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The paper argues thatscientificprogress is best characterized as an increase in scientists' understanding of the world. It also connects this idea with the claim thatscientific understanding and explanation are captured in terms of unification.

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This paper challenges Bird’s view thatscientificprogress should be understood in terms of knowledge, by arguing that unjustifiedscientific beliefs (and/or changes in belief) may nevertheless be progressive. It also argues that false beliefs may promoteprogress.

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What isscientificprogress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it. Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes ascientific improvement with respect to X. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs whenscientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone (...) to increase their understanding of X. This account is briefly compared to two rival accounts ofscientificprogress, based respectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and is argued to be preferable to both. (shrink)

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First, I argue thatscientificprogress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science’s theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension ofscientificprogress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes inscientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promotescientificprogress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.

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Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile,scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question ofscientificprogress. One answer is thatprogress occurs whenscientific theories ‘get closer to the truth’, i.e. increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is thatprogress consists in increasing theories’ (...) effectiveness for solvingscientific problems. A third answer is thatprogress occurs when the stock ofscientific knowledge accumulates. A fourth and final answer is thatscientificprogress consists in increasingscientific understanding, i.e. the capacity to correctly explain and reliably predict relevant phenomena. This paper compares and contrasts these four accounts ofscientificprogress, considers some of the most prominent arguments for and against each account, and briefly explores connections to different forms ofscientific realism. (shrink)

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"UnderstandingScientificProgress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for (...) advancing beyond verificationism and Hume’s problem of induction, but faults both Kuhn and Popper for being unable to show that and how their work could lead nearer to the truth." —Dr. LLOYD EBY teaches philosophy at The George Washington University and The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC "Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism is in my opinion a very significant contribution to the philosophy of science. I hope that it will be widely discussed and debated." – ALAN SOKAL, Professor of Physics, New York University "Maxwell takes up the philosophical challenge of how natural science makesprogress and provides a superb treatment of the problem in terms of the contrast between traditional conceptions and his own scientifically-informed theory—aim-oriented empiricism. This clear and rigorously-argued work deserves the attention of scientists and philosophers alike, especially those who believe that it is the accumulation of knowledge and technology that answers the question."—LEEMON McHENRY, California State University, Northridge "Maxwell has distilled the finest essence of thescientific enterprise. Science is about making the world a better place. Sometimes science loses its way. The future depends on scientists doing the right things for the right reasons. Maxwell's Aim-Oriented Empiricism is a map to put science back on the right track."—TIMOTHY McGETTIGAN, Professor of Sociology, Colorado State University - Pueblo "Maxwell has a great deal to offer with these important ideas, and deserves to be much more widely recognised than he is. Readers with a background in philosophy of science will appreciate the rigour and thoroughness of his argument, while more general readers will find his aim-oriented rationality a promising way forward in terms of a future sustainable and wise social order."—David Lorimer, Paradigm Explorer, 2017/2 "This is a book about the very core problems of the philosophy of science. The idea of replacing Standard Empiricism with Aim-Oriented Empiricism is understood by Maxwell as the key to the solution of these central problems. Maxwell handles his main tool masterfully, producing a fascinating and important reading to his colleagues in the field. However, Nicholas Maxwell is much more than just a philosopher of science. In the closing part of the book he lets the reader know about his deep concern and possible solutions of the biggest problems humanity is facing."—Professor PEETER MŰŰREPP, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia “For many years, Maxwell has been arguing that fundamental philosophical problems aboutscientificprogress, especially the problem of induction, cannot be solved granted standard empiricism (SE), a doctrine which, he thinks, most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted. A key tenet of SE is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part ofscientific knowledge independent of evidence. For a number of reasons, Maxwell argues, we need to adopt a rather different conception of science which he calls aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). This holds that we need to construe physics as accepting, as a part of theoreticalscientific knowledge, a hierarchy of metaphysical theses about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, which become increasingly insubstantial as we go up the hierarchy. In his book “UnderstandingScientificProgress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism”, Maxwell gives a concise and excellent illustration of this view and the arguments supporting it… Maxwell’s book is a potentially important contribution to our understanding ofscientificprogress and philosophy of science more generally. Maybe it is the time for scientists and philosophers to acknowledge that science has to make metaphysical assumptions concerning the knowability and comprehensibility of the universe. Fundamental philosophical problems aboutscientificprogress, which cannot be solved granted SE, may be solved granted AOE.” Professor SHAN GAO, Shanxi University, China . (shrink)

