter, the domain of absolute transience andmultiplicity (De arcanis aeternitatis, OO, X,6ab).

3. The Soul and the Order of Nature

One of the most complex questions in Cardano’s philosophy as awhole concerns the relationship between nature and the soul. This is apoint where Cardano’s multiple allegiances (scholasticAristotelianism, Plotinian Platonism, medicine and astrology) come tothe fore. Inevitably, it is also an area where not a few frictionsamong different traditions come to the fore. Among Cardano’sdesiderata there was the plan to devote a specific philosophicaltreatise to the notion of nature. It is an unfinished work that in alllikelihood he sketched at the beginning of the 1560s,De naturaliber unicus. It can be seen as part of a series of treatisesdevoted to the exploration of the most recondite aspects of thenatural, supernatural and moral worlds (De libris propriis,OO, I, 119; ed. Maclean, 293).De natura demonstratesCardano’s lifelong engagement with notions of naturalism,universal animation, and teleology. The discussion is opaque at timesbecause of the topic’s difficulty, the characteristic obscurityof Cardano’s disjointed and elliptical writing, and theprecarious condition of the text, left unfinished, with several gapsand marks of typographical sloppiness (typos, mistakes, and missingwords). On the other hand, being a monographic treatment of the meaningof nature, the treatise holds great significance, all the more sobecause, as Cardano explains, the investigation of nature(inquisitionaturae) sheds light on the very originof things, including human beings (De natura, OO, II, 283a).In this sense, fragmentary as it may be, Cardano’sDenatura is an attempt to outline the ultimate principles of reality(on the relationship between natural and supernatural phenomena inCardano, see Siraisi 1997, 149–173).

Cardano’s notion of order has strong Platonic overtones. Unityis a mark of perfection, for all things rejoice in unity and they arein a better condition when they reach that level of unity thatactualizes their potential nature. Unity gives structure and purposeto all the elements that make up the system of nature: “orderand fate, since they are one, and exist with respect to the One, aregood; disorder and luck are bad, for they do not strive towardsunity” (De uno, OO, I, 277b; ed. GarcíaValverde, 4). As an expression of unity and goodness, order is sopervasive that in fact accounts for even the most haphazard anddisorderly aspects of reality. Cardano maintains that multiplicityand diversity can always be brought back to potentially ordered seriesof individual elements (multitudoordinata)(De uno, OO, I, 281ab; ed. García Valverde, 24;Denatura, OO, II, 283a). What we perceive as beauty (decus)and elegance (ornamentum) in nature is not due to scatteredvariety (multitudo), but to a principle of ordered unity,“the one in the many,” which produces feelings of harmonyand symmetry in us (De uno, OO, 280a; ed. GarcíaValverde, 20). The same principle of order and unity applies toknowledge: we can say that we really know something when we manage torelate all the aspects and properties of this thing to one cause.According to Cardano, Plotinus followed the same approach in moralphilosophy, for he described his notion of happiness as a return to theOne (De uno, OO, I, 281b; ed. García Valverde, 24).

Among the sources of unity and order in the universe, souls play amost significant role. As we have seen in the previous section, soulsare at the center of Cardano’s cosmos. Being immaterial, they are“a unitary principle that is not continuous, nor contiguous, butexists of its own, not in a place, nor in a time.” Unlike life(vita), which is diffused everywhere and therefore cannot besaid to be a realprincipium, souls have no spatial andtemporal limitation and are nowhere (nullibi) to be foundbecause of their incorporeal nature (De uno, OO, I, 279a;García Valverde, 12). While souls are one and individualeverywhere (“our soul is no less here than in the sky, no less inItaly than in India”), bodies are different and manifolddepending on material circumstances and vital urges, for“division of bodies is determined by the needs of life (vitaecommodum)” (Paralipomenon, OO, X, 446a). Given thecentral role assigned to the soul, in all its forms, Cardano’sphilosophy of nature is inevitably exposed to charges of animism andanthropomorphism. The issue is accentuated by the fact that the humanbeing represents for Cardano a model of rationality and teleologicalactivity.

For Cardano, human souls are individual principles ofself-awareness. Selfhood is the principal argument in favour of theirimmortality. However, in defending the immortal character of humansouls, Cardano also relies on proofs of a more pragmatic andtheological nature. Hope in “the immortality of the soul”was implanted in human beings by God, therefore it cannot be consideredas a deluded expectation. In common people God instilled this hope“through religions (leges),” in wise people,“through the hidden truths (arcana) ofphilosophy.” However, when God provided human beings with hopefor immortal life, He decided to give them a feeble certainty, alwaysin need of confirmation. The reason, according to Cardano, is that afirm belief in the immortality of the soul would have created too widea gap between humans and animals, while leading man into arrogantdelusions of grandeur. There has always been and – “as longas there is a world” – there always will be an alternation(vicissitudo) of confirmations and doubts concerning theimmortality of the soul. It is a “vicissitude” of hopes anddespair that is part of the providential regime of the worldestablished by God (De utilitate ex adversis capienda, OO, II,26a). Hope in the immortality of the soul is also a fundamentalpostulate in Cardano’s moral philosophy. As we will see in thenext section, Cardano maintains that true inner tranquillity depends,among other things, on virtue, wisdom, and “hope in thegods.” Otherwise, what is passed off as tranquillity is in factmere harshness and stiffness (duritia) (Theonoston,OO, II, 303b, 305b, 308a, 312a).

