Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive

Panentheism

First published Thu Dec 4, 2008; substantive revision Sat Jun 3, 2017

“Panentheism” is a constructed word composed of theEnglish equivalents of the Greek terms “pan”, meaning all,“en”, meaning in, and “theism”, meaning God.Panentheism considers God and the world to be inter-related with theworld being in God and God being in the world. It offers anincreasingly popular alternative to both traditional theism andpantheism. Panentheism seeks to avoid either isolating God from theworld as traditional theism often does or identifying God with theworld as pantheism does. Traditional theistic systems emphasize thedifference between God and the world while panentheism stressesGod’s active presence in the world and the world’sinfluence upon God. Pantheism emphasizes God’s presence in theworld but panentheism maintains the identity and significance of thenon-divine. Anticipations of panentheistic understandings of God haveoccurred in both philosophical and theological writings throughouthistory (Hartshorne and Reese 1953; J. Cooper, 2006). However, a richdiversity of panentheistic understandings has developed in the pasttwo centuries primarily in Christian traditions responding toscientific thought (Clayton and Peacocke 2004a). While panentheismgenerally emphasizes God’s presence in the world without losingthe distinct identity of either God or the world, specific forms ofpanenethism, drawing from different sources, explain the nature of therelationship of God to the world in a variety of ways and come todifferent conclusions about the nature of the significance of theworld for the identity of God.

1. Terminology

Because modern “panentheism” developed under the influenceof German Idealism, Whiteheadian process philosophy, and currentscientific thought, panentheists employ a variety of terms withmeanings that have specialized content.

Theological terms as understood by panentheists:

1. Classical Theism: The understanding that ultimate reality is a being which isdistinct from the world and any other reality. This distinction attimes develops into an ontological separation between God and theworld that makes any interaction between God and the worldproblematic.
2. Pantheism: A type of theism that stresses the identity of God and the worldontologically. This identity is expressed in different manifestationsso distinctions can be made, but the distinctions are temporary. Thereis often a strong sense of necessity in God’s creation of theworld so that God as God must express deity in creation.
3. Transcendence: Generally, God’s externality to the world so that God isunlimited by any other being or reality. Hegel and then Hartshorneunderstand transcendence as including all that is in order to avoidany reality external to God that limits God.
4. Immanence: God’s presence and activity within the world. Panentheistsassert that traditional theism limits its affirmation of God’simmanence by understanding immanence as the transcendent presence ofthe supernatural Being within the natural realm. When this divinepresence is understood as distinctively transcendent, God’spresence and activity within the world as natural occurs as anintervention of the supernatural within the natural. God, then, isunaffected by the world and absent from the natural except in specificcases of intervention.
5. Kenosis: Divine self-emptying, or withdrawal, of divine attributes.Traditionally, the choice to limit the exercise of the divineattributes resulted from the divine will whether in the case ofJesus’ human life or in God’s relation to thecreation.
6. Essential Kenosis: God’s nature is self-giving and other-empowering. Thomas J.Oord’s concept of essential kenosis bases the emptying of divineattributes on the divine nature rather than the divine will (Oord2015, 158–166).

Terms influenced by the German Idealism of Hegel and Schelling:

1. Dialectic: The presence of contradictory realities where the contradictionis overcome by including elements from each of the contradictoryelements in a synthesis that is more than the combination of eachmember of the contradiction. Whitehead’s understanding ofGod’s redemption of evil by placing an evil event in a contrastto a good event expresses a similar understanding although he is notas explicit as Hegel in understanding all of reality as a dialecticaldevelopment.
2. Infinite: The obvious understanding of the infinite is as a negation of anylimits such as a bounded space or time. However, many panentheists,and other thinkers (Williams 2010, 143), understand the infinite in apositive sense as the inclusion of all that is and that might be(Clayton 2008a, 152). Panentheists influenced by process philosophyemphasize that divine infinity deals with possibility not actuality(Dombrowski 2013, 253, and Keller 2014, 80. In the processunderstanding, God contains all possibilities and presents everypossible response that an actual event might make to any events fromthe past that influence what that event becomes.
3. Perichoresis: The ontological intermingling of the divine and human natures inChrist and the members of the Trinity (Otto 2001). This concept ofintermingling has also been utilized to describe the Incarnation andthe relationship between God and individuals/creation. Moltmanngeneralizes perichoresis to the cosmic realm by affirming the presenceof God in the world and the world in God.

Terms influenced by Whiteheadian process philosophy:

1. Internal and External Relations: Internal relations are relations that affect the being of therelated beings. External relations do not change the basic nature oressence of a being. For panentheism, the relationship between God andthe world is an internal relationship in that God affects the natureof the world and the world changes the nature of God. Classical theismaffirms an external relationship between God and the world in thatGod’s actions affect the world but the world does not changeGod’s essence, necessary existence, or basic nature.
2. Dipolar: Refers especially to God as having two basic aspects. Schellingidentified these aspects as necessary and contingent. Whiteheadreferred to God’s primordial and consequent natures meaning thatGod has an eternal nature and a responsive nature. Whiteheadunderstood all reality to be dipolar in that each event includes bothphysical and mental aspects in opposition to a mind-body dualism.Hartshorne identified these aspects as abstract and concrete.

Terms related to current scientific thought:

