Buddhism represents a vast and rich intellectual tradition which,until recently, received very little influence from Westernphilosophy. This tradition contains a variety of teachings about howto live and what to do in various situations. Buddhism tells us topurify our own minds and to develop lovingkindness and compassion forall beings. The various forms of Buddhism offer systematic frameworksfor understanding the traits of character and types of actions thatcause problems for ourselves and others, as well as those qualitiesand actions that help to heal the suffering of the world. Whenstarting a Buddhist path, one agrees to follow rules of moraldiscipline that forbid various destructive actions; but once the mindhas reached a very high degree of spiritual development, the rules aretranscended and one acts spontaneously for the benefit of others.

Buddhism upholds lofty and demanding ethical values, but recognizesthe need to adapt those values to the conditions of the real world.From a Buddhist point of view, animal life is precious, and human lifeis even more so. Ideally we should refrain from killing animals, adopta vegetarian diet, renounce all forms of violence and live in harmonywith nature. Yet there are some difficult cases in which violence andkilling seem almost unavoidable. Some Buddhist writers have offeredguidance on how to act appropriately and realistically in suchsituations, without abandoning the compassion and lovingkindness thatform the basis of the Buddhist approach to ethics.

• 1. Basic Teachings of Buddhist Ethics
• 2. Forms of Buddhist Ethics
• 3. Theoretical Structure of Buddhist Ethics
• 4. Beyond Moral Discipline
• 5. Animals and the Environment
• 6. War, Violence and Punishment
• 7. Abortion and Euthanasia
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Basic Teachings of Buddhist Ethics

The main goal of Buddhist practice is to reach freedom from sufferingby coming to see the world as it actually is and abandoning thedistorted projections that our thoughts and emotions create. A veryimportant means to reach this goal is to refrain from destructiveactions, since these actions cause harm to others and create mentaldisturbances in us that generate suffering and keep us from seeingthings as they are. Moreover, according to Buddhist teachings, thosewho reach the goal of freedom thenceforward act in a loving andcompassionate manner towards others, helping these others in turn tobe more happy and free. Ethical action is thus both an important partof the Buddhist path and an important aspect of the results said toflow from that path.

There is no word in Buddhist languages such as Sanskrit, Pāli andTibetan that exactly corresponds to the English word“ethics.” The term most commonly translated as“ethics” is Sanskritśīla (Pālisīla, Tib.tshul khrims.) But this wordactually means something more like “moral discipline”;someone hasśīla when, having made a commitment tofollow a certain set of moral rules, she is actually disposed tofollow those rules.

There are central concepts of Western ethical theory that have noexact equivalent in Buddhist texts. It’s not clear that Buddhistthinkers have a concept of moral obligation at all. Moreover, Buddhisttexts often make points which we can understand in terms of thedistinction between intrinsic and instrumental value – that is,the distinction between what is valuable in itself and what isvaluable as a means to bring about something else. But they have notechnical terms that correspond to “intrinsic value” and“instrumental value.” And many statements that can be readas being about ethics can also be understood in a non-normative way,as descriptions of how a spiritually developed being actuallybehaves.

Nevertheless, there are many statements in Buddhist scriptures andtreatises that are hard to understand otherwise than as ethicalclaims. The Sanskrit termskuśala andśubha are used in a strongly evaluative way and oftentranslated as “good,” though in some contexts there areother possible translations (“skillful” forkuśala, “beautiful” forśubha). Buddhist texts talk about what we should do, andhold up models of spectacular altruism for our admiration andemulation. And Buddhism attaches considerable importance to systems ofrules that codify moral discipline.

A consideration that has motivated many Buddhists to vow to followrules of moral discipline is a wish to avoid the karmic consequencesof actions that harm others. These consequences have traditionallybeen understood largely in terms of rebirth in the various realms ofcyclic existence. In the earliest texts, there are five such realms:the hells, the worlds of hungry ghosts, animals, and humans, and theheavenly worlds of the gods (Skt.deva). Later texts add asixth realm, that of the titans (Skt.asura).

The hells are terrible places of torture and suffering, in whichbeings who are dominated by anger and hatred are cut to pieces,burned, frozen, and tormented by demonic apparitions that are in factprojections of their own distorted minds. Hungry ghosts are depictedwith large bellies and tiny mouths; driven by greed, they seekendlessly for something to eat or drink, but even when they find amorsel they can swallow, it turns into filth or fire in their mouths.Animals are seen as dominated by stupidity, limited to a fixed set ofpossible behaviors and primarily trying simply to survive. In thissystem, the human world is primarily characterized by the instrumentalpursuit of objects of desire. The titans are powerful beings who livein relatively pleasant circumstances, but are driven bycompetitiveness and obsessively envious of the splendor of the gods.They continually plot to invade the heavens. Unfortunately for thetitans, when they actually do battle with the gods, they always lose.The gods of the lower heavens, the heavens of desire, live in palacesof astonishing beauty and exquisite sensual pleasure. Blinded bypride, they disregard the suffering of those below them and ignore thefact that their high status is impermanent: they, too, will die. Atthe top of cyclic existence, in the heavens of form and the formlessheavens, other gods rest in a state of peaceful, quiet bliss, withalmost no manifest suffering and for vast, but finite, periods oftime.

Actions motivated by greed, hatred and delusion have a tendency todrive those who do them into the three lower realms of suffering: thehells, the hungry ghost realm, and the animal realm. Actions carriedout with better motivations, but still infused with a sense of self,tend to produce rebirth in the three higher realms of titans, humans,and gods. Vast numbers of sentient beings are trapped in this cycle,continually wandering from one realm to another, unable to escape andforced to experience the forms of suffering that exist in each realm.The human realm is particularly fortunate, because it is only in thisrealm that one can attain Awakening, which liberates one from thewhole cycle.

Some modern teachers have interpreted the doctrine of the six realmsas a psychological process unfolding in this one life: the realms areunderstood as the different ways we understand the world when underthe influence of the reactive emotions of anger, greed, stupidity,desire, competitiveness, and pride. (See, e.g., McLeod 2002,146–51.) But historically, most Buddhists have taken this systemliterally, as a cosmological account of how the world works and whathappens when we die. Therefore, to avoid the actions most likely todrive them into the lower realms, many Buddhists have undertaken toobey rules of moral discipline.

The two most important systems of moral discipline in Buddhism are theFive Precepts, which apply to lay people, and the Vows of IndividualLiberation (Skt.prātimokṣa) which apply to monksand nuns. Accepting these commitments is a crucial part of whatdefines someone as a Buddhist lay person or as a Buddhist monastic.The Five Precepts are quite similar to basic lists of prohibitions inother great world religions: those who take them make a commitment torefrain from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, anddrunkenness. The Vows of Individual Liberation are stricter, rulingout all forms of sexual activity and laying down detailed regulationsfor monastic etiquette and deportment.

Following the Five Precepts is said to lead to rebirth as a human andprevent rebirth in one of the lower realms of suffering. This form ofmoral discipline helps people develop self-respect, so that they areconfident in appearing in any gathering. It prevents many forms oftrouble and suffering that harmful actions produce for both the agentand others. Meanwhile, the Vows of Individual Liberation help themonastic community function in a way that serves the spiritualdevelopment of the monks and nuns. They also create a foundation formeditation practice that leads toward freedom.