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What constitutes cognitivescientificprogress? This Element begins with an extensive survey of the contemporary debate on how to answer this question. It provides a blow-by-blow critical summary of the key literature on the issue over the past fifteen years, covering the central positions and arguments therein. It also draws upon older literature, where appropriate, to inform the treatment. The Element then enters novel territory by considering meta-normative issues concerningscientificprogress. It focuses on how the (...) standards involved in assessingprogress arise. Does science have aims, which determine what counts asprogress, as many authors assume? If so, what is it to be an aim of science? And how does one identify such things? If not, how do normative standards arise? After arguing that science does not have overarching aims, the Element proposes that the standards are ultimately subjective. (shrink)

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Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account ofscientificprogress, according to which science makesprogress just in case there is a change inscientific justification. Here we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning respectively (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations inscientific justification, and (iv) the possibility ofscientific regress. We conclude by sketching a substantially different justification-based account ofscientificprogress that avoids (...) these problems. (shrink)

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I defend a novel account ofscientificprogress centred around justification. Science progresses, on this account, where there is a change in justification. I consider three options for explicating this notion of change in justification. This account ofscientificprogress dispels with a condition forscientificprogress that requires accumulation of truth or truthlikeness, and it emphasises the social nature ofscientific justification.

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A frequently advanced claim in contemporary science policy is that interdisciplinarity is especially well suited for being ‘transformative’ and for bringing about ‘major breakthroughs’. Thus, it is expected that, in contemporary science, majorprogress will come primarily from interdisciplinary research (IDR). Often in this dis-course, interdisciplinarity is also expected to integrate the involved disciplines or specialties. This chapter will provide a philosophical qualification of this political discourse by examining how interdisciplinaryprogress can be characterised. I shall argue that (...) in addition to the categories of incremental and transformativeprogress that are well known from mono-disciplinary science, IDR can sometimes also offer another category ofprogress that I shall call quasi-transformative. In examining these three kinds of interdisciplinary progresses I shall argue, first, that interdisciplinaryprogress does not necessarily require a specific type of integration between the involved disciplines or specialties, second, that social relations between scientists with different areas of expertise may play a crucial role in especially transformativeprogress, and third, that different disciplinary perspectives on what constitutesprogress can draw wedges between scientists from different disciplines. (shrink)

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Bird argues thatscientificprogress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient forscientificprogress, and argues thatscientificprogress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for thescientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for (...)scientificprogress, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required forscientific understanding. (shrink)

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In the Postscript to the second edition of The Structure ofScientific Revolutions Kuhn addresses charges of relativism by exhibiting his notion ofscientificprogress, a notion he claims is not relativistic. Critics have largely bypassed this as an evasion on Kuhn’s part. This essay argues that Kuhn’s model ofprogress does not rescue him from self-refutation charges, and that this criticism can be pressed regardless of whether he embraces global relativism. It concludes by tracing the (...) ongoing controversy regarding Kuhn and relativism to the elusive nature of Kuhn’s prose. (shrink)

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In the philosophical debate aboutscientificprogress, several authors appeal to a distinction between what constitutesscientificprogress and what promotes it (e.g., Bird, 2008; Rowbottom, 2008; Dellsén, 2016). However, the extant literature is almost completely silent on what exactly it is forscientificprogress to be promoted. Here I provide a precise account ofprogress promotion on which it consists, roughly, in increasing expectedprogress. This account may be combined with any (...) of the major theories of what constitutesscientificprogress, such as the truthlikeness, problem-solving, epistemic, and noetic accounts. However, I will also suggest that once we have this account ofprogress promotion up and running, some accounts of what constitutesprogress become harder to motivate by the sorts of considerations often adduced in their favor, while others turn out to be easier to defend against common objections. (shrink)

