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When an experimenter uses the experimental method to investigate the effects of the experimenter's expectancy it may be that this research, too, is affected by his expectancy and thus there is an expectancy paradox. To the extent that the experimenter expectancy effect accounts for the variation in the dependent variable and is general, that is to say, universal in psychological research, the expectancy paradox is ineluctable. However, an analysis of the research reviews extant in this area yields the conclusion that (...) expectancy effects are neither inexorable nor highly general in psychological research and this provides the basis for its extrication from the expectancy paradox. (shrink)

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Despite the by now historical tendency to demarcate scientific epistemology sharply from virtually all others, especially theological “epistemology,” it has recently been recognized that both enterprises share a great deal in common, at least as far as the epistemology of discovery is implicated. Such a claim is founded upon a psychological analysis of figuration, where, it is argued, metaphor plays a crucial role in the mediation of discovery, in the domains of science and religion alike. Thus, although the conventionally conceived (...) scientific method is crucial to the enterprise, primacy must nonetheless be accorded to discovery, which drives virtually all disciplines. (shrink)

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Gray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.

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Background: Nurses are often faced with many stressful situations in life, including personal life challenges, the nature of work that requires standing long and being focused, commitment to patient care, and dealing with patients who need help. Research objective: The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between empathy and compassion fatigue in nurses due to the mediating role of feeling guilty and secondary traumatic stress. Research design: This is a descriptive-correlation study. Participants: The statistical population consisted of (...) all the nurses in Kerman hospitals in 2017. Five hospitals were randomly selected from among the private and public hospitals in Kerman. The sample size was considered 360, but after the deletion of misleading questionnaires, the final sample of study consisted of 300 nurses. Ethical considerations: Approval from the researcher’s university Institutional Review Board for ethical review was obtained. Findings: The data analysis in this study was done through the path analysis method using the Amos software. The results showed the mediating role of omnipotent guilt between empathy and compassion fatigue in the nurses, the mediating role of survivor guilt between empathy and compassion fatigue in the nurses, and the mediating role of secondary traumatic stress between empathy and compassion fatigue in the nurses. Also, empathy could explain 77% of the nurses’ compassion fatigue through feelings of guilt and secondary traumatic stress. Discussion: Pathogenic empathy-based guilt and secondary traumatic stress may help explain some of the links between clinical empathy and symptoms of compassion fatigue. Conclusion: Interventions and training programs targeting pathogenic empathy-based guilt and empathic secondary traumatic stress may be particularly important to help reduce compassion fatigue. (shrink)

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Shame is one of a family of self-conscious emotions that includes embarrassment, guilt, disgrace, and humiliation. _On Shame_ examines this emotion psychologically and philosophically, in order to show how it can be a galvanizing force for moral action against the violence and atrocity that characterize the world we live in. Michael L. Morgan argues that becauseshame is global in its sense of the self, the moral failures of all groups in which we are a member – including (...) the entire human race – reflect on each person individually. Drawing on historical and current affairs to explore the emotion ofshame, as well as films such as _Night and Fog_, _Hotel Rwanda_ and _Life is Beautiful_ and the work of Primo Levi, Bernard Williams, and Stanley Cavell, Michael Morgan illustrates how moral responsibility can be facilitated by calling upon an emotional reaction that is familiar, complex, and central to our conception of ourselves as individuals and as members of society. (shrink)

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How doesshame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a)shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b)shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c)shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d)shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting (...) the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them. -/- . (shrink)

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On Annie Ernaux and Simone de Beauvoir, writing, philosophy, andshame.

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The connection betweenshame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary toshame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: (...) the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy ofshame and the Social Argument toshame's link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion that they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception ofshame and guilt have obscured the important rolesshame plays in our moral lives. (shrink)

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Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? "No," says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses ofshame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum's view that to (...) respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust. (shrink)

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Shame is most frequently defined as the emotion we feel when we fail to live up to standards, norms, or ideals. I argue that this definition is flawed because it cannot explain some of the most paradigmatic features ofshame. Agents often respond toshame with violence, but ifshame is the painful feeling of failing to live up to an ideal, this response is unintelligible. I offer a new account ofshame that can explain (...) the link betweenshame and violence. On my view,shame arises out of a tension between our identity and our self-conception: those things about which we feelshame are part of our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception. I conclude by arguing that this account ofshame is a valuable moral emotion. (shrink)

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Experimental methods and conceptual confusion : philosophy, science, and what emotions really are -- To 'make our voices resonate' or 'to be silent'? :shame as fundamental ontology -- Emotion, cognition, and world --Shame and world.

