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Brad Hooker; II*—Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 19–36, https://d.

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Rule-Consequentialism faces “the problem of partial acceptance”: How should the ideal code be selected given the possibility that its rules may not be universally accepted? A new contender, “Calculated Rates”Rule-Consequentialism claims to solve this problem. However, I argue that Calculated Rates merely relocates the partial acceptance question. Nevertheless, there is a significant lesson from this failure of Calculated Rates.Rule-Consequentialism’s problem of partial acceptance is more helpfully understood as an instance of the broader (...) problem of selecting the ideal code given various assumptions—assumptions about who will accept and comply with the rules, but also about how the rules will be taught and enforced, and how similar the future will be. Previous rich discussions about partial acceptance provide a taxonomy and groundwork for formulating the best version ofRule-Consequentialism. (shrink)

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Ruleconsequentialism is usually taken to recommend a single ideal code for all moral agents. Here I argue that, depending on their theoretical mo- tivations, somerule consequentialists have good reasons to be relativists.Rule consequentialists who are moved by consequentialist considerations ought to support a scheme of multiple relativized moral codes because we could expect such a scheme to have better consequences in terms of impartial aggregate well- being than a single universal code.Rule (...) consequentialists who nd compelling the theory’s coherence with our considered moral intuitions should do the same because a scheme of multiple codes could better cohere with our intuitions about costless bene ts, though these intuitions must be weighed against our allegiance to moral universalism. (shrink)

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Ruleconsequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A's doing F in C is in accordance with the the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so (...) has disastrous results. Though somerule consequentialists embrace a disaster-clause which permits agents to disregard some of the rules in the ideal code as a necessary means of avoiding disasters, they have not adequately explained how this clause works. I offer such an explanation and show how it fits naturally with the rest of RC. The second disaster objection asserts that even if RC can legitimately invoke a disaster-clause, it lacks principled grounds from distinguishing disasters from non-disasters. In response, I explore Hooker's suggestion that “disaster” is vague. I contend that every plausible ethical theory must invoke something similar to a disaster clause. So if “disaster” is vague, then every plausible ethical theory faces a difficulty with it. As a result, this vagueness is not a reason to prefer other theories to RC. However, I argue, contra Hooker, that the sense of “disaster” relevant to RC is not vague, and RC does indeed have principled grounds to distinguish disasters from nondisasters. (shrink)

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Ruleconsequentialism (RC) holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by an ideal moral code, i.e., the set of rules whose internalization would have the best consequences. But just how many moral codes are there supposed to be? Absolute RC holds that there is a single morally ideal code for everyone, while Relative RC holds that there are different codes for different groups or individuals. I argue that Relative RC better meets the test of reflective (...) equilibrium than Absolute RC. In particular, I contend that Relative RC is superior because it accommodates our convictions about costless benefits. Some have charged that Relative RC threatens our convictions about the generality of moral codes and that it leads inevitably to what Brad Hooker calls “runaway relativism.” I argue that Relative RC has principled reasons for stopping this imagined slide down the slippery slope. (shrink)

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Why should I take care of my aging parents? How far will morality require me to sacrifice for this cause? I will study these questions from the perspectives of Confucianism andrule‐consequentialism. Confucians believe that the continuity of families and the interactions between members of different generations can enhance the integrity of society in the long run. However, since Confucianism may impose extreme demands on its followers, this theory may be problematic. In this paper, I argue that despite (...) its demands, the Confucian doctrines are defensible and are worth upholding. To explain my view, I draw uponrule‐consequentialism and explain how therule‐consequentialist analysis complements and enhances the Confucian claims. I believe that the consequentialist conception of Confucianism can provide a useful resource for responding to the moral challenge of population aging in the current state of the world. (shrink)

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In this paper I analyse how procreative freedom poses a challenge forrule-consequentialism. First, I reconstruct therule-consequentialist case for procreative freedom. Second, I argue that population scenarios resulting from very low fertility pose a problem forrule-consequentialism since such scenarios cannot secure population growth or even avoid human extinction in the long run. Third, I argue that population scenarios resulting from excessive procreation also pose a problem forrule-consequentialism since they are incompatible (...) with the promotion of optimific consequences in various ways. Were therule-consequentialist to avoid these types of scenarios, the challenge would consist in doing so while retaining the liberal approach to individual rights and freedoms that maderule-consequentialism an advantageous competitor against moral theories like act-consequentialism. These population scenarios raise more general questions about howrule-consequentialism ought to conceptualise the application of universal rules in the long-term, intergenerational context. This is an important place for inquiry given thatrule-consequentialism is originally conceived as a forward-looking theory. (shrink)