4. Moral Philosophy: The Two Levels of Wisdom

The One (God), the ordered variety of nature (multitudoordinata), and the soul represent the main ontologicalcoordinates in Cardano’s view of the cosmos. The universe isorganized according to a plurality of orders, arranged alonghierarchical levels, but harmoniously attuned to each other. It is notcorrect, in Cardano’s opinion, to say that everything is for thesake of everything else (non omnia propter omnia), but ratherthat everything is for the sake of one thing (omniapropter unum). This means that the One toward which everythingelse converges includes many orders, “different among eachother.” Nature, art and chance produce a variety of causalsequences that often intersect and are more or less perfect dependingon the extent to which the end to be actualized prevails overrefractory matter. With respect to natural causes, some are universal,others specific. Among the universal causes of action, the mostimportant are the stars, which act over the sublunary world throughinfluences conveyed by light, heat and motion (De uno, OO, I,279, 281; ed. García Valverde, 12, 26). More specific andindividual sources of natural agency are demonic and human minds, whichadd to the complexity of moral and political action.

At its deepest, the principle of unity and order coincides with God.God is infinite, necessary, wholly undivided, therefore individual. Inkeeping with the principles of theological Trinitarianism, God isdescribed by Cardano in terms of power (potestas), mind(mens), and love (amor), and these attributes are not“three gods, as Plotinus thinks,” but original divineattributes. The natural world is a constant reminder that God’s“threefold and undivided life” flows into each singlething, down to the smallest beings (ad minima usque) (Dearcanis aeternitatis, OO, X, 6a). However, for all the layers andmediations that characterize Cardano’s universe, the distancebetween human beings and God remains unbridgeable. Man cannot reconcilethe finite with the infinite, for “no finite thing can betransformed into an infinite nature.” Cardano rules out that“this life of ours can get close to that which truly is,”for there is no proportion and no resemblance between the two levels ofbeing. Echoing Cusanian motifs, he argues that “everything thatis understood by a finite being is finite, for the act of understanding(comprehensio) occurs through some proportion; but there is noproportion between the infinite and the finite.” Likewise, oureyes cannot grasp the direct light (lux) of the sun, but onlya glimpse of its brightness (lumen) (De arcanisaeternitatis, OO, X, 4b–5a). Such a powerful and all-encompassingview of divine and natural order, in which the presence of latentPlatonic and Averroist motifs contributes to strengthen the cogentorganization of the whole universe, has inevitable repercussionsconcerning the meaning of moral action. During his life, Cardanodevoted a considerable number of works to ethical inquiries, surveyingalmost every aspect in the field: theoretical ethics, applied ethics,prudential behaviour, consolation, education, and the role of rhetoric.However, his most important contribution to moral philosophy consistsin his attempt to redefine the relationship between the universal scopeof practical reason and the need for human beings to apply moral lawsto the concrete circumstances of their life. This characteristictension between knowledge and application is particularly evident intwo works:Theonoston (which Cardano began to write around1555) andDe utilitate ex adversis capienda (published in1561).

Cardano presentsDe utilitate andTheonoston ascomplementary treatises aimed at implementing two different approachesin moral philosophy, the former based on the ordinary circumstances ofhuman life (humanitus), the latter assuming the existence ofsupernatural conditions such as immortal individual souls and theeffects of divine providence (divinitus). They outline twodifferent paths towards the achievement of the same end: lastinghappiness. While the ethical program devised inDe utilitateis designed to face situations of obvious emergency (quae oculisipsis subjacent) concerning human affairs (humanaeres),Theonoston provides an account of theimmortality of the soul (enarratioimmortalitatisanimi) that has momentous ethical consequences (Deutilitate, OO, II, 8, 39a;Theonoston, OO, II, 299b). Thesame duplicity of levels is evident in the way Cardano examines thenotion of “tranquillity,” which represents the highestpoint in one’s virtuous behaviour: one type of tranquillity ispremised on the attainment of a certain level of “honorable andmoderate pleasure,” the other secures a decent degree ofhappiness “even in the greatest calamities”(Theonoston, OO, II, 310b). Here it is worth pointing out thatCardano’s pragmatic approach to questions of moral philosophyworks on both levels, the rational and the empirical. In the finalanalysis, tranquillity is for Cardano the most useful thing that mayhappen to a human being, for it provides inner joy, long life, and amore robust kind of wisdom.