Other notable aspects of Buddhist moral discipline are captured in alist known as the Ten Good Courses of Action (Pālidasa-kusala-kamma-patha). In the Tibetan tradition, these arereferred to simply as the Ten Virtues (dge ba bcu). They arenegatively phrased: each of the Ten Good Courses of Action justconsists in refraining from the corresponding element of the Ten BadCourses of Action (mi dge ba bcu). The Ten Bad Courses ofAction are:

1. Taking life
2. Stealing
3. Sexual misconduct
4. Lying
5. Divisive speech
6. Harsh speech
7. Idle chitchat
8. Covetousness
9. Malice
10. Wrong view

(See Keown, 1992, 30 for this list, with somewhat differenttranslations.) Note that the behaviors forbidden by four of the fiveprecepts are included in this list, with the exception of drunkenness.The reason for omitting drunkenness may be that getting drunk does notnecessarily harm others, though it may put one in a state in which therisk of harming others is much greater.

The Ten Bad Courses of Action are traditionally classified into threeactions of the body (1–3), four forms of speech (4–7), andthree mental states (8–10). Among the actions of speech,divisive speech means speaking in a way as to aggravate conflict anddivide friends from each other. Harsh speech is speech motivated byanger that wounds another emotionally through insulting and severelycritical words. Idle chitchat is speech which fills time and absorbsattention without communicating anything of practical or spiritualimportance.

The three mental states on the list are closely related to the threepoisons, which are among the most fundamental psychological causes ofthe cycle of existence and the suffering that comes with it. The threepoisons are attraction, aversion and indifference. When we encounteran experience that appears to strengthen and confirm our sense ofself, we are attracted to that experience and attempt to prolong orrepeat it. When an experience appears to threaten our sense of self,we react with aversion, trying to avoid it or push it away. Anyexperience that doesn’t fall into these two categories seemsunimportant; since we are indifferent to it, we ignore thatexperience. Thus, in Buddhist teachings, indifference is very closelyassociated with ignorance, confusion, and incorrect understandings ofthe way things are. Completely overcoming these three poisons leads toliberation from cyclic existence, compassion, joy, freedom, andhappiness.

2. Forms of Buddhist Ethics

The lineages of Buddhism that have survived to the present day can begrouped into three traditions: Theravāda, Mahāyāna, andVajrayāna. The Theravāda, or “Teaching of theElders,” is the dominant form of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and inthe Southeast Asian nations of Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, and Laos.The Mahāyāna, or “Great Way,” originated inIndia, but is now the principal form of Buddhism in the Chinesecultural sphere, which includes China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. EastAsian forms of the Mahāyāna are outside the scope of thisarticle, but I will discuss Indian texts from the early period of thistradition. The Vajrayāna, or “Diamond Way,” ispracticed by Buddhists in the Himalayas and parts of Central Asia,including Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Mongolia. A small number ofJapanese Buddhists also belong to the Vajrayāna.

Both historically and doctrinally, the principal difference betweenthe Theravāda and the Mahāyāna lies in the goals theyrecommend. Most Theravāda practitioners aspire to become Saints(Skt.Arhat, PāliArahant). The life in whichsomeone becomes a Saint is that person’s last life; this personwill no longer be reborn, but will instead enter Nirvana at death. Asmall minority of Theravādins, however, aspire to become Buddhas.As they understand that goal, a Buddha is someone who rediscovers thetruths of Buddhism after they have been lost to the world, and teachesthem to others so as to benefit them. The Theravāda traditionmaintains that, like Saints, Buddhas pass into Nirvana at death.Becoming a Buddha is believed to be more difficult and take more timethan becoming a Saint; it is a demanding path for a small minority. Apractitioner who is on the way to becoming a Buddha is known inSanskrit as a bodhisattva (Pālibodhisatta).

By contrast, all serious Mahāyānists take the bodhisattvavow, promising to become Buddhas in order to help all beings. Indeed,some scholars have concluded that the Mahāyāna movementbegan within the framework of early Buddhism as a group ofpractitioners holding the same doctrines and embracing the samerituals as their fellow Buddhists, and distinguished only by theircommon choice to follow the path to Buddhahood. However, over time,many other differences evolved. In particular, matureMahāyāna traditions tend to hold that those who have becomeBuddhas, even after they die, continue to manifest in various formsand in various parts of cyclic existence in order to carry on the workof benefiting beings. They will remain in cyclic existence until allsentient beings have reached liberation.

Followers of Vajrayāna also embrace the commitment to becomeBuddhas for the benefit of all beings. The Vajrayāna can be seenas a branch of the Mahāyāna, since it shares the samespiritual goal. The main differences between the Vajrayāna andother forms of Mahāyāna concern ritual, iconography, andmeditation techniques. Those who practice Vajrayāna seek toattain Mahāyāna goals using Tantric means.

The Theravāda is the only surviving tradition of Buddhism that isnot Mahāyāna. But at one time, there were many suchtraditions: eighteen, according to one influential classification.However, apart from the Theravāda, all of these traditions havedied out. There is no generally accepted term to refer collectively toall the Buddhist lineages that held Sainthood as their primaryspiritual aspiration. In Mahāyāna texts, these forms ofBuddhism are calledHīnayāna, the “lesservehicle”, a pejorative term. More neutrally, these textssometimes refer to Buddhists who aspire to Sainthood as Disciples(Skt.Śrāvaka) and their path as the Way of theDisciples (Skt.Śrāvaka-yāna). Some scholarshave proposed the term “Mainstream Buddhism.”

Mahāyāna texts repeatedly affirm the superiority of theirapproach to the non-Mahāyāna forms of Buddhist practice.According to these texts, the Disciples wish to attain Nirvana forthemselves alone, so that they disregard the needs of others. Sincethey choose a less difficult path, their aspiration is inferior. Sincethey propose to abandon other beings trapped in the prison of cyclicexistence, on this account, the Disciples lack compassion.

These criticisms may be unfair; it can be argued that they aredirected at a straw man and not at the real Theravāda tradition.Most lineages of Buddhism, including the Theravāda, value andpractice the Four Divine Abidings (Pālibrahma-vihāra), also known as the Four Immeasurables.These are lovingkindness (Pālimetta), compassion(karuṇā), joy (pamudita) and equanimity(upekkhā). The content of lovingkindness is a wish forothers to be happy. Lovingkindness, which can be a very enjoyablestate, is a kind of opening to others and to the reality of theirlives. The content of compassion is a wish for others to be free fromsuffering. This quality makes it possible to be fully aware andpresent in the face of others’ suffering. Joy is traditionallyunderstood as the ability to rejoice in the happiness and goodqualities of others. To operate in someone, joy requires the absenceof envy, jealousy and self-hatred. Equanimity makes it possible to seesituations as they are, without preference or prejudice. It makes itpossible to extend the other three Divine Abidings equally to allbeings.

Most emotions that ordinary people experience are overcome ortransformed by the path; someone who was fully awake would not abidein or act from greed, hatred, competitiveness, or pride, for example.But the Four Divine Abidings are emotions in which awake people restand from which they act. Not only are these qualities recognized inthe Theravāda, they are extensively practiced in that tradition.In fact, theMetta Sutta, theDiscourse onLovingkindness, is one of the most important and frequentlyrecited scriptures in Southeast Asia today. Any discussion ofsimilarities and differences between Theravāda andMahāyāna should take these facts into account.

