Results for 'reasons'
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Bibliography:Moral ReasonsinMeta-Ethics Bibliography:ReasonsinPhilosophy of Action Bibliography:Internalism and Externalism about ReasonsinPhilosophy of Action Bibliography:Reasons and CausesinPhilosophy of Action Bibliography:Reasons and OughtsinPhilosophy of Action Bibliography:Reasons and RationalityinPhilosophy of Action Bibliography:Subjective and Objective ReasonsinPhilosophy of Action Bibliography:Reasons, MiscinPhilosophy of Action |
- InstrumentalReasons.InstrumentalReasons -unknownAs Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whetherreasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle thatreasons for ends are provided by desires. (...) Instead, they may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will, instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)
- The reasonableness of christianity and its vindications.Reasonableness Of Christianity -2010 - In S. J. Savonius-Wroth Paul Schuurman & Jonathen Walmsley,The Continuum Companion to Locke. Continuum.
- Bruno de finetti.I. Inductive Reasoning -1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha,Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 3.
- title:• To explain the expressive role that distinguishes specifically normative vocabulary. That is, to say what it is the job of such vocabulary to make explicit. Doing this is saying what'ought'means.• To introduce a non-Humean way of thinking about practical reasoning. [REVIEW]Practical Reasoning -1998 -Philosophical Perspectives 12:127.Export citation
Bookmark - A Clinical–Empirical Model of Emotion Regulation.Motivated Reasoning -2007 - In James J. Gross,Handbook of Emotion Regulation. Guilford Press. pp. 373.
- Empathising in online spaces.Practical Reasoning -2024 -Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):225-236.No categories
- Subject lndex.Ar See Affective Reasoner -2001 - In Robert Trappl,Emotions in Humans and Artifacts. Bradford Book/MIT Press. pp. 381.
- Section I phenomenology of life in the critique of reason.Of Reason -2011 -Analecta Husserliana: Phenomenology/Ontopoiesis Retrieving Geo-Cosmic Horizons of Antiquity: Logos and Life 110:14.
- Reasons and the first person.Jaegwon Kim -1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers,Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 67--87.
- Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way -2017 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).Many philosophers have been attracted to the view thatreasons are premises of good reasoning – thatreasons to φ are premises of good reasoning towards φ-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighedreasons. In this article, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out (...) implications for the debate over pragmaticreasons for belief and other attitudes and for one influential form of reductionism about the normative. (shrink)
- Reasons and the Good.Roger Crisp -2006 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.InReasons and the Good Roger Crisp answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Fundamental to ethics, he claims, is the idea of ultimatereasons for action; and he argues controversially that thesereasons do not depend on moral concepts. He investigates the nature ofreasons themselves, and how we come to know them. He defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though (...) not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. (shrink)
- And making 272.Sufficient Reason -2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder,Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 134--309.
- Aristóteles y la Economía entre los límites de la razón práctica.Bounds of Practical Reason -2007 -Ideas y Valores. Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 56 (134):45-60.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Begründet von Hans Vaihinger; neubegründet von Paul Menzer und Gottfried Martin.Practical Reason &Kant an Euler -forthcoming -Kant Studien.Export citation Bookmark
- Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about.Practical Reason -2012 - In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer,Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 40.
- Darwall on rational care.Engaging Reason -2006 -Utilitas 18 (4).
- From little slips to big disasters: an error quest.James Reason -2008 - In Patrick Rabbitt,Inside Psychology: A Science Over 50 Years. Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Humean Reflections in the Ethics of Bernard Williams.Practical Reason -2007 -Utilitas 19 (3).
- Integrity, practical deliberation and utilitarianism, Edward Harcourt.Public Reason -1997 -Philosophical Review 106 (3).
- John Dillon.That Irrational Animals Use Reason -2009 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis,Medieval Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2. Routledge. pp. 159.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- John Taber.Revelation Reason &Idealism In Sankara'S. -2000 - In Roy W. Perrett,Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 161.No categories
- Kathryn Montgomery hunter.Exercise of Practical Reason -1996 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21:303-320.Export citation Bookmark
- Paragraph Two.Platonist Reason &Richard Sorabji -2004 - In Carlos G. Steel, Gerd van Riel, Caroline Macé & Leen van Campe,Platonic ideas and concept formation in ancient and medieval thought. Leuven: Leuven University Press. pp. 32--99.Export citation Bookmark
- Reading Catalano's Reading Sartre.Dialectical Reason -2011 -Sartre Studies International 17 (2):81-88.Export citation Bookmark
- O ne main topic in practical philosophy is the question of when someone has a reason for a certain action. Most philosophers agree on the necessity of a motivational and a justificatory condition, but they still disagree about how these conditions can be fulfilled. Though these conditions are important in forming convincing concepts of practical. [REVIEW]Kirsten B. Endres &PracticalReasons -2003 - In Peter Schaber & Rafael Hüntelmann,Grundlagen der Ethik. De Gruyter. pp. 1--67.