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Shame is notoriously ambivalent. On one hand, it operates as a mechanism of normalization and social exclusion, installing or reinforcing patterns of silence and invisibility; on the other hand, the capacity forshame may be indispensible for ethical life insofar as it attests to the subject’s constitutive relationality and its openness to the provocation of others. Sartre, Levinas and Beauvoir each offer phenomenological analyses ofshame in which its basic structure emerges as a feeling of being exposed (...) to others and bound to one’s own identity. For Sartre,shame is an ontological provocation, constitutive of subjectivity as a being-for-Others. For Levinas, ontologicalshame takes the form of an inability to escape one’s own relation to being; this predicament is altered by the ethical provocation of an Other who puts my freedom in question and commands me to justify myself. For Beauvoir,shame is an effect of oppression, both for the woman whose embodied existence is marked as shameful, and for the beneficiary of colonial domination who feels ashamed of her privilege. For each thinker,shame articulates the temporality of social life in both its promise and its danger. (shrink)

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Doesshame have any role in politics? Far too often,shame is used as a weapon to dominate those who lack social power. For which reason, it is often regarded with skepticism by its many critics. But in an era where lying in order to get ahead in political contests seems to go unpunished by voters, where the sale of life-saving drugs is increased to astronomical proportions in the pursuit of profits, and where daily infractions against the dignity (...) of individuals is both widespread and quickly forgotten, the seeming lack ofshame threatens to undermine the shared values on which a democratic world depends. Drawing on the political thought of Hannah Arendt, especially her writings on Jewish and world politics, WorldlyShame constructs a political category ofshame that can help us respond to the crises of the present moment. "Worldlyshame" can return to us our sense of judgment, can be an inducement to action, and is a panacea for a world torn apart by horrors that diminish humanity. By developing a capacity for "worldlyshame," we can create political spaces that are hospitable to a plurality of voices and viewpoints, and which can thus be a bulwark against the world-destroying trends that engulf our world every day. (shrink)

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We examined an account of vicariousshame that explains how people can experience a self-conscious emotion for the behaviour of another person. Two divergent processes have been put forward to explain how another's behaviour links to the self. The group-based emotion account explains vicariousshame in terms of an in-group member threatening one's social identity by behaving shamefully. The empathy account explains vicariousshame in terms of empathic perspective taking; people imagine themselves in another's shameful behaviour. In (...) three studies using autobiographical recall and experimental inductions, we revealed that both processes can explain why vicariousshame arises in different situations, what variation can be observed in the experience of vicariousshame, and how all vicariousshame can be related to a threat to the self. Results are integrated in a functional account ofshame. (shrink)

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This paper develops an evolutionary account ofshame and its moral value. In so doing, it challenges the standard thinking aboutshame. Typically, those who approachshame from an evolutionary perspective deny that it is a morally valuable emotion, focusing instead on its social significance. And those who seeshame as morally valuable typically set aside questions aboutshame’s biological origins, if they see them as relevant at all. On my account,shame is an (...) emotion that sensitizes us to self-originating threats to our identities. So understood,shame is morally valuable because it brings a concern to protect our moral identities from damage that we (might) do to them. To develop my identity-driven account, I first argue that we can specify distinctly moral and social forms ofshame in terms of the moral and non-moral identities that undergird them. I then show that the resulting account not only makes empirically-supported predictions, but that it also accords with the claim thatshame is an evolutionary adaptation. The result is a novel account of the origins and cognitive foundations of a moral emotion. (shrink)

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In this paper, we reflect uponshame and humiliation as threats to personal and professional integrity and moral agency within contemporary health care. A personal narrative, written by a nurse about a particular shift in a British National Health Service Accident and Emergency Department, is provided as a case study. This is critically reflected and commented upon in dialogue with insights into the nature ofshame and humiliation. It is suggested that Accident and Emergency is a locus that (...) is latently prone to dynamics ofshame and humiliation, a potential exacerbated within a culture subject to externally‐determined time targets that are enforced by a top‐down system of surveillance and management. The result is that nurses may lose their sense of professional competence and responsibility, moral agency, and integrity, to their own personal detriment, as well as to the detriment of patients with whom they work. Insofar as examining a small part of a whole may suggest insights into the operation and ethos of a very large system, this very particular case study narrative/reflection has some important implications and lessons for the wider organization and provision of health care in Britain and beyond. (shrink)