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Under mounting pressure from the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and the common man in India, the government is hard-pressed to enact laws on carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-activerule of action seriously to curb carbon emission while keeping the collective scenario in view or to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a (...) collective approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now callruleconsequentialism, which is much different from the case-by-case actconsequentialism. In this case, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies) which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of action such as “curb corruption”, “curb apartheid”, “curb exploitation of woman” and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisitruleconsequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify whyruleconsequentialism is not only overdemanding of moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action. (shrink)

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Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a newRule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms ofRule Utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum RateRule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing (...) Expectation RateRule Utilitarianism, better solves partial acceptance problems. (shrink)

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The theory of morality we can call fullrule -consequentialism selects rules solely in terms of the goodness of their consequences and then claims that these rules determine which kinds of acts are morally wrong. George Berkeley was arguably the firstrule -consequentialist. He wrote, “In framing the general laws of nature, it is granted we must be entirely guided by the public good of mankind, but not in the ordinary moral actions of our lives. … (...) Therule is framed with respect to the good of mankind; but our practice must be always shaped immediately by therule.” Writers often classed asrule -consequentialists include Austin 1832; Harrod 1936; Toulmin 1950; Urmson 1953; Harrison 1953; Mabbott 1953; Singer 1955; 1961; and most prominently Brandt 1959; 1963; 1967; 1979; 1989; 1996; and Harsanyi 1977; 1982; 1993. See also Rawls 1955; Hospers 1972; Haslett 1987; 1994, ch. 1; 2000; Attfield 1987, 103-12; Barrow 1991, ch. 6; Johnson 1991; Riley 1998; 2000; Shaw 1999; and Hooker 2000. Whether J. S. Mill's ethics wasrule -consequentialist is controversial. (shrink)

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Brad Hooker’srule-consequentialism and T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism have been some of the most debated ethical theories in normative ethics during the last twenty years or so. This article suggests that these theories can be compared at two levels. Firstly, what are the deep, structural differences between therule-consequentialist and contractualist frameworks in which Hooker and Scanlon formulate their views? Secondly, what are the more superficial differences between Hooker’s and Scanlon’s formulations of these theories? Based on exploring these (...) questions and several purported differences between Hooker’s and Scanlon’s views, this article argues that, at the structural level, the two theories are more similar than previous recognised. It suggests that there is only one candidate for a deeper difference and even it may not be that significant. This insight sheds new light on both contractualism andrule-consequentialism, and it will also help us to formulate better versions of the views. (shrink)

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In this article, I argue that Brad Hooker'srule-consequentialism implausibly implies that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings to affect.

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According to Brad Hooker'srule-consequentialism, as well as ordinary moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, killing, and harming others, the optimific code will include an over-riding “prevent disaster clause”. This paper explores two issues related to the disaster clause. The first issue is whether the disaster clause is vague—and whether this is a problem forrule-consequentialism. I argue that on Hooker'srule-consequentialism, there will be cases where it is indeterminate whether a given outcome counts as (...) a disaster such that it is permissible to infringe a given prohibition to avoid that outcome. I argue that it counts in favour of Hooker'srule-consequentialism that it makes this space for vagueness. The second issue is how to understand the disaster clause so that it does not makerule-consequentialism intolerably demanding—and more particularly whether avoiding over-demandingness requires therule-consequentialist to place a counterintuitive limit on requirements to aid. I will argue thatrule-consequentialism can avoid over-demandingness without placing a counterintuitive limit on requirements to aid. (shrink)

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This paper explores what aRule Consequentialist of Brad Hooker's sort can and should say about normative rea- sons for action. I claim that they can provide a theory of reasons, but that doing so requires distinguishing dif- ferent roles of rules in the ideal code. Some rules in the ideal code specify reasons, while others perform differ- ent functions. The paper also discusses a choice thatRule Consequentialists face about how exactly to specify rea- sons. It ends (...) by comparing the theory of reasons offered byRuleConsequentialism with the theory offered by ActConsequentialism, noting thatRuleConsequentialism seems better able to explain moral constraints. (shrink)

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We best understandRuleConsequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms ofRuleConsequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However,Rule Consequentialist theories (...) are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases.Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions ofRuleConsequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised. (shrink)