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Psychological-epistemic accounts takescientificprogress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of thesemantic,epistemic,andnoeticaccounts ofscientificprogress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither necessary nor sufficient for (...) class='Hi'>scientificprogress. Rather than being fatal to the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts, this objection shows that these accounts are most plausible when they take the psychological states relevant toscientificprogress to be states of communities, rather than individuals. I draw on recent work in social epistemology to develop two ways in which communities can be the bearers of irreducible psychological-epistemic states. Each way yields a strategy by which proponents of one of the psychological-epistemic accounts might attempt to account for the social dimensions ofscientificprogress. While I present serious reasons for concern about the first strategy, I argue that the second strategy, at least, offers a promising path forward for a psychological-epistemic account ofscientificprogress. (shrink)

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ABSTRACTThis discussion note aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature ofscientificprogress. I argue against the semantic view ofscientificprogress, according to whichscientificprogress consists in approximation to truth or increasing verisimilitude. If the semantic view ofscientificprogress were correct, then scientists would makescientificprogress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories. Given that it is not the case (...) that scientists could makescientificprogress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories, it follows that the semantic view ofscientificprogress is incorrect. (shrink)

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What isscientificprogress? On Alexander Bird’s epistemic account ofscientificprogress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is morescientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using Bird’s epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of (...) the episode than at the beginning. This account is shown to be superior to the epistemic account by examining cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart. In these cases, it is argued thatscientificprogress matches increases inscientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. In addition, considerations having to do with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor this understanding-based account over its epistemic counterpart. (shrink)

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When science makes cognitiveprogress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whomscientificprogress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach.Scientificprogress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whomprogress (...) is made, i.e. the receivers rather than the producers ofscientific information. This includes not only scientists themselves, but also various other individuals who utilizescientific information in different ways for the benefit of society as a whole. (shrink)

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In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in whichscientificprogress is based on both rational and empirical considerations.

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Intuitively, science progresses from truth to truth. A glance at history quickly reveals that this idea is mistaken. We often learn fromscientific theories that turned out to be false. This chapter focuses on a different challenge: Idealisations are deliberately and ubiquitously used in science. Scientists thus work with assumptions that are known to be false. Any account ofscientificprogress needs to account for this widely acceptedscientific practice. It is examined how the four dominant (...) accounts—the problem-solving account, the truthlikeness account, the epistemic account, and the noetic account—can cope with the challenge from idealisation, with an eye on indispensable idealisations. One upshot is that, on all accounts, idealisations can promoteprogress. Only some accounts allow them to constituteprogress. (shrink)

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This collection of original essays offers a comprehensive examination ofscientificprogress, which has been a central topic in recent debates in philosophy of science. Traditionally, debates overscientificprogress have focused on different methodological approaches, notably the epistemic and semantic approaches. The chapters in Part I of the book examine these two traditional approaches, as well as the newly revived functional and newly developed noetic approaches. Part II features in-depth case studies ofscientific (...) class='Hi'>progress from the history of science. The chapters cover individual sciences including physics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, seismology, psychology, sociology, economics, and medicine. Finally, Part III of the book explores important issues from contemporary philosophy of science. These chapters address the implications ofscientificprogress for thescientific realism/anti-realism debate, incommensurability, values in science, idealisation,scientific speculation, interdisciplinarity, andscientific perspectivalism. New Philosophical Perspectives onScientificProgress will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

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Scientificprogress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makesprogress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general (...) satisfaction. (shrink)

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Does science have any aim(s)? If not, does it follow that the debate aboutscientificprogress is somehow misguided or problematically non-objective? These are two of the central questions posed in Rowbottom’sScientificProgress. In this paper, I argue that we should answer both questions in the negative. Science probably has no aims, certainly not a single aim; but it does not follow from this that the debate aboutscientificprogress is somehow misguided or (...) problematically non-objective. (shrink)

