The term “natural religion” is sometimes taken to refer toa pantheistic doctrine according to whichnature itself isdivine. “Natural theology”, by contrast, originallyreferred to (and still sometimes refers to)^[1] the project of arguing for the existence of God on the basis ofobservednatural facts.

In contemporary philosophy, however, both “naturalreligion” and “natural theology” typically refer tothe project of using the cognitive faculties that are“natural” to human beings—reason, sense-perception,introspection—to investigate religious or theological matters.Natural religion or theology, on the present understanding, is thusnot limited to empirical inquiry into nature, and it is not wedded toa pantheistic result. It does, however, avoid appeals to specialnon-natural faculties (ESP, telepathy, mystical experience) orsupernatural sources of information (sacred texts, revealed theology,creedal authorities, direct supernatural communication). In general,natural religion or theology (hereafter “naturaltheology”) aims to adhere to the same standards of rationalinvestigation as other philosophical and scientific enterprises, andis subject to the same methods of evaluation and critique. Naturaltheology is typically contrasted with “revealed theology”,where the latter explicitly appeals to special revelations such asmiracles, scriptures, and divinely-superintended commentaries andcreedal formulations. (See DeCruz and DeSmedt 2015)

Philosophers and religious thinkers across almost every epoch andtradition (Near Eastern, African, Asian, and European) have engagedthe project of natural theology, either as proponents or critics. Thequestion of whether natural theology is a viable project is at theroot of some of the deepest religious divisions: Shi’itethinkers are optimistic about reason’s ability to prove varioustheological and ethical truths, for instance, while Sunnis are not;Roman Catholic theologians typically think that reason providesdemonstrations of the existence of God, while many Protestanttheologians do not. Unlike most of the topics discussed in anencyclopedia of philosophy, this is one over which wars have beenfought and throats have been cut.

The most active discussions of natural theology in the West occurredduring the high medieval period (roughly 1000–1400 C.E.) and theearly modern period (1600–1800 C.E.). The past few decades havewitnessed a revival of natural theological debate in the publicsphere: there are now institutes promoting “Intelligent DesignTheory”, popular apologetics courses, campus debates betweenbelievers and agnostics, a “New Atheist” movement, Youtubedebates between apologists and atheists regarding new books in naturaltheology (such as the one between Nathan Lewis and Bernie Dehler onthe Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology),^[2] and TED talks by famous atheists on how to resist natural religion(such as the one by Richard Dawkins in February 2002).^[3]

Among professional philosophers (who aren’t typically part ofthese more popular debates), arguments over our ability to justifypositive or negative answers to religious questions have become fairlytechnical, often employing sophisticated logical techniques in aneffort to advance the discussion instead of retreading the same oldground. The prestigious Gifford Lectures series hosted by a consortiumof Scottish universities, however, has tried to feature new but stillaccessible work in natural theology for over 100 years (it too has aYoutube channel!)^[4]

In this article, we aim to avoid most the more recent complexities butalso explain their origins by focusing on some central developments inthe early modern period that helped to frame contemporary naturaltheological debates. We are focused here only ontheoreticalarguments (botha priori anda posteriori orempirical ones). It is controversial whethermoral argumentsare also part of natural theology, but we set them aside here (see theentry onmoral arguments for the existence of God).

• 1. Prolegomenal Considerations
  • 1.1 Religious language and concepts
  • 1.2 Rational access
• 2.A priori arguments
  • 2.1 Ontological arguments
    • 2.1.1 Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109)
    • 2.1.2 René Descartes (1596–1650)
    • 2.1.3 Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)
    • 2.1.4 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
    • 2.1.5 Contemporary Modal Versions
  • 2.2 The argument from necessary truths
  • 2.3 The argument from possibility
• 3.A posteriori arguments
  • 3.1 The classical cosmological argument
  • 3.2 Teleological or design arguments
    • 3.2.1 Hume on the teleological argument
    • 3.2.2 The teleological argument from fine-tuning
  • 3.3 Arguments from religious experience
• 4. “Ramified” natural theology
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Prolegomenal Considerations

Theologians often follow Immanuel Kant’s example and addressvarious “prolegomena” (preliminary questions) beforetrying to do any substantive metaphysics. These include questionsabout the nature of religious language and about whether or not we arein principle able to access and understand religious truths.

1.1 Religious Language and Concepts

Again, we will use the term “natural theologian” to referto someone who aims to use ordinary human cognitive faculties (reason,sense-perception, introspection) to establish positive truths aboutthe existence and nature of God and other religiously significant,supersensible beings or states of affairs. Such a person presupposesthat sentences in human language (or at least sentences in thelanguage of human thought) can express some theological truths, evenif other such truths are beyond us.

Critics of natural theology sometimes challenge these semanticpresuppositions. They provide reasons to think that our thoughts,concepts, or sentences are incapable of expressing theological truths,because they are incapable of referring adequately to the transcendententities that play an important role in many religiousdoctrines—entities such as Judaism’s YHWH,Neo-Platonism’s One, Vedanta’s Brahman, Mormonism’sHeavenly Father, and so on. The debate surrounding these issues isoften designated “the problem of religious language”, butit is usually as much about humanconcepts as it is aboutsentences in natural languages.

In the western tradition, there have been a few periods of especiallyactive discussion of these prolegomenal issues. The Neo-Platonic erawas one (see the discussion of negative theology in the entry onPlotinus), the high medieval period (1100–1400 or so) was another, theEnlightenment movement in 17^th–18^thcentury Europe (especially the empiricist portion of it) was a third.More recent discussions have involved both analytic and continentalfigures: A.J. Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, AntonyFlew, Norman Malcolm, Emmanuel Levinas, and William P. Alston haveeach discussed, in very different ways, the question of whether andhow our language might succeed in referring to transcendent entities.However, since the 1970s, analytic philosophers have turned away froma focus on language to a revival of metaphysics, and the“problem of religious language” has been much lessprominent.

1.2 Rational Access

In addition to questions about what religious language means or refersto and how religious conceptsapply (if at all), the naturaltheologian faces another set of preliminary questions about ourability togenerate sound arguments about such entities orfacts. Our sense-perceptual and rational faculties are clearly limitedand fallible. There are presumably many facts about the naturaluniverse that we are incapable of grasping due to their complexity orinaccessibility. So why should we think that our natural faculties candeliver truths about even more remote or transcendent entities?

