Zhu Xi, the preeminent Neo-Confucian (daoxue) master ofthe Southern Song (1126–1271), is generally ranked as secondonly to Confucius (551–479 BCE) in influence and as rivalingZhuangzi (fourth century BCE) in philosophic acumen in the Chinesephilosophical tradition. A leading scholar and classicist as well assharp intellect and devoted practitioner, Zhu Xi worked out aphilosophically compelling synthesis of the ideas of the NorthernSong (960–1126 CE) masters Zhou Dunyi (1017–73), ZhangZai (1020–77), and the brothers Cheng Yi (1033–1107) andCheng Hao (1032–85). Intriguingly, his idea of a holisticsynthetic approach itself may have been inspired in part by HuayanBuddhism (Ivanhoe 2000:47–49).^[1] Over time, Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confuciansynthesis proved to be a potent philosophic catalyst for hisintellectual supporters and opponents alike, until the fall ofImperial China in 1911 and beyond. His influence gradually extendedto Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, as well, each of which adapted histhought along with the Confucian classics and traditions in its ownway. Besides synthesizing key Northern Song Neo-Confucian ideas, Zhuresearched and reflected on the received Five Classics (Changes,Odes, History, Rites, andSpring and Autumn Annals),and compiled, edited, and commented on a compendium of essentialConfucian texts, theGreat Learning (Daxue),theAnalects (Lunyu) of Confucius, theBook ofMencius (Mengzi), and theDoctrine of the Mean(Zhongyong), titled theFour Books(Sishu).

Notably, from theGreat Learning Zhu adapted and distilledthe methodology of investigating things to extend knowledge while fromtheMean he stressed attuning oneself to attain utmostpropriety. Investigating things incorporated reading and classicalstudies but ensured one’s practical grasp of and personalresonance with the pulse of life: nature and phenomena as well associety and human relations and concerns (Gardner 1986, 1990).Attuning oneself involved reverent concentration and mindfulreflection and practice. A century later, Yuan dynasty(1271–1368) officialdom adopted Zhu Xi’s edition oftheFour Books as the basis for the Imperial ExaminationSystem, in effect canonizing it until the termination of the imperialexamination system toward the end of the Qing dynasty(1644–1911) in 1908. The change from theFive Classicsto theFour Books as the basis of the imperial examinationsystem resulted in a reform and renewal of the Confucian tradition andoutlook. It effected a restoration of Confucius’ originalconcern with personal ethical cultivation, realization, and practicefrom the more bureaucratic, careerist approach taken by manyConfucians of the preceding Han and Tang dynasties (206 BCE–905CE) that had weakened the tradition spiritually. Zhu Xi’s spiritand thought were deeply rooted in the original teachings of Confuciusand his early school, as well as in the seminal ideas of the NorthernSong masters, and exerted a profound influence in China and aroundEast Asia for centuries.

• 1. Life and Works
• 2. Philosophy of Human Nature and Approach to Self-Cultivation
• 3. Ethical Philosophy
  • 3.1 Investigating Things for Ethical Discernment and Practice
  • 3.2 Moral Cosmic Synthesis
• 4. Natural Philosophy
  • 4.1 Investigating Things for Natural Knowledge and Action
  • 4.2 Philosophic Synthesis
• 5. Complementarity betweenli andqi, and among related terms
• 6. Major Interpreters of Zhu Xi
• Bibliography
  • Primary Sources
  • Translations of Primary Sources
  • Secondary Sources
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Works

Zhu Xi was born in Youqi in Fujian in October 1130. Many anecdotesattest that he was a highly precocious child. It was recorded that atage five he ventured to ask what lay beyond Heaven, and by eight heunderstood the significance of theClassic of Filiality(Xiaojing). As a youth, he was inspired by Mencius’proposition that all people could become a sage. In Zhu Xi’schildhood, his father Zhu Song (1097–1143) arranged for severalold friends to educate Zhu Xi after his passing. Consequently, ZhuXi was educated by several eclectic scholars who had delved intoDaoism and Buddhism as well as Confucianism, and inclined him to bedeep and wide-ranging in his intellectual predilections and culturalinterests. Later he studied Chan (Zen) Buddhism with the monk DaoQian of the Kaishan Temple, and reputedly met with the Chan master DaHui (Dahui Zonggao,1089–1163).^[2] Traces of Huayan’s holistic thought canalso be discerned in the formation of Zhu Xi’s system.Remarkably, Zhu passed the officialjinshi exam (the“presented scholar” exam) at just nineteen, drawing onChan Buddhism in his answers.^[3] He continued to pursue Daoism and Buddhismuntil he met the Neo-Confucian master Li Tong (1093–1163) adecade later, and formally became his student in 1160. In fact,Zhu’s father had recommended that he conduct his advancedstudies under Li Tong, but Zhu postponed seeing Li for years until hefinally admitted to himself that he was no longer making progress inhis eclectic cultivation and suffered spiritual doubts. Li Tong was amaster in the southern Yang Shi (1053–1135) lineage of theCheng brothers’ school, partial to the teachings of ChengYi. Li Tong convinced Zhu of the cogency and superiority of theConfucian Way and cultivation. Meanwhile, having passedthejinshi examination, Zhu was eligible to hold office, andhad been assigned to several prefectural administrative posts. But,since he disagreed with central court policy on several major issues,he preferred to hold temple guardianships, which gave him the leisureto conduct Confucian studies and cultivation in earnest, and shieldedhim from the ruthless court politics. Having chosen this careerpath, Zhu Xi had the leisure to study and reflect, so over time hemade numerous contributions in classical studies, historicalinquiries, literary studies, and philosophic reflections. He moreoverdeveloped into a man of letters and wrote subtle prose and elegantverse.

A renowned teacher in later life, Zhu taught the classics andNeo-Confucian thought and practice to hundreds if not thousands ofstudents. His oral discourses and discussions are preserved intheClassified Dialogues of Master Zhu (Zhuziyulei), and his poetry, essays, correspondence, and other proseworks are collected in theCollected Writings of Master Zhu(Zhuzi wenji). He also published critical, annotated editionsof several classics, including theBook of Change(Yijing) and theBook of Odes (Shijing),essential works of Neo-Confucianism, including by Zhou Dunyi, ZhangZai, and the Cheng brothers, and a vital Neo-Confuciananthology,Reflections on Things at Hand(Jinsilu). He also edited and annotated an important earlytext of inner alchemy Daoism; theCantong qi (Unity ofthe Three) by Wei Boyang (3^rd cent. CE), whichcombines the cosmology of theYijing and the Daoist teachingofwuwei (non-intentional action) with inner alchemy. Zhu Xiremained devoted to his spiritual and intellectual work virtually tohis last breath, pondering and discussing problematic passages intheGreat Learning during the last several days of his life.Throughout his life, Zhu Xi sought to reestablish the fundamentalconcepts and values of Confucianism to restore China’s culturaland political integrity as a Confucian society, especially sincepeople in search of spiritual guidance and solace were increasinglylooking to Daoism and Buddhism rather than Confucianism, which wasperceived as a state ideology and orthodoxy and had lost spiritual andethical purchase. Moreover, Zhu believed that the empire needed thespiritualélan of Confucius’ original ethicalideas and values to meet the challenge of barbarian encroachments.His own sincere patriotism, commitment to the tradition, and devotionto learning and scholarship have remained an inspiration to this dayin East Asia and throughout the world.

2. Philosophy of Human Nature and Approach to Self-Cultivation

Zhu Xi developed a theory of basic human propensities(nature,xing) to account for both the possibility of humanevil and that of human goodness and perfectibility. On this theory,while (following Mencius, 372–289 BCE) insisting that people arebasically good (well intended and sensitive to the sufferings ofothers), he accepted that the manner in which this basic dispositionis manifested is conditioned and at times contained by aperson’s specificqi endowment (native talents andgifts,qizhi), family and social environment, and otherfactors. Such factors together yield one’s empiricalpersonality, intelligence, and aptitude for spiritual-ethicalcultivation. Zhu accepted that there are real differences inindividual disposition, character, as well as aptitude for ethicalself-cultivation and realization, owing to individual variationsinqi endowment, environment, etc. Furthermore, he arguedthat people can become bad or evil due, for example, to a coarse orsensualqi endowment, the bad influence of ruthless kin orfriends, a selfish or harsh social environment, a cruel streak,etc. Nonetheless, following Mencius, he firmly believed that anyonewho is sincerely determined to practice moral self-cultivation and whodevotes him or herself to it certainly can attain a degree of ethicalself-realization if not sagehood.