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Background and Objectives: In this research article, the researcher addresses the issue of creating public understanding in a democratic society about theprogress of science, with an emphasis on pluralism from philosophers of science. The idea that there is only one truth and that there are just natural laws awaiting discovery by scientists has historically made it difficult to explainscientificprogress. This belief motivates science to develop theories that explain the unity of science, and it is (...) thought that diversity in the way different ideas presented by scientists is a problem that results in time being wasted in search of the most accurate theory. Some scientists perceive a benefit in having a range ofscientific hypotheses, though. One benefit that is frequently cited is thatscientific diversity as a whole contributes to the development of a democratic society that permits the expression of a range of viewpoints. The road to accountablescientific pluralism is fraught with difficulties, though. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account both pluralism's advantages and disadvantages. This research aims at: 1. analyzing in an epistemological way the interpretation ofscientific theories and theprogress of science from the perspectives ofscientific pluralists; 2. analyzing the relationship between science and democracy in explainingscientific significance andprogress; and 3. synthesizing new knowledge on epistemic dependentism and to argue that it plays a significant role in evaluating research issues related toscientific pluralism. Methodology: The research methodology involves the application of documentary investigation along with philosophical discourse. The method of philosophical argumentation involves analyzing the lines of arguments found in relevant academic publications in order to assess their validity and soundness. Main Results: One key argument of the pluralists is the use of the concept of theoretical pluralism, which suggests thatscientific knowledge is created from a variety of perspectives according to the social and cultural context of knowledge creation. It is found that part of Longino's argument is based on the negation of rational/social dichotomy. Moreover, her theory is a departure from philosopher of science Philip Kitcher, who advocates the creation ofscientific knowledge and the evaluation ofscientificprogress through the means of democratic society. He explains that these procedures will lead to "well-ordered science" in democratic society. Discussions: The researcher examines the underlying ideas accepted by these two philosophers of science and finds that although their opinions differ, they have common ground in the acceptance of consensus. However, the views of both philosophers still lack weight in explaining the knowledge itself. The researcher argues that the acceptance of pluralism as a way of understandingscientificprogress necessarily lends itself to dependentism, which points to interdependence in comparisons of superiority/inferiority betweenscientific theories. It is undeniable that the situation has emerged all the time, even though the success of thescientific theories being compared to each other comes from different social and cultural grounds of thought. Conclusions: Some popular models ofscientific pluralism in the philosophy of science still lack a compelling justification, particularly on the epistemic grounds. By elucidating the epistemic significance of the interdependence of these things,scientific pluralism can be strengthened by incorporating the notion of epistemic dependentism into the analysis ofscientificprogress. (shrink)

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According to the foundationalist picture, shared by many rationalists and positivist empiricists, science makes cognitiveprogress by accumulating justified truths. Fallibilists, who point out that complete certainty cannot be achieved in empirical science, can still argue that even successions of false theories mayprogress toward the truth. This proposal was supported by Karl Popper with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Popper’s own technical definition failed, but the idea thatscientificprogress means increasing truthlikeness can be (...) expressed by defining degrees of truthlikeness in terms of similarities between states of affairs. This paper defends the verisimilitude approach against Alexander Bird who argues that the “semantic” definition is not sufficient to defineprogress, but the “epistemic” definition referring to justification and knowledge is more adequate. Here Bird ignores the crucial distinction between realprogress and estimatedprogress, explicated by the difference between absolute degrees of truthlikeness and their evidence-relative expected values. Further, it is argued that Bird’s idea of returning to the cumulative model of growth requires an implausible trick of transforming past false theories into true ones. (shrink)

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The functional approach toscientificprogress has been mainly developed by Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper, Laudan, and more recently by Shan. The basic idea is that science progresses if key functions of science are fulfilled in a better way. This chapter defends the function approach. It begins with an overview of the two old versions of the functional approach by examining the work of Kuhn, Laudan, Popper, and Lakatos. It then argues for Shan’s new functional approach, in which (...) class='Hi'>scientificprogress is defined as an increase of usefulness of exemplary practices. (shrink)

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I argue thatscientificprogress is precisely the accumulation ofscientific knowledge.

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“Problem-solving” as a criterion ofscientificprogress defended by Thomas S. Kuhn and Larry Laudan, respectively, has been criticized by several authors. Recently, Alexander Bird has suggested that problem-solving as a criterion ofscientificprogress is regressive and anti-intuitive. In this text I reassess Kuhn, Laudan and Bird’s positions and I show that Bird’s arguments are untenable.