A related debate concerns whether natural theology is the only methodby which we can have access to the domain of truths aboutsupersensible realities of religious interests. Some practitioners(call themrationalists) argue that only propositions thatcan be justified by unaided human reason are candidates forpermissible belief. Others (call themhybridists) allow thatour natural faculties can take us a certain distance—toknowledge of the basic nature and even existence of God, say—butargue that we must ultimately appeal to revelation andfaithwhen it comes to more specific doctrines regarding the divine nature,acts, and intentions. This is the canonical Roman Catholic position onfaith and reason developed in authors such as Augustine, Anselm,Aquinas, and revived in the natural scientific context of theRenaissance by Catalan scholar Raymond Sebond (1385–1436).Sebond’s Latin work,Theologia Naturalis(1434–1436), became famous when Michel de Montaigne translatedit into French in 1569 and made it the subject of the longest of hisrenownedEssays (‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’),in 1580.

There are many kinds of hybridists: while they all think a turn torevelation and/or faith is necessary at some point, some seek toestablish little more than the bare existence of God before goingbeyond unaided reason for greater details. Others think it is possibleto develop a robust understanding of God from within the bounds ofreason and sense-perception. Indeed, in recent years the so-called“ramified natural theology” movement has sought to use ournatural faculties to demonstrate (or show to be highly probable)robust doctrines that go well beyond bare theism—for example,specifically Christian doctrines such as that of the Trinity, theresurrection, or the historical authenticity of certain miracles orbiblical prophecies (Swinburne 2003; Newman et al. 2003; Gauch Jr.2011; seesection 4 below).

Opponents of natural religion or theology, by contrast, denythat reason and our other ordinary perceptual capacities can justifyreligious beliefs. Some of these opponents arefideists(e.g., on some readings, Tertullian, Blaise Pascal, Pierre Bayle, J.G.Hamann, F.H. Jacobi, and Søren Kierkegaard) who hold these samebeliefs as articles of faith rather than as teachings of reason (seethe entry onfideism). Pascal, for instance, was a preeminent mathematician with stronginterests in natural theology, but ultimately concluded (during whathe called a “night of fire” in November 1654) that unaidedreason is more likely to lead us to the false god “ofphilosophers and scholars” than to the true “God ofAbraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob”. The 20^thcentury Reformed theologian Karl Barth opposed natural theology formuch the same reason, and made his opposition to Emil Brunner’sversion of the hybridist project clear in a book titled simply“Nein!” (Barth 1934). In his Gifford Lectures(which were endowed by Lord Gifford to be a lecture series aboutnatural theology), contemporary theologian Stanley Hauerwas espouses afideistic view in the tradition of Pascal and Barth but claims(somewhat perversely) that his project (which incorporates biblicaltexts and specifically Christian doctrines) counts as “naturaltheology” all the same (Hauerwas 2001: 15ff).

Other opponents of natural theology areagnostics who do notfind the hybridist or fideist turn to faith appealing. They deny thatour natural faculties have succeeded in justifying any positive ornegative substantial (i.e., non-analytic) theistic beliefs, andconsequently suspend belief. Agnostics differ, however, as to whetherunaided reasoncould in principle but doesnot infact justify such beliefs (thus Bertrand Russell’s famousresponse to a question about what he would say if he were to die andthen confront God on judgment day: “not enough evidence, God,not enough evidence!”), or whether our unaided faculties are notevenin principle adequate to the task.

Still other opponents of natural theology areatheists.Atheists agree with fideists and agnostics that our natural facultiescannot establish the existence of God or other religious entities. Butthat’s because they think those faculties provide reasons tobelieve that such entities do not exist at all (see the entry onatheism and agnosticism). One such reason is the negative one that we cannot produce any soundarguments for theistic claims. But atheists also often maintain thatthere are positive reasons to believe that God does notexist—the incoherence of the concept of God, for instance, orthe incompatibility of God’s existence and the existence ofhorrendous suffering and evil (see the entry on the problem ofevil).

There are many ways to approach a survey of natural theology. Here wehave chosen to focus largely on the classic historical discussions,and in particular on the debates in the medieval and Enlightenment(17^th–18^th century) periods in the west.We will consider versions of the two basic kinds of positive argumentin favor of religious theses:a priori arguments andaposteriori arguments. There are several species of each ofthese.

2.A priori arguments

2.1 Ontological arguments

A priori arguments are those that do not require an appeal toparticular sense-perceptual experiences in order to justify theirconclusions. Immanuel Kant gave the name “ontological” toa priori arguments that aim to prove the existence of anobject from a concept or an idea of that object (see the entry onontological arguments, Oppy 2018). But disagreements about whether such a strategy canestablish the existence of God began well before Kant’stime.

2.1.1 Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109)

An early and now-canonical formulation of the ontological argument isfound in the second book of St. Anselm’sProslogion(Anselm 1077–78). Anselm begins by characterizing God as the“being than which none greater can be thought” and thenseeks to show that such a being does and indeed must exist.

Anselm’s argument can be reconstructed in various ways (see theentry onSaint Anselm), but here is one:

1. By the term “God” we understand something than whichnothing greater can be thought. [premise]
2. When we think using the term “God”, God is in theunderstanding. [premise]
3. Therefore, something than which nothing greater can be thought isin the understanding. [by (1) and (2)]
4. What is in the understandingand in reality is greaterthan what is in the understanding alone. [premise]
5. Therefore, God exists in the understanding and in reality, and notjust in the understanding alone. [by (3) and (4)]

In support of (2), Anselm notes that

[T]he fool has said in his heart that “There is no God”.But when this same Fool hears me say “something than whichnothing greater can be thought”, he surely understands what hehears; and what he understands exists in his understanding, even if hedoes not understand that it exists [in reality]. (Anselm81–2)

So according to Anselm, even the “foolish” atheistunderstands what the term “God” refers to when heargues that God does not exist. By this Anselm simply means that theatheist has the idea of God, and thus has God “in hisunderstanding”.

Premise (4) presupposes that things can exist in a number of differentways or modes. One of those ways is as the object of anidea—i.e., existence “in the understanding”. Anotherway for it to exist is “in reality”. (4) articulates acomparative value judgment about these ways of existing: it isgreater for something to exist inboth ways than itis to exist merely in the first way.

In order to deduce (5) from (3) and (4), Anselm uses areductio adabsurdum argument:

And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot existonly in the understanding. For if it exists only in the understanding,it can be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater.(Anselm 82)

More explicitly:

1. Suppose a certain being,B₁, is conceived ofas God is in the proof, andB₁ is in theunderstanding alone. [supposition forreductio]
2. But we can conceive of another being,B₂, thatis exactly likeB₁, except thatB₂ exists in reality as well as in theunderstanding. [introspection]
3. Thus,B₂ is greater thanB₁. [by (4)]
4. It is impossible to conceive of a being that is greater thanB₁. [by (a) and (1)]
5. Contradiction. [by (c) and (d)]
6. Therefore, (a) is false: IfB₁ is conceived ofas God is in the proof, thenB₁ must exist inreality as well as in the understanding. [by (e)]

Philosophers and theologians have made numerous efforts to revive ordemolish Anselm’s argument over the centuries (see Leftow 2012,2022 for discussion). The most influential proponents includeRené Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Charles Hartshorne, NormanMalcolm, Robert M. Adams, and Alvin Plantinga. Its main detractorsinclude Anselm’s contemporaneous interlocutor—a monk namedGaunilo—as well as Thomas Aquinas, Descartes’correspondents Johannes Caterus, Marin Mersenne, and Antoine Arnauld,Immanuel Kant, and, more recently, David Lewis (1970), Peter vanInwagen (1977), and Graham Oppy (1996, 2009). In what follows, anumber of the relevant moves in the early modern discussion will beconsidered, as well as some contemporary developments of the17^th century modal argument.