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The popularity ofrule-consequentialism among philosophers has waxed and waned. Waned, mostly; at least lately. The idea that the morality that ought to claim allegiance is the ideal code of rules whose acceptance by everybody would bring about best consequences became the object of careful analysis about half a century ago, in the writings of J. J. C. Smart, John Rawls, David Lyons, Richard Brandt, Richard Hare, and others.1 They considered utilitarian versions ofruleconsequentialism but (...) discovered flaws in the view that attach to the wider consequentialist doctrine. In the eyes of many, the flaws were decisive. Brad Hooker has produced brilliant work that unsettles this complacent consensus.2 Over a period of several years he has produced a sustained and powerful defense of a version ofruleconsequentialism that does not obviously succumb to the criticisms that have been thought to render this doctrine a nonstarter. He acknowledges intellectual debts to Richard Brandt. But Hooker avoid certain excrescences in Brandt’s efforts to conceive of morality as an ideal code of rules. Most notably, Hooker eschews Brandt’s misguided attempt to derive some version ofrule utilitarianism from an underlying commitment to some form of contractualism. Moreover, Hooker has worked to articulate a version ofruleconsequentialism in sufficient detail that one can see how the different parts of the doctrine hang together and how the best version of the.. (shrink)

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This paper examines recent attempts to defendRule-Consequentialism against a traditional objection. That objection takes the form of a dilemma, that eitherRule-Consequentialism collapses into Act-Consequentialism or it is incoherent. Attempts to avoid this dilemma based on the idea that using RC has better results than using AC are rejected on the grounds that they conflate the ideas of a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure. Other strategies, Brad Hooker's prominent amongst them, involving the (...) thought that RC need contain no overarching concern to maximize the good are acknowledged to avoid the original dilemma, but lead to further problems of motivating and justifying RC in the absence of such a concern. The paper argues that Hooker's attempt to deal with these problems by using a 'Reflective Equilibrium plus method is unsuccessful. (shrink)

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Recent formulations ofrule-consequentialism have attempted to select the ideal moral code based on realistic assumptions of imperfect acceptance. But this introduces further problems. What assumptions about acceptance would be realistic? And what criterion should we use to identify the ideal code? The solutions suggested in the recent literature all calculate a code's value using formulas that stipulate some uniform rate of acceptance. After pointing out a number of difficulties with these approaches, I introduce a formulation of RC (...) on which non-uniform acceptance rates are calculated rather than stipulated. In addition to making more realistic assumptions about acceptance rates, Calculated Rates RC has several other advantages: it gives equal consideration to both acceptance and compliance rates and it brings RC more in line with our intuitive ways of thinking about rules and their consequences. (shrink)

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Rule-consequentialism has been accused of either collapsing into act-consequentialism or being internally inconsistent. I have tried to develop a form ofrule-consequentialism without these flaws. In this June's issue of Utilitas, Robert Card argued that I have failed. Here I assess his arguments.

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This article examines Ian McEwan's script for director Richard Eyre's film, The Ploughman's Lunch, the title of which alludes to a deceptive, post-World War II advertising campaign that promulgated a false narrative about British tradition. McEwan's script, and Eyre's film adaptation of it, offer a prescient exposé of Britain's culture of mendacity in the 1980s in ways that draw onrule-consequentialist ethics to maintain that lying on the personal, professional, and political level has a pernicious effect on society. McEwan's (...) work on the film also marks a crucial turning point in the author's career, one in which he first begins to explore complex ethical and moral conundrums that would figure prominently in his major fiction. (shrink)

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Ruleconsequentialism holds that an action's moral standing depends on its relation to the moral code whose general adoption would have the best consequences. Heretoforerule consequentialists have understood the notion of a code's being generally adopted in terms of its being generally obeyed or, more commonly, its being generally accepted. I argue that these ways of understanding general adoption lead to unacceptable formulations of the theory. For instance, Brad Hooker, Michael Ridge, and Holly Smith have recently (...) offered different answers to the question of what ‘acceptance rate’ we should build into our formulation ofruleconsequentialism, and all are unsatisfactory. I argue instead for a novel approach to formulatingruleconsequentialism, ‘uniform-moral-education’ruleconsequentialism, on which what it means for a moral code to be generally adopted is not for it to be generally followed or generally accepted, but instead for it to be generally taught. (shrink)