4.1 Divine Providence, Immortality of the Soul, and the Highest Good

Despite the emphasis he places on the benefits of prudent action,Cardano believes that real, lasting happiness can be possible only ifwe demonstrate in a persuasive way that the human soul is immortal andthat God intervenes actively in the human world, sanctioning aprovidential regime of the world. Two principles, more than any other,underlie Cardano’s moral philosophy: that the human soul isimmortal, and that universal order, being a direct emanation of theOne, governs all aspects of reality. Everything that happens has beenplanned by God, and all that God has established can only be good.Regarding the immortality of the soul, Cardano maintains that, in orderto lead a meaningful existence and act accordingly, people need to knowwhether there is life after death and whether the nature of theirafterlife will depend on the way they behaved in this world. In hisopinion, Aristotle and the Stoics took the value of virtue for granted.In actual life, human beings will never be persuaded that virtue shouldbe pursued for its own sake, unless they are convinced that their soulis immortal (De utilitate, OO, II, 3). In this sense, Cardanodefends the immortality of the soul on strong pragmatic grounds.Referring to Seneca’s renowned instructions on how to cope withthe thought of death, he points out that meditating about death whilemaintaining that the soul is mortal is simply absurd. In his eyes,Seneca is a bad rhetorician and an Epicurean in disguise, who exhortsus to die serenely while claiming that there is nothing after death(De utilitate, OO, II, 10a; see Giglioni 2012, 187).

As we have seen while examining his natural philosophy,Cardano’s moral views assign a central role to the soul:“The soul is the most important thing we own; everything refersto it, for riches, honors, and health are nothing without a soundsoul” (De utilitate, OO, II, 10a). Mentalself-awareness, in particular, is the principal argument through whichCardano advocates the immortality of the soul, for a human being is thesame thing as his mind (homo animus est) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 12; on Cardano’s notion of the mind, seeGiglioni 2005–2007; García Valverde 2013). The same emphasis onmental awareness can be found in Cardano’s moral investigations,for in his opinion human beings cannot understand what the ends oftheir actions are if they lack a clear knowledge of themselves (Deutilitate, OO, II, 2). The highest good for them can only lie inthose attributes and activities that are part of their minds (quaeanimo coniuncta sunt) (De utilitate, OO, II, 27a). Inthis sense, the relationship between tranquillity and awareness isbiunique: human beings can be peaceful only when they know what thehighest good is and know that they have attained it(Theonoston, OO, II, 303b). According to the Hermit’sdefinition of tranquillity inTheonoston,tranquillitas coincides withsecuritas, that is, acondition of unbreakable inner peace, free from cares and anxiety, andit is a level of wisdom that would even suit God. In this respect, truetranquillity for human beings coincides with their being“assimilated” to God, so that, when this condition ofserenity is reached, nothing is any longer felt as lacking in meaningand substance. This level of happiness is a “kind ofpleasure” that derives from the awareness of “being in thepossession of goods” (Theonoston, OO, II, 302a;Deoptimo vitae genere, OO, I, 488b). Intellectual pleasure shouldnever be amonstrum, that is to say, a hybrid creatureresulting from combining the goods of reason with those of the body andexternal luck (Theonoston, OO, II, 313b–314a).

By doing so, Cardano provides a definition of happiness which isinclusive of both knowledge and pleasure. Happiness consists in a“perception of pleasure” that is great (magna),full (plena), pure (pura), untroubled(secura), and safe (tuta) (De utilitate, OO,II, 37b;Theonoston, OO, II, 305b;De librispropriis, OO, I, 76b; ed. Maclean, 212–213). InTheonoston, happiness is said to coincide with a kind of innercomposure understood not in terms of lack of sensibility(indolentia), but as a condition of mental vigour stemmingfrom the contemplation of the true nature of things. If tranquillityconsisted in mere refractoriness to unsettling experiences, theimpassive state of a stone should then be viewed as the best condition(Theonoston, OO, II, 299b, 305b, 313b). By contrast, ethicalpeace rests on a state of cognitive tension and focus. In ways thatremind us of the sea and the air, undisturbed calm (tranquillaquies) is always accompanied by a current of “lightmotion,” i.e., a state of balance between opposite conditions“which does not unsettle, but delights us.” Cardano’stranquillitas is therefore not the same as absolute rest:“in its state of highest tranquillity, our soul is as it weretremulous and breathing” (Theonoston, OO, II, 300a,305b). The incessant vitality of our being demonstrates that “thematter we are made of, being of a celestial origin, produced andentwined with motion, does not enjoy rest, but thrives onmotion,” a motion that, in the final analysis, is no bodilyactivity, but an expression of knowledge and intellect(Theonoston, OO, II, 304a). True tranquillity results from acondition of inviolable self-fulfilment (securitas) based onresources that are in our power (in nostra potestate esse).Cardano is not convinced by the Senecan view of tranquillity as abalanced active life (vita actuosa), or by Socrates’skind of ‘engaged’ tranquillity; in both cases, theirbehaviour is for Cardano symptomatic of ambition rather than being theindication of a truly committed philosophical life(Theonoston, OO, II, 306b). Finally, Cardano rejects theideals of tranquillity championed by Plutarch, Antoninus and Cicero,viewed as models of ethical escapism devised by men who in their lifenever managed to reach a condition of stable serenity(Theonoston, OO, II, 305a).