2.1.2 René Descartes (1596–1650)

Descartes’ ontological argument, first presented in the FifthMeditation, aims to prove the existence of God from the idea of God(Descartes 1641, cited below from the edition by Adam and Tannery(1962–1976) and referred to as “AT”). Here is oneway to formulate the argument (compare Pereboom 1996, 2010; foralternatives see the entry onDescartes’ Ontological Argument):

1. When I have an idea of an object, the object really has whatevercharacteristics I clearly and distinctly understand it to have.(premise)
2. I have an idea of God in which I clearly and distinctly understandGod as the being that has all perfections. (premise)
3. Therefore, God has all perfections. [by (1) and (2)]
4. Everlasting existence is a perfection. (premise)
5. Therefore, God has everlasting existence. [by (3) and (4)]
6. Therefore, God exists. [by (5)] (AT 7.63–71)

One prominent way of resisting this argument is to reduce it toabsurdity by appeal to “parity of reasoning”. JohannesCaterus, for instance, objected to Descartes that by a preciselyparallel form of reasoning we could prove the real existence of theobject of an idea of an existent lion (AT 7.99). Gaunilo’s replyto Anselm centuries earlier was similar: by parity of reasoning, onecan prove the existence in reality (and not just in the understanding)of the maximally perfect island (Anselm 102).

The objection aims to show that, like the idea God, the idea of theexistent lion and the idea of the maximally perfect island includeexistence, and thus the existence of these objects can be establishedvia an ontological argument. But the claim that the existence ofCaterus’s lion and Gaunilo’s island can be established inthis way is absurd, and thus the same holds for the theisticontological argument. Note that this parity argument via areductio ad absurdum, if successful, would show that theontological argument is unsound, but without indicating which step inthe reasoning is at fault.

A second objection, anticipated by Descartes in the Fifth Meditation,is that truly predicating a property of something without specifyingany conditions or intentional contexts involves an affirmation thatthe thing exists. So from the truth of “Macron is the Presidentof France”, one can conclude that Macron exists. As a result,“Pegasus is a winged horse” is strictly speaking false,though by using the intentional context “according to themyth” we can say, truly, “According to the myth, Pegasusis a winged horse”. This suggests that premise (3) above issubject to a decisive challenge, and Descartes can legitimately claimonly, for instance “According to the idea of God, God has allperfections”, or “If God exists, then God has allperfections”. But then all that follows in step (6) is theunspectacular conclusion that “According to the idea of God, Godexists”, or, even less impressively, “If God exists, thenGod exists”.

A third problem, raised in the Second Objections by Father MarinMersenne, is that the argument would be sound only if a maximallyperfect being is really possible, or, equivalently, only if there is agenuine divine essence. But this, Mersenne complains, has not beenestablished (AT 7.127). (Side note: Gaunilo and Mersenne are goodexamples of how devout theists might still take issue with naturaltheological efforts to prove God’s existence.)

Descartes’ reply to these objections involves the notion of a“true and immutable nature” (“TIN”) (AT7.101ff.). Only some of our ideas are of things that have TINs.Moreover, TINs themselves exist in some way, although they need notexist in concrete or empirical reality. Perhaps they are abstractobjects, like numbers or sets (Descartes explicitly compares them toPlato’s Forms). In any case, the kind of existence TINs have issufficient to undermine the second objection above: the divineessence—God’s nature—is atrue andimmutable nature, and thus we do not need to prefix anything like thephrase “According to the idea of God” to premise (3).Rather, Descartes thinks we can clearly and distinctly perceive thatGod’s nature is a TIN, and that this TIN contains allperfections. Thus we can conclude that “God has allperfections”. That would make the inference to (6) a validone.

Descartes’ challenge, then, is to show that God’s natureis a TIN and that the natures of an “existent lion” and“the maximally perfect island” are not TINs. In the FifthMeditation Descartes maintains that TINs are different from fictitiousideas in that TINs are in some sense independent of the thought oftheir conceivers. For example, the nature of a triangle is a TINbecause it contains properties that we don’t grasp when we firstform the idea of a triangle, and deducing these further properties isa process “more like discovery than creation”. God’snature also has this feature—we obviously don’t grasp allof the properties of the maximally perfect being when we first form anidea of it. The problem, however, is that it is not clear how thiscriterion would rule out the natures of a most perfect island or anexistent lion as TINs, since in those cases we also don’t graspall of the properties when we first form the idea.

Later, Descartes (AT 7.83–4) characterizes a TIN as having aunity such that it cannot be divided by the intellect. He thinks thathaving this feature shows that it hasn’t been simply puttogether by the intellect or imagination, and is thus a genuinenature. Accordingly, the idea of an existent lion does not correspondto a TIN because I can coherently conceive of a lion thatdoesn’t exist. Likewise I can coherently conceive of a maximallyperfect island having one fewer coconut tree but one more mango tree,and so on. But it also seems that I can conceive of some of the divineperfections without others (i.e. of an omnipotent being that islacking maximal benevolence). So by this standard it appears that theidea of God also fails to correspond to a true and immutable nature.(Note: Descartes himself seems to resist this objection by arguingthat all of the divine perfections ultimately boil down to sovereigntyor omnipotence.)

To the third problem, concerning the real possibility of God,Descartes replies that our clear and distinct ideas ofTINs—produced in us by reason—are reliable guides to whatis really possible. Since we can (supposedly) see clearly anddistinctly that there is no incompability in our idea of God’snature, the denial that God is really possible is on equal footingwith the denial that the angles of a triangle are equal to two rightangles (AT 7.150–1).

2.1.3 Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

Leibniz addresses several of the central objections toDescartes’ ontological argument (in, e.g., Leibniz 1676 [PP]:167–8; 1677 [PP]: 177–80; 1684 [PP]: 292–3; 1692[PP]: 386; 1678 [PE]: 237–39; 1699 [PE]: 287–88; Adams1994: 135–56). These include:

1. the claim that the essence of a most perfect being includes itsexistence—that existence is a perfection—hasn’t beensubstantiated;
2. the claim that all this argument can establish is the conditional“If an object of the concept of God exists, then Godexists”; and
3. the claim that the real possibility of a most perfect being cannotbe demonstrated

In several places Leibniz addresses (A) by arguing that by“God” we understand a necessary being, and that from thisit follows that the essence of God involves necessary existence. Inthis way we supposedly avoid altogether the premise that existence isa perfection. (One wonders, however, whether the argument forincluding “necessary existence” in the idea of God willneed to rely on the premise that necessary existence is aperfection.)