1. Dualism: While dualism may refer to a variety of pairs of opposites, inscientific thought and process philosophy dualism refers to theposition that consciousness and matter are fundamentally differentsubstances, or kinds of stuff. Panentheists generally reject thedualism of consciousness and matter (Clayton 2004c, 3). As analternative, paenentheists tend to affirm that consciousness andmatter are different manifestations of a basic ontological unity. Thisbasic ontological unity may take the form of panpsychism,panphyschism, in which all actualities include an element ofmentality. Griffin prefers the term “panexperientialism”because all actualities have an experiential component (2004, 44-45).Clayton takes an alternative approach to overcome theconsciousness-material dualism by advocating strong emergence in whichontologically different types of existence develop out of the basicontological unity (2004, 3-6). Leidenhag identifies difficulties witheach of these approaches (2016).
2. Reductionism: The properties of one scientific domain consists of properties ofa more elementary scientific domain (Kim 2005, 164). Modernreductionism primarily holds that all of reality can be explained byusing only physical, sub-atomic, entities and denies the existence ofmental realities as a separate kind of existence. Any reference to ahigher type of existence results from a lack of information about thephysical entities that are involved. Modern reductionism denies theexistence of mental realities as a separate type of existence.Causation always moves from the bottom-up, from the basic physicalentities to higher forms of organization. For example, thought iscaused by the physical components of the brain. Reductionism allowsfor weak emergence but not strong emergence and top-down causation(Davies 2006, 37). Panentheism critiques reductionism as anoversimplification of reality and the experience of reality.
3. Supervenience: Generally refers to a relation between properties. Popular usagerefers to one property depending on another property such as mindbeing a quality that supervenes on physical structures. Analyticphilosophy instead emphasizes a logical relation between classes ofproperties with a variety of understandings of the nature of therelationship (Leuenberger 2008 and McLaughlin and Bennett 2014).
4. Emergence: Emergence, as a process involved in supervenience, occurs when anew property arises out of a combination of elements. The traditionalexample is that water emerges out of the combination of oxygen andhydrogen atoms in certain proportions. There are a variety of types ofemergence that have been identified. In part-whole emergence, thewhole is more than the total of all the parts (Corning 2002). Strongemergence understands evolution to produce new and distinct levelscharacterized by their own laws or regularities and causal forces.Weak emergence holds that the new level follows the fundamental causalprocesses of physics (Clayton 2004c, 9). Strong emergence is alsoknown as ontological emergence and weak as epistemological emergence.Many panentheists attach an emergentist sense to supervenience inwhich higher level properties have downward causation from thesupervenient property to the underlying property (Clayton 2006a,26-27, but see Leidenhag 2016 for a critique of attaching a strongemergence concept to supervenience).
5. Top-Down Causation: More complex levels of objects or events affect less complexelements. A common example of top-down causation is the effect ofthought upon a person’s body. This contrasts with bottom-upcausation where the simple is the cause of the more complex. Inbottom-up causation, physical elements cause other, more complex,objects or events. Scientists heatedly debate the possibility oftop-down causation (Davies 2006).
6. Entanglement: In quantum theory, the correlation of two particles that originatein a single event even though separated from each other by significantdistance. Entangled objects behave in ways that cannot be predicted onthe basis of their individual properties. The impossibility ofprediction can be understood epistemically if behavior is consideredthe result of an average of many similar measurements or ontologicallyif behavior results from the existence of the world in an indefinitestate prior to measurement. Both Bohr’s indeterministic andBohm’s deterministic understandings of quantum theory acceptthis relational understanding of physical processes. Understanding theworld as persistent relationships that continue even during separationprovides a model based in science for understanding God’srelation to the world. God’s influence can be present at thelevel of individual events although this entanglement would remainhidden from a local perspective. However, the implications ofentanglement for concepts of causality become even more complex whenconsidering the relation between God and the world. Polkinghornesuggests that causality may be active information,“pattern-forming operations” of what might be called“the causal principle”, rather than an exchange of energy(2010, 9).

Although numerous meanings have been attributed to the“in” in panentheism (Clayton 2004, 253), the moresignificant meanings are:

1. Locative meaning: Location that is included in a broader location. For example,something may be located in a certain part of a certain room. Such ameaning is problematic in reference to God because of the commonunderstanding that God is not limited by spatial categories. Ifspatial categories do not apply to God in ordinary usage, to saysomething is located in God becomes problematic. “In” thentakes on metaphysical meanings.
2. Metaphysical basis for being: Beings come into existence and continue to exist due to thepresence of divine Being. The concept of participation in bothclassical theism and panentheism often includes the understanding thatthe world comes into being and continues to exist through taking partin God’s Being (Clayton 2008, 118–119).
3. Metaphysical-Epistemological basis for being: Presence in God provides both identity and being. KarlKrause’s panentheism asserted a metaphysical structure thatinvolved both how an entity differs from other entities(epistemological identity) and what it is in itself (ontologicalstatus) (Göcke 2013a).
4. Metaphysical interactive potential: Neither God’s actions nor the world are completelydetermined. This lack of complete determination leads to anunpredictable self-organizing relation of both God and the world basedon prior actualizations of each. “The ‘en’designates an active indeterminacy, a commingling of unpredictable,and yet recaputulatory, self-organizing relations” (Keller 2003,219).
5. Emergence metaphor: A more complex entity comes from at least a partial source.
6. Mind/Body analogical meaning: The mind provides structure and direction to the organization ofthe organism of the body. The world is God’s body in the sensethat the world actualizes God as specifically who God is and manifestsGod while different from God. Many, but not all, panentheists utilizethe mind/body analogy to describe the God/world relation in a mannerthat emphasizes the immanence of God without loss of God’stranscendence.
7. Part/Whole analogical meaning: A particular exists in relation to something that is greater anddifferent from any of its parts and the total sum of the parts. Theworld is in God because the world shares in the greater unity ofGod’s being and action.

2. History

Although Karl Krause (1781–1832) appears to be the first to usethe explicit label of “panentheism” (Gregersen 2004, 28),Schelling used the phrase “Pan+en+theism” in hisEssayon Freedom in 1809 before Krause used “panentheism” in1829 (Clayton 2010, 183). However, various advocates and critics ofpanentheism find evidence of incipient or implicit forms ofpanentheism present in religious thought as early as 1300 BCE.Hartshorne discovers the first indication of panentheistic themes inIkhnaton (1375–1358 BCE), the Egyptian pharaoh often consideredthe first monotheist. In his poetic description of the sun god,Ikhnaton avoids both the separation of God from the world that willcharacterize traditional theism and the identification of God with theworld that will characterize pantheism (Hartshorne 1953, 29–30).Early Vedantic thought implies panentheism in non-Advaita forms thatunderstand non-dualism as inclusive of differences. Although there aretexts referring to Brahman as contracted and identical to Brahman,other texts speak of Brahman as expanded. In these texts, the perfectincludes and surpasses the total of imperfect things as anappropriation of the imperfect. Although not the dominantinterpretation of theUpanishads, multiple intimations ofpanentheism are present in theUpanishads (Whittemore 1988,33, 41–44). Hartshorne finds additional religious concepts ofGod that hold the unchanging and the changing together in a way thatallows for the development and significance of the non-divine inLao-Tse (fourth century BCE) and in the Judeo-Christian scriptures(1953, 32–38).

In philosophical reflection, Plato (427/428–348/347 BCE) plays arole in the development of implicit panentheism although there isdisagreement about the nature of that role. Hartshorne drew a dipolarunderstanding of God that includes both immutability and mutabilityfrom Plato. Hartshorne understood Plato’s concept of the divineto include the Forms as pure and unchanging being and the World soulas changing and in motion. Although he concluded that Plato neverreconciled these two elements in his understanding of the divine, bothaspects were present (1953, 54). J. Cooper, instead, maintains thatPlato retained an essential distinction between the Good and the otherbeings that Plato called gods. According to J. Cooper, Plotinus(204–270 CE) rather than Plato provided the basis forpanentheism with his description of the physical world as an emanationof being from the One making the world part of the Ultimate (2006,35–39). However, Baltzly finds evidence in theTimaeusof a polytheistic view that can be identified as panentheistic(2010).