In outlining his views about the nature of the good, Cardano isfollowing a deliberately eclectic approach. He combines the Stoicconception of virtue with Epicurus’ emphasis on indifference(indolentia), Aristotle’s notion of virtuous life withAverroes’ characterization of happiness as the highest level ofknowledge accessible to human beings. He justifies his eclecticposition by arguing that philosophers who were so clever in theirfields are likely to have come up with closely related ideas and thattherefore “two or more of their opinions can converge intoone” (De utilitate, OO, II, 24b). From Socrates, forinstance, Cardano draws the principle that only wise people can betruly happy because virtue lies in knowledge (De utilitate,OO, II, 90b). From medical authors, he borrows the view that pleasurealways follows release from a condition of tension or pain (Deutilitate, OO, II, 28a). Following traditional argumentativepatterns in moral philosophy, Cardano distinguishes among goods of themind (virtues), goods of the body (health, longevity), and goods offortune. Among the goods of fortune, Cardano lists finding the rightwife, a lasting fame, and a painless death (De utilitate, OO,II, 19b). Goods of the body, such as enjoying good health and followinga healthy regimen, are also part of one’s happiness (Deutilitate, OO, II, 19a; on Cardano’s notion of health, seeSiraisi, 70–90).

Strictly speaking, goods and ills are values. As such, theytranscend the level of nature and therefore cannot be treated as ifthey were natural or against nature: “Goods and ills reside inthe soul; faculties and defects in the body; helps and impediments infortune and its occurrences” (Theonoston, OO, II, 314b).In general terms, Cardano defines the good as “what is longed forby the majority of human beings,” such as health, wealth,friends, glory, offspring and wisdom. In a more specific sense(simpliciter), good is what is everlasting(perpetuum), safe (securum), and unchangeable(immutabile) (De utilitate, OO, II, 23ab). In orderto achieve a stable condition of inner peace people need to commit to agood that cannot be taken away from them. Ultimately, since only Godhas all the requisites to be this kind of imperishable good, the moregenuine meaning of good is that which brings us closer to God or makeus similar to Him (Theonoston, OO, II, 307b–308a, 313b). Thedifference between human beings and God is that in God the good(bonum) coincides entirely with self-preservation (vitaincolumis), whereas in human beings these two conditions aregenerally separate. Human beings need to take care of their life andaim at a life that is marked by reason. There cannot be any discourseon happiness where the primary requisites for life are lacking (due tomental illness or death) (Theonoston, OO, II, 309b).

Goods of the mind are virtues. By virtue, Cardano means theprinciple that teaches human beings to behave in the best way towardsGod, animals and our fellow human beings. Hence the key virtues aresense of duty (pietas), compassion (humanitas), andkindness (benignitas) (Theonoston, OO, II, 312ab).Given their importance, virtues are among the foundations of humanaction: “by its nature, virtue is eternal and a divine good inus; all the rest rots in time and depends on circumstances”(De utilitate, OO, II, 21a. See ibid., 38b) . Emanating fromthe innermost part of our rational soul, virtues have the power toretroact on our mind, thus fortifying and safeguarding its faculties.The most prophylactic among virtues are fortitude, prudence andmoderation, and they result from the combined actions of nature, habitand reason, establishing a delicate balance between control of naturalimpulses (impetus naturae), education, and the process ofdecision making.

As already said, Cardano’s moral philosophy rests on a series ofinterrelated principles which also play a key foundational role innatural philosophy: that the soul is immortal; that incorporeal livesare everlasting; and that mental awareness is the definingcharacteristic of the soul. Since the intellect is the only thing thathumans can boast about themselves as being truly immortal,intellectual self-knowledge is regarded by Cardano as the highest goodthat a human being may ever attain. Inevitably, this assumptionre-proposes the Averroist conundrum about whether the mind belongs tohumankind as a whole or it informs the life and knowledge of eachindividual human being. Cardano seems to suggest that the mindtranscends individual human beings ([mens] superior esthomini), for happiness coincides with eternal life: “he whodoes not live long cannot be happy for long” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 23ab; on Averroism in Cardano, seeGarcía Valverde 2013). There cannot be happiness in human lifeif there is no afterlife for the soul. On this point, Cardano followsSt Paul’s argument in his Letter to the Romans (8: 20–22):

If our soul did not survive death, we would be much unhappier thananimals are. For, besides the fact that no animal, apart from thehuman being, knows that it is going to die, all non human animals(bruta) enjoy some happiness for the very fact that theyexist, since they live as if they were to live forever, and thereforethey participate in eternal bliss. Only human beings are separatedfrom eternity, even in their thought, for not only do they know thatthey can die, but they also are aware that they will inevitably die,and die within a pre-established time (De utilitate, OO, II,24a).