In some writings Leibniz tries to bypass (B) by presenting an argumentwith a different conditional as its conclusion (see Adams 1994:135–42):

1. If there is a divine essence, then the divine essence involvesnecessary existence. [premise]
2. If God is a possible being, then there is a divine essence.[premise]
3. If God is a possible being, then the divine essence involvesnecessary existence. [by (1), (2)]
4. If God is a possible being, then God necessarily exists. [by(3)]
5. Therefore, if God is a possible being, then God actually exists.[by (4)]

What has yet to be dealt with, clearly, is Mersenne’s problemabove—(C), that the real possibility of a most perfect beingcannot be demonstrated. Leibniz offers several types of argumentsagainst this. One relies on the fact thatother things areclearly possible, together with the claim that only a necessary beingprovides a satisfactory ground or explanation for the possibleexistence of contingent beings. So on the assumption that contingentbeings possibly exist, it must be at least possible for God, as anecessary being, to exist (for more on this kind of argument frompossibility, see section 2.3 below).

A second type of Leibnizian argument for God’s real possibilityreturns to the thesis that God is the most perfect being, and addsthat perfections are positive and simple, unanalyzable qualities. So,for example, consider any proposition of the form “AandB are incompatible”, whereA andB are any two perfections. Two properties are incompatibleonly if they are logically incompatible, according to Leibniz. Thus“A andB are incompatible” will be trueonly if one of these perfections turns out to be the negation of theother (as inomniscient andnon-omniscient), or iftheir analyses reveal simpler properties, one of which is a negationof another. But on the assumption that all the divine perfections arepositive, simple, and thus unanalyzable, neither of these scenarioscan obtain. Consequently, “A andB arecompatible” is always true for any two perfections, and thus abeing with all perfections is really possible (Leibniz 1678 [PE]:238–39; Adams 1994: 142–48).

A third Leibnizean response to Mersenne’s objection is that itis rational topresume the real possibility of the things wecan conceive, at least until their impossibility has beendemonstrated.

2.1.4 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Kant’s most famous criticism of the ontological argument isencapsulated in his claim that “existence” (or“exists”) is not a positive determination or “realpredicate” (Kant 1781/1787: A592/B619ff). Alternatively,“existence” is not “a predicate that is added to theconcept of the subject and enlarges it” (A598/B626; see Stang2016 and Pasternack 2018 for discussion). Kant’s idea here isthat since “existence” is not a real predicate, existingcannot be one of God’s perfections.

One way to interpret the objection is as follows:

1. SupposeA andB are two entities, andAis greater thanB att₁. [premise]
2. IfB becomes as great asA att₂, thenB changes. [by (1)]
3. For every entityx, ifx changes, then:
   1. there is a timet₁ at whichx has (orlacks) some propertyP, and
   2. there is a later timet₂ at whichxlacks (or has)P as a result ofx’s acting orbeing acted upon. [premise]
4. For every entityx, ifx comes into existence inreality, conditions (3a) and (3b) are not satisfied. [premise]
5. Therefore, when an entity comes into existence in reality, itdoesn’t change. [by (3), (4)]
6. Therefore,B cannot become as great asA solelyin virtue ofB’s coming into existence in reality. [by(2), (5)]
7. Therefore,A cannot be greater thanB solely invirtue of existing in reality. [by (6)]

(4) is the key premise in this formulation—does coming intoexistence involve a genuine change? There is clearly a technical sensein which saying that a concept applies to something does not enlargethe concept or change our conception of the being it refers to. But itmight remain open that a being that has all perfections but does notexist is not as great as a being that has all perfections and alsoexists.

Kant’s objection can perhaps be avoided altogether by proposingthat the perfection at issue isnecessary existence, and notmere existence. Addingnecessary existence to our concept ofa being would presumably involve changing it (and thus enlarging itsconcept). This is effectively a modal version of the ontologicalargument (seesection 2.1.5).

Kant’s most pressing criticism, in our view, goes back to theissue raised by Mersenne: we cannot determine whether God (conceivedas having necessary existence or not) is really possible. Kant grantsto Leibniz that the notion of a most perfect being may not involve alogical contradiction, but he argues that this is not enough to showthat it is really possible, for there are ways of being impossiblethat do not involve logical contradictions (A602/B630). Theimplication for the ontological argument is that we cannot know orrationally presume that it is really possible for the divineperfections to be jointly exemplified even if we know that theyinvolve no contradiction.

For how can my reason presume to know how the highest realitiesoperate, what effects would arise from them, and what sort of relationall these realities would have to each other? (Kant LPT [AK28:1025–26])

2.1.5 Contemporary Modal Versions

Versions of the ontological argument discussed by Leibniz and Kanthave been elaborated by Robert M. Adams (1971), Alvin Plantinga(1979), Peter van Inwagen (1977, 2009). These versions employcontemporary modal semantics and metaphysics to motivate the followingtwo assumptions:

(Assumption 1):

“It’s possible that God exists” means“there is some possible world in which God exists”.

(Assumption 2):

“God necessarily exists” means “God exists inevery possible world” (i.e., “there is no possible worldin which God doesn’t exist”).

The argument then proceeds as follows:

1. It’s possible that God exists. [premise]
2. Therefore, God exists in some possible world (call itw*). [by (1), (Assumption 1)]
3. If God exists, then God necessarily exists. [by definition of“God”]
4. Therefore, inw* God necessarily exists. [by (2),(3)]
5. Therefore, inw* God is such that God exists in everypossible world [by (4), (Assumption 2)]
6. The actual world is one of the possible worlds [premise]
7. Therefore, inw* God is such that God exists in theactual world [by (5), (6)]
8. Therefore, God exists in the actual world [by (7)]

Critics have resisted numerous aspects of the argument (forcomprehensive discussion, see Oppy 1995). The inference to (7), forinstance, assumes that the actual world is possiblerelativetow*. But that assumption is only legitimate on some modelsof how talk of modality (i.e. of possibility and necessity) works.Thus, the critic claims, it hasn’t been shown thatw*has the relation to the actual world that licenses the conclusion thatGod actually exists.

The most significant disagreement, however, is again the one thatMersenne raised against Descartes. How can the claim aboutmetaphysical possibility in (1) be justified? Adams (1994: ch.8),following Leibniz, claims that we are rationally permitted, in theabsence of strong reasons to the contrary, topresume thereal possibility of most things, including God. Others argue that nosuch presumption of metaphysical possibility is justified, especiallyregarding supersensible things.