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The notion thatshame is a global emotion, one which takes the whole self as its focus, has long enjoyed a near consensus in both the psychological and philosophical literature. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have questioned this conventional wisdom: on their view, most everyday instances ofshame are not global, but are instead limited to a specific aspect of one’s identity. I argue that this objection stems from an overemphasis on the cognitive dimension ofshame. (...) Its proponents cannot make sense of globalshame because they only understand the emotion in terms of an intellectual self-evaluation, where I am ashamed upon assessing myself to have disappointed a particular standard or ideal. However, whenshame is understood as arising early on in life from one’s threatened connection with others, and as having affective, embodied, and unconscious aspects alongside its later cognitive ones, the intuition that it feels all-encompassing makes more sense. Our earliest experiences ofshame, which are largely devoid of complex cognitive content, are global because they are experienced as casting doubt upon our lovability in general. It is only later, as cognition develops, that we learn to hang this sense of overall defectiveness, which is reawakened in subsequentshame experiences, onto specific parts of the self. While this might lead us in adulthood to intellectually understand ourshame as having a local basis, such as a failed norm or ideal, its global phenomenology will remain. (shrink)

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Online shaming is a subject of import for social philosophy in the Internet age, and not simply because shaming seems generally bad. I argue that social philosophers are well-placed to address the imaginal relationships we entertain when we engage in social media; activity in cyberspace results in more relationships than one previously had, entailing new and more responsibilities, and our relational behaviors admit of ethical assessment. I consider the stresses of social media, including the indefinite expansion of our relationships and (...) responsibilities, and the gap between the experiences of those shamed and the shamers’ appreciation of the magnitude of what they do when theyshame; I connect these to the literature suggesting that some intuitions fail to guide our ethics. I conclude that we each have more power than we believe we do or than we think carefully about exerting in our online imaginal relations. Whether we are the shamers or the shamed, we are unable to control the extent to which intangible words in cyberspace take the form of imaginal relationships that burden or brighten our self-perceptions. (shrink)

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Shame appeals may be both relevant to and make possible argumentation with reluctant addressees. I propose a normative pragmatic model of practical reasoning involved inshame appeals and show that its explanatory power exceeds that of a more traditional account of an underlying practical inference structure. I also illustrate that analyzing the formal propriety ofshame appeals offers a more complete explanation of their normative pragmatic force than an application of rules for dialogue types.

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Recent defenses of shaming as an effective tool for identifying bad practice and provoking social change appear compatible with feminism. I complicate this picture by examining two instances of online feminist shaming that resulted inshame backlashes. Shaming requires the assertion of social and epistemic authority on behalf of a larger community, and is dependent upon an audience that will be receptive to the shaming testimony. In cases where marginally situated knowers attempt to “shame up,” it presents challenges (...) for feminist uses. (shrink)

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Fosteringshame in societies may not curb violence, becauseshame is alienating. The person experiencingshame may not care enough about others to curb violent instincts. Furthermore, men may be lessshame-prone than are women. Finally, ifshame is too prevalent in a society, perpetrators may be reluctant to talk about their actions and motives, if indeed they know their own motives. We may be unable accurately to discover how perpetrators think about their own violence.

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_Disrupting Shameful Legacies: Girls and Young Women Speaking Back through the Arts to Address Sexual Violence_ is based on methodologies that seek to disrupt colonial legacies, by privileging speaking up and speaking back through the arts and visual practice to challenge the situation of sexual violence.

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Ontological accounts ofshame claim that the emotion has to do with our basic human vulnerability: on this view, one is ashamed over having had this vulnerability exposed before others. Against this view, I argue that it is not our vulnerable dependency on others itself which causes us to feel ashamed, but our rejection in the face of such vulnerability.Shame is not the result of simply being looked at, then, but of being looked at and not being (...) seen. In this sense, theshame we do feel over being vulnerable before, and dependent on, others is not a necessary part of human relations, but a sign that something has gone wrong within them; it is personal, not ontological. (shrink)

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In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim thatshame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regardshame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families ofshame episodes, none of them generalize so as to (...) motivate the conclusion thatshame is an essentially social emotion. We consider each thesis in turn, explaining in the process their connections with one another as well as the constraints on a theory ofshame they help uncover. Finally, we show how a non-social picture ofshame is not only capable of meeting these constraints, but has the further virtue of shedding light on those situations in which others seem to play no role in why we feelshame. (shrink)