If neither the meditative approach nor the active approach tocultivation and practice were efficacious, what path remained open toZhu Xi? Recent research shows that Zhu Xi embarked on a carefulreading of the works of Zhou Dunyi during this period ofspiritual-philosophical crisis during which he rediscoveredZhou’s doctrine of “the interpenetration of stillness andactivity” for the human mind and spirit (Adler 2014). With thisidea, Zhou Dunyi was advocating that whereas the states of action andrest are mutually exclusive in the case of physical objects, suchstates interpenetrate and are mutually implicative in the case ofhuman mental and spiritual phenomena (Adler 2014). This doctrinepiqued Zhu Xi’s interest, and he came to see it as offering away out of the dilemma between Li Tong’s stress on stillness andHu Hong’s stress on activity in cultivation and practice, andtheir respective shortcomings. Zhou Dunyi’s doctrine wasparticularly exciting to Zhu Xi for it highlighted the distinctnessand religiosity of the human mind and spirit, which Zhou describes asnot subject to the same limitations and restrictions as are physicalphenomena. Zhou Dunyi moreover associates this idea with a vital andwell integrated model of human mind and spirit, self-cultivation, andcosmos. Inspired by Zhou Dunyi’s doctrine of theinterpenetration of stillness and activity and related ideas, Zhu Xiworked out a twofold cultivation effort that incorporated at oncenurturing one’s feeling of reverence (jing) to purifymind while investigating things to discern their determinate ordefining patterns (li). Cultivation of reverence, originallya religious virtue associated with ancestor worship and ceremonialrites, as described in the classics and taught by Confucius(551–479 BCE), serves to purify the mind, attune one to thepromptings of the original good nature, and set one to act withappropriateness (yi). Moreover, by grasping the definingpatterns (li) of relationship and intercourse that constitutethe world, society, people, and proper conduct, one gains the masterkey to acting with utmost propriety (zhongyong). The mindthat is imbued with reverence and comprehends these patterns willdevelop into a good will (zhuzai) dedicated to actingappropriately and with utmost propriety. Sincejing takes onconnotations of focus, concentration, and alertness, as well asreverence in Zhu Xi’s discourses, mindfulness has been suggestedas the English translation that covers the fullness of thetermjing (Kalton 1988) in Zhu Xi’s thought.

In later life, Zhu started to regard this twofold approach tocultivation and realization as too complicated, gradual, and difficultto carry out in practice. Like Confucius before him and anticipatingWang Yangming after him, Zhu Xi came to accept that the sincereConfucian adept must, on embarking on his or her project of ethicalself-cultivation, first strive to establish his or her sinceredetermination (lizhi) to realize the cardinal Confucianvirtues and become an exemplary person (junzi), that is tosay, a master of appropriateness in interpersonal conduct and humanaffairs generally.

3. Ethical Philosophy

Zhu Xi’s methodology for achieving perspicacity(ming) in ethical judgment and “appropriateness”(yi) in practice can be summed up in his call to investigatethings to extend knowledge (gewu zhizhi). Zhu advocated thismethodology to stress the need for people, as prospective moralagents, to notice the fine details, the distinguishing features ofparticular situations and to fashion on that basis the mostdiscerning, appropriate response. These distinguishing features cansuggest alternative moral considerations to be weighed (Pincoffs1986). This call lay behind Zhu’s promotion of theGreatLearning (Daxue) and call for life-long learning andmoral reflection in a bid to achieve a modicum of objectivity andbreak free of the moral intuitionism and resultant subjectivismtypical of Neo-Confucians of his generation.

3.1 Investigating Things for Ethical Discernment and Practice

Throughout his career, Zhu Xi focused on the twin problems of 1)determining the conditions of moral agency, and 2) setting forth aviable program of moral self-cultivation on that basis. Zhu saw moralagency as the expression of a moral will, which he understood to bethe achievement of an inner self-mastery (zhuzai) that formsthe core of a person’s moral character, perceptivity,cognizance, and responsiveness. On this view, self-cultivation thatis aimed at nurturing self-mastery must include forming aconcentrated, reverential mind-set (jing) and a discerningsense of appropriateness. Early on, Zhu had emphasized the need toattain a working knowledge of the constitutive patterning(li) of reality and society in the light of which the normsand ritual action (li) prescribed for proper interpersonalrelationships and intercourse are devised. He later found thatestablishing the determination (lizhi) to seekself-realization and conduct oneself appropriately counted for asmuch as the long-term cultivation process itself, during which onecan lose sight of one’s purpose and be side-tracked (see QianMu 1986: 123–127). Moreover, while still maintaining theimportance of the norms and ritual action for character-building andthe social order, Zhu began to emphasize the need to build up asympathetic but realistic grasp of the warp and woof of real dailyhuman life viewed in the perspective of such broad Confucian ethicalideals as humaneness (ren) and fairness (gong). Heunderstood that, although the norms and ritual action are broadlyapplicable and reliable, many situations call for specificallytailored responses.^[4]

Consequently, against the moral intuitionism prevalent at the timein Neo-Confucianism, as espoused by his teacher Li Tong(1093–1163), his intellectual rival Lu Jiuyuan(1139–1193), and others, Zhu argued that intuitionism isinadequate for dealing effectively with the complex human affairsthat people are apt to encounter in theirlives.^[5]Rather, he advocated dedicating oneself to the observation and studyof the patterning/patterns (li) of relationship,interaction, and change among all things, among human beings inparticular. He regarded “investigating things to extendknowledge” as the surest way to deepen and broaden one’sdiscernment of the patterns that constitute the lived-world. Suchknowledge, importantly, would sharpen one’s sense ofappropriateness by attuning oneself to the subtle distinguishingfeatures of particular situations.

Again, Zhu Xi conceived the world as a patterned (li)totality made up of a cosmic vapor (qi) that under variousconditions condenses and solidifies into countless permutations, fromthe purest transparentyuanqi (primordialqi), totheYin-Yang poles modulated by the primaltaiji(supreme polarity) pattern, to thewuxing (five phases),each of which bears an identifying inner pattern and set ofpropensities (xing) that involve interconvertability andrecombination with the other four phases, and finally to thephenomenal world: Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things (tiandiwanwu).^[6]

For Zhu Xi, the world presents a vital tapestry of relationships,cycles, processes, events, and things that are spontaneously arrayedin aesthetic order. In the nexus of these arrays,li aremanifested three dimensionally and present different faces fromdifferent angles (Graham 1986a: 148; Qian Mu 1986: 133).Liare inherently perspectival. Zhu adopts metaphors of the grains inwood, the lines in jade, the “veins” in a leaf, the linesin marble, and even the texture of beef, to stress thatliare manifested immanently rather than abstractly, and thus are to besought concretely by observing phenomena in the world, not by pure,disengaged, abstract ratiocination (Needham 1956a:473). Moreover,li are never presented in their putativeoptimal pure form. They always appear conditioned by the degree ofpurity of theqi through which they are manifested and ofthe environing conditions.

Li also structure the human mind, thought, and language,such that human beings are predisposed to grasp and attempt torespond appropriately to the things and situations theyencounter.^[7]Objective learning on this view can be understood as a facet ofself-learning: indeed, by the principle of continuity, objectiveunderstanding enhances self-understanding, for by comprehending thewarp and woof of the outerli of things, one gains insightinto the innerli constituting one’s mind andcharacter (Qian Mu 1971: II 31–38). For Zhu Xi, whileli structure the mind,thought, and language, this is not just at the cognitivelevel:li also structure the inner patterning(xing) and basic impulses that predispose us to havecharacteristically human emotions (qing) and responses(ganying) under various sets of conditions (Graham 1986a:152–154; Qian Mu 1971: II. 25–30). InZhu’s Confucian view,li andxing predisposeone to be sensitive and responsive; metaphorically, they provide thehardware of human nature. Self-cultivation and moral reflection arethe means by which one actively conditions and fine-tunes thesepredispositions of sensitivity and response. They thus function asindispensable software for cultivating personhood.

These are the contours of Zhu Xi’s approach to moralself-cultivation and interpersonal ethics. The standard ethical normswork well in standard situations, normal families, good communities,and ordinary social circumstances. But, Zhu also understood thatpeople are richly complicated and that human affairs often becomecomplex, get out of hand, and go awry. Life is just not that ideal,not that simple. We sometimes encounter ethically anomalous situationsto which the standard sets of feelings and responses as prescribed bythe received norms and ritual actions simply do not fit. In manyinstances, standing on the norm and being moralistic simply would makematters worse. Zhu himself said that one must have ample experienceand self-cultivation so that,

If, by chance, an anomalous affair should come up,one could comprehend it. One wants to be in a position to grasp suchaffairs thoroughly in order to understand their unfamiliaraspects. (YL: ch. 19)

Zhu Xi considered how to tailor responses appropriate inproblematic situations under the rubric ofquan (weighingthings up, discretion, expedientmeans).^[8] Henoted several kinds of situations in which recourse to discretion andexpedient means might be advisable: 1) extraordinary situations thatcannot be covered by the standard norms and ritual actions, 2) urgentsituations that require a direct violation of the received norms andritual actions to be satisfactorily resolved, and 3) situations inwhich it humane and prudent not to observe the relevant norms andritual actions (see Wei 1986). Situations of the first kind includethose that call for a disruption of the given human order, forexample the removal of an evil authority figure, such as a psychoticparent or a cruel despot. For situations of the second kind, Zhu hadin mind emergencies when one would have to violate a norm in order toperform an emergency action, such as grasping the hand of a drowningsister-in-law, or shoving an old lady out of the path of a runawayoxcart.^[9]Finally, the third kind of situation includes those in which it wouldbe more compassionate to waive or overlook the ritual prescriptions,such as in cases of condoning the remarriage of a widow who wouldotherwise be destined to isolation and destitution.