2.2 The argument from necessary truths

Leibniz’s argument for God’s existence from the existenceof the necessary truths crucially involves the premises that alltruths are true in virtue of something distinct from them (they needwhat contemporary metaphysicans sometimes call a“truth-maker”). Since necessary truths would be true evenif there were no finite minds to think them, such truths cannot betrue in virtue of facts about human psychology. Against the Platonicsuggestion that they are true in virtue of Forms existing outside ofany mind whatsoever, Leibniz argues that some of the truths are aboutabstract entities, which are not the kinds of things that could havemind-independent existence. The only contender that remains, then, isthat these truths are true in virtue of the ideas in an infinite andnecessarily existent (divine) mind (Leibniz 1714 [PP]: 647; Adams1994: 177ff.).

Leibniz’s argument stakes out one position on the grounding ofnecessary truths, but there are many rival views that do not invokethe existence of a necessary and eternal divine mind. A Platonistmight respond by claiming that it hasn’t been shown thatabstract entities do not have mind-independent existence, whileHumeans would argue that necessary truths are all analytic, and thattherefore only the structure of language or of our conceptual schemesis required to ground their truth.

2.3 The argument from possibility

A third sort ofa priori proof argues from facts about themere possibility of something (or of some collection of things) to theexistence of a “ground of possibility” that somehowexplains them. An early version of such an argument can be found inAugustine and the Neo-Platonic tradition, but the canonicalpresentations of this sort of “possibility proof” are inLeibniz’sMonadology (1714) and, much more elaborately,in Kant’s book-length treatise calledThe Only PossibleBasis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763). Notethat if truths about what is possible are necessary truths, as theyindeed seem to be, then this might be a more specific version of theargument from necessary truths (see2.2).

Kant’s version of the argument is based on the claim that thereare real possibilities that are not grounded in the principle ofnon-contradiction, but that nevertheless must have a ground orexplanation (Kant 1763 [AK 2: 63ff]). If they are not grounded in theprinciple of non-contradiction, then they are not grounded inGod’s thinking them rather than their negations, which is howLeibniz had proposed that all such possibilities are grounded. Put theother way around, Kant thinks that someimpossibilities aregroundednot in the law of non-contradiction, but in anon-logical kind of “real repugnance” between two or moreof their properties. Kant maintains, for instance, that it isimpossible for a material being to be conscious, even though nological contradiction exists betweenmaterial andconscious (Kant 1763 [AK 2: 85–6]). It follows thatthis impossibility is not grounded in divine thought, for God canthink any proposition that does not involve a contradiction. So factsabout some real possibilities and real impossibilities can only begrounded in a necessary being that somehowexemplifies(rather than merely thinking) every combination of fundamentalproperties whose joint exemplification is really possible. That being,of course, is supposed to be God. (For discussion, see Fisher andWatkins 1998; Adams 2000; Chignell 2009, 2012, 2014, 2023; Stang 2010;Abaci 2014; Yong 2014; Hoffer 2016; Abaci 2019; Oberst 2018,2020).

One way out of this argument is simply to claim that some realpossibilities are primitive or ungrounded. This appears to be anoption for Kant in his critical period insofar as he is no longercommitted to rationalist principles such as the Principle ofSufficient Reason (see Abaci 2019). Still, even in his critical period(i.e., after 1770 or so), Kant never repudiated the earlierproof—and supposedly claimed in a lecture from the 1780s that it“can in no way be refuted” (Kant LPT [AK 28: 1034]). Thissuggests that in his critical period Kant still held that God’sexistence is the only available ground for real possibility, but thatthe explanatory point may justify at most a kind of theoretical belief(Glaube) rather than full demonstrative knowledge (seeChignell 2009, Stang 2016, and Oberst 2020).

3.A posteriori Arguments

3.1 The classical cosmological argument

Ana posteriori argument involves at least one premise whosejustification essentially appeals to some sort of empirical fact orexperience. The main demonstrativea posteriori argument iswhat Kant dubbed “the cosmological argument”. It ismotivated by the familiar question “Why is there somethingrather than nothing?” and goes from the empirical fact of theexistence of something (or of the cosmos as a whole, perhaps) to theexistence of a first cause or ground of that cosmos that is, at leastin part, not identical to that cosmos. Cosmological arguments arefound across almost every philosophical tradition, and find prominencein the West in the writings of Aristotle, Avicenna,al-Ghāzāli, Maimonides, Aquinas, Locke, Leibniz, SamuelClarke, and David Hume. Here we will start with Avicenna, but thenfocus largely on the early modern period (see the entry on theCosmological Argument; and Rowe 1975 and Almeida 2018 for generaldiscussions).

Avicenna (980–1037), whose Arabic name is Ibn Sina, sets outcosmological arguments in a number of works, but a detailed version isfound in hisRemarks and Admonitions (Kitab al-Isharat wal-Tanbihat) (Avicenna [ISR]; Mayer 2001). He begins with a claimabout contingently existing things: since it is possible for acontingent thing either to exist or not to exist, whether it exists ornot hangs in the balance (ISR, Class 4, Chapter 10). But then, if acontingent thing does exist, there must be something external to it, acause, that accounts for its existing rather than not. Thisestablishes a principle crucial to the argument: the existence of anycontingent thing is from [caused by] something distinct from it.Avicenna next considers the aggregate of all the existing contingentindividual things or “units” – past, present, andfuture – the totality, and proposes and evaluates four optionsfor accounting for the totality’s existence (ISR, Class 4, ch.12):

1. The existence of the totality does not require a cause. However,given the principle that the existence of any contingent thing musthave a cause, the world would then have to exist necessarily. But theworld’s existing necessarily is ruled out by the fact that allof the units in it are contingent things.
2. The cause of the existence of the totality is “the units init all together.” But then the world would cause itself toexist, which is ruled out by the principle that the existence of anycontingent thing requires a cause distinct from it.
3. The cause of the totality is some (subset) of the units in it. Buteach of those individual units are caused to exist by other units inthe world, so no one unit is qualified to be the cause of theexistence of the totality.
4. The only remaining option is that the existence of the totalityhas a cause distinct from the totality. Because all of thecontingently existing things or units are in the totality, the causemust be that whose existence is necessary in itself. (ISR, Class 4,ch. 15)

Avicenna is fully aware that the argument shouldn’t end here,since it must be shown that the necessarily existing thing is God, andhe provides a number of considerations in favor of this claim (Adamson2013).