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In this article, I examine the relevance and desirability ofshame and guilt to restorative justice conferences. I argue that a careful study of the psychology ofshame and guilt reveals that both emotions possess traits that can be desirable and traits that can be undesirable for restoration. More in particular, having presented the aims of restorative justice, the importance of face-to-face conferences in reaching these aims, the emotional dynamics that take place within such conferences, and the relevant (...) parts of the empirical psychology ofshame and guilt, I argue that restorative justice practitioners have to take account of a rather more complex picture than it had hitherto been thought. Restorative conferences are not simply about "shame management," though practitioners must certainly avoid shaming and humiliation. Given the nature ofshame, guilt, and restorative conferences, it is not possible to provide a single concrete precept applicable to all restorative conferences. The successful holding of conferences depends in large part on the cultural and situational specificities at hand. The latter include among others knowledge of the perceived relations standing between victim and offender as well as the affective specificities of the individuals involved. (shrink)

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This discussion of pride,shame, and guilt centers on the beliefs involved in the experience of any of these emotions. Through a detailed study, the author demonstrates how these beliefs are alike--in that they are all directed towards the self--and how they differ. The experience of these three emotions are illustrated by examples taken from English literature. These concrete cases supply a context for study and indicate the complexity of the situations in which these emotions usually occur.

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Aristotle and Xunzi onShame, Moral Education and the Good Life is the first major work that takes two philosophers from the ancient Greek and early Chinese traditions to stimulate discussion of an interdisciplinary nature on the rich and complex topic of the emotions, in particularshame. It features sophisticated comparative analysis of the Greek and Chinese texts while bringing the ancient materials to bear on modern controversies such as the role ofshame in moral education and (...) social cohesion. Despite fundamental differences in their social-historical and intellectual backgrounds, Aristotle and Xunzi bear striking similarities in several respects: their concept of humans as essentially members of communities, as having a unique set of characteristics that set them apart from other living things, and as beings in need of moral training to fulfil their potential and become integrated into a well-ordered society. The two philosophers' discourses onshame reveal important insights into their ideals of human nature, moral education and the good life. This book tackles directly the methodological problems that are relevant to anyone interested in cross-cultural comparisons and organises discussion of the ancient sources in such a way as to facilitate a thorough integration of perspectives from the cultural traditions concerned. This approach provides sufficient focus to allow for detailed textual analysis while giving scope for making constant connections to the broader comparative questions at issue. (shrink)

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There are five ways in whichshame might negatively impact upon our attempts to combat and treat HIV.Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history to the clinician.Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being retained in care.Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing.Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their (...) HIV status to new sexual partners.Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it should, or needs to, be. Drawing on recent philosophical work onshame, and more broadly on work in the philosophy and psychology of emotion, we propose a framework for understanding howshame operates upon those who experience the emotion, propose a strategy for combatting the negative roleshame plays in the fight against HIV, and suggest further study so as to identify the tactics that might be employed in pursuing the strategy here proposed. (shrink)

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Two studies employed a dissociative detachment induction technique to examine if experiences of dissociation increased acuteshame feelings. Study 1 recruited college participants, while Study 2 enlisted adults attending treatment for childhood sexual abuse. Two hypotheses were explored: (1) moreshame would be reported following a dissociative detachment induction than a relaxation induction; and (2)shame would increase when detachment was induced in the relationship context of a close other than when alone. Study 1 (N = 81) (...) effectively induced detachment and participants reported highershame in this condition compared to the relaxation condition. This effect was maintained when state anxiety was controlled. The relationship context produced no impact on dissociation orshame. Attributions around feeling flawed predominantly linked detachment experiences with subsequentshame feelings. In Study 2 with clinical participants (N = 28), regression analyses showed stateshame was predicted by acute detachment after controlling for state anxiety, gender, and traitshame and dissociation. The most common appraisals offered for why detachment led to feelings ofshame was being flawed and exposed. Collectively, our findings suggest that increased acuteshame results from detachment experiences, making more specific the relationship betweenshame and dissociation. (shrink)

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abstractShame punishments have become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional punishments, often taking the form of convicted criminals holding signs or sweeping streets with a toothbrush. In her Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum argues against the use ofshame punishments because they contribute to an offender's loss of dignity. However, these concerns are shared already by the courts which also have concerns about the possibility that shaming might damage an offender's dignity. This situation has not led the (...) courts to reject all uses of shaming, but only to accept shaming within certain safeguards. Thus, despite Nussbaum's important reservations againstshame punishments, it may still be possible for her to accept shaming within specific parameters such as those set out by the courts that protect the dignity of an offender. As a result, she need not be opposed to the use of legitimateshame punishment. (shrink)