Clearly, such considerations lead us into unmapped ethical terrain.How far can one justifiably take such sidestepping of the receivedapplicable norms and ritual actions? What qualifications andrestrictions might apply? For his part, Zhu Xi mentioned at least twoqualifications: a weak qualification that the expedient adopted not beotherwise ethically objectionable, and a stronger qualificationstipulating that the expedient adopted be in compliance with the Way,i.e., that it satisfy some basic moral value, at least as basic as thevalues expressed in the relevant received norm and ritual action.Thus, any exercise of discretion that is undertaken in light ofone’s sense of appropriateness (yi), if exercised withsufficient probity and care, should satisfy the moral values embodiedin the Way more adequately than would a routine observance of thestandard norm. Humaneness is the core moral value that was invokedmost often in such cases, but there are a number of others: filialpiety, fraternity, fidelity, empathy, compassion, appropriateness, etcFamous examples from the Confucian tradition include Mencius’reminder that one should overturn the propriety of not grasping thehand of a member of the opposite sex in order to rescue a drowningsister in law (Mencius 4A.17), and Cheng Yi argued for anexception to the impropriety of widows remarrying on the basis offilial piety (Rosenlee 2006: 134). Similarly, Socrates showed thatJustice is not always realized by observance of the proprieties oftruth-telling and faithfully returning a friend’s property(PlatoRepublic 331c).

Nonetheless, ever cognizant of temptation and moral weakness, Zhuinsisted on the well established probity and integrity of anyone whowould venture to use discretion and exercise expedient means. Hestated:

Intending to weigh up a situation carefully [in orderto exercise expedient means], one must have cultivated the inner rootdaily, so that one’s mind is sensitive, perspicacious, pure, andintegrated; [even in that case,] one still must naturally weigh upsuch situations most carefully. As Cheng Yi (1033–1107) said:

Be reverent in order to straighten oneself within;practice appropriateness in order to square situations without.One’s sense of appropriateness comprises the moral fiber whichone expresses through sincere ritual action. (YL 37, 37:6a, par. 36).

Only those who have extensively “investigated things toextend knowledge”, and who are conversant with the subtlepatternings of the human heart and human affairs would be qualified toconsider exercising expedient means over simply following thenorms. (Zhu knew this ethical knowledge is as much a matter ofpractical experience as of book learning. At times, he told hisoccasionally priggish students that well-disposed people, even ifmorally untutored, can be more discerning and have better discretionthan are some academicians!)

While Zhu stressed making careful observations in situations inorder to tailor the most fitting responses in context, at the sametime he envisioned a cultivation process whereby one discerns evermore fundamental and yet far-reaching patterns (li) thatshape nature and moral value. That is, Zhu sometimes construed theproject of investigating things to extend knowledge as an ascendantmovement whereby the learner finally arrives at thepinnacle—taiji (supreme polarity) that embraces andsubsumes all derived patterns. To Zhu, graspingtaiji inthis sense was tantamount to grasping the master key, for itrepresented to him the apex of being and value, and bestowedrealization and sagehood on those who sincerely and authenticallycomprehended and embraced it.^[10] While this conception charts an ideal pathto the pure, compassionate mind-set of sagehood, it obscures ZhuXi’s usual emphasis on fine-tuning and sharpening one’smoral discernment and responsiveness in the midst of things—infull view of the situatedness of people in their daily life. Thisconception also neglects Zhu’s equal emphasis on the claim thatpatterns as inborn propensities (xing) are manifested onlyin concrete specificqi formations, and thus that 1)patterns are to be discerned in their fine particularity, that 2) themoral impulses are to be nurtured in the stream of human life, andthat 3) the emotions, when not obscured by desires or obsessions, forthe most part are immediate expressions of the basic naturalimpulses.

How, too, to square this broad vision of probing inquiry and deepunderstanding with the potentially constrictive Confucian moralpsychology constructed round the virtues of humaneness,appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom, and their attendantemotions? Zhu Xi likely realized that these virtues functioned asthematic foci for cultivation as one establishes ones moralorientation and bearings and a balanced interpersonal stance. Oneneeds to go through an initial stage of mastering these basic virtuesin order to 1) reinforce one’s altruistic impulses and curtailthe egoistic ones, 2) be inclined to seek principled rapport andharmony in interpersonal affairs, and 3) be moved by a sense ofoneness with others and all things. Subsequently, the more ethicalhuman phenomena one observes and considers in advanced level learningand cultivation, the more one feels a broad sympathy for others thattranscends the narrowly-graded love, the so-called love withdistinctions that is attributed to the notion ofren(humaneness) in Confucianism (seeMencius, 1A.7, 3A.5, and7A.45). The more one observes the nuances of human affairs and thesprings of human action, the more one will express deference andrespect in ways that do not necessarily coincide exactly with thegeneral prescriptions of the norms and ritual actions. In this way,one will build up a repertoire of conduct that reflects one’spersonal ethical discernment and discretion, which expressesone’s personal ethical attainment and style.

Zhu Xi on occasion modeled his ethical conception of observingsituations and fashioning the most appropriate responsenaturalistically on the butcher character, Cook Ding, portrayed in theZhuangzi as a skilled artisan: just as the sure blade of CookDing’s cleaver goes straight to the cartilage between the bones,the cultivated sense of appropriateness (yi) of ZhuXi’s moral adept strikes right at the heart of interpersonalsituations (see Thompson 1988: 39–40). A.C.Graham once contrasted Zhu’s perception/response model(gan-ying) of ethical action with that of Zhuangzi bysuggesting that Zhu’s notion of appropriate response wasinformed by rigorous adherence to rules and principles, whereasZhuangzi’s was relatively intuitive and spontaneous (Graham1986a: 143–145). This apparent contrast can be resolved byseparating the stages of cultivation and mastery: Zhuangzi’sskilled artisans, such as Butcher Ding, all had to undergo prolongedperiods of rigorously controlled apprenticeship before they could“forget” the “knowing that” in an integrated,spontaneous process of “knowing how”. For his part, Zhu Xiknew that the years of learning and practice—one’s moralapprenticeship—culminates in a responsive moral agent who canoperate as intuitively and spontaneously in his or her personal andsocial ethical sphere as do Zhuangzi’s skilled artisans intheirs.^[11]Zhu’s moral adept is in effect an artisan of interpersonalintercourse. Zhu could rightfully claim Confucius as a prime modelfor this view. After decades of cultivation, Confucius could say,“At sixty, my ear was attuned. At seventy, I could give my heartfree rein and without overstepping the mark” (Analects2.4).

Zhu Xi’s appropriateness approach to ethics has severaldistinct features. First, one is to be well-versed in the receivednorms and rituals that circumscribe interpersonal relationships andprescribe proper behavior in family and society. Second, one is tohave made ample observations and responses in real lifesituations. Third, one is to have examined and reflected on ways inwhich others act and respond in situations, for reference. Fourth,through extensive observation and experience, one is to be cognizantof the range of considerations that come into play in real lifesituations: moral principle, utility, fairness, sympathy, compassion,and so forth.^[12] Fifth, one is to remain flexible andopen-minded as well as avoid making surmises, being insistent,stubborn, or self-centered (Analects 9.4). According to thisview, while observing the ethical norms and rules of thumb in his orher community, the moral adept possesses a store of personal ethicalsensitivity, responsiveness, and resourcefulness, by which to fashionthe most fitting responses to situations.