The Mahāyāna path to awakening, like many textualdiscussions of that path, is organized around the qualities known asthe Six Perfections (Skt.pāramitā). The SixPerfections are:

1. Generosity (dāna)
2. Moral discipline (śīla)
3. Patient endurance (kṣānti)
4. Perseverance (vīrya)
5. Meditative stability (dhyāna)
6. Wisdom (prajñā)

Kṣānti, the third perfection, is a complexconcept, difficult to render with a single English word. It has threemain aspects. One is the ability to endure and maintain one’scalm and clarity of intention in the face of obstacles such asfrustrations, delays, and unpleasant sensations.“Patience” would be a plausible translation for thisaspect ofkṣānti. The second, and most important,aspect of the perfection is the ability to remain peaceful, notbecoming angry, when other people harm us or cause difficulties forus. This second and primary aspect could justify a translation as“forbearance”. When insulted, someone with strong moraldiscipline would not retaliate, but might become angry and restrainthe expression of the anger; someone with strong patient endurancewould not become angry in the first place. The termkṣānti is also often used to refer to the abilityto remain calm and not react with fear or anger when hearingpresentations of the ultimate truth, the way things really are.

Perseverance, the fourth perfection, is the ability to pour energyenthusiastically into constructive activities that benefit oneself andothers. Meditative stability, the fifth perfection, is the ability tomaintain clear, stable attention during meditation practice. Thoughthoughts may arise during meditation, they do not cause distraction insomeone with strong meditative stability, but merely appear asmovements of mind.Prajñā, which could betranslated as “wisdom” or as “discernment,” isdifficult to define and varies subtly in meaning among differentBuddhist lineages. This quality allows those who have it to makedistinctions between phenomena and to understand things as theyactually are. It is often described as intuitively based and can onlypartially be put into words.

The termpāramitā, which I have been translating as“perfection,” could also be rendered as“transcendence.” In order to awaken fully, a bodhisattvamust train in these qualities so deeply as to transcend how they areordinarily understood. This is done by achieving what is known as“the threefold purity,” meaning that the bodhisattva doesnot regard either herself, the action being performed, or the objectof that action as being a real, objectively existing thing. So, forexample, someone who thinks that he has a substantial self and isgiving real food to an objectively existing recipient would be showingworldly generosity. But someone who can give while regarding herself,the gift, and the recipient as like mirages, existing only from acertain point of view and not in objective reality, can practice thetransmundane perfection of generosity. (On this see, e.g., Huntingtontrans. 1989, 150.)

3. Theoretical Structure of Buddhist Ethics

Buddhist texts don’t often take up the question of the generaltheoretical principles that differentiate between good and bad, orright and wrong; they more often tend to lay down a variety ofparticular moral rules, guidelines, virtues, and vices, and leave thematter there. But when the texts do address what differentiates rightfrom wrong in general, they tend to focus on the consequences of ourdecisions and actions. Take, for instance, this passage from theAdvice to Rāhula at Ambalaṭṭhikā:

When you reflect, if you know: ‘This action that I wish to dowith the body would lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction ofothers, or to the affliction of both; it is an unwholesome bodilyaction with painful consequences, with painful results,’ thenyou definitely should not do such an action with the body. But whenyou reflect, if you know: ‘This action that I wish to do withthe body would not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction ofothers, or to the affliction of both; it is a wholesome bodily actionwith pleasant consequences, with pleasant results,’ then you maydo such an action with the body. (Ñānamoli and Bodhitrans. 1995, 524–25)

This passage identifies the criterion of permissible action in termsof consequences, and in particular, consequences that consist ofhappiness and suffering. Passages such as this one suggest thepossibility of regarding Theravāda ethics as having aconsequentialist foundation.

Most Buddhist authors don’t say enough about the overallstructure of their normative commitments to make it possible toattribute any particular ethical theory to them. One exception wouldbe Śāntideva (late 7th-mid 8th century CE), whose writingscontain a number of passages of great interest from the perspective ofethical theory. Perhaps the most revealing of these can be found intheTraining Anthology(Śikṣā-samuccaya) at standard page 15 (seeGoodman 2016a, 17). The passage reads:

If a bodhisattva does not make a sincere, unwavering effort inthought, word, and deed to stop all the present and future pain andsuffering of all sentient beings, and to bring about all present andfuture pleasure and happiness, or does not seek the collection ofconditions for that, or does not strive to prevent what is opposed tothat, or does not bring about small pain and suffering as a way ofpreventing great pain and suffering, or does not abandon a smallbenefit in order to accomplish a greater benefit, if he neglects to dothese things even for a moment, he undergoes a downfall.

Here Śāntideva focuses our attention on the futureconsequences that our actions can causally “stop” or“bring about”; at least in this passage, he seems to beadvocating consequentialism. In particular, what Śāntidevais concerned with here is the experienced quality of certain feelings;he is trying to stop “pain and suffering” and bring about“pleasure and happiness.” Philosophers use the term“hedonism” to refer to the view that takes the presence ofhappiness and the absence of suffering to constitute well-being.Moreover, the view Śāntideva advocates is universalist,because it extends moral concern to all sentient beings. It’sfairly clear, moreover, that Śāntideva is an advocate ofmaximization: he regards it as mandatory to bring about a small amountof suffering to prevent a greater amount, and to sacrifice a smallamount of happiness to achieve a larger amount. And since he does notsay anything about constraints or important considerations arisingfrom the distribution of happiness and suffering, the most plausiblereading of this passage would involve accepting aggregation, in whichthe happiness and suffering of all beings are considered together,without attaching significance to how these are distributed. Now theethical view called “classical utilitarianism” can bedefined as aggregative, maximizing, universalist, hedonistconsequentialism. This passage, then, can most naturally beinterpreted as a statement of the classical utilitarian form ofconsequentialism.

Though this passage gives us strong reasons to accept thatŚāntideva is committed to assigning impartial benevolence acentral role in how we should live and behave toward others, a numberof scholars have questioned whether we have enough evidence tointerpret him as a utilitarian (e.g., Harris 2015). And as MichaelBarnhart and others have argued, even if Śāntideva himselfactually was a utilitarian, it does not follow that such a view can beattributed to the Buddhist tradition as a whole (Barnhart 2012,19).

According to many of the world’s intellectual traditions, eachperson is a real, individual substance with a true essence or self.According to Buddhism, this widely held view is false; you are not asubstance. Instead, all there is to a person is a complex, rapidlychanging stream of mental and physical phenomena, connected by causallinks and inextricably interrelated with the rest of the universe.This view is known as the doctrine of no self (Pālianattā; Skt.anātman.) Śāntidevadraws on this teaching to argue that egoism is irrational, and that weshould work for the benefit of all sentient beings. As he writes,“Without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone. They are tobe warded off simply because they are suffering. Why is any limitationput on this?” (Crosby and Skilton trans. 1995, 97) If you arenot a real thing, there is no reason to place any greater intrinsicimportance on preventing your own future suffering than on preventingthe future suffering of others. As writers such as Mark Siderits(2003, ch. 9) have often noted, this strategy for justifying altruism,which many scholars now call the Ownerless Suffering Argument, closelyresembles the arguments for consequentialism in Parfit 1984 (ch. 15).In fact, it’s hard to see how the Ownerless Suffering Argumentcould support any moral view that is not some form of universalistconsequentialism.