From Plato to Schelling (1775–1854 CE), various theologians andphilosophers developed ideas that are similar to themes incontemporary panentheism. These ideas developed as expressions oftraditional theism. Proclus (412–485 CE) and Pseudo-Dionysus(late Fifth to early Sixth century) drawing upon Plotinus developedperspectives in which the world came from God and understood therelationship between God and the world as a dialectical relationshipin which the world came from God and returned to God. (J. Cooper 2006,42–46). In the Middle Ages, the influence of Neoplatonismcontinued in the thought of Eriugena (815–877 CE), Eckhart(1260–1328 CE), Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464 CE), andBoehme (1575–1624 CE). Although accused of pantheism by theircontemporaries, their systems can be identified as panentheisticbecause they understood God in various ways as including the worldrather than being the world and because they used a dialecticalmethod. The dialectical method involved the generation of oppositesand then the reconciliation of the opposition in God. This retainedthe distinct identity of God in God’s influence of the world (J.Cooper 2006, 47–62). During the early modern period, Bruno(1548–1600 CE) and Spinoza (1631–1677 CE) responded to thedualism of traditional theism by emphasizing the relationship betweenGod and the world to the point that the nature of any ontologicaldistinction between God and the world became problematic. Laterthinkers such as the Cambridge Platonists (Seventeenth century),Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758 CE) (Crisp 2009), and FriedrichSchleiermacher (1768–1834 CE) thought of the world as in someway in God or a development from God. Although they did not stress theontological distinction between God and the world, they did emphasizethe responsive relationship that humans have to God. Humanresponsiveness assumed some degree of human initiative if not freedom,which indicates some distinction between God and humans. Theassumption of some degree of human initiative was a reaction againstthe loss of freedom due to Spinoza’s close identificationbetween God and the world (J. Cooper 2006, 64–90).

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the development ofpanentheism as a specific position regarding God’s relationshipto the world. The awareness of panentheism as an alternative to theismand pantheism developed out of a complex of approaches. Philosophicalidealism and philosophical adaptation of the scientific concept ofevolution provided the basic sources of the explicit position ofpanentheism. Philosophical approaches applying the concept ofdevelopment to God reached their most complete expression in processphilosophy’s understanding of God being affected by the eventsof the world.

Hegel (1770–1831) and Schelling (1775–1854) sought toretain the close relationship between God and the world that Spinozaproposed without identifying God with the world. Their concept of Godas developing in and through the world provided the means foraccomplishing this. Prior to this time, God had been understood asunchanging and the world as changing while existing in God (J. Cooper2006, 90). Schelling’s understanding of God as personal providedthe basis for the unity of the diversity in the world in a manner thatwas more open than Hegel’s understanding. Schelling emphasizedthe freedom of the creatures in relation to the necessity ofGod’s nature as love. For Schelling, God’s free unfoldingof God’s internal subjective necessity did not result in anexternal empirical necessity determining the world (Clayton 2000,474). This relationship resulted in vitality and on-going development.Hartshorne classified this as a dipolar understanding of God in thatGod is both necessary and developing (1953, 234). J. Cooper describesSchelling’s thought as dynamic cooperative panentheism (2006,95). Hegel found Schelling inadequate and sought a greater unity forthe diversity. He united Fichte’s subjective idealism andSchelling’s objective idealism to provide a metaphysics ofsubjectivity rather than substance (Clayton 2008a, 125). Hegel’sunification of Fichte and Schelling resulted in a more comprehensiveand consistent system still based upon change in God. God as well asnature is characterized by dialectical development. In his rejectionof pantheism, Hegel understood the infinite as including the finite byabsorbing the finite into its own fuller nature. This retained divinetranscendence in the sense of the divine surpassing its parts althoughnot separate from the parts (Whittemore 1960, 141–142). Thedivine transcendence provided unity through the development of theAbsolute through history. Karl Krause (1781–1832) in 1828labeled Schelling’s and Hegel’s positions as“panentheism” in order to emphasize their differences fromSpinoza’s identification of God with the world (Reese 2008, 1).J. Cooper describes Hegel’s panentheism as dialecticalhistorical panentheism (2006, 107).

As Darwin’s theory of evolution introduced history into theconceptualization of biology, Samuel Alexander (1859–1938),Henri Bergson (1859–1941), and C. Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936)introduced development into the ways in which all of physical realitywas conceptualized. They then worked out positions that in a varietyof ways understood God and the world as growing in relationship toeach other. Although Hartshorne’s classification of“panentheism” did not include Alexander in the category of“panentheism,” only occasionally mentioned Bergson, andmade no reference to Morgan, Whitehead referred to all three of thesethinkers positively. Although it may be too strong to claim that theyinfluenced Whitehead (Emmett 1992), they did provide the backgroundfor Whitehead’s and then Hartshorne’s systematicdevelopment of process philosophy as an expression of panentheism.Hartshorne popularized the modern use of the term“panentheism” and considered Whitehead to be theoutstanding panentheist (Hartshorne 1953, 273). Although Hartshornemade several modifications to Whitehead’s understanding of God,the basic structures of Whitehead’s thought were continued inHartshorne’s further development of Whitehead’s philosophy(Ford 1973, Cobb 1965). God, for process philosophy, is necessary forany actual world. Without God, the world would be nothing more than anunchanging existence radically different from the actual world ofexperience. God as both eternal and temporal provides possibilitiesthat call the world to change and develop. God as eternal provides anactual source of those possibilities. However, if God is only eternal,the possibilities would be unrelated to the actual world as itpresently exists. Thus, Whitehead and Hartshorne understand the worldto be present in God in order for the possibilities that lead todevelopment to be related to the world (Hartshorne 1953, 273). Theimplication of God’s inclusion of the world is that God ispresent to the world and the world influences God. Although thepresence of the world in God could be understood as a form ofpantheism, process philosophy avoids collapsing the world into God orGod into the world by maintaining a distinction between God and theworld. This distinction is manifest in the eternality of God and thetemporality of the world. It is also apparent in the freedom of theevents in the world. Although God presents possibilities to the eventsin the world, each event “decides” how it will actualizethose possibilities. The freedom of each event, the absence of divinedetermination, provides a way for process thought to avoid God beingthe cause of evil or containing evil as evil. Since God includes theevents of the world, God will include the evil as well as the goodthat occurs in the world and this evil will affect God since the worldaffects God’s actualization. But, because God does not determinethe response of each event to the possibilities that God presents, anyevent may reject God’s purpose of good through theintensification of experience and actualize a less intense experience.God does take this less intense, evil, experience into God’sself, but redeems that evil by means of relating it to the ways inwhich good has been actualized. Thus, God saves what can be saved fromthe world rather than simply including each event in isolation fromother events (J. Cooper 2006, 174, 180).