3.2 Moral Cosmic Synthesis

In his watershed essay,A Treatise on Humanity(Renshuo), Zhu Xi discourses on the classical Confucianteaching of humanity (ren) in a unified cosmic and humanperspective. In concluding, he criticizes alternative accounts ofhumanity, i.e., Confucius’ spirit of humaneness, on variousconceptual and ethical grounds.^[13] Following the early Han tradition, Zhuassociates humaneness with cosmic creativity. In its most basicmanifestation, humaneness is characterized as the impulse of“heaven and earth” (the cosmos) to produce things. Byextension, this impulse yields the cycle of seasons and the pervasivefecundity of nature. Advocates of this doctrine had foundconfirmation in the rich, productive Chinese soil and temperateclimate, which supported their assumption that nature was generallyfertile and afforded the right conditions for humanflourishing. Pervasive, the impulse to produce appears in each andevery one of the myriad creatures while in human beings it is refinedinto the virtue of “humaneness”, which, when fullyrealized, involves one’s caring attitude and dedicatedresponsibility toward others. Zhu Xi moreover correlates“origination, growth, flourishing and firmness”, thefourfold initial stages of creativity and production in the cosmosand nature first mentioned in early commentaries on theBook ofChange, with humaneness, appropriateness, ritual conduct andwisdom, the four cardinal virtues enunciated by Confucius. Zhu Xithus portrays the fully cultivated person as at once a complement toheaven and earth, a vital participant in cosmic creativity, and acatalyst for the flourishing and self-realization of others. On thisbasis, he goes on to formulate the definition ofren(humanity, humaneness) for the subsequent tradition: “theessential character of mind” and “the essential patternof love”. The virtue of humaneness thus grounds the dispositionof mind as commiserative and describes the core of moralself-realization as love for others (other-directed concern), to beappropriately manifested.

In the closing argument of theTreatise on Humanity, ZhuXi stresses that while the stillness and activity phases of theemotions provide emotive stage setting for one’s dedicatedcultivation, realization, and practice of humaneness, what is crucialis the insight that,

If one could but trulypractice love andmaintain it (italics added), one would possess the well-spring ofall virtues and the root of all gooddeeds. (based on Chan 1963, 212–227, edited)

Under this premise, Zhu cites Confucius’ advice to Yan Hui,“Master the self by practicing ritual propriety”(Analects XII.1). For Zhu Xi, one masters oneself to rein inone’s naïve self-centeredness by paying ritual respect toothers, which in turn spurs a change in the axis of one’s moralconcern to other people, especially those with whom one is related anddaily interacts. What is important, then, isthe moral-ethicalaxis of one’s motivations. But, how is one to sustain andmanifest this humanity consistently in attitude and practice? Zhu Xidoes not appeal to philosophic reflection but recommends mindful(jing) daily cultivation and practice, i.e., being calm andfocused, respectful in personal life, diligent in conducting affairs,and dedicated to upholding interpersonalrelations.^[14]Moreover, he considers that emotion plays a fundamental role inethical cultivation and performance. After stressing servingone’s parents with filiality and one’s elder brother withfraternal respect, Zhu Xi urges: “Be loving in dealing with allthings”, which goes well beyond standard filtered and restrained“graded” Confucian sentiments.

Humaneness is not just a matter of considerateness and paying duerespect; Zhu Xi underscores the rigors of conducting oneselfsincerely and authentically with humaneness, citing Confucius’examples of not only ministers who had declined official posts tomaintain their integrity but of times when the exemplary person iswilling to sacrifice his or her own life to fulfill humanity(Analects 15.8). Nonetheless, the animating spirit of ZhuXi’sTreatise remains: “love people gently andbenefit things”, as reflected in Mencius’ four incipientethical impulses and Confucius’ four cardinalvirtues.^[15]

4. Natural Philosophy

4.1 Investigating Things for Natural Knowledge and Action

While Shao Yong and Cheng Yi in the Northern Song had introducedthe idea of observation in terms ofguanwu (observingthings),fanguan (reflective perception), andgewu(investigating things), Zhu Xi not only discussed the idea ofobservation but offered a multitude of actual observations ofcelestial and terrestrial phenomena. In addition, his penchant forhierarchy and systemization led modern commentators in the twentiethcentury to draw comparisons with Plato, Aristotle, and even ThomasAquinas. Around the mid-twentieth century, Joseph Needham vividlypresented Zhu’s system in terms of process philosophy as bearingorganismic patterns of conceptualization and distinct parallels withscientific thinking:

I am prepared to suggest, in view of the fact thatthe termLi always contained the notion of pattern, and thatChu Hsi himself consciously applied it so as to include the mostliving and vital patterns known to man, that something of the idea of‘organism’ was what was really at the back of the minds ofthe Neo-Confucians, and that Chu Hsi was therefore further advanced ininsight into the nature of the universe than any of his interpretersand translators, whether Chinese or European, have yet given himcredit for. (Needham 1956a: 474)

Soon thereafter, after undertaking a careful study of Zhu’sdialogues (Zhuzi yulei), Hu Shih presented Zhu’s methodof inquiry,gewu zhizhi (investigate things to attainknowledge) as essentially a process of “hypothesis andverification by evidence” (Chan 1989: 566), consistent in spiritwith a scientific approach to inquiry. Needham and Hu effectively castZhu’s thought and method in a new light, as more creative,scientific, and practical than previously thought. Since then, manyhave discussed Zhu as a process thinker, but little has been writtento consider the extent to which his system could accommodate ascientific worldview, and the extent to which his method of inquirywas consistent with a scientific approach. Yung Sik Kim examines theextent to which Zhu anticipated genuine scientific methods ofobservation and conceptualization inThe Natural Philosophy of ChuHsi (2000).

Zhu from childhood displayed a genuine interest in naturalphenomena and in raising speculative questions. Later he tended torein in this interest, for example by relating features of observednatural phenomena to human analogues for didactic purposes and byrefraining from pressing his speculations very far, i.e., beyond thescope of verifiable knowledge and applicability. Zhu lived during atumultuous period in Chinese history when Neo-Confucian scholarstended to draw upon the resources of their own tradition to revitalizethe empire, an effort in which Zhu’souvre constituteda watershed. He sought to wed the objective and subjective trends ofthe earlier movement into a practical synthesis in which objectiveinquiry played a key role in subjective cultivation. Subsequently,however, as his disciples refined his thought into a scholasticdoctrine, subjective cultivation prevailed over objective inquiry,which was increasingly redirected into the narrow limits of readingand interpersonal conduct.

In the Ming dynasty, the influential WangShouren (Yangming; 1472–1529) spurned Zhu’s method ofinquiry altogether after a futile attempt to observe theli(patterning) in the bamboo outside his gate. Holding that facts areobvious to a perceptive mind and do not require endless furtherinvestigation, Wang went on to formulate an idealist pragmatism thatbecame influential. Intending to counter the scholasticism andcareerism of his day, Wang, a military man, stressed volitionism andactivism and spurned the sort of careful objective inquiry Zhu thoughtnecessary to making balanced judgments and appropriate responses.

Zhu conceptualized nature and natural phenomena in termsofli (pattern, patterning) andgewu (theinvestigation of things),qi (primalvapor),yin-yang,wuxing (fivephases),shu (number, probability, ratio),xiang(images); figures from theBook of Changes), ghosts andspirits (gui-shen), heaven and the sage(tian-shengren), stimulus-response (ganying), andtransformation and change (bianhua). In this context, itwas important to treatli matter-of-factly as the intrinsicpatterning of things and events. While theli involved withthe identities of things are those facets of intrinsic patterningthat pertain to their basic interactive propensities and functions,theli of a concrete thing form “a gestalttotality” (Kim 2000), nearly as complex as the thingitself. Thus, whereas scholars tend to take Zhu’s assertionthat “for a certain (kind of) thing to exist, there first mustbe thatli” or “there must be thislifor there to be that (kind of) thing” as indicative of ametaphysical principle of sufficient reason, in thiscontextli simply affirm that things of identifiable kindsbear identifying patterns (xing) that make them what theyare and interact as they do.Li indicate reference pointsfor identities of things that influence their typical patterns ofinteraction with other things.Li thus conceived do notamount to principles of explanation and are more involved withdefinition, so references to theli of phenomena do not addanything cognitive or scientific.^[16] At times, Zhu did present the idea ofinvestigating things in chapter 5 of theGreat Learning(Daxue) as involving a step-by-step approach, with an eyeto discerning ever higher levels of commonality among themyriadli (patterns), aiming at an ultimate comprehensionof the most basic form of pattern,taiji (supremepolarity). Although this approach lacks the rigor of a logicalcategorical system, when viewed together with Zhu’s commentson Zhou Dunyi’sDiagram of the Supreme Polarity(Taiji tu), it is suggestive for viewing phenomena andforms in a developmental, almost evolutionary context. As Needhamcomments:

Chu Hsi wrote:

If one peers into the mystery, thethaichi [taiji, supreme polarity] seems a chaotic anddisorderly wilderness lacking all signs of an arranger…, yettheLi (fundamental pattern) of motion and rest, and of Yinand Yang, is fully contained within it.