Avicenna’s cosmological argument from the contingency of theworld contrasts with another major type of argument for God’sexistence in Islamic natural theology, one that aims to demonstratethe existence of God from the beginning of the world in time.Al-Ghazali (1056-1111), inThe Incoherence of thePhilosophers, develops this type of argument in two steps. Thefirst aims to establish, against a prominent Aristotelian tradition,that the world is not eternal but has a beginning in time. The secondstep reasons that for any being that begins to exist at a time, theremust be something that determines that it comes to exist at that time.And thus, because the world begins to exist at a time, there must besomething which determines that it comes to exist at that time. Asal-Ghazali puts it, “every being which begins has a cause forits beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, itpossesses a cause for its beginning.” He then argues that itmust be God who by free choice determines that the world comes toexist at the time it does, and we can thus conclude that God exists.These argumentative themes are characteristic features of theAsh’arite theological tradition in Islam; in recent times,al-Ghazali’s argument has been defended by William Lane Craig(1979).

Leibniz’s cosmological argument (Leibniz 1697 [PE]:149–55; 1714 [PP]: 646, [PE]: 218–19) does not assume orattempt to establish that the world, the collection of all actualcontingent beings, has a beginning in time, and in this respect itmore closely resembles Avicenna’s argument thanal-Ghazali’s. Leibniz argues as follows: suppose that in factthe world has no beginning in time, and that each being in the worldhas an explanation in some previously existing being(s). Two demandsfor explanation might still arise: Why is there a world at all ratherthan none? and: Why does this world exist and not some other world?Neither explanation can be provided by appealing solely to entitieswithin the world (or within time). Leibniz’s conclusion is thatthere must be a being that is not merely hypothetically, butabsolutely necessary, and whose own explanation is containedwithin itself. This being is God. (See Pruss 2009 for discussion; asimilar cosmological argument is advanced around the same time bySamuel Clarke 1705, see also the entry onSamuel Clarke).

David Hume puts forward three main objections to the type ofcosmological argument offered by Leibniz and Clarke (Hume 1779, PartIX, and the entryHume on religion). The first is that the notion of (absolutely) necessary existenceitself is problematic. Suppose that some being is absolutelynecessary—then its nonexistence should be absolutelyinconceivable. But, says Hume, for any being whose existence we canconceive, we can also conceive its nonexistence, and thus itisn’t a necessary being. Hume anticipates the objection that ifwe truly understood the divine nature, we would be unable to conceiveGod’s nonexistence. He replies that an analogous point can bemade about matter: for all we know, if we truly understood the natureof matter, we would be unable to conceive its nonexistence. This wouldshow that the existence of matter is not contingent after all, andthat it does not require an external explanation. Thus, by parity, thecosmological argument does not establish that God is the necessarybeing who is responsible for the rest of the cosmos.

Hume’s second objection is that God cannot be the causalexplanation of the existence of a series of contingent beings that hasno temporal beginning, since any causal relation “implies apriority in time and a beginning of existence” (Hume 1779, PartIV). In reply, it seems quite possible to conceive of a non-temporalcausal relation, and thus to conceive of God, from outside of time,causing a series of contingent beings that has always existed. Indeed,this view is common in the theological tradition. Moreover, as Kantalong with numerous contemporary metaphysicians argue, we cancoherently conceive of a relation ofsimultaneous causation.If this is right, then even a God who is in time could ground theexistence of a series of contingent beings with no temporalbeginning.

Hume’s third objection is that in a causal series of contingentbeings without a temporal beginning, each being will have a causalexplanation by virtue of its predecessors. Since there is no firstbeing, there will be a causal explanation for every contingent beingon the basis of previously existing contingent beings. However, ifeach individual contingent being has a causal explanation, then theentire causal series has an explanation. For wholes are nothing overand above their parts:

did I show you the particular causes of each individual in acollection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it veryunreasonable should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of thewhole twenty. (Part IV)

A reply to this last objection might be that even if one has explainedin this way the existence of each individual in the contingent series,one still has not answered the two questions mentioned earlier: Why isthere a world at all rather than none? and: Why does this world existand not some other world? (for further discussion, see Rowe 1975;Swinburne 2004; Pruss 2006; O’Connor 2008, 2013).

Kant, too, objects to the cosmological argument, but mainly on thegrounds that it delivers an object that is inadequate to the classicalconception of God. Any effort to turn the ultimate ground into themost perfect of all beings, Kant says, will have to smuggle in somesort of ontological argument (see Pasternack 2001; Forgie 2003; Proops2014, 2021; and the entry onKant’s philosophy of religion).

In general, objections to the cosmological argument (both historicaland contemporary) take one of the following forms:

1. not every fact requires explanation, and the fact that thecosmological arguer is pointing to is one of those;
2. each being in the cosmos has an explanation, but the cosmos as anentire series does not require anadditional explanation,over and above the explanations of each member of the series;
3. the sort of explanation required to explain the empirical datacited by the cosmological arguer does not amount to a supernaturalexplanation (e.g., the Big Bang could suffice);
4. the sort of explanation required to explain the empirical datacited by the cosmological arguer is not going to deliver anything asaugust as the God of traditional religious doctrine but rather, inHume’s terms, a somewhat “mediocre deity”.

3.2 Teleological or design arguments

The Greek word “telos” means “end” or“purpose”. Thea posteriori arguments in naturaltheology that are referred to as “teleological” claim thatthe natural world displays some sort of purposive or end-directeddesign, and that this licenses the conclusion that the natural worldhas a very powerful and intelligent designer (see the entry onteleological arguments for God’s existence). Earlier authors dubbed this sort of non-demonstrative, inductiveargument a “physico-theological” argument (see, e.g.,William Derham 1713).

Teleological arguments can be found in numerous traditions and timeperiods, including the classical Greek and Roman context (see Sedley2008) and the Indian philosophical tradition (see Brown 2008). In thewest the argument is primarily associated with William Paley(1743–1805), although in fact this type of argument wasdiscussed by numerous early modern figures before him (see Taliaferro2005, DeCruz and DeSmedt 2015). The fact that Paley’s 1802 bookwas calledNatural Theology is no doubt part of why naturaltheology as a whole is sometimes equated with theaposteriori investigations of nature for the purposes ofsupporting religious theses. In the analogy that made Paley’sargument famous, the relationship between a watch and a watch-maker istaken to be saliently similar to the relationship between the naturalworld and its author. If we were to go walking upon the heath andstumble upon a watch, a quick examination of its inner workings wouldreveal, with a high probability, that “its several parts wereframed and put together for a purpose” by what must have been“an intelligence” (1802: 1–6). Likewise with theuniverse as a whole.

A different kind of teleological argument is developed by GeorgeBerkeley (1685–1753), for whom natural, physical objects do notexist independently of minds, but consist solely in ideas. Given theregularity, complexity, and involuntariness of our sensory ideas,their source (Berkeley argues) must be an infinitely powerful,benevolent mind that produces these ideas in us in a lawlike fashion.God’s existence can also be demonstrated from the harmony andbeauty that the ideas of the world display (Berkeley 1710: §146).Since according to Berkeley our ordinary experience is a type ofdirect divine communication with us, our relationship with God is inthis respect especially intimate. Thus he frequently remarks, quotingSt. Paul, that “in God we live and move and have ourbeing” (Acts 17:28).