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I argue that (1) ifscientificprogress, construed in revolutionary terms, were to continue indefinitely long, then any non-trivial question answerable by the use of thescientific method would in fact be answered in a way that would allow for further refinement without undermining the essential correctness of the answer; and (2) it is reasonable to believe thatscientificprogress will continue indefinitely long. The establishment of (1) and (2) entails that any non-trivial empirically answerable (...) question will be answered in a way that allows for further indefinite refinement.Moreover, inasmuch as the establishment of (1) and (2) undermines the ontological relativity inherent in the commonly held view that unto eternity there will be competing alternativescientific theories of differing ontological commitment, it provides for the ontologically and epistemologically privileged position of science. (shrink)

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Systemism and social mechanisms, as articulated by Bunge, are concepts with great potential for application to assessment of researchprogress. This study will use the conceptual tools made available by systemism and social mechanisms to evaluate the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project as ascientific effort toward the greater understanding of crises in world politics. Systemism and social mechanisms are articulated as key concepts in the quest forscientificprogress. The goals and basic characteristics of the (...) ICB Project as ascientific venture then are described. The ICB Project is assessed in terms of how well it lives up to standards forscientificprogress. Finally, conclusions and ideas about future research are presented. The basic finding of this study is that the ICB Project is quite successful in meeting the standards forscientificprogress entailed by the concepts of systemism and social mechanisms. Key Words:scientificprogress • international relations • international crises • paradigm. (shrink)

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Dellsén (2017) has recently argued for an understanding-based account ofscientificprogress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particularscientific discipline) makes cognitiveprogress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. Dellsén contrasts this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015) epistemic account, according to which suchprogress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects (...) of Dellsén’s account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. Since a number of Park’s arguments rely on the idea thatscientificprogress may merely consists in “achieving the means to increase knowledge” (Park 2017: 570), I will start by discussing this “means-end thesis”. (shrink)

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The article discusses the problem ofscientificprogress in the contemporary philosophy of science, which is most often understood as the development of science associated with the pursuit of discovering the truth. The stance of Philip S. Kitcher, one of the most famous and influential contemporary philosophers of science, is presented. His considerations deepen the issue mentioned in the article’s title, primarily by expanding the scope of this topic. Thus, Kitcher’s considerations represent currently effective model of the philosophy (...) of science, which describes and explains research strategies but does not formulate methodological norms. (shrink)

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Twentieth century philosophy of science has been dominated by a view of language with a strong prejudice against psychology, even while empirical psychology has moved away from the nineteenth century philosophical psychology against which the prejudice was originally directed. This legacy is shown to dominate even in recent Kripke‐inspired efforts toward new theories of meaning. Its influence is argued to undermine prospects for making sense of such phenomena asscientificprogress. Avoiding this consequence requires that we pursue a (...) psychologically informed theory of meaning. (shrink)

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Discussions on the status of definitions of life have long been dominated by a position known as definitional pessimism. Per the definitional pessimist, there is no point in trying to define life. This claim is defended in different ways, but one of the shared assumptions of all definitional pessimists is that our attempts to define life are attempts to provide a list of all necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as alive. In other words, a definition of life (...) is a strict, descriptive definition. Against this, several pragmatic alternatives have been put forward. On these pragmatic accounts, definitions of life are not strictly, but rather loosely descriptive. Their purpose is not to be true, but to be useful to scientists by guidingscientific practice. More recently, this position has come under attack for not being able to explain how our attempts to define life are connected toscientificprogress within the biological sciences. Here, I argue to the contrary by showing how pragmatic definitions of life can be, and in fact are, conducive toscientificprogress. Additionally, I show how the pragmatic account of definitions of life can be brought to bear upon our normative discussions involving definitions of life. (shrink)

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One of the key interpretative problems generated by the development of quantum theory was the conceptual consistency underlyingscientific change, a problem not adequately treated by any of the leading theories ofscientific development. In different but related ways Quine, Sellars, and Davidson have treated the problem of conceptual consistency by showing how one can begin with ordinary language and proceed to specialized extensions. Their techniques have not been applied to modern physics. However, one basis for applying them (...) arises from the deep similarities between some of the work of these analysts and the Copenhagen interpretation rightly interpreted. To make this more concrete three concepts whose meanings have changed as a result ofscientificprogress are considered: 'atom', 'state of a system', and 'particle'. Each functions in a different way and requires a different type of analysis. (shrink)