From the perspective of this argument, your suffering has no greatersignificance than that of anyone else, but it also has no less. Youare one of the many sentient beings whose welfare is to be promoted.Moreover, you may have more effective means available to advance yourown happiness than you do to advance the happiness of others. And youoften know much more about yourself than you do about others. So thereis scope within this view to justify prudential concern for your ownfuture; in the early and middle stages of the path, you may end up inpractice spending more time taking care of your own future needs thanthose of others. This kind of prudential concern is compatible withthe doctrine of no self, and is not the same as egoism. Here egoismwould mean attaching more intrinsic significance to your own welfarethan to that of others, or even disregarding others’ welfare andmerely making an effort to promote your own. Buddhists would seeegoism as reflecting a damaging lack of perception of the absence ofself.

Any interpretation of Buddhist ethics must find room for theabsolutely crucial role of intention. There are many contexts in whichBuddhism seems to emphasize the intention with which an act wasperformed much more than the benefit or harm that actually resulted.One case often cited is that of Channa, who presented a gift of foodto the Buddha which gave him dysentery and thus caused his death.Since Channa’s intention was to perform a meritorious act ofgenerosity, the Buddha tells his followers not to condemn Channa;since he did not know that the food was contaminated, he actuallygained goodness from this action.

Less dramatically, the amount of good or bad karma generated by anaction is said to be strongly dependent on the motivation with whichit was carried out. Thus actions performed out of hatred are morekarmically damaging than those performed out of greed. Meanwhile, someBuddhist texts seem to say that any action performed with goodintentions is a good action, whereas any action performed with badintentions is a bad one. These suggestions may support a theoreticalreconstruction that focuses more on motivation than onconsequences.

As we will see in Section 6, most forms of Buddhism also take astrongly negative attitude to killing. Sometimes, this opposition istaken to an extent which may be difficult to justify from aconsequentialist perspective. Many consequentialist theories, such asclassical utilitarianism, notoriously make it much easier to justifykilling than it would be on other moral perspectives. The moststraightforward application of utilitarianism would imply that it issometimes morally permissible to kill someone when doing so wouldbring about benefits or prevent harms sufficient to outweigh the valueof the future existence that would otherwise be enjoyed by the personto be killed. Many Buddhists, especially in the Theravāda, wouldrecoil from this implication and place a much higher standard on thejustification of killing, if it can be justified at all. This issueposes a significant problem that a consequentialist interpretationneeds to solve.

Another way of understanding Buddhist ethics is to read it as similar,not to consequentialism, but to virtue ethics. This account was firstproposed by Damien Keown (in Keown 1992) and has since been followedby several scholars. The virtue ethics approach begins from theundoubted fact that Buddhist texts devote a great deal of attention towhat kind of people we should strive to be and what virtues we shouldseek to cultivate in ourselves. In this respect, Buddhist ethics mayseem more similar to the views of ancient Greek thinkers such asAristotle than to more modern Western thought. For Aristotle, the goalwe should aim at in life iseudaimonia, often translated“happiness” or “human flourishing.” Thiscondition ofeudaimonia is the good for humans. Keown arguesthat the role of Nirvana in Theravāda ethics is analogous:Nirvana is the good. The various abilities and virtues that arecultivated on the Buddhist path would then derive their value fromtheir relation to this good, either as means to attaining Nirvana oras constituent aspects of the awakened life.

One way to settle the issue between consequentialist and virtue ethicsinterpretations of Buddhist teachings would be to identify the mostfundamental aim of the Buddhist worldview. Is it the perfection of theindividual’s character, as in virtue ethics, or the welfare ofall sentient beings, as in universalist, welfaristconsequentialism?

Now on a traditional Buddhist view, the Law of Karma says that thoseof our actions that are intended to harm others will evolve intomisery for us, whereas those of our actions that are intended tobenefit others will evolve into happiness for us. Moreover, thehighest states of well-being we can attain are also characterized bylovingkindness and compassion for others. In all or nearly all cases,then, the action that is best for the agent and the action that isbest for all beings will coincide, on this view. There is no deepconflict between self-interest and morality.

This is wonderful, if true, but it makes our theoretical task muchharder. Should we say that the most fundamental aim of Buddhistpractice is to benefit all sentient beings everywhere and advancetheir welfare, and that it so happens that the most effective way foreach agent to do this is to work toward her own awakening? Or shouldwe say that the most fundamental aim of practice is thepractitioner’s own awakening, and that it so happens thatpursuing this aim will turn out to benefit others as well?

Mahāyāna texts are full of passages that focus on theimportance of the welfare of all beings and extol those who promotethis goal. Therefore, the virtue ethics interpretation appears moreplausible when applied to the Theravāda than when applied to theMahāyāna. And in fact, Keown proposed his account primarilyin relation to the Theravāda; he offers a rather differentinterpretation of the Mahāyāna, which in fact involves acertain kind of consequentialism. We should not necessarily assumethat all forms of Buddhism have the same structure at the level ofethical theory.

It is possible to construct an interpretation that acknowledges thecentral importance of virtue and the cultivation of character inBuddhism within an overall framework that is consequentialist. Oneapproach is character consequentialism, in which the good consequencesthat are to be maximized are defined by the welfare of sentientbeings, and the welfare of sentient beings is understood to consist inboth happiness and virtue. On this view, we have a non-instrumentalreason to promote the virtue of ourselves and others. (This theory isdefended at length in Goodman 2009.) Character consequentialism thusrejects hedonism, the view that identifies welfare with happiness, andadvances a theory in which the good has two major components. Thisapproach allows us to avoid some of the damaging philosophicalobjections that have been raised against hedonism. But it also createsquestions about how to compare the value of greater virtue against thevalue of greater happiness, should these considerations everconflict.

Another approach is aretaic consequentialism, an indirect form ofconsequentialism in which the primary objects of evaluation arecharacter traits, not actions or rules. This theory tells us todevelop in ourselves those states of character which are conducive tothe happiness of sentient beings. (See Siderits 2007, 292–93)This elegant interpretation explains why Buddhist texts so often focuson character traits, but it also retains a hedonist view ofwell-being. It allows us to interpret instructions on moral disciplinenot as inflexible rules, but as advice about what traits of characterto cultivate.

How plausible is it to interpret Buddhist authors as committed to ahedonist view of well-being––or indeed, to any view ofwell-being at all? South Asian Buddhist texts often use terms such asartha andhita that plausibly express the sameconcept as our term “well-being,” so it is reasonable toask what account the authors of those texts might have given of whatthey meant. Given the central importance of the prevention ofsuffering in Buddhism, as expressed in such teachings as the FirstNoble Truth, it must be true that well-being in Buddhism includesfreedom from suffering as, at least, one of its components. Meanwhile,given the strongly negative Buddhist view of desire, it would not beplausible at all to regard Buddhism as holding a desire-fulfillmenttheory of well-being.