3.2.1 Hume on the teleological argument

Hume’sDialogues Concerning Natural Religion pre-datePaley, of course, but they feature an especially influential andelegant critical discussion of teleological arguments (1779), adiscussion of which Paley was no doubt aware. (In fact, Paley may haverestyled his argument as an inference-to-best explanation in an effortto avoid some of Hume’s criticisms.)

Hume’s assault on the teleological argument begins byformulating it as follows (compare Pereboom 1996, 2010):

1. Nature is a great machine, composed of lesser machines, all ofwhich exhibit order (especially adaptation of means to ends).[premise]
2. Machines caused by human minds exhibit order (especiallyadaptation of means to ends). [premise]
3. Nature resembles machines caused by human minds. [by (1),(2)]
4. If effects resemble each other, their causes resemble each otheras well. [premise]
5. The cause of nature resembles human minds. [by (3), (4)]
6. Greater effects demand greater causes (causes adequate to theeffects). [premise]
7. Nature is much greater than machines caused by human minds.[premise]
8. The cause of nature resembles but is much greater than humanminds. [by (5), (6), (7)]
9. The cause of nature is God. [by (8)]
10. Therefore, God exists. [by (9)]

Hume’s objections to this argument include the claims that theanalogies on which it is dependent are not exact, and thus that thereare alternative explanations for order and apparent design in theuniverse. One response to these objections is that the teleologicalargument should be conceived as an argument to thebestexplanation, on the model of many scientific arguments. In that casethe analogy need not be exact, but might still show that a theisticexplanation is best (and again, Paley himself may have recognizedthis). Hume, in the voice of his character Philo, concedes

that the works of nature bear a great analogy to the productions ofart is evident; and according to all the rules of good reasoning, weought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causeshave a proportional analogy. (Part XII)

But Philo also affirms that we cannot infer any important similaritiesbetween humans and the author of nature beyond intelligence, and inparticular we cannot infer some of the divine attributes that are mostimportant for sustaining traditional theistic religion (Part V). Mostsignificantly, given the evil that there is in the universe, we cannotconclude that its designer has the moral qualities traditionalreligion requires God to have (Part X). Thus, again, we are left witha rather “mediocre deity”.

One of Hume’s neglected objections to the teleological argumentis that it generates an absurd infinite regress (Part IV). If theorder and apparent design in the material universe are explained bydivine intelligence, what explains the order and apparent design thatgive rise to intelligence in the divine mind? By dint of the reasoningemployed in the teleological argument, it would have to be asuper-divine intelligence. But what explains the order and apparentdesign that give rise to super-divine intelligence? An absurd infiniteregress results, and to avoid it one might well suppose the materialworld “contain[s] the principle of order withinitself”.

To this Hume has the theist Cleanthes reply that

even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it anyobjection that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answerevery new question which may incessantly be started?

This seems right: in scientific theorizing it is no decisive objectionagainst an explanation that it contains entities that are themselvesnot fully explained. Crucial to the value of scientific explanationsis that they supply an explanatoryadvance, and we canreasonably believe that a theory does so without our having in handcomplete explanations for all of the entities it posits.

3.2.2 The teleological argument from fine-tuning

In recent decades, some natural theologians have developed aninductive argument for the existence of God that appeals to the factthat the fundamental features of the universe are fine-tuned for theexistence of life. According to many physicists, the fact that theuniverse can support life depends delicately on various of itsfundamental characteristics, notably the values of certain constantsof nature, the specific character of certain fundamental laws, andaspects of the universe’s conditions in its very early stages.The core claim of the argument is that without an intelligentdesigner, it would be improbable that the constants, laws, and initialconditions were fine-tuned for life.

William Lane Craig (see e.g., Craig 1990, 2003) develops a version ofthis argument, which proceeds as follows. The world is conditionedprincipally by the values of the fundamental constants:

• a: the fine structure constant, or electromagneticinteraction;
• mn/me: proton to electron mass ratio;
• aG: gravitation;
• aw: the weak force; and
• as: the strong force.

When one imagines these constants being different, one discovers thatin fact the number of observable universes, that is to say, universescapable of supporting intelligent life, is very small. Just a slightvariation in any one of these values would render life impossible. Forexample, if the strong force (as) were increased as much as1%, nuclear resonance levels would be so altered that almost allcarbon would be burned into oxygen; an increase of 2% would precludeformation of protons out of quarks, preventing the existence of atoms.Furthermore, weakening the strong force by as much as 5% would unbinddeuteron, which is essential to stellar nucleosynthesis, leading to auniverse composed only of hydrogen. It has been estimated that thestrong force must be within 0.8 and 1.2 its actual strength or allelements of atomic weight greater than four would not have formed. Oragain, if the weak force had been appreciably stronger, then the BigBang’s nuclear burning would have proceeded past helium to iron,making fusion-powered stars impossible. But if it had been muchweaker, then we should have had a universe entirely of helium. Oragain, if gravitationaG had been a little greater, all starswould have been red dwarfs, which are too cold to support life-bearingplanets. If it had been a little smaller, the universe would have beencomposed exclusively of blue giants, which burn too briefly for lifeto develop. This gives us reason to believe that there is anintelligent designer who fine-tuned the universe as we actually findit.

The debate surrounding the fine-tuning argument is technically complex(a detailed summary is available in the entry onfine-tuning). Here we discuss some of the most pressing issues.

As noted, a core claim of the argument as widely understood is thatthe fine-tuning for life of the constants, laws, and initialconditions would be deeply improbable without an intelligent designerof the universe. One question concerns the notion of probability atwork in this claim. Contemporary accounts usually appeal to anepistemic notion of probability (e.g., Monton 2006), by contrast withphysical and logical alternatives. On this reading, the core claim isthat fine-tuning for life without an intelligent designer isimprobable in the sense that we should not expect it without such abeing, or that without such a being we should be surprised that thereis such fine-tuning (Leslie 1989, van Inwagen 1993, Bostrom 2002:23–41; Manson and Thrush 2003: 78–82).

Given this understanding of the core improbability claim, some critics(e.g., Carlson and Olsson 1998) have argued that the fine-tuning atissue requires no explanation. Any specific sequence of heads andtails in a long series of coin tosses is improbable in this sense;that is, any one sequence would be one we wouldn’t andshouldn’t expect. But no specific sequence requires anexplanation other than that it was randomly generated. So why shouldthe finely-tuned actual array of constants, laws, and initialconditions require an explanation other than an appeal to randomness?Many, however, disagree, and argue that the availability ofexplanatory hypotheses with intuitive pull, such as an intelligentdesigner or a multiverse (discussed below), indicates that a moresubstantive explanation for fine-tuning is required (e.g., Leslie1989).