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On the assumption thatshame is a universal emotion, cross-cultural research onshame relies on translations assumed to be equivalent in meaning. Our studies here questioned that assumption. In three studies (Ns, 108, 120, 117),shamewas compared to its translations in Spanish (vergüenza) and in Malayalam (nanakedu). American English speakers usedshamefor the emotional reaction to moral failures and its use correlated positively withguilt, whereasvergüenzaandnanakeduwere used less for moral stories and their use correlated less with the guilt words. In comparison (...) with Spanish and Malayalam speakers’ ratings of their translations, American English speakers ratedshameandguiltto be more similar to each other. (shrink)

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This paper offers a sustained philosophical meditation on contrasting interpretations of the emotion ofshame within four academic discourses—social psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology and Aristotelian scholarship—in order to elicit their implications for moral education. It turns out that within each of these discourses there is a mainstream interpretation which emphasisesshame’s expendability or moral ugliness (and whereshame is typically described as guilt’s ugly sister), but also a heterodox interpretation which seeks to retrieve and defend (...) class='Hi'>shame. As the heterodox interpretation seems to offer a more realistic picture ofshame’s role in moral education, the provenance of the mainstream interpretation merits scrutiny. I argue that social scientific studies of the concept ofshame, based on its supposed phenomenology, incorporate biases in favour of excessive, rather than medial, forms of the emotion. I suggest ways forward for more balanced analyses of the nature, moral justification and educative role ofshame. (shrink)

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At a time when some modicum of formal gender equality has been won in many late‐capitalist societies of the West, what explains the persistence of practices that extract labor and value from women and girls while granting a “surplus” of value to men and boys? Genderedshame is a central mechanism of the apparatus that secures the continued subordination of women across a number of class and race contexts in the mediatized, late‐capitalist West. Focusing on the story of Amanda (...) Todd, two forms ofshame are distinguished. “Ubiquitousshame” is thatshame that accrues to feminine existence as such, and is structured in relation to a futural temporality of redemption. “Unboundedshame” is a brute form of value‐extraction that has found its ecological niche in social media—and destroys all futural aspirations. (shrink)

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Through positing that our capacity for physical vulnerability is at the core of originalshame, Sartre’s account in Being and Nothingness revealsshame as an essential structure of human existence. Reading Sartre’s ontological account of ‘pureshame’ alongside recent writing aboutshame in early child development, particularly Martha Nussbaum’s account of ‘primitiveshame,’ this article will explore the inherent links betweenshame, the body and vulnerability, ultimately positing that our human need for belonging is (...) the fundamental driving force behindshame, and what gives it its ontological status. In short, this article will argue thatshame is not merely about a painful awareness of one’s flaws or transgressions with reference to norms and others, but about a deeper layer of relationality through our bodily vulnerability. (shrink)

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Isshame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature ofshame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value ofshame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original (...) philosophical account ofshame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas aboutshame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account ofshame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account,shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake inshame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance. -/- This philosophical account ofshame engages with all the current debates onshame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public polic. (shrink)

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We tend to suppose that the ancient Greeks had primitive ideas of the self, of responsibility, freedom, andshame, and that now humanity has advanced from these to a more refined moral consciousness. Bernard Williams's original and radical book questions this picture of Western history. While we are in many ways different from the Greeks, Williams claims that the differences are not to be traced to a shift in these basic conceptions of ethical life. We are more like the (...) ancients than we are prepared to acknowledge, and only when this is understood can we properly grasp our most important differences from them, such as our rejection of slavery. The author is a philosopher, but much of his book is directed to writers such as Homer and the tragedians, whom he discusses as poets and not just as materials for philosophy. At the center of his study is the question of how we can understand Greek tragedy at all, when its world is so far from ours. Williams explains how it is that when the ancients speak, they do not merely tell us about themselves, but about ourselves. _Shame and Necessity_ gives a new account of our relations to the Greeks, and helps us to see what ethical ideas we need in order to live in the modern world. (shrink)

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Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...) attributability sense, it will be argued, is to feelshame and feelingshame is also to suffer. The different control conditions cannot be explained by a difference in the harm of blame. Instead, this paper argues that accountability and attributability are governed by different kinds of appropriateness: an agent S is accountability blameworthy for X only if S deserves to feel guilty; an agent S is attributability blameworthy for X only if it is fitting that S feelsshame for X. (shrink)