Innumerable smaller organisms were also contained within it, andindeed composed it. Some of them more highly organized than others. Infact, the world was no more undifferentiated for the Neo-Confuciansthan for modern organic philosophy; it manifested a series ofintegrative levels of organization, wholes at one level being parts onthe next. A clear statement of this conception appears in the ninthparagraph of theThai chi Thu Shuo [Explanation of thediagram of the supreme polarity], which indicated the inapplicabilityof categories outside the level to which they belong. (Needham 1956a:466)

For Zhu, investigating things to attain knowledge involves arrivingat a grasp of their constituentli; “knowing” or“understanding” such phenomena, thus, is a matter ofgrasping theirli. While Zhu often speaks of knowing orcomprehending something in terms of the metaphor of seeing it clearly,of having a clear discernment of it, which is nothing like rigidpropositional knowledge, he does recognize several forms or levels ofknowing, and regards the basic steps of learning in analyticalpropositional terms and the higher levels in more synthetic insightterms. That is, one first learns facts about the building blocks ofthe world and human life, e.g., what things are, what they mean, howthey fit together; then, gradually, one gains insights into thebroader patterns of relationship and intercourse that comprise theworld and human life and that eventually afford sensitive glimpses ofthe inner root as well as the larger picture. Zhu’s discoursesare as full of detailed accounts of phenomena as they are of syntheticinsights, which should be expected given that Zhu gives equal statusand value to the various sorts of qualities that the Western traditiondivides into primary (quantitative), secondary (qualitative), andtertiary (qualitative effects).

As noted, Zhu drew on notions ofqi, yin-yang, the fivephases,shu (numbers, probablilities), and images asconceptual and categorical resources for classifying, characterizing,and understanding the world, especially cycles, processes, andparticular things and events. Chinese thinkers, especially during theHan dynasty, used such notions to arrange categories of reality andcompile lists of qualities for each category. While some of theassociated qualities are directly or causally linked, many of them arearbitrary—perhaps assigned in light of long forgotten events ordecrees. These sets of categories were compiled as systematic indicesfor grasping things and events in terms of categorical associationsand imputations. Inevitably, these sets of categories bore a stronglycultural stamp and bias but were applied equally to natural phenomena,as if the natural world were an extension of the human world,notvice versa.

Zhu often classified a natural phenomenon in terms of thesecategories and associations, and left it at that, unconcerned that thecategories were haphazard and the associations arbitrary andinexplicable. Likely Zhu recognized that these categories andassociations often were arbitrary and not particularly informativeregarding physical reality but did not find it necessary or practicalto pursue the matter. Zhu contented himself with assigning phenomenato these culturally colored sets of categories and associationsbecause in those speech contexts those associations were moresignificant and interesting than the probing of purely physicalcategories and explanations would have been. These sorts of examplesreflect the cultural common sense and conditions of common speech ofhis age.

The questions arises whether these sets of categories andassociations were more a help or a hindrance to the development ofscience in traditional China. On the one hand, their loose criteriaand arbitrary design allowed for easy classifications and“accounts” of phenomena that would have stymied seriousscientific investigation while, on the other, the associations thusattributed to these phenomena sometimes might have yieldedexpectations or hypotheses of sorts, thus stimulating further inquiry.Interestingly, Zhu often sidestepped these sets of categoriesaltogether in his serious thinking about natural phenomena and judgedthem by what he took to be the deciding factors in the casesthemselves, often in light of analogies. Striking cases of this areZhu’s discussions on the structure of the cosmos (heaven andearth) and insightful explanations of phases of the moon and eclipsesof the sun and moon. For example, Zhu often said that the earth wasfloating on water; both below the earth and surrounding its four sideswere water, but he also said thatqi surrounded theearth. And, he also spoke of vortices, centrifugal forces, andoccasionally of the earth’s motion. Zhu was interested in theseaccounts of the formation of the world, but saw no way to confirm anyof them. He perhaps thought it was important to present such accountsas representative of an objective approach to a question that was moreamenable to mystical or religious approaches.

Zhu’s notions of stimulus-response and transformation andchange are noteworthy, for they are counterparts to the concepts ofcausation and change in Western science. Construing phenomena assensitive, perhaps perceptive in a rudimentary sense, the notion ofstimulus-response reinforces the interdependence of things. Assuming aresonance among things in terms of parallelisms among their forms, andaffinities among theirqi, this notion presents phenomena ona biological model and conduces to an ecological rather than amechanical outlook. While providing an interactive way of talkingabout phenomena, it doesn’t open the way or impel the inquirerto uncover the nuts and bolts of causation and change. Also, since theidea of stimulus-response was usually tied to the aforementioned setsof categories and associations, it was often vague and applied inarbitrary and superstitious ways. As might be expected, Zhu’snotions of transformation and change also reflected biological andhuman-life models, with transformation indicating gradual change, asin the growth of a child or the passage of summer, and changeindicating a sudden transformation, as from a caterpillar to abutterfly or from summer to winter and life to death. From thestandpoint of developing science, by making change seem to be sonatural and inevitable, these notions of transformation and changetended to make further inquiry appear to be unwarranted. In contrast,Western ideas of eternal substance and inert matter made the observedchanges on the earth and in the skies problematic and in urgent needof further inquiry and explanation. More pragmatic in spirit, theChinese were concerned mainly with registering and grasping theobserved patterns and sequences of change in and around them so as tobe able to adjust their lives to the ever-changingcircumstances. (This was a function of theBook ofChanges.)

Zhu Xi posits an ontological and causal continuity between thecelestial and terrestrial realms, as well as between the animal andplant species and humanity. Indeed, there is no categorical differencebetween human beings and other life forms. Against this backdrop, Zhucarefully observed anomalies and sketched explanations based on thegeneral ideas available to him. For example, when observing fossils ofseashells atop a mountain, Zhu noted that the area had once been aseabed and hypothesized that the earth formerly was softer and morefluid and that, through wave motions, this seabed later rose to becomea mountain top. Meanwhile, the entire earth dried as it grew older.While this explanation was not rigorous or determinate enough to countas a scientific hypothesis; Zhu appealed only to naturalistic conceptsand principles in his comments. Zhu made quantitative measurements ofplant growth. Zhu once heard a monk’s claim that one can seeevidence of the nourishing powers of “night vapor” byobserving bamboo sprouts, which grow twice as fast at night as duringthe day. Later, during a stay at a Buddhist residence on JadeMountain, Zhu observed that the bamboo sprouts there displayed the“same rate of growth day and night, exactly the opposite of themonk’s claim”. Qian Mu observes that Zhu’s practiceofgewu (investigating things) was fruitful because he madeobservations with questions or hypotheses in mind, adding that WangShouren’s observations of bamboo had been fruitless because hehad no question or hypothesis in mind to test. Wang was undertakingbland looking (Qian 1986: 215f, 219).

In contrast to analytical Western concepts used in studying thenatural world, including matter, material quality, motion, and change,Zhu Xi adopted a holistic approach to understanding the physical worldand phenomena. He drew upon received notions ofli (pattern)andqi (cosmic vapor) to describe and account for thematerial, dynamic, and formal features of perceivedphenomena.Li (pattern) refer to the inner patterns of bothinteraction and identifying form. As noted,li are notgeneral overarching principles, but inner patternings implicated inthings and events, from the discernible textures—grains in wood,veins in leaves—to the postulated identifyingforms,xing, of things. In terms of dynamicinteraction,li structure the primalyin-yangintercourse astaiji, and the intercourse among the fivephases as their constitutive identifying forms. Zhu thus conceived ofthe cosmos as emerging from incipientyin-yang interaction inthe initially formless primalqi(yuanqi).Yin-yang interaction and furtherpermutations give rise to the five phases, which bear the full rangeof material and perceptual qualities and whose interaction gives riseto heaven, earth, and the myriad things, i.e., the cosmos.

The Chinese system of five phases differs from traditional Westernatomism on several counts. Asqi (yin-yang) operatesin essentially a wave-like manner, the world is manifested as a fieldof interactingqi forces. Change is a function of theattunement of forms and resonance ofqi, and transformationis viewed according to chemical and biological models. That is, notonly are the five phases derived fromyin-yang interaction;they are divisible and inter-convertible. Moreover, while Westernatoms bear only primary qualities in themselves, each of the fivephases exhibits a range of perceptual qualities and effects, and thetradition attributes a plethora of qualities and associationstoyin andyang. These flexible and adaptableconcepts do not create the sorts of problems, the kinds of conflictswith observation, that lead to rethinking and further, more preciseinvestigation of phenomena. Because perceptual properties of all sortsare propagated from the formation of the five phases, Zhu Xi andothers in his tradition did not draw the critical distinction betweenprimary and secondary qualities that formed a crucial linchpin inphysical analysis in the West from antiquity. To be sure, Zhu spoke ofa threshold between perceptible and imperceptible phenomena in termsof the expressions “above forms” (xing er shang)and “within forms” (xing er xia). “Aboveforms” refers not to general principles or primary qualities butessentially to the immanental moral underpinnings of nature andhumanity, i.e., the inner roots of order and harmony, ecologicallyconceived, primary examples of which aredaoandli. Characterizing these fundamental notions as“above forms”, Zhu insisted that people needed tocomprehend them in light of their manifestations in perceivedphenomena “within forms”. Lacking the critical distinctionbetween primary and secondary qualities, Zhu treated perceptualqualities, such as color and taste, as equally basic, innate, and realin material substances as any other, and as such he did not look tounderlying principles, causes, or mechanisms in terms of which toexplain these manifest qualities.