However, hedonism is not our only interpretive option.Śāntideva claims in several passages that the Buddhistvirtues work together and reinforce each other. This makes it possibleto read him as holding a “homeostatic cluster” view ofwell-being like that of Richard Boyd (see Goodman 2016b, 149-152.)Those who defend the analogy between Buddhist ethics and Aristotelianvirtue ethics could advance a nature-fulfillment theory as the properinterpretation of well-being in Buddhism. Mark Siderits (2007) rejectsthis interpretation on the grounds that it conflicts with the doctrineof no self, which implies that, ultimately, humans have no nature tofulfill. But Christopher Gowans has pointed out that, if we regardwell-being as existing at the conventional level of truth, thisobjection may lose its force (see Gowans 2015, 117).

Some scholars, such as Charles Hallisey (1996) and Jay Garfield, haveconcluded that it is futile and misleading to try to interpretBuddhist ethics as a systematic theory fitting into one of therecognized types of ethical theories in the West. Rather, they suggestthat Buddhist ethics is pluralist, in that it draws on various kindsof moral considerations in different cases, and particularist,rejecting the entire enterprise of formulating general moralprinciples to cover all cases. This view can easily accommodatetextual evidence of various kinds of moral reasoning used by Buddhistsin different situations. But since the resulting interpretation lacksan overarching structure, it has few theoretical resources toadjudicate conflicts between different values, and it may become quiteunclear what the view says about particular difficult cases.

Buddhist texts say relatively little about metaethics, and attempts toconstruct metaethical views that would be consistent with Buddhistphilosophical commitments have encountered many difficulties. Onefascinating recent attempt to provide a metaethics for early Buddhism,in the work of Jake Davis (2016 and Forthcoming,) takes statementsabout what the wise would approve or criticize as indicating thesource of ethical normativity. This kind of formulation is frequentlyencountered in canonical texts, as for instance in theMettaSutta: “Let them not do the slightest thing that the wisewould later reprove.” Buddhists accept that a mind that is calm,clear and stable sees the truth more accurately than disturbed,fluctuating ordinary consciousness. For Davis, the ethical truth justconsists of those normative statements that would be acceptedunanimously by those whose inner life exhibits, to a sufficientdegree, these qualities of mental clarity and insight. Thus, on hisview, even if the wise would often approve of taking actions thatwould have valuable consequences, it is not those consequences but theapproval of the wise that makes those actions morally right.

The theoretical structure of Buddhist ethics is a subject ofcontinuing research and debate among a number of scholars, and furtherdevelopments are likely in our understanding of this field.

4. Beyond Moral Discipline

Buddhist texts contain a large number of enigmatic statements, ofvarious different types, seemingly to the effect that once apractitioner reaches a sufficiently advanced stage of spiritualdevelopment, moral discipline is no longer necessary. These statementshave been interpreted in dramatically different ways by various Asiantraditions, and Western scholars disagree about how we shouldunderstand them.

The Pāli Canon contains the claim that Saints have“abandoned goodness (puñña) and vileactions (pāpa).” Some writers have interpretedthis statement as meaning that ethical norms no longer apply toSaints. But Damien Keown has argued quite convincingly against thisinterpretation (1992, ch. 4). “Goodness” and “vileactions” refer to actions which have karmic effects in thefuture, projecting a future existence that includes happiness orsuffering, respectively. Since the life in which one becomes a Saintis one’s last life, it is impossible that any actions that occurafter Sainthood is attained could project future existence throughkarma. The change which stops the accumulation of karma is mostplausibly identified as the abandonment of clinging to the belief in asubstantial self. Someone who no longer thinks of actions as stemmingfrom and having effects on a real, persisting self is no longertrapped in cyclic existence.

Theravāda texts contain intriguing suggestions that Saints nolonger have to worry about following rules of moral discipline; theyjust spontaneously act in appropriate ways. But there are alsostatements in Theravāda texts to the effect that a Saint wouldnever knowingly and intentionally break any of the rules of monasticdiscipline. These rules forbid many actions which the Buddhisttradition regards as reprehensible merely by convention, such aseating after noon. If someone has not taken a vow that prohibitseating after noon, then doing so is not wrong: the wrongness of theaction stems merely from the fact that it infringes a valuable systemof discipline that the agent has chosen to undertake. If Saints justact spontaneously and aren’t psychologically bound by rules,it’s not clear why they would, in all circumstances, avoidactions which are wrong merely because they are forbidden by rules ofmonastic discipline. There seems to be a serious tension here.

Writers expounding Mahāyāna ethics face somewhat similarissues, but handle them rather differently. According toMahāyāna philosophers such as Asaṅga andŚāntideva, an advanced practitioner who is motivated bycompassion may sometimes see that an action which is forbidden by theusual rules of Buddhist moral discipline would actually be moreeffective at preventing suffering and promoting happiness than anyaction the rules would permit. Under such circumstances, thatpractitioner can permissibly break the rules out of compassion.

For example, Asaṅga tells us that it would be permissible totell a lie to save another sentient being from being killed orseriously harmed. If someone takes up with bad friends, it would bepermissible to criticize those friends to him, a case of divisivespeech, in order to protect him from being corrupted by them. It wouldbe permissible to overthrow a wicked king or remove a corrupt templeadministrator from office. If a thief steals items belonging to themonastic community, it would be permissible to steal them back inorder to protect him from the severe bad karma of consuming thoseitems. In fact, if a bandit is planning to murder a large number ofspiritually advanced beings, it would be permissible to kill thebandit preemptively, thus saving him from the terrible torment ofaeons in the hells. In all such cases, according to Asaṅga,these acts, if done with the right kind of motivation, would result inmuch merit for the one who carries them out. (Tatz trans. 1986,70–73)

One thing that many of these cases seem to have in common is that therule-violating action proceeds from a compassion that includes in itsscope not only the potential victims of the harms that are to beprevented, but also the perpetrator of those harms. When people hearof the Buddhist commitment to nonviolence, one question they often askis whether someone with foreknowledge of the events of the 1940s wouldbe permitted by Buddhist principles to assassinate Hitler in 1930. Ifwe follow Asaṅga, the answer would seem to be: yes, you may killHitler, if you have compassion for him and you do it partly for hissake. Thus, in extreme cases, violence may be permissible; but hatredis never justified.

One way to understand Asaṅga’s view here would be toimagine that one of your loved ones, such as your brother or son, isslipped a drug which makes him temporarily insane, and he then attacksyou with a knife. To remain passive and let him kill you would not bethe best thing you could do for him. If you are able to knock himdown, take the knife away and restrain him, you thereby protect himfrom a lifetime of regret and distress resulting from having killedyou. This use of coercive force would therefore naturally flow fromyour love for him.

In addition to particular examples of permissible violations of therules of moral discipline, both Asaṅga and Śāntidevagive us general statements about when the rules should be broken.These statements are strikingly consequentialist in flavor. ThusAsaṅga tells us this: “If the bodhisattva sees that somecaustic means, some use of severity would be of benefit to sentientbeings, and does not employ it in order to guard against unhappiness,he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is faultthat is not defiled” (Tatz trans., 1986, 76).Śāntideva’s view is similar; he writes:“Realizing this, one should always be striving for others’well-being. Even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionateperson who sees it will be of benefit.” (Crosby and Skiltontrans., 1995, 41). According to these statements, an agent who istruly motivated by compassion can break the usually applicable rulesof moral discipline whenever doing so would benefit those involved inthe situation.