3. Contemporary Expressions

Protestant theologians have contributed to recent developments ofpanentheism by continuing the German Idealist tradition or thetradition of process philosophy. Although the majority of thecontemporary expressions of panentheism involve scientists andprotestant theologians or philosophers, articulations of forms ofpanentheism have also developed among feminists, in the Roman Catholictradition, in the Orthodox tradition, and in religions other thanChristianity.

Utilizing resources from the tradition of German Idealism, JürgenMoltmann developed a form of panentheism in his early work,TheCrucified God in 1974 (1972 for the German original), where hesaid that the suffering and renewal of all humanity are taken into thelife of the Triune God. He explicated his understanding of panentheismmore fully inThe Trinity and the Kingdom in 1981.Theological concerns motivate Moltmann’s concept of panentheism.Panentheism avoids the arbitrary concept of creation held bytraditional theism and the loss of creaturely freedom that occurs inChristian pantheism (J. Cooper 2006, 248). Moltmann understandspanentheism to involve both God in the world and the world in God. Therelationship between God and the world is like the relationship amongthe members of the Trinity in that it involves relationships andcommunities (Molnar 1990, 674). Moltmann uses the concept ofperichoresis to describe this relationship of mutual interpenetration.By using the concept of perichoresis, Moltmann moves away from aHegelian understanding of the trinity as a dialectical development inhistory (J. Cooper 2006, 251). The relationship between God and theworld develops because of God’s nature as love that seeks theother and the free response of the other (Molnar 1990, 677). Moltmanndoes not consider creation necessary for God nor the result of anyinner divine compulsion. Instead creation is the result of God’sessential activity as love rather than the result of God’sself-determination (Molnar, 1990, 679). This creation occurs in aprocess of interaction between nothingness and creativity, contractionand expansion, in God. Because there is no “outside” ofGod due to God’s infinity, God must withdraw in order forcreation to exist. Kenosis, or God’s self-emptying, occurs increation as well as in the incarnation. The nothing in the doctrine of“creation from nothing” is the primordial result ofGod’s contraction of God’s essential infinity (J. Cooper,2006, 247). Moltmann finds that panentheism as mutual interpenetrationpreserves unity and difference in a variety of differences in kindsuch as God and human being, person and nature, and the spiritual andthe sensuous (Moltmann,1996, 307).

In his process panentheism, David Ray Griffin assumes that scientificunderstandings of the world are crucial and recognizes theimplications of scientific understanding for theology. However, hisconcept of panentheism builds on the principles of process philosophyrather than scientific concepts directly. Griffin traces modernatheism to the combination of understanding perception as exclusivelybased on physical sensations, accepting a naturalistic explanation ofreality, and identifying matter as the only reality. But, theemergence of mind challenges the adequacy of this contemporaryworldview (2004, 40–41). He claims that the traditionalsupernaturalistic form of theism with its emphasis upon the divinewill does not provide an adequate alternative to the atheism of thelate modern worldview because God becomes the source of evil. Griffinargues that traditional theism makes God the source of evil becauseGod’s will establishes the general principles of the universe(2004, 37). Process panentheism provides a way to avoid the problemsof both materialistic naturalism and classical theism (2004, 42).Griffin proposes panexperientialism that bases sensory perception on anon-sensory mode of perception in order to explain both the mind-bodyinteraction and the God-world interaction. God and the world aredifferent entities but both are actual. They are numerically distinctbut ontologically the same, in Griffin’s terms, avoiding dualismand supernaturalism. God and events in the world interact throughnon-sensory perception (2004, 44–45). Through this interaction,God can influence but not determine the world, and the world caninfluence God’s concrete states without changing God’sessence. Process panentheism recognizes two aspects of the divine, anabstract and unchanging essence and a concrete state that involveschange. Through this dipolar concept, God both influences and isinfluenced by the world (2004, 43–44). Griffin understands Godas essentially the soul of the universe although distinct from theworld. The idea of God as the soul of the world stresses the intimacyand direct relationship of God’s relationship to the world, notthe emergence of the soul from the world (2004, 44). Relationality ispart of the divine essence, but this does not mean that this specificworld is necessary to God. This world came into existence fromrelative nothingness. This relative nothingness was a chaos thatlacked any individual that sustained specific characteristics overtime. However, even in the chaos prior to the creation of this world,events had some degree of self-determination and causal influence uponsubsequent events. These fundamental causal principles along with Godexist naturally since these causal principles are inherent in thingsthat exist including the nature of God. The principles cannot bebroken because such an interruption would be a violation ofGod’s nature. An important implication of the two basic causalprinciples, a degree of self-determination and causal influence, isthat God influences but does not determine other events (2004, 43).Griffin’s understanding of naturalism allows for divine actionthat is formally the same in all events. But this divine action canoccur in a variable manner so that some acts are especially revelatoryof the divine character and purpose (2004, 45).

Much of the contemporary discussion and development of panentheismoccurs in the context of the science and religion discussion. Theearly modern concept of an unchanging natural order posed a challengeto understandings of divine action in the world. The currentdiscussion draws on the development of scientific information aboutthe natural world that can contribute to religious efforts to explainhow God acts in the world. In the contemporary discussion, ArthurPeacocke and Paul Davies have made important contributions asscientists interested in, and knowledgeable about, religion. Peacockedeveloped his understanding of panentheism beginning in 1979 andcontinuing through works in 2001, 2004, and 2006. Peacocke starts withthe shift in the scientific understanding of the world from amechanism to the current understandings of the world as a unitycomposed of complex systems in a hierarchy of different levels. Theseemergent levels do not become different types of reality but insteadcompose a unity that can be understood naturally as an emergentistmonism. At the same time, the different levels of complexity cannot bereduced to an explanation of one type or level of complexity. Thecreative dynamic of the emergence of complexity in hierarchies isimmanent in the world rather than external to the world (Peacocke2004, 137–142). Similarly, Paul Davies describes the universe bytalking about complexity and higher levels of organization in whichparticipant observers bring about a more precise order (2007). Animportant scientific aspect of this concept of complexity andorganization is the notion of entanglement especially conceptual levelentanglement (Davies 2006, 45–48). Again, the organization,which makes life possible, is an internal, or natural, order ratherthan an order imposed from outside of the universe (Davies 2004).Peacocke draws upon this contemporary scientific understanding of theuniverse to think about the relationship between God and the naturalworld. He rejects any understanding of God as external to naturewhether it is a traditional theistic understanding where Godintervenes in the natural world or a deistic understanding where Godinitiates the natural world but does not continue to be active in theworld. For Peacocke, God continuously creates through the processes ofthe natural order. God’s active involvement is not anadditional, external influence upon events. However, God is notidentified with the natural processes, which are the action of God asCreator (Peacocke 2004, 143–144). Peacocke identifies hisunderstanding of God’s relation to the world as panentheismbecause of its rejection of external interactions by God in favor ofGod always working from inside the universe. At the same time, Godtranscends the universe because God is more than the universe in thesense of God being unlimited by the world. This panentheistic modelcombines a stronger emphasis upon God’s immanence withGod’s ultimate transcendence over the universe by using a modelof personal agency (Peacocke 2004, 147–151). Davies also refersto his understanding of the role of laws in nature as panentheismrather than deism because God chose laws that give a co-creative roleto nature (2004, 104.