Cardano’s reflections on mental happiness, assimilation toGod, and universal intelligibility should be read against thebackground of contemporary discussions about the Averroist notion ofintellectual beatitude. There is no doubt that, when Cardanocharacterizes the highest good as the union of the soul with God, hisdefinition is full of Aristotelian and Averroistic resonances. Thesummumbonum, he argues inDe utilitate exadversis capienda, is “to be assimilated to the highestgood,” i.e., God. Unlike other kinds of love, love of God is“honest” and “safe,” for its object neverdeserts the seeking soul (De utilitate, OO, II, 6, 25a.500a;Desapientia, OO, I, 500–501; ed. Bracali,30–36). Elsewhere, Cardano’s definition ofsummumbonum is suppler and implies such componentsas wisdom (sapientia), virtue (especially fortitude andprudence), and progeny: wisdom is distinctively human; expressions offortitude and prudence can also be seen in several animals; to havechildren, finally, is a prerogative that belongs to almost all livingbeings. It is a sort of pyramidal model of virtue, with fertility atthe basis and wisdom at the top (only very few people can reach wisdom)(De utilitate, OO, II, 25b;Theonoston, OO, II, 302b;on Cardano’s views on virtue, see Ingegno 1980, 318–76).

4.2 Prudence and Practical Wisdom

The characteristic oscillation between intellectual good andprosperous life is particularly evident inDe utilitate ex adversiscapienda. This work is meant to provide directions on how toovercome difficult situations and lead a reasonably serene life relyingonly on the material conditions of one’s existence and on theinformation that one can get from sensible experience. Contrary to theapproach followed inTheonoston, inDe utilitateCardano focuses on the kind of happiness that one can reach in thislife, advancing the hypothesis – to be understood in anexperimental sense – that there is no survival of the soul(etiamsublata immortalitate) (De utilitate,II, 5). In this case, the moral actor is confronted not so much withthe goods attainable by the mind as with the ills that the mind needsto transform into opportunities for inner exercise or practical gain.Cardano divides ills (mala) into external and internal. Theyboth can be measured according to the impact they have on our lives(magnitudo) and the level of constraint they impose on ouractions (necessitas). External ills depend on the variablearrangement of external events (fortunaearbitrium)and on the shifting states of the body. Although, properly speaking,the body is “no part of ourselves,” nevertheless, itcommunicates with our mind. Internal ills are all those passions thatcan be hardly eradicated from our soul, such as madness, anger, fear,and envy. Since they are located within the soul (animus), itis exceedingly difficult to turn them into something useful andproductive unless we undergo a radical transformation of our self(De utilitate, OO, II, 11b–12a, 13b).

Cardano claims that there can be five kinds of responses tocalamities in one’s life. The first two are“paradoxical” and have nothing relevant to say aboutpossible applications to the practical aspects of one’s life.These are the Christian and the Stoic responses: adversities are eithergood in themselves, or they have absolutely no incidence insomeone’s happiness. The remaining three kinds of response are ofa “pragmatic” nature, for they appeal to the human sensesand have possible social outcomes. First, they teach us how to avoidmisfortunes or mitigate the impact they have on our life; second, incase they happen, they direct our attention to ways of coping withmisfortunes or escape dangerous consequences; third, they tell us howto gain “some good” out of “any kind of ill”(De utilitate, OO, II, 10b, 27b, 39a). For Cardano, thisethical program in three stages is an approach that suits peopleinvolved in the many activities of civic life and helps meet theirsocial commitments. The distinctive trait of prudent people is theirability to turn difficulties into opportunities of knowledge and moralbetterment (De utilitate, OO, II, 11a). Regarding the“paradoxical” attitudes to calamities displayed by Stoicand Christian sages, Cardano thinks that there is a great differencebetween the situation in which the wise man is deemed capable of“bearing calamities with fortitude” (the Stoic approach)and that in which he is supposed to look at them as part of“one’s goods” (the Christian attitude). Even moredifferent, however, is to interpret calamities as useful and productivemeans of experience, as suggested by Cardano. Otherwise, to praise theills of life remains a futile rhetorical exercise, and for this reasonCardano does not hesitate to place Erasmus’Lausstultitiae (“Praise of Folly”) in this category ofedifying but useless rhetoric. With the exception of irreparablelosses, which can only be assuaged by resorting to a whole range ofconsolatory techniques, Cardano maintains that any other ill can alwaysbe turned into something useful and therefore no consolation is needed.To sum up, he identifies different levels – rhetorical,cognitive, and pragmatic – within the domain of moral philosophy:“To praise adversities is the eloquent rhetorician’s task;to bear them with fortitude belongs to a generous soul or a person whoknows divine truths; to draw useful instruction from them is the markof a prudent man” (De utilitate, OO, II, 11a).