Several Mahāyāna texts, then, allow for certain cases inwhich advanced practitioners may violate the rules of moraldiscipline. Texts from the Vajrayāna, or Tantric, traditions ofBuddhism go further than this. Revered Tantric masters such asNāropa, Kukkurīpa, and Padmasambhava are shown engaging inshocking actions that flagrantly violate the conventions of societyand the rules of Buddhist moral discipline. But these stories do notnecessarily mean that the Vajrayāna rejects all forms of ethics.Numerous texts make it clear that even as they break the rules,Tantric adepts are motivated by compassion for all sentient beings.They see that given the situation, unconventional and even grotesqueactions are the most effective means to bring about the welfare ofothers. Since they are totally free of all bonds of ideology or socialconditioning, they spontaneously do what will be best on the whole,without worrying about what others might think or what the rulebookmight say. They have transcended moral discipline completely, whileremaining, in a deeper sense, ethical exemplars.

5. Animals and the Environment

Like several other Asian traditions, Buddhism does not regard humansas fundamentally different from other animals. Through the process ofrebirth, what is in some sense the same entity can be a human now, butan animal in the past and in the future. One consequence of this claimis that any animal you meet is likely to have been a human at onetime, and may even have been your own mother in a previous life.Moreover, animals are seen as just as capable of suffering as humansare; they are also appropriate objects of the emotions of compassion,lovingkindness and equanimity. Thus we have powerful reasons not tocause them unnecessary suffering and to refrain from harming orkilling them.

Though animals are sentient beings and possess consciousness, just ashumans do, there is one reason why human lives are more precious thananimal lives. Only in a human body can one attain awakening; in ananimal body, this is not possible. Therefore, Buddhists maintain thatit is worse to kill a human than to kill an animal.

Though all Buddhist traditions attach moral significance to animallife and animal suffering, not all Buddhists practice vegetarianism.For example, Theravāda monks, who live by begging, are expectedto eat whatever food is placed in their bowl, including meat, withoutpreference or discrimination. However, they are forbidden to eat meatfrom an animal if they have seen, heard, or suspected that the animalin question was killed specifically for them.

The Tibetan plateau is at a high altitude and has a very cold, dryclimate. Over much of Tibet, the only form of food production possibleis nomadic pastoralism, with sheep and yaks as the major sources offood. Moreover, under premodern conditions, and given the coldweather, people living in Tibet needed to eat calorie-dense food inorder to survive. A strict vegetarianism was therefore quiteimpractical. As a result, many Tibetans came to accept meat eating asa necessary part of their lifestyle. Today, however, with morevegetarian food options available and with many Tibetans living inexile, important spiritual leaders in the Tibetan tradition have begunto advocate a switch to a vegetarian diet.

Some sources in the Buddhist tradition hold that it is worse to killan animal yourself than to eat the meat of an animal someone else haskilled. Many faithful Buddhists go to great lengths not to killanimals. Moreover, the professions of hunting and fishing areclassified as “wrong livelihood,” and Buddhists areexpected not to follow them. In majority Buddhist countries, butchersare often members of non-Buddhist religious minorities.

Before the time of the historical Buddha, animal sacrifice was animportant part of Indian religious practice. The Buddha expressed hisunqualified opposition to animal sacrifice, holding that far fromcreating religious merit, it would only produce bad karma for thoseengaged in it. As a result of his teachings, along with those ofMahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, ideals of nonviolencebecame more prevalent in India, and animal sacrifice declined rapidlyin frequency and prestige. Among a few marginal Buddhist orquasi-Buddhist groups in the Himalayas, animal sacrifice is stillpracticed today; but Buddhist monastic institutions have fairlyconsistently opposed the killing of animals for religiouspurposes.

Most Buddhist texts hold that plants are not sentient beings and donot have moral status in and of themselves. Although a few scatteredsources suggest that plants might be sentient, the mainstream of thetradition sees it as morally unproblematic in itself to use, kill, oreat plants. However, since animals depend on plants, there aresometimes instrumental reasons to protect plants for the sake ofanimal welfare. We do find guidance, for example, to be careful incutting down trees to refrain from harming the animals who live in andaround them. In Southeast Asia, some Buddhist monks have been veryactive in protecting forests from logging.

Buddhism does not see a great gulf between humans and non-humananimals, as some adherents of Western religions do; the suffering ofanimals is morally significant, just like the suffering of humans.Moreover, Buddhist theories of causality stress that things arise independence on a diverse collection of causes and conditions, implyingthat human life is interdependent in complex ways with other forms oflife on Earth. And as mentioned above, the cultivation oflovingkindness and compassion for all sentient beings is an importantpart of most systems of Buddhist meditation practice. As a result ofthese teachings, many contemporary Buddhists, especially in the West,place great value on ecological awareness and environmentalsustainability. They seek to develop a way of life for humanity thatsupports spiritual practice and can coexist in harmony with thenon-human animals who share our planet.

6. War, Violence and Punishment

The Buddhist tradition generally sees war and violence as deeplymorally problematic. War is seen as tragic and typically unnecessary,and the position of a soldier is seen as highly karmically dangerous.Violence directly causes harm and suffering to sentient beings,pollutes the minds of those who use it, and creates cycles of hatredand retribution that can inflict terrible damage, both physical andpsychological.

In general, the Buddhist attitude toward violence is expressed inverses X. 1–2 of theDhammapada:

Everybody fears being struck by a rod.
Everybody fears death.
Therefore, knowing this, feeling for others as for yourself,
Do not kill others or cause others to kill.
Everybody fears being struck by a rod,
Life being dear to all.
Therefore, knowing this, feeling for others as for yourself,
Do not kill others or cause others to kill.
(Maitreya, trans, 1995, 37)

The phrase translated “feeling for others as for yourself”is the Pāliattānaṃupamaṃkatvā, which might be more literally rendered as“having made an analogy with oneself.” Here a form ofmoral reasoning is used that is quite similar to the Golden Rule:imaginatively put yourself in the place of others, and you will seethat certain ways of treating them are morally impermissible. TheDhammapada also tells us:

Whoever withholds the rod from creatures
Both weak and strong,
Abstaining from killing and causing killing
Him do I call a Noble One.
(Maitreya, trans, 1995, 107)

Buddhists explicitly reject the Hindu teaching that a soldier in ajust war will be reborn in a heavenly realm. Instead, Buddhists holdthat those who die in battle are likely to be reborn as animals or inthe hells, especially if they die with a feeling of anger or hatredtoward the soldiers on the other side. In his commentary on theFour Hundred Stanzas (Catuḥśataka) ofĀryadeva, Candrakīrti expresses a very low opinion of thosewho give their lives in battle for their king and country: “Inthis world people who give up all of their possessions for gambling,liquor, and prostitutes are not entitled to respect. Virtuous-mindedpeople do not honor the sacrifice of these people, since they pursuean addiction. In the same way, the sacrifice of life in battle shouldnot be respected, since this is the basis for harmful actions”(Lang trans., 2003, 200). He also criticizes the view that kings maypermissibly engage in warfare, and offers what looks like a generalstatement of pacifism: “a sage is inferior when his treatisesexplain violence as virtuous behavior. A mediocre sage has doubts:‘it may be so or it may not be so.’ A superior sage doesnot regard violence as virtuous behavior” (Lang trans., 2003,197).