Philip Clayton begins with contemporary scientific understandings ofthe world and combines them with theological concepts drawn from avariety of sources including process theology. He describesGod’s relationship with the world as an internal rather than anexternal relationship. Understanding God’s relationship asinternal to the world recognizes the validity of modern scientificunderstandings that do not require any external source in order toaccount for the order in the world. At the same time, God’sinternal presence provides the order and regularity that the worldmanifests (2001, 208–210). Clayton agrees that the world is inGod and God is in the world. Panentheism, according to him, affirmsthe interdependence of God and the world (2004a, 83). This affirmationbecame possible as a result of the rejection of substantialisticlanguage in favor of personal language in thinking of God.Substantialistic language excludes all other actualities from any oneactuality. Rejection of substantialistic language thus allows for theinteraction of beings. Clayton cites Hegel’s recognition thatthe logic of the infinite requires the inclusion of the finite in theinfinite and points towards the presence of the world in God (Clayton2004a, 78–79). Clayton, along with Joseph Bracken (1974, 2004),identifies his understanding of panentheism as Trinitarian and kenotic(Clayton 2005, 255). It is Trinitarian because the world participatesin God in a manner analogous to the way that members of the Trinityparticipate in each other although the world is not and does notbecome God. God freely decides to limit God’s infinite power inan act of kenosis in order to allow for the existence of non-divinereality. The divine kenotic decision results in the actuality of theworld that is taken into God. But, for Clayton, God’s inclusionof finite being as actual is contingent upon God’s decisionrather than necessary to God’s essence (2003, 214). Claytonaffirms creation from nothing as a description of creaturely existenceprior to God’s decision. The involvement of the world in aninternal relationship with God does not completely constitute thedivine being for Clayton. Instead, God is both primordial, or eternal,and responsive to the world. The world does constitute God’srelational aspect but not the totality of God (2005, 250–254).The best way to describe the interdependence between God and the worldfor Clayton is through the concept of emergence. Emergence may beexplanatory, epistemological, or ontological. Ontologicalunderstandings of emergence, which Clayton supports, hold 1) monismbut not physicalism, 2) properties emerge in objects from thepotentiality of an object that cannot be previously identified in theobject’s parts or structure, 3) the emergence of new propertiesgiving rise to distinct levels of causal relations, and 4) downwardcausation of the emergent level upon prior levels (2006a, 2–4).Emergence recognizes that change is important to the nature of theworld and challenges views of God as unchanging (Clayton 2006b,320).

A number of feminists advocate panentheism by critiquing traditionalunderstandings of transcendence for continuing dualistic ways ofthinking. Feminist panentheists conceive of the divine as continuouswith the world rather than being ontologically transcendent over theworld (Frankenberry 2011). Sallie McFague’s use of metaphors inboth theology and science led her to describe the world as God’sbody. McFague bases the metaphorical nature of all statements aboutGod upon panenetheism (2001, 30). Furthermore, for McFague,panentheism sees the world as in God which gives priority toGod’s name but includes each person’s name and preservestheir distinctiveness in the divine reality (2001, 5). God’sglory becomes manifest in God’s total self-giving to the worldso that transcendence becomes immanence rather than being understoodas God’s power manifest in distant control of the world. GraceJantzen also uses the metaphor of the world as God’s body.Additionally, Jantzen (1998) and Schaab (2007) have proposed metaphorsabout the womb and midwifery to describe God’s relation to theworld. Anna Case–Winters challenges McFague’s metaphor ofthe world as God’s body. Case–Winters acknowledges thatthis metaphor maintains God’s personal nature, offers a coherentway to talk about God’s knowledge of and action in the world,recognizes God’s vulnerable suffering love, and revalues natureand embodiment. But at least McFague’s early use of theworld-as-God’s-body metaphor tended towards pantheism and evenher later introduction of an agential role for the divine stillretains the possibility of the loss of the identity of the world.Case–Winters uses McDaniel’s (1989) distinction betweenemanational, arising out of the being of the One, and relational,present through relationship, understandings of God’s immanencein the world to establish a form of panentheism with a clearerdistinction between God and the world. The world is an“other” in relation to God rather than being a directexpression of God’s own being through emanation forCase–Winters (30–32). Frankenberry contrastsMcFague’s and Case–Winter’s two concepts oftranscendence to the traditional hierarchical concept oftranscendence. McFague’s concept is one of total immanence whileCase–Winters holds a dialectic between individual transcendenceand immanence (2011). Frankenberry suggests that pantheism may providea more direct repudiation of male domination than panentheism provides(1993).

Although much of the development of panentheism takes place in thecontext of the Christian tradition, connections between other worldreligions and panentheism have been identified. These connectionsrange from explicitly panentheistic traditions, to similarities tospecific beliefs and practices of a tradition, to beliefs andpractices that could be developed into panentheistic positions.Hartshorne in his discussion of panentheism included a section onHinduism (1953). Biernacki considers Hinduism to be one of the mostpanentheistic traditions (Biernacki 2014b). The concept of the worldas the body of the divine offers a strong similarity to Westernpanentheism. TheGita identifies the whole world, includingall the gods and living creatures, as the Divine body. But the DivineBeing has its own body that contains the world while being more thanthe world. While the Upanishads acknowledge the body of the Divine attimes, the body of the divine is never identified as the cosmos. Mostof the Tantrics hold a pantheistic view in which the practitioner is amanifestation of the divine. Abhinavagupta, in the tenth century,provided the first panentheistic understanding of the world asGod’s body. For him, differentiation is Shiva concealing hiswholeness. Abhinavagupta also insisted that Shiva transcends thecosmos (Bilimoria and Stansell 2010, 244–258; Clayton 2010,187–189; and Barua 2010, 1–30. See also Hardy 2016). Othertraditions where connections to panentheism have been found includeJudaism (Artson 2014 and Langton 2016), Jainism (Chapple 2014),Confucianism (Lee 2014), Buddhism (Samuel 2014), and Sufism(Sharify–Funk and Dickson 2014). While these connections mightimply a universalistic theology, panentheism affirms the importance ofall religions and supports inter–religions dialogue (Biernacki2014a, 6, 10).