Zhu Xi didn’t feel the need to formulate a theory of motionas such either, because the factors were glossed in his commonsensegrasp of the world and he didn’t see any advantage ofexplicating them. Importantly, he couldn’t conceive of theirtheoretical ramifications or especially of their practicalimplications, such as for engineering and technology. At the sametime, Zhu did have a grasp of inertia and the relativity of motion,keys to solving the problems of motion, but it was not adequate to thetask. The capacity to imagine ideal cases and relationships would havebeen necessary: for example, Galileo had to conceive of theparadigmatic case of motion in terms of an object moving in a straightline on a frictionless plane at a constant velocity, something thatcan never occur in nature, for any actual object inevitably will beenvironed and influenced by a variety of forces, such as gravity andfriction. Essential, too, was the mathematical plotting of motions innature that approximate the paradigmatic motions, such asKepler’s plotting of planetary motion and Galileo’splotting of the trajectories of projectiles, to produce preciserepresentations of near-paradigmatic motions. Necessary, too, was anawareness of the possibility of mathematical calculation and precisepredictions. Zhu’s philosophy involved viewing all thingsinteractively in relative context. If he had had a notion ofparadigmatic (perpetual) motion, it would have been something likewave motions in the sea or the cyclical pumping action of thetraditional Chinese waterwheel used for irrigation with rising fulltroughs of water complemented by the falling empty troughs(receptacles), which he had used to depict theyin-yangoperation oftaiji. Zhu also lacked the necessary notions ofprecise mathematicization, measurement, and calculation in terms ofwhich to make the theory of motion bear fruit. Consequently, it ishardly to be expected that Zhu or any one else in his intellectualcircle should have had occasion to formulate anything like ascientific theory of motion.

Several features of Zhu Xi’s thought and his notion ofobservation discouraged him from forming a genuinely scientific theoryor making scientific observations. Zhu was loath to investigate thesorts of fundamental abstract concepts, such as element, mixture,infinity, space, time, void, causality, and law, that were necessaryfor making breakthroughs in the scientific revolution. Because of theConfucian commonsense approach to things, Zhu was disinclined topursue or investigate such abstract, intangible, and seeminglyephemeral notions. He tended to think that focusing on concepts likevoid, nothingness, infinity, and space would draw people away from theworld of human affairs and ultimately point them toward pointlessintrospection. Zhu’s concern with the real world itself stymiedhis investigations into the very abstract concepts necessary forconstructing a better grasp of this so-called real world.

Zhu Xi had a “particularistic” tendency to investigateeach phenomenon on its own terms, without attempting to relate it tomore general explanatory principles, as in his treatment of inertiaand the relativity of motion. In another case, he discussed thedifficulty of boiling rice atop a particular mountain in terms of thecharacteristics of theqi (cosmic vapor) of that mountain,without relating the phenomenon generally to characteristicsofqi (as air pressure) at high altitudes. Inevitably, thisignoring of general principles made Zhu less sensitive to thecontradictions that arose when he offered more than one explanation ofa single phenomenon.

Why did Zhu Xi go to the trouble of constructing his elaboratesystem and making and discussing all these observations if theydidn’t carry him beyond common sense to a deeper and moreaccurate perception and account of reality, to go beyond the detailsof particular cases to more general principles and truths?Zhu’s ultimate purpose was pragmatic rather than epistemic;that is, he was laying out the concepts, framework, and practicesthat he deemed most conducive to self-cultivation, self-realization,and ethical practice, rather than formulating objectively accurateconcepts, systems, and methods for ascertaining objective truthsabout the world. So, he did not have a practical interest in pushinghis inquiries in purely scientific directions. But, this way ofputting it is not completely right because Zhu had considered avariety of philosophic positions and did think he had selected thebest and most accurate of the concepts and systems at hisdisposal. And, he did attempt to render his ideas in a manner thatwas faithful to reality, the devotion to which was one of his corecultivation themes.^[17] Clearly, he did not have the requisiteconcepts, framework, or style of thinking through which to conceivethe world under overarching scientific principles and abstractgeneralities.

Zhu Xi’s working concepts and thought were typified byimmanental patterns (li) rather than by transcendentalprinciples. He regarded reality, the world, not in terms of logicalorder, but as manifesting aesthetic order. Reality for him was notcomposed of independent atoms operating under general laws; rather itformed a field in which particulars appeared as foci determined incontext. To Zhu, ours is not an absolute, objective universe in whichparticular individuals are subsumed under generalities and behaveaccording to universal laws; rather, the world unfolds before us inlight of our increasing, expanding perception of the arrays ofparticular phenomena around us. The world we experience is a functionof, a field manifested as, the tapestry formed through the resonanceamong the foci making up that field. Consequently, the task ofinvestigating things is a process of unfolding (rather than aninductive process), an exhausting of theli constitutingparticular things and events, from their gestalt forms, such as thesymmetrical bilateral forms of most biological entities, to theiridentifying forms to their functions and typical patterns ofinteraction. Proceeding in this way, we seek not the most general lawsor principles governing particular atomic individuals, but rather themost basic or common patterns of interaction and formation amongparticulars as foci in fields. Consequently, for example, the ultimatepattern in Zhu’s thought,taiji, the supreme polarity,is not an abstract ideal like a platonic form or a law of nature; itis an immanental pattern that is realized ubiquitously butdistributively, not overarchingly or generally. Zhu was not workingtoward a scientific conception of the world, of reality, asconstituted on general principles and abstract equations; he wastraversing an alternative route by eliciting the formations of thingsand events in ecological context in a way that would open one’smind to the intimate resonance among particulars as foci in fields. Atthe same time, by stressing the expression “gewuqiongli” (investigate things to exhaust theirli),Zhu maintained a measure of analyticity in his insights to ensure thatthe knowledge people gleaned was nuanced and textured enough tocontribute to life understanding and appropriate conduct.

4.2 Philosophic Synthesis

Zhu Xi erected a philosophical synthesis that has been comparedbroadly to the systems of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Whitehead,and others. These “Great Chain” systems are hierarchicaland rooted in the distinction between form and matter. Recentimmanental readings of Zhu Xi’s thought have stirred comparisonswith Spinoza and even Husserl (Choi 1999; Yeo 2013). Zhu Xi preservedthe immanental character of his hierarchy by incorporating ZhouDunyi’s conception of world (and self) as shown intheDiagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taiji tu), as away to combine the Cheng brothers’ concept ofli(pattern) with Zhang Zai’s notion ofqi (cosmic vapor)as organically integrated in a holistic system. In Zhou’streatise,Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity(Taiji tu shuo) (Adler 2014), Zhu discerned a viable accountof the formation of the world in stages from the originalunformedqi, toyin andyang, the fivephases, earth, wood, fire, water, and metal, and on to heaven, earthand the ten thousand things. Zhu blended this conception with ideasfrom theBook of Change and its commentaries in setting fortha comprehensive philosophy of cosmic and human creativity andproviding philosophical grounds for the received Confucian concepts ofhuman nature and self-cultivation.

Zhu Xi’s penchant for thinking in polarities,liandqi, in particular, has continued to stir critics toregard him as a dualist who used two fundamental concepts to explainreality. For his part, any viable account of the complexity ofphenomena must involve two or more facets in order to register theircomplexity, variety, and changes. Zhu generalized the organicunderstanding ofli andqi implied in ZhouDunyi’sExplanation under a principle ofcomplementarity, inspired by Cheng Hao’s observation that allthings have their complement (discussed in the next section). Atfirst, Zhu thought this principle only governedqi phenomenaas patterned byli, but eventually he admitted that not onlywereyin andyang paradigmatic polar complements butthat the supreme polarity (taiji) complementedtheyin-yang polarity, and inferred thatliandqi, as the references oftaijiandyin-yang, respectively, too had to be complements. Thismeant thatli andqi were functionally on a par andmutually implicative. Zhu still felt the need toprioritizeli ontologically and ethically, however, for thereason thatli underwrites both the possibilityofqi ordering (to yield a world and phenomena) and thepossibility of moral feelings and norms (to yield ethics and a systemof rites). Treatingli andqi as full ontologicalcomplements would quite possibly entail a Daoist conception of natureas pure spontaneity and ethics as just perspectival whileprioritizingqi overli would be inadequate forunderstanding the world and phenomenal orders, and reduce ethics tothe received norms.

5. Complementarity betweenli andqi, and among related terms

Recognizingli andqi as complements serves tounderscore their unity in difference and their implicatedness in notjust the forms but in the flow of events comprising theworld.^[18]This complementary relationship, moreover, underscores the basicholism and power of Zhu’s thought regarding the formation ofthe world and things.