As in the case of intellectual happiness, relief from emergencies ispredicated on knowledge. Cardano characterizes his method(ratio) for avoiding misfortunes and preparing againstcalamities as based on a particular kind of knowledge(scientia) – both useful and necessary – which“teaches us to recognize and obtain known goods, and once theyare obtained, it tells us how to use them and how to protect us withthem against ills” (De utilitate, OO, II, 17a). Theambivalent role ofanimus in Cardano’s moral philosophyis particularly evident in his directions on how to draw profit frommisfortunes, for both misery and happiness depend on awareness(“the fact that we know our condition”) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 88b). Our thinking activity is a key element inturning adversities into opportunities of growth in self-awareness. Anyphilosophical discussion of ethical matters presupposes that theethical subject is aware of his or her happiness or unhappiness:“the mind (animus) alone is the one who is happy orunhappy.” We have previously noted how closely Cardano’snotion of thesummumbonum is connected to theprinciple of soul’s awareness. In the same way, all forms ofexternal goods (riches, physical beauty, health, friends, offspring,country, honors) are no part of happiness unless they are related tothe mind (quatenusad animum referuntur).

The principal resources through which human beings may learn to drawadvantages from adversities are fortitude, prudence, worldly knowledge(rerumexperientia), and all sorts of helps(auxilia), such as material means, friends, authority, bodilystrength and practical experience (exercitatio) (Deutilitate, OO, II, 12a). Among the resources provided by reason,Cardano shares with Seneca the belief that meditating about one’sdeath (meditatiomortis) can trigger active andpointed responses to everyday problems: “although death is anecessary event, nevertheless, it contains in an eminent way, so tosay, all the reasons that sadden our life.” Thinking about death,regardless of whether people may be sure that they are going to surviveafter death, “can dissolve almost any form of sorrow”(De utilitate, OO, II, 17b). When methodically structured, farfrom producing anxiety, the thought of death and of the transientnature of all human affairs injects a sense of purpose and order intoour existence, making us gradually adjusted to a universe in a constantflux. Cardano’s method of drawing profit from adversities isbased on the general principle that everything in nature is subject toincessant change: “I usually compare human affairs, this wholesublunary frame (machinasublunaris) and all thathappens in it to a mass of wax in which, while it is compressed,protrusions become cavities and cavities protrude, all forms change,and now they change into similar ones, now into dissimilar ones, intocharming or foul, horrible and pleasant ones.” The principle ofthe unremitting transformation of reality (vicissitudorerum) is therefore the ontological rationale behind ourbelief that ills can be turned into goods (De utilitate, OO,II, 14b). Closely related to this principle is Cardano’s strikingassumption that, when considered from the point of view of happiness,all things are on a par (omniaaequalia sunt):“God levelled the conditions not only for all human beings, butalso for all things which are under the sky” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 18a, 24b).

It is while examining the essence of humane misfortune that Cardanoreaches the important conclusion that loss and want are the ultimatecauses of one’s hardships. The ability to anticipate and feel inadvance the effect of losing something or someone (sensusamissionis) can therefore prepare us to face calamities in ourlife (De utilitate, OO, II, 7). While Cardano insists thatexperience of adversities in life (sensuscalamitatum) provides people with a richer sense of theirhappiness, however, he is also well aware that there are limits in thehuman ability to process misfortunes into material for innertransformation (De utilitate, OO, II, 38b). Materialdestitution is certainly one of these limits. Among the circumstancesthat affect our perception of want, penury prevents us from focusing onthe improvement of our knowledge and level of awareness. When in hisdivision of the goods (of the mind, of the body and of fortune) Cardanodescribes material means as a pre-condition for the exercise of virtueand happiness, he takes special care in specifying that the ethicalinconvenience in being poor does not lie in not having access to theadvantages of material prosperity, but in the inability to work towardsone’s own happiness: “if someone does not have the means toraise his children, to look for wisdom or to practice justice, he willcertainly be unhappy, not because he is poor, but because he cannotpractice the works of happiness” (De utilitate, OO, II,26a). Mental pain is another situation in which human ability to turnmisfortunes into positive experiences is tested to the limit. The wayCardano insists on the severe reality of mental pain (molestiaanimi,doloranimi) is one of the mostcharacteristic aspects of his moral philosophy: “No disease, ifthere is not fear of death, can equal mental pain (doloranimi)” (De utilitate, OO, II, 18a).