4. Ontological Nature of God/world Relation

The feminist discussion about the adequacy of the metaphor of theworld as God’s body points toward an issue in the broaderpanentheistic discussion about how to describe the relationshipbetween God and the world and the adequacy of the specific metaphorsthat have been used. McFague argues that any attempt to do theologyrequires the use of metaphor (2001, 30). Clayton proposes differentlevels of metaphor as the most adequate way to reconcile the conflictbetween divine action and the integrity of the created realm (2003,208). For Peacocke, the limitation of language requires the use ofmodels and metaphors in describing both God and the cosmos (Schabb2008, 13. The dominant metaphor in panentheism has been the world asGod’s body. The primary objection to the world as God’sbody is the substantialistic implications of the term“body” that lead either to an ontological separationbetween the world and God or to a loss of identity for God or theworld. Further, Bracken finds that the soul–body metaphor lacksclarity about the freedom and self–identity of the creatures inrelations to God (1992, 211). Anna Case–Winters faults thesoul–body metaphor for tending to see the soul as dominating thebody and failing to recognize the world as a unified organism (1995251, 254). Metaphors may be helpful, but they are never literal andthus fail to describe precisely the actualities involved. Beyond thedifficulty of the soul–body metaphor the multiplicity of waysthat panentheists describe the mutual relationship between God and theworld indicates a vagueness of understanding of the ontology of therelation between God and the world. Other attempts to describe theGod–world relation by use of the term “in” confronta diversity of meanings seeking to make the concept of the worldexisting in God more precise (Clayton 2004b, 253).

More clearly metaphysical understandings of God’s relation tothe world have been articulated. Schelling’s German idealismunderstood God as freely unfolding emanation by introducingsubjectivity. There is no ontological separation between God and theworld because the world participates in the infinite as its source(Clayton 2000,477–481). Krause understood the world’sparticipation in God both ontologically and epistemically. Theparticularity of each existent being depends upon the Absolute for itsexistence as what it is (Göcke 2013a, 372). Keller offers anothermetaphysical understanding by arguing for creation out of chaos. Sherejects substance metaphysics and describes the relation between Godand the world as a complex relationality involving an activeindeterminacy and past realities (2003, 219). Finally the science andreligion discussion provides another metaphysical understanding bydrawing upon scientific concepts of supervenience, emergence, downwardcausation, and entanglement to provide a ground for theologicalconcepts of God’s relation to the world.

The nature of the mutual relationship between the infinite and thefinite is crucial to the claim by panentheism to be a creativealternative to the transcendent being of classical Christian theismand the immanent being of pantheism. The nature of this relationshipbasically depends upon the understanding of the ontology of eachmember of the relationship. The issue is the nature of being for Godand for the world as the basis for mutual influence between God andthe world. Various traditions in Christian thought have sought todescribe the nature of God’s being and the world’s beingin their relationship. Thomistic thought utilizes a concept of analogyas it wrestles with the nature of the being of God and the being ofthe world (Malloy 2014). Others in considering God’s action inthe world posit the necessity of ontological difference between Godand finite reality (Leidenhag 2014, 219). Process thought directlyaddresses the issue of ontology by calling for an ontology that doesnot consider substance as the basic type of existence becausesubstance does not allow for internal relations (Bracken 2014,10).

Historically, participation, Hegelian dynamic ontology, and processdynamic ontology have been utilized to describe the ontological basisfor the relations between God and the world. Participation hasphilosophical antecedents in Plato and Aristotle and was utilized inAugustinian and Orthodox Christian traditions. In participation, theexistence of the world somehow takes part in God’s being. Earlymodern usage of the concept of participation appears in the thought ofKrause (1781–1832) and Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944). Krauseidentifies the character of every thing as the result of itsparticipation in the original unity of the Absolute. But the Absoluteis still different in its internal constitution from its parts(Göcke 2013a, 372). Bulgakov describes participation as theinclusion of the finite by the Absolute (Gavrilyuk 2015, 453).Hegelian dynamic ontology describes an Infinite which gives rise tothe finite through a dialectical process of negation. The finitethrough a second reciprocal negation of its finitude brings aboutunion and return in transformation to both the Infinite and the finite(Williams 2010, 143). Process dynamic ontology understands God asdipolar with a primordial nature that is eternal and a consequentnature that includes the actualizations achieved by the world. Godpresents possibilities to the events of the world which then makedecisions bringing about actualities that are then included inGod.

Bracken and Cazalis seek to make the ontological nature of therelation more precise. Bracken proposes a Trinitarian field theory toexplain the world’s presence in God. The world is a large butfinite field of activity within the all–comprehensive field ofactivity constituted by the three divine persons in ongoing relationswith each other and with all the creation (2009, 159). Bracken’sTrinitarian field theory draws on systems theory from science,Whitehead’s concept of society, and Christian Trinitariandoctrine. A society as a type of system is a group of entities with anorganizing principle. Basically, reality is an all–encompassingsociety in which subsocieties operate in their own ways as distinct.God functions as the regnant subsociety and receives the richness ofthe information from the world of creation (Bracken 2014, 80). Brackensummarizes this system understanding of panentheism in threeconclusions: 1) systems are social rather than individual, can becombined horizontally and vertically, change over time due to changesin constituents, and do not make decisions; 2) the three divinepersons and all their creatures are together constituent members of anexpanded divine life–system; and 3) the relationships of thevarious levels of societies involve both bottom–up causation andan objective formal top–down causation of the constraints ofhigher order systems on lower order systems (2015a, 223). Although notas fully developed as Bracken’s society explanation, Cazalisuses category theory and the concept of adjunction in order to offeran internal law that gives specificity to panentheism. In thisapproach relations go both ways between two categories and the linkcarries the univeral property from one element of a given category toanother category (Cazalis 2016, 210).

5. Criticisms and Responses

Even after more than one hundred years of development, panentheismcontinues to grow and change. Much of this growth has taken place as aresult of advances in science. Another impetus for change has beencriticisms of panentheism. Some of the most important criticisms areraised by the major alternatives to panentheistic understandings ofthe God-world relation. Panentheism faces challenges both from thosewho find some form of pantheism more adequate than any distinctionbetween God and the world and from those who resist any lessening ofthe emphasis upon divine transcendence. Finally, the variety of theversions of panentheism has led to an active internal discussion amongthe various versions.