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As an indirect ethical theory,ruleconsequentialism first evaluates moral codes in terms of how good the consequences of their general adoption are and then individual actions in terms of whether or not the optimific code authorises them. There are three well-known and powerful objections toruleconsequentialism’s indirect structure: the ideal world objection, therule worship objection, and the incoherence objection. These objections are all based on cases in which following the optimific code has (...) suboptimal consequences in the real world. After outlining the traditional objections and the cases used to support them, this paper first constructs a new hybrid version ofconsequentialism that combines elements of both act andruleconsequentialism. It then argues that this novel view has sufficient resources for responding to the previous traditional objections to pureruleconsequentialism. (shrink)

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Some things aren't what their names suggest. This is true of rubber ducks, stool pigeons, clay pigeons, hot dogs, and clothes horses. Frances Howard-Snyder's "RuleConsequentialism is a Rubber Duck" ("APQ", 30 (1993) 271-78) argues that the answer is Yes. Howard-Snyder thinksrule-consequentialism is a form of deontology, not a form ofconsequentialism. This thought is understandable: many recent definitions ofconsequentialism are such as to invite it. Thinkingrule-consequentialism inferior to act- (...) class='Hi'>consequentialism, many philosophers, when discussingconsequentialism, have had act-consequentialism in mind. Having just one kind ofconsequentialism in mind has led them to offer definitions ofconsequentialism that are really definitions of just act-consequentialism. My paper discusses three different possible definitions ofconsequentialism and defends one that does justice torule-consequentialism's family membership. (shrink)

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According to this chapter's arguments,rule‐consequentialism need not be guilty of either collapse into extensional equivalence with act‐consequentialism or incoherence. The chapter also explains howrule‐consequentialism and contractualism differ over what is the best account of impartially justified rules. The final two sections considerrule‐consequentialism's relation to intuitionism and Ross‐style pluralism and whetherrule‐consequentialism fails to be a form ofconsequentialism.

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Surveys different principles about duties to aid, including Kantian principles. Then proposes arule‐consequentialist duty to aid, and defends that approach against objections to it.

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Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage,rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than therule-consequentialist principles. I ask therule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is (...) the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer therule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems,rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by therule-consequentialists. (shrink)

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Most of us believe morality requires us to help the desperately needy. But most of us also believe morality doesn't require us to make enormous sacrifices in order to help people who have no special connection with us. Such self-sacrifice is of course praiseworthy, but it isn't morally mandatory.Rule-consequentialism might seem to offer a plausible grounding for such beliefs. Tim Mulgan has recently argued in _Analysis and _Pacific Philosophical Quarterly thatrule-consequentialism cannot do so. This (...) paper replies to Mulgan's arguments. (shrink)

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I argue thatruleconsequentialism sometimes requires us to act in ways that we lack sufficient reason to act. And this presents a dilemma for Parfit. Either Parfit should concede that we should rejectruleconsequentialism (and, hence, Triple Theory, which implies it) despite the putatively strong reasons that he believes we have for accepting the view or he should deny that morality has the importance he attributes to it. For if morality is such that we (...) sometimes have decisive reason to act wrongly, then what we should be concerned with, practically speaking, is not with the morality of our actions, but with whether our actions are supported by sufficient reasons. We could, then, for all intents and purposes just ignore morality and focus on what we have sufficient reason to do, all things considered. So if my arguments are cogent, they show that Parfit’s Triple Theory is either false or relatively unimportant in that we can, for all intents and purposes, simply ignore its requirements and just do whatever it is that we have sufficient reason to do, all things considered. (shrink)

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This paper asks howrule‐consequentialism might adapt to very adverse futures, and whether moderate liberalconsequentialism can survive into broken futures and/or futures where humanity faces imminent extinction. The paper first recaps the recent history ofrule‐consequentialist procreative ethics. It outlinesrule‐consequentialism, extends it to cover future people, and applies it to broken futures. The paper then introduces a new thought experiment—the “ending world”—where humanity faces an extinction that is unavoidable and imminent, but not (...) immediate. The paper concludes by explaining why this thought experiment challengesrule‐consequentialism's commitment to procreative liberty, and briefly asking howrule‐consequentialism might respond to that challenge. (shrink)

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It is commonly claimed thatruleconsequentialism (utilitarianism) collapses into actconsequentialism, because sometimes there are benefits from breaking the rules. I suggest this argument is less powerful than has been believed. The argument requires a commitment to a very particular (usually implicit) account of feasibility and constraints. It requires the presupposition that thinking of rules as the relevant constraint is incorrect. Supposedly we should look at a smaller unit of choice—the single act—as the relevant choice variable. (...) But once we see feasibility as a matter of degree, there is no obvious cut-off point for how broadly we should think about the constraints on our choices. Treating “a bundle of choices” as a relevant free variable is no less defensible than treating “a single act” as the relevant free variable.Rule utilitarianism,ruleconsequentialism, and other rules-based approaches are stronger than their current reputation. (shrink)