Buddhist monks, especially in the Theravāda tradition, areexpected to practice a strict form of non-violence; they should preferbeing killed to killing others, and should even practicelovingkindness and compassion toward those who harm them or theirfamilies. The Buddha himself is said to have mediated a dispute overwater rights between two neighboring kingdoms, preventing it fromescalating into an armed conflict. In troubled times, Buddhist monkshave often sought opportunities to bring about peace and theresolution of conflict through dialogue. Normative Buddhist textspraise the role of peacemaker and an attitude of impartial benevolencetoward all parties to a conflict (see, e.g., Thurman trans. 2000, 70).The Buddhist attitude toward war is thus quite negative, and passagesglorifying military victory or sanitizing the realities of warfare arehard to find in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist texts.

Nevertheless, the common perception of Buddhism as a whole as anunequivocally pacifist tradition is questionable. Many forms ofBuddhism have arrived at the position that in rare cases, war may benecessary.

One way that Buddhist ethical theory might be used, in certain extremecases, to justify war relies on Asaṅga’s account ofjustifiable killing, discussed in section 4 above. For example, if theofficials of a militarily powerful state, monitoring the situation ina small developing country, see that a genocide has begun to takeplace there, they might reflect that those who are now committinggenocide are not only causing terrible harm to their victims, but alsoaccumulating severe negative karma for themselves. These officialsmight decide to intervene to stop the genocide, motivated bycompassion for everyone involved, including the killers. If they aresincerely motivated in this way, Mahāyāna Buddhists mightsee their actions as acceptable, even if they involved using militaryforce and killing many people, because less suffering would result andthe overall consequences would therefore be much better.

As Stephen Jenkins has shown in an important recent article, a numberof influential Mahāyāna texts provide arguments of thisgeneral type. Both Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna offer theexample “of a physician, certainly one of the most important andpervasive metaphors for a bodhisattva, amputating a finger that hasbeen bitten by a poisonous snake, thus preventing the spread ofgreater suffering” (Jenkins 2011, 12). Candrakīrti thendevelops this theme through another example,

of a hunter who kills one of his sons to prevent both from dying. Thetwo sons are arguing at the edge of a precipice and one of them grabsthe other with the intention of hurling them both over. Since hecannot reach them, and so has no other option, the hunter shoots oneson with an arrow to prevent them both from dying. This case shows aconcern for reducing the proportional extent of harm, as in theexample of amputation (Jenkins 2011, 15–16).

Several Mahāyāna scriptures also contain statementsinconsistent with an unqualified pacifism. For instance, theMahā-parinirvāṇa Sūtra states that it ispermissible for someone with a pure intention to kill those whopersecute Buddhism (Jenkins 2011, 18). Another scriptural text, theRange of the Bodhisattva(ārya-bodhisattva-gocara), explicitly endorses defensivewarfare, when carried out with strict limitations and in order toprotect the people:

Although in war, injury and death may be inflicted on the opposingarmy, a ruler by his skillful means will commit less unspeakable andless nonvirtuous action and may not necessarily experienceretribution, since he undertook such measures with heedfulness andcompassion. (Jamspal trans. 2010, 61)

In practice, Buddhist societies have not always refrained from war.For example, between 1635 and 1642, the Mongol leader Gushri Khaninvaded Tibet, suppressed various warring factions, and placed supremepolitical power over the region in the hands of the dGe lugs traditionand its leader, His Holiness the Fifth Dalai Lama. In theSong ofthe Queen of Spring, a text published in 1643, the Fifth DalaiLama describes Gushri Khan as an emanation of the great BodhisattvaVajrapāni, and justifies his warlike actions as motivated bycompassion (Maher 2008, 186–90). In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monksand rulers have endorsed the use of military force to defend theirisland, seen as a sacred land and a sanctuary for the Buddhistreligion, against Hindu invaders from South India. During the recentcivil war, similar justifications were used to defend the use ofmilitary measures against separatist rebels, mostly Hindus belongingto the Tamil minority. In general, Buddhist kings in many parts of theworld, including Southeast and Central Asia, have called on theirmilitary forces to resist foreign invasions.

Buddhist discussions of the ethics of punishment are fairly rare, butthere is an important passage about punishment in the Precious Garland(Ratnāvalī), a letter to a king from the greatBuddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. Whether or not Buddhistethics in general is consequentialist, the theory of punishmentNāgārjuna presents is clearly a consequentialist one. Tomaintain social order, punishment is a regrettable necessity. But theking should not punish out of anger or a desire for revenge. Instead,he should inflict punishment out of compassion, especially compassionfor the criminals themselves, whose destructive actions may havecondemned them to many lifetimes of suffering. (See Hopkins 1998 for atranslation of the text and Goodman 2009, ch. 9, for discussion.)

Moreover, punishment should be as mild as is consistent with achievingthe goal of restraining crime. Prisoners should be treated well andheld under humane conditions. Moreover, those prisoners who arephysically weak, and therefore pose less danger to society, should bereleased early. It’s fairly clear that Nāgārjuna wouldreject retributivist theories of punishment, which hold that prisonersshould be punished because they deserve to suffer or in order to takeaway any unjust advantage they may have gained by their actions. Fromthe point of view of retributivism, the physical strength or weaknessof prisoners is irrelevant to how much punishment they deserve.Moreover, some forms of retributivism, especially cruder, popularversions, would endorse harsh conditions of punishment in order toensure that prisoners have to undergo the degree of suffering thatthey deserve.

Just as Asaṅga’s theory can be used to justify certainkinds of military action, it could also help justify punishment.Punishment can have a number of beneficial effects: it canincapacitate criminals, physically preventing them from repeatingtheir crimes; it can deter criminals, inducing them to follow the lawfrom fear of further punishment; it can rehabilitate criminals bygiving them education and skills that provide them with better optionsthan a life of crime; sometimes, it can even reform criminals, helpingthem change their character to become better people, so that they willno longer wish to commit crimes. These good effects of punishmentbenefit society, since they reduce the crime rate; but from a Buddhistpoint of view, they also benefit criminals themselves by preventingthem from creating more bad karma. Thus punishment can be motivated bycompassion for both criminals and their victims, and so it could beacceptable in Buddhist ethics.

Some people see Buddhism as maintaining unqualified pacifism andrejecting violence completely in general. In fact, some Buddhistscriptures and treatises do allow for extreme cases in whichcompassionately motivated punishment, violence, and even war could bejustified. They reserve their unqualified opposition for the reactiveemotions that often lead to violence, such as anger, hatred, malice,and the desire for revenge. Buddhists should cultivate lovingkindnessand compassion for everyone, even those guilty of the worst actions,and even while recognizing that some people need to be forciblyrestrained from doing even more damage. In a world that has been soterribly scarred by violence and cruelty, the Buddhist rejection ofmost forms of warfare seems wise and appropriate. But in a complicatedworld of difficult choices, allowing for the necessity of violence inrare instances may be difficult to avoid.