Both pantheists and scientists working with naturalist assumptionscriticize panentheism for its metaphysical claim that there is a beingabove or other than the natural world. At times, this criticism hasbeen made by claiming that a thorough-going naturalism does not need atranscendent, individualized reality. Corrington describes thedevelopment of his thought as a growing awareness that panentheismunnecessarily introduces a being above nature as well as in nature(2002, 49). Drees expresses a similar criticism by arguing that allcontemporary explanations of human agency, including non-reductionistexplanations, are naturalistic and do not require any reference to ahigher being. For panentheists to claim that divine agency isanalogous to human agency fails both to recognize that human agencyrequires no additional source or cause and to explain how a divinesource of being could act in the realm of physical and mentalprocesses (1999). Frankenberry makes this objection more specific.Panentheism offers a more complex relationship between God and theworld than is necessary. This unnecessary complexity is revealed bythe problems that panentheism has with the logic of the freedom ofparts in wholistic relations, the possibility of the body-soul analogyrelapsing into gender inflected ideas of the soul as the maleprinciple, the problem with simultaneity of events in the divineexperience in relation to the principle of the relativity of time, thenecessity of the everlasting nature of value, and finally the use ofthe ontological argument to establish the necessity of the abstractpole of the divine nature (1993, 36–39). Gillett points out thatpanentheism lacks an explanation for a causal efficacy higher than thecausal efficacy realized by microphysical causation (2003, 19).Generally, panentheists respond to these criticisms by affirming theinadequacy both scientifically and metaphysically of any type ofreductionistic naturalism. Such a naturalism whether articulated inscientific categories or religious categories fails to recognize theemergence of levels of complexity in nature. The emergence of higherlevels of organization that cannot be completely explained in terms oflower levels renders non-differentiated accounts of being inadequate.Panentheists often argue that the emergence of higher levels of ordermakes possible downward causation. Davies describes the difficultiesin coming to a clear description of downward causation and concludesthat the complexity of systems open to the environment makes room fordownward causation but has not yet provided an explanation of howdownward causation works (2006, 48). The concepts of entanglement anddivine entanglement may offer a new perspective on causation andespecially the role of the divine in natural causation(Wegter–McNelly 2011).

Traditional Christian theists raise a variety of critiques ofpanentheism. Experiential critiques question the ability ofpanentheism to provide a God worthy of worship (Nash 1983, 117). Oneresponse to this critique is to question the definition of“worthy of worship”. Leftow suggests that any definitionof God as meriting worship includes a conceptually appropriate objectthat is aware of the world and being superior to the world in some way(2016, 70). A closely related experiential critique is that thepanentheistic God is unable to guarantee a future good. Whilepanentheists agree that human freedom logically precludes God’sprevention of future evil that results from human choice, many affirmthat God’s response to unpreventable evil is that God sufferswith the person suffering evil. However God’s suffering with aperson, even if that offers the support of a relationship with God,does not provide a basis for the hope of overcoming evil.

These experiential criticisms express underlying theologicalcritiques. The dominant theological criticism of panentheism is thatGod is unable to guarantee the defeat of evil. Clayton and Brackenrespond by maintaining that the world does influence God butGod’s will, expressed through the decisions that God makes,protects God’s ability to save (Clayton 2005). Moltmanndescribes God’s essence as directing God’s activity inorder to maintain the reliability of God as love acting on behalf ofcreation. Moltmann does not find it necessary to protect divinefreedom by giving it priority over divine love but rather understandsfreedom as acting according to the divine nature of love (Moltmann1981, 98, 99). J. Cooper challenges this response by criticizingpanentheism for holding a concept of God that can save through thegeneral processes of nature but not in any distinctive way.Vanhoozer’s concern for divine freedom is based on a similarconcern (1998, 250). But, Griffin’s discussion of divinevariable action does allow for specific and distinctive manifestationsof divine love (2004, 45). Jensen also criticizes the ability of thepanentheist concept to save by distinguishing between salvation by Godand salvation through agents of their own salvation (2014,12–13). For him, a process panentheist’s God can only drawand persuade rather than save (Jensen 2014, 128). Pak concludes thatan open future makes any ultimate victory over evil impossible (Pak2014, 223–224). In response, B. Cooper lists five ways in whicha process theology supports God’s power over other realities: 1)ontological priority in providing definition, 2) universality to allactuality, 3) as the ground of novelty, 4) as the ground and preserverof all value, and 5) the unconditioned character of God’sintegrity as seeking to increase value in the world and love towardsthe world (1974, 102). Oomen finds three similar elements inWhitehead’s thought that relate to God’s governing andsustaining the world: 1) God originates all occasions by presentingthe initial aim which provides some direction against evil, 2) Godpreserves all that can be preserved, and 3) God as everlasting meansthat no occasion can overcome God forever (2015, 287–288). Anadditional criticism is that since the world is necessary for God tobe God in the classic panentheism of Hegel and Whitehead, God is notfree to choose to save. The absence of a doctrine of creation fromnothing results in God’s provision of salvation being necessaryrather than free (Olson 2012). While Olson questions whether or not aclassic panentheist can hold to creation from nothing, Clayton affirmscreation from nothing as consistent with panentheism (2008).Ultimately the panentheist response is that God’s nature as lovedirects God’s actions bringing salvation. God’s nature aslove is the crucial aspect of divine action rather than a causalefficacy. The emphasis of traditional theism on divine will missesthat the divine will is directed by divine love (Oord 2015 and Molnar,1990, 679).