In promoting (whenever possible) the value of happiness in allcircumstances of human life, Cardano does not intend to humour anyhuman tendency to self-delusion. On the contrary, he sees his effort todispel false beliefs and to curb proclivities to self-deception as hismain contribution to moral philosophy, for there is no greater meritthan “to free mankind from false opinions” (Deutilitate, OO, II, 26a). Indeed, sometimes he goes so far as tocriticize Averroes’ notion of mental happiness as a form ofentertaining false hopes (in this case, the hope to achieveintellectual bliss). Cardano thinks that the principal task of a moralphilosopher should be that of freeing the mind from misapprehensionsand prejudices: “There are many people who prefer to be happy ina mistaken way rather than acknowledge the reality of their affairs andtheir condition” (De utilitate, OO, II, 24b). As alreadysaid, mentalsecuritas cannot be premised on forms ofself-distraction and self-delusion, which turn our mind away from thecauses of our discontent. A good physician would never try to assuagethe pain of the patient by recommending him to buy “paintings andprecious stones” (Theonoston, OO, II, 307a).Cardano’s method of drawing profit from adversities is thereforean attempt to promote endurance while insisting on a courageousacceptance of the human condition.

The clash between appearance and reality, which represents thehallmark of Cardano’s ontology and theory of knowledge, hastherefore its obvious counterpart in his moral philosophy, where heoften associates human misery with unrealistic ambitions triggered byhuman desires: “Since human nature is driven to the infinite byappetites, it can never be satisfied, for it cannot contain theinfinite, indeed, not even a great part of what it desires.”Therefore, he who is not capable of restraining his own appetites, behe the greatest of the kings, will certainly be the unhappiest person(De utilitate, OO, II, 5;De sapientia, OO, I, 532a,544b–545a; ed. Bracali, 135, 174–175). To fight our propensity tocherish illusory dreams of happiness (somniumumbraeandumbra somnii), Cardano recommends us to become more awareof the precarious nature of the human condition (humanafragilitas) and to increase our level of self-mastery. Thecombined action of self-knowledge (noscete ipsum)and self-control (imperate ipsum) contributes tonarrow the otherwise unmanageable scope of our desires(Theonoston, OO, II, 310b;De consolatione, OO, I,615a;De utilitate, OO, II, 89b-90a). Self-awareness andself-control contribute to create positive habits (mores) outof actions and passions. Unlike nonhuman animals (belluae),human beings are capable of disciplining themselves (imperaresibiipsis) and to shape their nature (et naturam et moressibi formare) (Paralipomena, OO, X, 448a). They modifytheir behavior through thought (cogitatio), language(sermo), and action (actio). Actions are primarilydirected to what is useful for us and are ruled by the criterion ofinterest (utile), by pleasure, nature, and habit. Thoughtconcentrates on what is either useful or harmful for us. Languageadjusts our actions and thought to the variable circumstances thatpresent themselves from time to time (De utilitate, OO, II,19a, 20b;De minimis, I, 693a). Once we manage to strike abalance between the scope of our desires and the reality in which welive, two things become most necessary (maximenecessaria): to obtain what we wish to have (haberequod velis) and to know how to use what we have (his quaehabes uti commode scire) (De utilitate, OO, II, 1). Tofacilitate this task, Cardano distinguishes between disciplines inwhich the theoretical aspect is more prevalent (such as geometry andtheology), disciplines which are characterized by a balanced interplayof theory (scientia) and practice (usus), such asmedicine and law, and finally disciplines in which practice(exercitatio) is essential, like moral philosophy. Cardanoenumerates five requisites that define the nature of an accomplishedaction (in terms of attaining the right means for the right end(adeptio), readiness of execution (promptitudo), andcompletion (perfectio)). These requisites are nature, art,diligence, practice, and familiarity with the experts in the field(De utilitate, OO, II, 1–2;Desapientia, OO, I, 494b; ed. Bracali, 15).

Bibliography

Cardano’s works

Cardano, Girolamo,Opera omnia, ed. Charles Spon, 10 vols.(Lyon: Jean-Antoine Huguetan and Marc-Antoine Ravaud, 1663; repr.Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1966, abbreviated in this article as‘OO’).