A number of critics press the objection that we should not besurprised that we observe features of the universe that are requiredfor our own existence. If the constants, laws, and initial conditionswere incompatible with our existence, we would not be here to observethis. In Elliot Sober’s (2003, cf. 2019) analysis, what’sat work here is the observer selection effect, which tends to resultin a certain bias. In this case, our observations are biased towardfine-tuning because we would not have existed to make theseobservations had the universe not been fine-tuned for life. But anybias resulting from an observer selection effect should be factoredout and set aside, and this is so for the fine-tuning at issue.

Critics of this line of reasoning cite examples in which it appears togoes awry. In John Leslie’s (1989) example, you are draggedbefore a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen. The command is given;you hear the deafening sound of the guns. But then there you are,surprised to be observing the aftermath, and that you are still alive.Now consider the hypothesis that the marksmen intended to miss, whichseems a reasonable option for explaining why you’re still alive.But notice that this case features an observation selection effectanalogous to the one Sober proposes for fine-tuning: you can’tobserve the aftermath unless you survive the firing squad. OnSober’s recommendation, observation selection effects should befactored out and set aside. But on this recommendation your stillbeing alive wouldn’t require an explanation, and wewouldn’t have reason to accept the explanation that the marksmenintended to miss. So, according to the critics, there must besomething wrong with Sober’s analysis.

Leslie (1989) proposes that the hypothesis of multiple universes,i.e., of the multiverse, would provide an explanation for fine-tuningfor life (see Friederich 2021 for a discussion of the notion of amultiverse). Here is his analogy (which involves guns again, oddly).You are alone at night in an extremely dark forest when a gun is firedfrom far away and you are hit. If you assume that there is no one outto get you, this would be surprising. But now suppose that you werenot in fact alone, but instead part of a large crowd (which you do notsee because it’s so dark). In that case, Leslie suggests, youwould be less surprised at being shot, since it seems at leastsomewhat likely that a gunman would be trying to shoot someone in thecrowd. Leslie suggests that this story supports the multiverseexplanation for the universe being fine-tuned for life; (see Bradley2009 for a formal version of this argument; see Juhl 2007 for acritical assessment).

Roger White (2000) contends that there is a problem withLeslie’s account. While the multiverse hypothesis would explainwhythere is some universe or other that is fine-tuned forlife, since it would raise the probability of that hypothesis, itwould not similarly explain whythis universe is fine-tuned forlife. He contends that supposing that the gunman was firing atrandom, being part of a large crowd explains—raises theprobability—thatsomeone or other is shot, butnotthat you are shot. By contrast, the hypothesis that thegunman was aiming at you, as opposed to firing at random, does explainin this way that you are shot. Similarly, the multiverse hypothesisexplainsthat there is some universe or other that is fine-tunedfor life, but notthat this universe is fine-tuned forlife. By contrast, in White’s view the hypothesis of anintelligent designer does explain why—raises theprobability—that this universe is fine-tuned for life. Whiteargues:

Postulate as many other universes as you wish, they do not make it anymore likely that ours should be life-permitting or that we should behere. So our good fortune to exist in a life-permitting universe givesus no reason to suppose that there are many universes (White 2000:274; see Rota 2005 for another theistic response to the multiversehypothesis).

3.3 Arguments from religious experience

Arguments for the existence of God from a special kind of experienceare often called “arguments from religious experience”.Some philosophers and theologians have argued that our ordinary humancognitive faculties include what John Calvin called a special“sense of divinity” that, when not impeded or blocked,will deliver immediately justified beliefs about supernatural entities(Plantinga 1981, 1984, 1993a, 1993b, 2000). Some such thinkers, then,might construe an argument from religious experience as belonging tothe category of natural religion or natural theology. Others, however,insist that “characteristic of the Continental Calvinisttradition is a revulsion against arguments in favor of theism orChristianity” (Wolterstorff 1984: 7; see also Sudduth 2009). Inany case, most authors who write about religious experience generallyconstrue it as caused by something other than our ordinary facultiesand their intersubjectively available objects, and thus do not thinkof it as one of the topics of natural theology (see Davis 1989, Alston1991, Kwan 2006).

See the entry onreligious experience for expansive discussion of this issue.

4. “Ramified” Natural Theology

Some supporters of natural religion or natural theology seek to useour ordinary cognitive faculties to support theses that are morerobust and specific than those of generic or“perfect-being” theism. This project has recently beendubbed “ramified” natural theology by Richard Swinburne(see Holder 2013). A few of these efforts involvea prioriargumentation: an ancient argument for the Trinity (found in St.Augustine (De Trinitate, c. 399–419, Book IX), andRichard of St. Victor (De Trinitate, c. 1162–1173,III.1–25)) is that any supreme being would have to be asupremely loving being, and any omnipotent supremely loving beingwould ultimately have to emanate from itself something that is bothother and yet just as supreme and lovable as itself, and that a thirdsuch person would be necessary as a kind of product of that lovebetween the first two. Marilyn McCord Adams’s books on theodicy(Adams 2000, 2006) and Eleonore Stump’s Gifford Lectures (Stump2010) constitute an effort to consider thea priori problemof evil from within the context of a ramified (and thus in this casemore robustly Christian) kind of natural theology.

But most ramified natural theology is inductive in spirit: thus HugoGrotius divides hisDe veritate religionis Christianae (1627)into a first book that deals with classical natural theology but thenlater books that deal specifically with the truth of Christianity.John Locke (1695) argued for the “Reasonableness ofChristianity” using a broadly historical, probabilisticapproach. William Paley (1794) further developed this approach, andmuch more recently Swinburne argued for the conclusion thatBayesian-style reasoning justifies belief in the resurrection of Jesuswith a probability of 97% (Swinburne 2003). Numerous otherphilosophers (and also many natural scientists) appeal to historicaland scientific data as well as empirical and statistical principles ofreasoning to support the authenticity of various biblical claims, theprobability of various miracle stories, and so forth (see e.g., Olding1990; Polkinghorne 2009; Gauch Jr. 2011). Note that this is a way ofappealing to the content of sacred texts and special revelation whichis consistent with the methods of natural theology: the prophetic orhistorical claims of those texts are evaluated using public evidenceand accepted canons of inductive reasoning. Still, even optimisticnatural theologians like Locke, Paley, Swinburne, and these otherscount as hybridists insofar as they think there are some importantdoctrines about the divine that cannot be justified by our naturalcognitive faculties. Thus even they will at some point be willing (inKant’s famous phrase) to “deny knowledge in order to leaveroom for faith” (1787, Bxxx).

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Acknowledgments

Our thanks to Monica Burnett, Ryan Darr, Hugh Gauch, Chad McIntosh,Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval, and Daniel Rubio for helpful feedback onearlier drafts of this entry.