Metaphysical critiques of panentheism provide a basis for both thetheological and experiential criticisms made by traditional Christiantheists. Four types of metaphysical critiques have been made. Onecriticism is that panentheism fails to maintain an ontologicaldistinction between God and the world (Leidenhag 2014, 215, 219, 220).While panentheism identifies differences between God and the world,the distinction is one of characteristics rather than one of being.Although different forms of panentheism understand similarities anddifferences between God and the world in different ways, both Hegeland Whitehead refer to differences between God and the world that areimportant. Hegel’s dialectical panentheism distinguishes betweenGod prior to creation and creation in God (Tabaczek 2013, 151).Whitehead describes God as non–temporal and events composing theworld as temporal (Bracken 2015, 542). The modal status of the worldin relation to God provides a related challenge to panentheism.Göcke concludes that the significant difference betweenpanentheism and classical theism is that according to panentheism theworld is an intrinsic property of God while classical theism holdsthat the world is an extrinsic property of God (2013b, 74). A thirdtype of critique is that panentheism holds an inadequate concept oftranscendence. According to J. Cooper, if God’s transcendencedoes not infinitely exceed God’s immanence, God’spresence, knowledge, and power are limited rather than complete,immediate, and unconditioned (2006, 322–328). Transcendence maybe either horizontal, between like entities, or vertical, involvingdifferent entities. Whitehead’s understanding of God’stranscendence is horizontal and limited because God only influencesevents before or after the decisions of the events. God cannot bepresent simultaneously with the event. Likewise, Hegel’s denialof divine simplicity makes ontological difference between God and theworld impossible thus limiting God’s transcendence (Tabaczek2013, 151, 154). While Clayton and others have identifiedtop–down causation as indicating God’s verticaltranscendence, Jensen finds this inadequate because they are unable toidentify clearly God’s presence in the causal nexus of the world(2014, 131). However, Bracken rejects the necessity of a causal jointwhen both top–down and bottom–up causation occur (2014,10). Also, Clayton counters that few process panentheists accept afull equality between finite actual occasions and the divine actualoccasion or occasions. God being the chief exemplification ofcreativity indicates a difference between God and actual occasions andthus a vertical transcendence (Clayton 2015, 27). FinallyBracken’s field understanding of panentheism gives priority toGod as the regent subsociety (2014, 79–80). The fourthmetaphysical criticism grows out of a technical aspect ofWhitehead’s cosmology, the relation between creativity and God.Whitehead attributes metaphysical ultimacy to creativity andunderstands God as the primordial manifestation of creativity. Thisappears to leave God in a secondary position (Hosinski 2015, 275).Cobb resolves the problem of the priority of creativity by identifyingcreativity as an abstract metaphysical principle rather than anactuality more important than God (1982, 126 and see Nobharu 2015,499). Bracken considers creativity to be the systematic whole ratherthan a greater reality than God (1992, 216 and 214).

Analytic theology (Jeanine Diller and As Kasher, eds. 2013 and AndreiA. Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa, eds. 2016) offers a different type ofcritique of panentheism. Analytical approaches to panentheism critiquepanentheism as lacking a distinctive identity making carefulidentification, research, and development of a distinctive positionimpossible. Göcke’s effort to identify a distinctive ofpanentheism notes the similarities of classical theism and panentheismand concludes that the only difference is a modal difference in thatthe world is not necessary for God in classical theism while the worldis necessary for God in panentheism (2013). Lataster challengesGöcke’s limitation of the distinction between classicaltheism and panentheism by claiming that panentheism’s rejectionof divine immutability distinguishes panentheism from classical theism(2014). Göcke rejects this distinction as failing to recognizethat spatial references are not adequate in dealing with metaphysicalrather than physical or logical necessity (2014). Göcke makes therequirements for the distinction between classical theism andpanentheism more specific by calling for a consistent definition of“in” by panentheists and by noting the presence oflogically contradictory but self-consistent interpretations of keynotions by various panentheists (2015). Nagasawa develops the conceptof modal panentheism by describing modal panentheism as holding thatGod is the totality of all possible worlds and that all possibleworlds exist to the same extent that the actual world exists. Thus Godincludes all possible worlds and any actual worlds. But Nagasawa alsonotes that modal panentheism has some similarities to traditionaltheism which limits any modal distinction between classical theism andpanentheism (2016). Mullins provides further evidence and refinementin questioning the distinctiveness of panentheism by pointing outsimilarities among panentheism, open theism, and neo-classical theismand by critiquing Göcke’s modal distinction as failing tosay anything unique about God. Both modal distinctions and consideringthe world as God’s body fail because they do not say anythingunique about the nature of God (2016). Mullins offers an analyticresponse to the challenge regarding the distinctiveness of panentheismby suggesting that panentheism can distinguish itself from classicaltheism by making absolute space and time attributes of God and byrecognizing the distinction between absolute time and space andphysical and temporal realities contained within absolute time andspace. Such a distinction offers a literal understanding of“in” in contrast to classical theism (2016).

An alternative response begins by recognizing that metaphoricalmeanings of “in” serve as placeholders for what isasserted about the relationship between God and the world (Göcke2015, 4). Panentheism’s metaphors offer a variety of ways ofdescribing the distinctive of panentheism, the balance between divinetranscendence and divine immanence. In distinction from classicaltheism’s derivation of immanence from divine transcendence,panentheism affirms the basic role of divine immanence. In contrast topantheism’s derivation of divine transcendence from divineimmanence, panentheism affirms God’s difference from the world.Nikkel recognizes the importance of this balance even withinpanentheism. He warns against an overemphasis upon transcendenceleading to the loss of the indeterminacy needed for growth that occursin panentheism overly influenced by German Idealism and anoveremphasis on immanence leading to the loss of God as the source ofexistence that occurs in panentheism overly influenced by processthought (2016). While the idea of panentheism may not be aphilosophically stable concept in itself, that instability makespossible respecification in light of particular theologies (Gregersen2017, 583). Thus the term “panentheism” pointed to abalance between classical theism and pantheism in the early twentiethcentury with its use of “in”. The growth of the influenceof scientific thought upon theology leads to a more specificunderstanding of the balance in the relation between God and the worldthat emphasizes the mutual interaction of God and the world and moveson from the usefulness of “in”. Gregersen articulates thisby suggesting two requirements for a contemporary stable notion ofpanentheism, God contains the world so that the world belongs to Godand there is a feeding back from the world into divine life (2017,582).

The varieties of panentheism participate in internal criticism.Clayton (2008, 127) and Crain (2006) emphasize the dependence of theworld upon God rather than the dependence of God upon the worldalthough they maintain that God is influenced, and changed, by theworld. They criticize understandings of God that limit God by makingGod subject to metaphysical principles. Griffin emphasizes theregularity provided by metaphysical principles. This regularityrecognizes the order in reality that the reliability of God’slove provides. Panentheists also caution that the emphasis upon theontological nature of the relation between God and the world can leadto a loss of the integrity of the world. Richardson warns againstlosing the discrete identity of finite beings in God (2010, 345).Case-Winters calls for maintaining a balance between the distinctionbetween God and the world and God’s involvement with the world.Over–emphasis upon either side of the balance leads to positionsthat are philosophically and theologically inadequate(Case–Winters 2007, 125).

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Acknowledgments

R.T. Mullins suggested several sources that increased the coverage ofthis article and through careful reading provided helpful challengesto increase the clarity of this article without being responsible forany remaining lack of clarity. David Basinger, in personalconversation, helped me recognize that God's suffering with a persondoes not provide a basis for the hope of overcoming evil.

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