• Book on Games of Chance (De ludo aleae),ed. Øystein Ore, in Ø. Ore,Cardano: The GamblingScholar, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953,181–241.
• Writings on Music [includesDe musica, VaticanMS 5850], ed. Clement A. Miller, Rome: American Institute ofMusicology, 1973.
• Della mia vita, ed. Alfonso Ingegno, Milan: Serra eRiva, 1982.
• L’oroscopo di Cristo, ed. Armando Torno, Milan:Philobiblon, 1990.
• Aforismi astrologici, ed. Giuseppe Bezza, Milan: Xenia,1999.
• Pronostico generale dil nobile messer Hieronymo Cardanophysico milanese, ed. Germana Ernst, inGirolamo Cardano: Leopere, le fonti, la vita, eds. Marialuisa Baldi and GuidoCanziani, Milan: Angeli, 1999, 457–475.
• Il prosseneta, ovvero della prudenza politica, ed. PieroCigada, Milan: Mondadori, 2001.
• Book of My Life, ed. Jean Stoner, New York: New YorkReview Books, 2002 [1930].
• De libris propriis: The editions of 1544, 1550, 1557,1562, with supplementary material, ed. Ian Maclean, Milan: Angeli2004.
• De subtilitate (Books 1–7), ed. Elio Nenci, Milan:Angeli, 2004.
• Come si interpretano gli oroscopi, ed. Ornella PompeoFaracovi, Pisa and Rome: Istituti Editoriali e PoligraficiInternazionali, 2005.
• De immortalitate animorum, ed. José ManuelGarcía Valverde, Milan: Angeli, 2006.
• De ludo aleae, ed. Massimo Tamborini, Milan: Angeli,2006.
• Somniorum Synesiorum libri quatuor:Les quatres livres des songesde Synesios, ed. Jean-Yves Boriaud, 2 vols., Florence: Olschki,2008.
• De sapientia libri quinque, ed. Marco Bracali, Florence:Olschki, 2008.
• Elogio di Nerone, ed. Marco Di Branco, Rome: Salerno,2008.
• De utilitate ex adversibus capienda praefatio,ed. Raffaele Passarella, Milan: Angeli, 2008.
• De uno, ed. José Manuel García Valverde,Florence: Olschki, 2009.
• Artis magnae sive de regulis algebraicis liber unus,ed. Massimo Tamborini, Milan: Angeli, 2011.
• Guglielmo: Dialogo sulla morte, ed. José ManuelGarcía Valverde, Italian. transl. by Paolo Raimondi, Turin:Aragno, 2011.
• The De Subtilitateof Girolamo Cardano, ed. JohnM. Forrester, Tempe, AZ: The Arizona Center for Medieval andRenaissance Studies, forthcoming 2013.
• Carcer, Marialuisa Baldi, Guido Canziani and Eugenio deRienzo (eds.), Florence: Olschki, 2014.

Secondary Literature

Bibliographic information about studies on Cardano can be found inIngo Schütze, “Bibliografia degli studi su Girolamo Cardanodal 1850 al 1995”,Brunianae Campanelliana 4(1998), 449–467.

• Baldi, Marialuisa, and Canziani, Guido (eds.), 1999,GirolamoCardano: Le opere, le fonti, la vita, Milan: Angeli.
• Baldi, Marialuisa, and Canziani, Guido (eds.), 2003,Cardano ela tradizione dei saperi, Milan: Angeli.
• Casali, Elide, 2013, “Il Pronostico del 1534 di GirolamoCardano. L’esemplare della Collezione Campi,”Bruniana & Campanelliana, 19(2): 571–575.
• Corrias, Anna, 2018, “When the Eyes Are Shut: The StrangeCase of Girolamo Cardano’s Idolum in Somniorum Synesiorum LibriIIII,”Journal of the History of Ideas, 79: 179–197.
• Couzinet, Marie-Dominique, 2001, “La variétédans la philosophie de la nature: Cardan, Bodin,” in Dominiquede Courcelles (ed.),La varietas à laRenaissance. École des Chartes, Paris, pp. 105–117.
• Di Rienzo, Eugenio, 1987, “Dal principato civile allatirannide: IlNeronis encomium di Gerolamo Cardano,”Studi storici, 28: 157–82.
• Ernst, Germana, 2001, “Veritatis amordulcissimus: Aspects of Cardano’s Astrology,”inSecrets of Nature: Astrology and Alchemy in Early ModernEurope, eds. William R. Newman and Anthony Grafton, Cambridge,MA: The MIT Press, 39–68.
• García Valverde, José Manuel, 2013,“Averroistic Themes in Girolamo Cardano’sDeImmortalitate Animorum,” inRenaissance Averroism andIts Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe,eds. Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni, Dordrecht: Springer,145–71.
• Giglioni, Guido, 2005–2007, “Mens in GirolamoCardano”, inPer una storia del concetto di mente,Eugenio Canone (ed.), 2 volumes, Florence: Olschki, II, 83–122.
• –––, 2008, “‘Bolognan BoysAre Beautiful, Tasteful, and Mostly Fine Musicians’: Cardano onMale Same-Sex Love and Music,” inThe Sciences ofHomosexuality in Early Modern Europe, eds. Kenneth Borris andGeorge Rousseau, New York: Routledge, pp. 201–20.
• –––, 2009, “Nature and Demons:Girolamo Cardano Interpreter of Pietro d’Abano,” inContinuities and Disruptions between the Middle Ages and theRenaissance, eds. Charles Burnett, José Meirinhos, andJacqueline Hamesse, Louvain-la Neuve: Brepols, 89–112.
• –––, 2012, “The Many RhetoricalPersonae of an Early Modern Physician: Girolamo Cardano on Truth andPersuasion,” in Stephen Pender and Nancy S. Struever (eds.),Rhetoric and Medicine in Early Modern Europe,Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 173–93.
• –––, 2013, “Girolamo Cardano: Universitystudent and professor,”Renaissance Studies, 27(4):517–532.
• –––, 2014, “Humans, Elephants, Diamonds andGold: Patterns of Intentional Design in Girolamo Cardano’s NaturalPhilosophy,”Gesnerus, 71: 237–247.
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