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What are appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality? In Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker begins by answering this question, and then argues for arule-consequentialist theory. According torule-consequentialism, acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules, and rules are impartially justified if and only if the expected overall value of their general internalization is at least as great as for any alternative rules. In the course of developing hisrule- (...) class='Hi'>consequentialism, Hooker discusses impartiality, well-being, fairness, equality, the question of how the 'general internalization' of rules is to be interpreted byrule-consequentialism, and the main objections torule-consequentialism. He also discusses the social contract theory of morality, act-consequentialism, and the question of which moral prohibitions and which duties to help othersrule-consequentialism endorses. The last part of the book considers the implications ofrule-consequentialism for some current controversies in practical ethics. (shrink)

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This paper replies to Carson's attacks on an earlier paper of Hooker's. Carson argued thatrule-consequentialism--the theory that an act is morally right if and only if it is allowed by the set of rules and corresponding virtues the having of which by everyone would bring about the best consequences considered impartially--can and does require the comfortably off to make enormous sacrifices in order to help the needy. Hooker defendsrule-consequentialism against Carson's arguments.

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This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Consequentialist Argument forRule‐Consequentialism The Reflective Equilibrium Argument forRule‐Consequentialism The Focus on Internalization of Rules The Majority of People in Each New Generation Expected rather than Actual Value of Rules Distribution Old Objections New Objections.

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Prima facie,rule-consequentialism as a moral theory would correlate with the concerns of an omnibenevolent being should one exist. Indeed, such a being would be divine, and under the lenses of the three Abrahamic religions, would inter alia, also be omnipotent and omniscient. In this paper, I consider the attitude of such a being torule-consequentialism in human society. I argue, from a probabilistic perspective, that the evidence of Abrahamic scripture confirms, to a degree, that God (...) would judgerule-consequentialism to be a sound moral theory in different societies. I also consider a similar argument from a secular perspective. (shrink)

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This paper defends views likeruleconsequentialism by distinguishing between two sorts of ideal world objections. It aims to show that one of those sorts of objections is question-begging. Its success would open up a path forward for such views.

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In his 2000 book _Ideal Code, Real World: ARule-consequentialist Theory of Morality_, Brad Hooker recognizes that his theory, like mostrule-consequentialist theories, must answer the question of how agents are to resolve conflicts that may arise among the rules his theory endorses. Here I examine Hooker’s answer to this question, and I argue that his answer fails to solve a serious problem that arises from such conflicts.

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Is an action obligatory if and only if it is prescribed by a code that is the best to be taught to the next generation? This paper discusses whether this version ofruleconsequentialism is superior to acceptance-based formulations in some relevant respects. Ultimately, I conclude that, given certain requirementsruleconsequentialism should ideally meet, teaching-based formulations are no better than acceptance-based ones.

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In this paper, I provide a defense ofruleconsequentialism that does not appeal to the “guiding teleological idea” according to which the final ground of moral assessment must lie in effects on well-being. My defense also avoids appeals to intuition. It is a contractualist defense. Many forms of contractualism can, with only minor tweaking, be used to defendruleconsequentialism. In this paper I show how one specific form of contractualism does the job. This argument (...) is inspired by a version of contractualism briefly discussed by Tim Mulgan and by his claim that it converges withruleconsequentialism, given certain restrictions. I show that Mulgan’s own argument for convergence is seriously flawed, but that a variation on his contractualism does converge withruleconsequentialism, and it does it without Mulgan’s own restrictions. Though Mulgan himself does not treat convergence as an argument forruleconsequentialism—his own argument is heavily intuitionistic—I claim that convergence provides significant support forruleconsequentialism. (shrink)

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This paper employs (and defends where needed) a familiar four-part methodology for assessing moral theories. This methodology makes the most popular kind of moral pluralism--here called Ross-style pluralism--look extremely attractive. The paper contends, however, that, ifrule-consequentialism's implications match our considered moral convictions as well as Ross-style pluralism's implications do, the methodology makesrule-consequentialism look even more attractive than Ross-style pluralism. The paper then attacks two arguments recently put forward in defence of Ross-style pluralism. One of (...) these arguments is that no moral theory containing some single normative principle to justify general pro tanto duties can do justice to the ineliminable role of judgment in moral thinking. The other argument is that no such theory is plausible in light of the fact that our moral ideas come from disparate historical sources. (shrink)

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