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Attitudes likeshame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality.Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object ofshame and (...) contempt is not the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour. (shrink)

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Self-conscious emotions such asshame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases (...) do not necessarily challenge the idea thatshame and pride are about the emoting subject. Rather, we claim that some of the most paradigmatic scenarios ofshame and pride induced by others can be accommodated by taking seriously the consideration that, in such cases, the subject “group-identifies” with the other. This is the idea that, in feeling these forms ofshame or pride, the subject is conceiving of herself as a member of the same group as the subject acting shamefully or in an admirable way. In other words, these peculiar emotive responses are elicited in the subject insofar as, and to the extent that, she is (or sees herself as being) a member of a group – the group to which those who act shamefully or admirably also belong. By looking into the way in which the notion of group identification can allow for an account of hetero-inducedshame and pride, this paper attempts to achieve a sort of mutual enlightenment that brings to light not only an important and generally neglected form of self-conscious emotions, but also relevant features of group identification. In particular, it generates evidence for the idea that group identification is a psychological process that the subject does not have to carry out intentionally in the sense that it is not necessarily triggered by the subject’s conative states like desires or intentions. (shrink)

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In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim thatshame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regardshame as displaying a structure in which "others" play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families ofshame episodes, none of them generalize so as to (...) motivate the conclusion thatshame is an essentially social emotion. We consider each thesis in turn, explaining in the process their connections with one another as well as the constraints on a theory ofshame they help uncover. Finally, we show how a non-social picture ofshame is not only capable of meeting these constraints, but has the further virtue of shedding light on those situations in which others seem to play no role in why we feelshame. (shrink)

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What, if anything, can justify public shaming? Philosophers who have written on this topic have pointed out the role of public shaming in enforcing valuable social norms. In this paper, I defend an alternate, supplementary justification for public shaming: as a form of moral self-defence. Moral self-defence is the defence of one’s moral standing – being recognized as an equal in the eyes of oneself and others – rather than the defence of one’s physical body or rights. Agents can engage (...) in moral self-defence by publicly criticizing, blaming, or expressing other negative feelings towards wrongdoers, which sometimes constitutes contributions to public shaming. (shrink)

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This paper outlines what we call a network model of collective emotions. Drawing upon this model, we explore the significance of collective emotions in the Palestine-Israel conflict. We highlight some of the ways in which collectiveshame, in particular, has contributed to the evolution of this conflict. And we consider some of the obstacles thatshame and the pride-restoring narratives to which it gave birth pose to the conflict’s resolution.

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Some philosophers argue that we should be suspicious aboutshame. For example, Nussbaum endorses the view thatshame is a largely irrational or unreasonable emotion rooted in infantile narcissism. This claim has also been used to support the view that we should largely abandon shaming as a social activity. If we are worried about the emotion ofshame, so the thought goes, we should also worry about acts which encourageshame. I argue that this line of (...) reasoning does not license the leap from the critique ofshame to the critique of shaming. This is because shaming does not always aim to inflictshame on its targets. Many acts of shaming (which I label ‘performative shaming’) should simply be understood as aiming to serve their characteristic function of shoring up social norms and standards. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT The paper examines the role ofshame as a motivator to engage in social struggles. The author first introduces a distinction between social and moralshame arguing that, while the former can lead to a passive submission to injustice, the latter usually works as a motivating force to resist it. He subsequently discusses three cases of injustice, in which the subject is respectively the victim, the actor, and the witness. The main thesis of the paper is that (...) in all three cases the subject may feel moralshame for tolerating injustice and therefore be motivated to resist it. The conditions under which moralshame arises are discussed, while the absence of moralshame is attributed, through reference to clinical studies, to psychic defence mechanisms, such as negation and rationalisation, which allow the subject to tolerate injustice when it would be too costly to fight it. Throughout the paper, the author engages in a discussion of Honneth’s theory of social struggles, reassessing the role of recognition within the moral grammar of social struggles while attributing the due importance to the desire to live up to one’s self-ideal. (shrink)

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Questions about the relation betweenshame and embarrassment are often posed in discussion of emotion but have rarely been examined at length. In this study I assemble and examine distinctions that have been proposed in the literature with the aim of identifying the criteria that have been used to differentiateshame and embarrassment. Relevant empirical studies are also reviewed. Despite the attention paid to the question of the difference betweenshame and embarrassment consensus on differentiating criteria has (...) not been reached nor has there been consideration of what kind of question is being posed. Three positions that have been adopted are identified and critically evaluated. (shrink)

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