Zhu Xi was inspired by Cheng Hao’s formulation of theprinciple of complementarity which he placed prominently in sec. 1 ofthe Neo-Confucian anthology,Reflections on Things at Hand(par. 25):

Master Cheng Hao said: Theli of heaven,earth and the myriad things is that nothing exists in isolation;everything certainly has its opposite/complement. This isspontaneously so and not artificially arranged. When I reflect on thistruth late at night, I feel delighted as if my hands were waving andmy feet were dancing. (based on Chan 1967, edited)

Zhu Xi regards this complementary pattern asdescribing the most fundamental ordering tendency of cosmos,phenomena, and self. Notably, this isli (pattern) in a newsense, now more as apattern of creative intercourse thanjust as inherent patterning or order. It generalizes the significanceoftaiji, though itprima facielackstaiji’s insistent implication ofliintoqi intercourse and derived phenomena. Zhu remarks thatCheng Hao felt delighted about his insight into thislibecause,

once he had grasped deeply the truth that,“nothing exists in isolation but certainly has itsopposite/complement,” it seemed to him marvelous andjoyous. (based on Chan 1967, edited)

Zhuzi yulei (Classified Dialogues of MasterZhu),juan 95, contains Zhu’s discussions with studentson this Cheng Hao quotation. As mentioned, Zhu usually construes thisas ali pattern underlying the complementary relationshipsamongqi phenomena, whichli itself transcends,hence implying a vertical bifurcation betweenliandqi. When a disciple asks Zhu whether the complementshave to be “things” or whether, “Li toocould have a complement?” The Master replies,

As to the categories of above and below, small andgreat, clear and turbid, they also pertain tothings. But, ifwe were to say, “having the above, there must be the below;having the large, there must be the small”, that would be purelya matter ofli, that is to say ithas to be likethis, as a sort of logical necessity. For example, in nature’sproduction of things, there cannot only beyin, there mustalso beyang; there cannot only beyang, there mustalso beyin. These [yin andyang] aremutual complements. The contexts of these complements are notthemselves complementaryli. Rather, theli are thevery reason by which there are thesecomplements. (trans. by the author)

Zhu also applies thislipattern creatively to number, speech, objects, and games. Accordingto this pattern, “One complements two”, “aboveforms” complements “within forms”. Any word willbear its semantic complementwithin.^[19]And, this object before your eyes has its complements of back, front,top, and bottom. Moreover, each side has its complement…. Anysingle thing bears its complementwithin.^[20]For example, the paths on a checkerboard form series of complementarypairs. In the end, when only one path remains open and it seems thatno other complement remains, this very path still complements the 360other paths.^[21] This is called a one-many complement, likethe Way-implement complement” (Zhuziyulei,juan 95).

At the same time, Zhu hesitates to accept thatliandqi themselves are complementary, but this primarilyreflects his ethical concerns.^[22] On the ontological side, he eventually doesaffirm thatli andqi are complementary by saying:

As to what would be the complementoftaiji, it is said thattaiji iswuji(free of polarity)….Taiji alsocomplementsyin-yang…. [Regarding] the Way above formsand… utensil within forms… these are‘horizontaloppositions’…. (trans. by the author)

This is just like,

having the tranquility of the pre-aroused emotionsof pleasure and anger, grief and joy, there is the harmony of theseemotions when aroused in duedegree. (trans. by the author)

Taiji andwuji are opposed, apparentlycontradictory, expressions. Signifying the most basiccomplementarity, namely, that betweenyinandyang,taiji is the most primitive and originalform ofli. It is quintessentialli, or elementaryform (patterning). Signifying something unbounded and free ofpolarity,wuji describes the unformed primalqiwhenceyin andyang emerge throughthetaiji impulse. It is quintessentialqi, purepotentiality. Hence, Zhou Dunyi’s proposition, “Wujier taiji” (Free from polarity, and yet the supremepolarity), expresses the identity of opposites (liandqi) that gives rise to the initial impulse ofphenomena.^[23]In the next step of this impulse,yin andyang areformed. They complementtaiji as pure energy to pure form,thus expressing another dimension of theli-qicomplementarity.

Although the distinction between “above forms” and“within forms” does not strictly mark the distinctionbetweenli andqi; nevertheless, as the wayiscorrelated with li, and implement is embodiedqi,their “horizontal complementarity” implies asimilar pattern forli andqi. Strikingly, whereasthose who take this above-below forms distinction as“metaphysical” and “physical” would have todescribe the opposition as “vertical”, Zhu saysplainly that it ishorizontal, thus imputing a closer, moreinteractive relationship between these complements than could obtainhad their relationship been strictly vertical.

A final reason why Zhu Xi’s ideas ofliandqi ought to be taken as horizontal and not verticalcomplements, that is, as a complex unity and not as a metaphysicalduality, is found when Zhu makes two seemingly contradictory claimsaboutli andqi: (1)Li is priortoqi. 2)Li is not present apart fromqiformations. Whereas 1) is usually regarded as a positive metaphysicalclaim, it means rather thatli in this sense refers to“permanent possibilities ofqi formation”. Forexample, for any particularqi formation to have come about,it had to have been possible for theqi constituents tocombine in that particular way to yield those properties andcapacities.^[24] Whereas (2) is often taken to meanthatli subsist until instantiated, it means ratherthatli are the patterning of real processes and things;they exist immanently in processes and things, though they can beanalyzed and discussed separately from their real contexts. This iswhy, methodologically, Zhu insists that learners acquaint themselveswith theli of things, processes, affairs, ethics, etc., byexamining actual things, processes, phenomena, etc. He regards thestudy ofli in abstraction from phenomena to be wooden,hollow, empty, etc. Hence, Zhu’s claims (1) and (2) and hismethodological strategy all indicate that, for him, the relation ofcomplementarity betweenli andqi is essentiallyhorizontal.

The “li” pattern in the Cheng Hao quotationthus turns out to be a “meta-li”aboutthe dynamicli-qi complements that originate and comprise theworld and its constituents, that is, as a second-order abstractionfrom theli andqi that are actually implicated inphenomena. Again, this meta-li confirms the basic unity anddynamism of Zhu’sli-qi system. It reveals the pulse oflife at the heart ofli and affirms the possibilities of formin the vagaries ofqi movement. It enlivens Zhu’ssystem and makes it flexible and conceptually adaptable to experienceand thinking.

We may reflect that Zhu’s original notion ofli aspattern involves restrictions that conflict with experience orexpression, so he reconfigures it in light of ZhouDunyi’sExplanation of the Diagram of the SupremePolarity and the Cheng Haoquotation.^[25] To work as intended,li has totolerate and express simultaneous assertions of“contradictory” complementary terms. At the same time,this reconfiguration marks a step away from primarily immanentalaesthetic pattern of theli conception toamore abstract, more self-consciouslymeta-pattern.

6. Major Interpreters of Zhu Xi

Zhu Xi was an active scholar-intellectual who held discussions anddisputes with other scholars, both in correspondence and inperson. His thought can be understood by contrast with the thought ofhis intellectual rivals as well as through his positive views. Forexample, his series of letters with Zhang Shi on the topic ofself-cultivation and moral psychology, preserved in theCollectedWritings of Master Zhu (Zhuzi wenji), provides anilluminating record of these two dedicated Confucians’ quest fora well-grounded, efficacious approach to self-cultivation. He debatedwith Lü Zuqian (1134–1181) on the nature of education. Zhufocused on the Confucian Way and moral practice in education while Luargued for a broader-based humanities approach. Zhu held a series ofdebates with Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan: 1139–93) on the nature ofrealization and moral conduct. Whereas Zhu advocated regimens ofstudy, reflection, observation, and practice, Lu spoke simply ofreflecting on self and clarifying the mind, considering that once themind was clear one would know spontaneously what to do in anysituation. Zhu also corresponded with the “utilitarian”Confucian scholar Chen Liang (1143–94), who disputed Zhu’sfocus on individual moral realization and the received“Way” with a broader institutional approach that was moresensitive to empirical facts and conditions. Zhu generally eclipsedall of the other scholars of his day, partly because he outlived themand had so many students but mainly because his system was socompelling. It was comprehensive yet nuanced, tightly reasoned yetaccommodating of individual differences. It preserved the essentialConfucian Way, yet ramified it to meet the challenges of Buddhism andDaoism as spiritual teachings. Zhu’s influence rose at the endof the Southern Song dynasty and became decisive during the Yuandynasty when his edition of theFour Books was adopted as thebasis of the imperial examination system arranged by scholars trainedin his approach.