7. Abortion and Euthanasia

There is considerable controversy about the moral status of abortionin Buddhist ethics, with the majority of writers taking a pro-lifeposition. The basic premise of the traditional understanding ofabortion in Buddhism is that reincarnation is a discrete event whichhappens at the time of conception. This claim can be found indiscussions of reincarnation in prestigious sources such as theTreasury of Metaphysics (Abhidharma-kośa) ofVasubandhu. It implies that an embryo, even during the first week ofpregnancy, is a human being. As discussed in section 5, what isdistinctively valuable about human life is the possibility ofawakening. When the life of a fetus is taken through abortion, thispossibility is foreclosed. It follows that abortion is seriouslywrong, almost as serious as the deliberate murder of an adult. This isthe view of most Buddhists on the mainland of Asia today.

It’s important to keep in mind that the technological and socialcontext of abortion has changed dramatically since the time when thePāli Canon was composed. Today, a woman might be informed by herdoctor that the fetus she is carrying suffers from a severe geneticabnormality; if she gives birth, her baby will live for a few days ora few months in great pain before its inevitable early death. At thetime of the Buddha, medical technology was obviously far tooundeveloped to make such a situation possible. In the Pāli Canon,many of the cases that involve abortion relate to a woman in apolygamous marriage who is jealous of her co-wife’s pregnancyand wishes to cause her rival to miscarry. Buddhist teachers whoformulated a blanket prohibition on abortion with this latter type ofcase in mind might reconsider if they were aware of the former type ofcase.

Unlike some other world religions, Buddhism does not have any moralobjection to contraception. Thus Buddhists could easily agree tosupport programs to reduce the need for abortion by makingcontraception more widely available and educating people in itsuse.

Some Buddhists might question the premise that a human being existsfrom the time of conception onward. Some Buddhists in the contemporaryWest do not read the traditional teachings about reincarnationliterally, and so would not have reason to accept that reincarnationhappens at the moment of conception. Moreover, there are scientificreasons to believe that consciousness does not begin until at leastthe twentieth week of pregnancy (McMahan 2002, 267). There can be noreincarnation without consciousness. If we want both to believe inreincarnation and to accept what science tells us about the physicalbases of consciousness, we should perhaps hold that reincarnation is agradual process that slowly brings about a new conscious being that isconnected with one who has recently died. This concept of a gradualbeginning of life may be counterintuitive in some respects, but itharmonizes well with the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of no self. Ifwe accept this understanding, then early abortion would not constitutekilling a sentient being.

Despite these counterarguments, most Buddhists today would acceptthat, in their ethical system, abortion is morally wrong. It does notnecessarily follow that they would advocate making abortion illegal.In many ways, it is contrary to the spirit of Buddhism to imposeBuddhist values on others by force. Buddhists were early advocates ofreligious toleration, and the political environment of India beforethe Islamic invasions was mostly quite a tolerant one in practice.Moreover, Buddhist states have usually not chosen to prohibit suchpractices as slaughtering and eating animals, even when their rulershave held that these practices are immoral. Some writers have arguedthat due to the severity of the offense of killing a human, abortionin particular should not be legally tolerated by Buddhist societies(for example, see Harvey 2000, 342–350). In fact, in someBuddhist countries, such as Japan, abortion is legal; in others, it istechnically illegal, but the law is not strictly enforced. In adiverse society where the moral status of fetuses is controversial, astrict prohibition on abortion is likely to be difficult and costly toenforce, and doing so would lead to intense social controversy,alienating people from their own government. The inevitable use ofcoercion and violence in law enforcement, in the form of police andprisons, itself represents a grave karmic cost of imposing any penallaw on segments of the population who do not accept it as legitimate.Thus many of the reasons internal to the Buddhist tradition that couldbe used to argue in favor of religious toleration would also seem tosupport a legal regime that permits abortion, even if Buddhist ethicalviews imply that abortion is wrong.

The Buddhist tradition is less strongly opposed to suicide than someother world religions. For a young, healthy person to complete suicideis seen unequivocally as a destructive action. Yet the texts have aperspective of greater ambivalence and complexity toward the suicideof the gravely ill. Nevertheless, since the overall outlook of theirreligion encourages Buddhists to value life and oppose killing, theytend to be quite concerned about the moral status of euthanasia andassisted suicide.

Traditional Buddhist beliefs imply that to die mindfully, with fullawareness of the processes of death, is a powerful spiritual practice.The vivid, direct experience of impermanence and the strong sense ofnon-attachment that result from dying this way could contributeprofoundly to the spiritual progress of that person in future lives.This consideration motivates some Buddhists to allow death to take itsnatural course, neither hastening it through suicide nor putting itoff briefly through desperate measures of little benefit. Those wholack the needed depth of spiritual training may not be able to diemindfully, and therefore may be better candidates for aggressivemedical intervention to prolong life. Even for them, though, thechaos, excitement, confusion and fear of dying in the midst ofaggressive medical intervention may increase the risk of anunfavorable rebirth. If the intervention promises no more than achance of a few more hours or days of life, with no hope of a genuinerecovery, those who believe in future lives may see it as a pooroption.

The very strong emphasis on the relief of suffering we find inBuddhist ethics might lead us to conclude that Buddhists should favorassisted suicide or euthanasia when a patient is in severe pain, wantsto die, but is unable to complete suicide due to physical limitations.A doctor who carries out such procedures, though, even with theconsent of the patients involved, is in a karmically perilousposition. If the doctor’s motives for killing terminal patientsare in any way impure, the karmic consequences could be very serious.The same applies to family members who cause the death of theirrelative while motivated, even in part, by greed or by dislike of thatperson.

For more information on these issues, see the detailed and helpfuldiscussion by Peter Harvey (Harvey 2000, 286–310). The questionsof euthanasia and assisted suicide involve several important Buddhistvalues which may be in tension with each other. In looking at thesematters from a Buddhist perspective, we are unlikely to find any easyanswers.

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• Ñānamoli and Bodhi, trans, 1995,The Middle LengthDiscourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the MajjhimaNikāya, Boston: Wisdom Publications.
• Parfit, Derek. 1984.Reasons and Persons. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Siderits, Mark, 2003,Personal Identity and BuddhistPhilosophy: Empty Persons, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
• –––, 2007, “Buddhist Reductionism and theStructure of Buddhist Ethics,” in P. Bilimoria, J. Prabhu, andR. Sharma (eds.),Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions andContemporary Challenges, vol. 1, pp. 283–296, Burlington,VT: Ashgate.
• Tatz, Mark, trans, 1986,Asanga’s Chapter on Ethics Withthe Commentary of Tsong-Kha-Pa, The Basic Path to Awakening,The Complete Bodhisattva, Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin MellenPress.
• Thurman, Robert, trans, 2000,The Holy Teaching ofVimalakīrti: A Mahāyāna Scripture, UniversityPark, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Walshe, Maurice, trans, 1995,The Long Discourses of theBuddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, Boston:Wisdom Publications.

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Other Internet Resources

• Journal of Buddhist Ethics, online journal, an important venue for research in this field.
• The Metta Sutta, a beautiful and inspiring early Buddhist text on lovingkindness.
• Access to Insight, a website providing translations of numerous scriptures from thePāli Canon of the Theravāda tradition.
• The 37 Practices of a Bodhisattva, an excellent translation by Ken McLeod of a short Tibetan Buddhisttext explaining the practices and ethics of Mahayana Buddhism.

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