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Scientificprogress is a hot topic in the philosophy of science. However, as yet we lack a comprehensive philosophical examination ofscientificprogress. First, the recent debate pays too much attention to the epistemic approach and the semantic approach. Shan’s new functional approach and Dellsén’s noetic approach are still insufficiently assessed. Second, there is little in-depth analysis of theprogress in the history of the sciences. Third, many related philosophical issues are still to be explored. (...) For example, what are the implications ofscientificprogress for thescientific realism/antirealism debate? Is the incommensurability thesis a challenge toscientificprogress? What role does aesthetic values play inscientificprogress? Does idealisation impedescientificprogress? This book fills this gap. It offers a new assessment of the four main approaches toscientificprogress (Part I). It also features eight historical case studies to investigate the notion ofprogress in different disciplines: physics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, seismology, psychology, sociology, economics, and medicine respectively (Part II). It discusses some issues related toscientificprogress:scientific realism, incommensurability, values in science, idealisation,scientific speculation, interdisciplinarity, andscientific perspectivalism (Part III). (shrink)

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This paper exploits the language of structuralism, as it has recently been developed with stunning effectiveness in defining the relations between confirmation, empiricalprogress and truth approximation, to concisely clarify the fundamental problem of the classical Lakatos concept ofscientificprogress, and to compare its way of evaluation to the real problems of scientists facing the far from perfect theories they wish to improve and defend against competitors.I opt basically for the structuralist terminology adopted in Kuipers (2000), (...) because that is balanced with care to deal with a range of issues far wider than the one dealt with in this contribution. It should be added that this does not commit me to any position on any subject, because structuralism is not a (meta-) theory, it is a language, able to express anything that can be said in other concept systems created to describe knowledge and its dynamics. (shrink)

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Contemporary debate surrounding the nature ofscientificprogress has focused upon the precise role played by justification, with two realist accounts having dominated proceedings. Recently, however, a third realist account has been put forward, one which offers no role for justification at all. According to Finnur Dellsén’s (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 56:72–83, 2016) noetic account, science progresses when understanding increases, that is, when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world that (...) they could before. In this paper, we argue that the noetic account is severely undermotivated. Dellsén provides three examples intended to show that understanding can increase absent the justification required for true belief to constitute knowledge. However, we demonstrate that a lack of clarity in each case allows for two contrasting interpretations, neither of which serves its intended purpose. On the first, the agent involved lacks both knowledge and understanding; and, on the second, the agent involved successfully gains both knowledge and understanding. While neither interpretation supports Dellsén’s claim that understanding can be prised apart from knowledge, we argue that, in general, agents in such cases ought to be attributed neither knowledge nor understanding. Given that the separability of knowledge and understanding is a necessary component of the noetic account, we conclude that there is little support for the idea that science progresses through increasing understanding rather than the accumulation of knowledge. (shrink)

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Charles Peirce had a flair for asking fruitful questions and for proposing answers that did not block the way of inquiry. Typical examples occur in his philosophy of science where he raises issues that are still very much alive. They include such items as the nature and conditions ofscientificprogress, the grounds of human success in formulating theories, the completability ofscientific knowledge, and the limits imposed by the economy of research. Because these are living issues, (...) Peirce's ideas about them invite examination as if he were our philosophical contemporary. Nicholas Rescher so examines them in his compact, timely book. His treatment is sympathetic but by no means uncritical, as might have been expected in view of the similarities and differences between his own position of methodological pragmatism and the pragmaticism of Peirce. The ensuing discussion thus seems to me worth looking at in a bit of detail. (shrink)

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Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account ofscientificprogress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look atscientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way (...) in which scientists make judgments aboutprogress. As far as scientists are concerned,progress is made whenscientific discoveries contribute to the increase ofscientific knowledge of the following sorts: empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological. I then propose to articulate an account ofprogress that does justice to this broad conception ofprogress employed by scientists. I discuss one way of doing so, namely, by expanding our notion ofscientific knowledge to include both know-that and know-how. (shrink)

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