While raising his standing in pedagogy, this focus on theFourBooks came at the expense of Zhu’s deeper, more nuancedtexts and dialogues, and opened the door to undue philosophiccriticism. The schematic presentation of Zhu’s cosmic theoryofli pattern andqi cosmic vapor that lay in thebackground of his commentary to theFour Books easily openedhim to charges of dualism and of reading abstract categories into thedown to earth, essentially practical ancient texts. Because hiscommentary was focused on reading and understanding the meaning,intent, and cultivation message of theFour Books, criticsgeneralized that Zhu and his method were essentially scholastic andwould be myopic and stilted in facing real situations. Anyone whoperuses the corpus of Zhu’s writings and dialogues, however,will find that his ontology is not a crude dualism but a holism builtof complementary, mutually implicative elements that never exist inseparation. Also, his reflections are always informed by knowledge ofhistory, current events, practical observation, and personalreflection, as his method of observation applies generally to objects(and self) and phenomena while respecting texts, which he took to behandbooks of ethical insight and practice, after all. Even Zhu’scomments on Confucius and Mencius often refer back to the person andthe speech context, and thus are not entirely scholastic. His methodof observation opened the door to breakthroughs beyond the“verities” of the classics, though he was careful not toplay up this fact because most of his intellectual colleaguesprimarily sought the truth in the texts, thinking empirical facts weredistractions from the essential Natural-patterning (tianli)that was reflected most adequately in the canonical texts.

Whereas early generations of Zhu’s followers were acquaintedwith his broad learning, incisive style, and open spirit, Confuciansof the Ming and Qing dynasties knew him mostly through his edition oftheFour Books, through which they targeted their criticismsof his thought. Zhu’s most eminent critic was the Mingscholar-official Wang Yangming (1472–1529). He rejectedZhu’s approach to observation as too objective and open-ended,as outward and diffuse rather than inward and concentrated. It couldbe said that, in his criticisms, Wang was reacting more to thescholastic attitudes fostered by the examination system than to Zhu Xihimself. Wang ultimately respected Zhu and went on to compile a textin which he attempted to show that in later life Zhu had changed hisapproach in a subjective, practical way that anticipated Wang’sapproach.

Scholars of the late Ming through the early Qing period(mid-seventeenth to early eighteenth century), notably, Wang Fuzhi(1619–92) and Dai Zhen (Tai Chen, 1723–77), disputed Zhuon philosophical and textual grounds. Whereas Zhu had insisted on thepriority of “pattern” overqi, (roughly, formover matter), Wang and Dai followed the Northern Song thinker ZhangZai in affirming the priority ofqi, viewing patternsasa posteriori evolutionary realizations ofqiinteractions. They thought this account dissolved the threat of anyhint of dualism in cosmology, ontology, and human nature. For hispart, Zhu Xi would have responded that, fundamentally,“pattern” is implicated in the very make-up and possibleconfigurations ofqi, which is why the regularaposteriori patterns can emerge.Li“patterning” provides for the standing orders andprocesses, based on the steady interactions ofyin-yang, fivephases, etc., that give rise to the heaven-earth world order, with itsfull complement of ten thousand things. The fundamentalapriori patterns are necessary to the world order and provide thefecund context in which thea posteriori forms emergecontinuously. Wang and Dai’sqi-based view could notaccount for existence and the variegated yet systematic given worldorder in this sense. At the same time, Zhu did not think that“patterns” were absolutely determinative. They just setcertain “possibilities of order” that are realized whenthe necessaryqi conditions obtained. For the most part, heregistered the range of randomness and free flow inqiactivity that is best exemplified in the randomness of weather systemsand seismic events.

As to textual grounds, Wang and Dai argued that Zhu was so enamoredof his metaphysics of pattern andqi that he constantly readthem into the classical texts. For example, Dai said Zhu blandlyassociated Confucius’ termtian (heaven) with his ownnotion ofli (pattern), quotingAnalects 11:9 whereConfucius, in sorrow over the death of his disciple Yan Hui, criedthat “Heaven had forsaken” him. Dai asked, Could Zhureasonably claim that Confucius was crying thatli hadforsaken him? Critics tend to find Dai’s counter-intuitiveexample against Zhu’s approach to be compelling. However,consulting Zhu’s original commentary, we find that he noted thatthis phrase was not literally about heaven but rather expressedConfucius’ utmost sorrow, that Confucius felt Yan Hui’sdeath as if it was his own son’s, without mentioning“pattern”. This example does not support Wang andDai’s claim in the least. It illustrates that Zhu’scommentary was nuanced and sensitive to pragmatic, situational usagesdespite his penchant to see his own notion of “pattern” insome of Confucius’ usages of “heaven”. Moreover, asthe intellectual historian Daniel Gardner shows, Zhu’scommentary was not intended as simply a glossary with comments. It wasintended as a guide to self-cultivation. Hence, Zhu sometimes recastpassages in theAnalects more generally to show their broaderimplications for self-cultivation and realization, often with theisolated countryside student in mind. Gardner shows how Zhu hadeffectively enriched the text as a tool for self-cultivation whereasearlier commentaries of the Han and Tang dynasties had just givenglosses necessary for answering examination questions.

Known in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the West dueto the work of Jesuits in China, Zhu Xi’s thought and texts weremade more widely available to western scholarship in the latenineteenth century. Notably, James Legge (1815–1897) based histranslations of the Chinese Classics on Zhu Xi’s commentaries,which he quoted and discussed in his footnotes to the texts. Early inthe twentieth century, a Chinese student of John Dewey(1859–1951) at Cornell, Hu Shi (1891–1962), initiallyfollowed the empirical, textual Qing scholars in viewing Zhu as ascholastic metaphysician. But, after readingZhu’sDialogues in old age, Hu contended thatZhu’s method of observation was not scholastic but essentiallyscientific in nature. J.P. Bruce, who translated a book of Zhu’scollected writings in the 1920s, viewed Zhu’s notionofli (pattern; principle) in light of Stoic naturallaw. From the 1930s, the eminent historian of Chinese philosophy, FengYoulan, interpretedli along the lines of platonic Formsmaking Zhu Xi appear to be an idealist and abstract thinker. In the1950s, Carsun Chang naturalized the notion ofli by aligningit with the Aristotelian “nature” or“essence”, thereby locking Zhu’s thought into a sortof rigid descriptive metaphysics.

From the 1960s, Mou Zongsan interpreted and criticized Zhu’sontology and ethics on Kantian grounds, claiming Zhu had erectedana priori framework but then illicitly sought to derivefurthera priori knowledge (of patterns) byaposteriori means (observation). In the 1970s, the intellectualhistorian, Qian Mu examined and explained Zhu Xi’s thoughtdirectly in traditional indigenous terms, without reading westernconcepts and logical patterns into his system. Scholars wanting toread Zhu Xi on his own terms, largely unmediated by western thought,turn to the five volume Zhu Xi anthology edited by Qian Mu as a richstarting point.

In 1956, Joseph Needham, a chemist, made a significant breakthroughby interpreting Zhu’s system in terms of a process philosophy,Whitehead’s organic naturalism. Needham successfully recastmuch of Zhu’s language in naturalistic rather than metaphysicalterms. The cultural, moral dimension of Needham’s account hasbeen developed by Cheng-ying Cheng and John Berthrong while thescientific dimension has been examined by Yung Sik Kim. In the 1980s,A.C. Graham offered the most insightful and apt account ofZhu’s terminology and pattern of thought in, “What WasNew in the Ch’eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?” and otherwritings. Graham showed decisively that the termli refersto an embedded contextual “pattern”, rather than to anysort of abstract form or principle. He reminded us that thetermli never figures in propositions or logical sequences,as would be natural for “principle”. Rather,liare always conceived as structuring, balancing, modulating, guidingphenomena, processes, reflection and human discernment and response.For example, one never finds moral syllogisms in Zhu Xi’swritings. Many of Zhu’s discussions thus concern moralemotional intelligence: attunement, sensitivity, discernment, andresponse. Joseph Adler viewsli as indicative of an“ordering” tendency that may be manifested as“pattern” or as “principle” in differingcontexts. (We might say that people devise principles in the light ofobserved patterns.) Adler also examines the key roles played bytheBook of Change and Zhou Dunyi in the formation ofZhu’s thought, and joins Thomas Wilson and Hoyt Tillman inshowing the extent to which Zhu Xi re-visioned, revised, and recastthe Confucian Way. Adler shows how Zhu Xi made Zhou Dunyi a pivotalfigure in the succession of the Confucian Way while Wilson isinterested in Zhu’s account of the Way as a sort ofeducational-ideological revision, and Tillman is interested in howZhu’s account of the Way eventually outlasted other competingversions that might have offered more practical and liberal openingsin late imperial China.

In summary, the depth and range of Zhu Xi’s thought wereunparalleled in the Chinese intellectual tradition and around EastAsia. Zhu Xi studies globally continue to be vital, wide-ranging, andcontentious, and to attract increasing interest around the world.

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• Zhu Xi texts on Gutenberg (in Chinese)
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• “Opposition in ChineseThought”, B.W. van Norden.

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