- The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’.Ralph Wedgwood -2015 -Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.Many philosophers working on the branches of philosophy that deal with the normative questions have adopted a "Reasons First" program. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term 'reason' in English, none of which are any more fundamental than any others. Indeed, most of these concepts are not particularly fundamental in any interesting sense.
- WeighingReasons.Stephen Kearns &Daniel Star -2013 -Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):70-86.This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normativereasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it (...) appears to confront when it comes to the topic of the weighing ofreasons. Our paper responds to all of the criticisms that these critics have provided, shedding fresh light on this interesting topic in the process. (shrink)
- SubjectiveReasons.Eric Vogelstein -2012 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to viewreasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is thatreasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjectivereasons, where (roughly) objectivereasons are determined by (...) the facts, while subjectivereasons are determined by one's beliefs. My goal in this paper is to offer a plausible theory of subjectivereasons. Although much attention has been focused on theories of objectivereasons, very little has been offered in the literature regarding what sort of account of subjectivereasons we should adopt; and what has been offered is rather perfunctory, and requires filling-out. Taking what has been said thus far as a starting point, I will consider several putative theories of subjectivereasons, offering objections and amendments along the way, will settle on what I take to be a highly plausible account, and will defend that account against objections. (shrink)
- Actions not as planned: The price of automatization.J. T. Reason -1979 - In Geoffrey Underwood & Robin Stevens,Aspects of consciousness. New York: Academic Press. pp. 1--67.
- Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way &Daniel Whiting -2016 -Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normativereasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought thatreasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative (...) counter-examples due to Julia Markovits, Mark Schroeder, and others. This paper develops and motivates an interpretation of the response constraint that avoids the putative counter-examples. (shrink)
- WhichReasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal &Alex Worsnip -2021 -Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.The slogan that rationality is about responding toreasons has a turbulent history: once taken for granted; then widely rejected; now enjoying a resurgence. The slogan is made harder to assess by an ever-increasing plethora of distinctions pertaining toreasons and rationality. Here we are occupied with two such distinctions: that between subjective and objectivereasons, and that between structural rationality (a.k.a. coherence) and substantive rationality (a.k.a. reasonableness). Our paper has two main aims. The first is to (...) defend dualism about rationality – the view that affirms a deep distinction between structural and substantive rationality – against its monistic competitors. The second aim is to answer the question: with the two distinctions drawn, what becomes of the slogan that rationality is about responding toreasons? We’ll argue that structural rationality cannot be identified with responsiveness to any kind ofreasons. As for substantive rationality, we join others in thinking that the most promisingreasons-responsiveness account of substantive rationality will involve an “evidence-relative” understanding ofreasons. But we also pose a challenge for making this idea precise – a challenge that ultimately calls into question the fundamentality of the notion of a reason even with respect to the analysis of substantive rationality. (shrink)
- Reasons, normativity, and value in aesthetics.Alex King -2021 -Philosophy Compass 17 (1):1-17.Discussions of aestheticreasons and normativity are becoming increasingly popular. This piece outlines six basic questions about aestheticreasons, normativity, and value and discusses the space of possible answers to these questions. I divide the terrain into two groups of three questions each. First are questions about the shape of aestheticreasons: what they favour, how strong they are, and where they come from. Second are relational questions about how aestheticreasons fit into the wider normative (...) landscape: whether they are distinctive, what their normative status is, and how they interact with each other and with non-aestheticreasons. This piece aims to provide a taxonomy to clarify and organise the burgeoning literature and to make a few concrete suggestions for avenues of future research. (shrink)
- Reasons First.Mark Schroeder -2021 - Oxford University Press.Reasons First explores the hypothesis thatreasons have a basic explanatory role in ethics and epistemology. While widely accepted concerning moral worth, Schroeder argues that this idea also illuminates some long-standing puzzles to do with knowledge.No categories
- Reasons.John Gardner &Timothy Macklem -2002 - In Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro,The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford University Press UK.No categories
- PragmaticReasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner -2018 - In Daniel Star,The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.This is a discussion of the state of discussion on pragmaticreasons for belief.
- Reasons, reverence, and value.Jeanette Kennett -unknownNo categories
- (1 other version)Arereasons causes? A Wittgensteinian response to Davidson.Severin Schroeder -2001 - InWittgenstein and contemporary philosophy of mind. New York: Palgrave. pp. 50--70.No categories
- AestheticReasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting -2021 -Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.What does the aesthetic ask of us? What claims do the aesthetic features of the objects and events in our environment make on us? My answer in this paper is: that depends. Aestheticreasons can only justify feelings – they cannot demand them. A corollary of this is that there are no aesthetic obligations to feel, only permissions. However, I argue, aestheticreasons can demand actions – they do not merely justify them. A corollary of this is that (...) there are aesthetic obligations to act, not only permissions. So, I conclude, the aesthetic asks little of us as patients and much of as agents. (shrink)
- Howreasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter -2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting,Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.In this paper, I develop a theory of how claims about an agent’s normativereasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the plausible ideas thatreasons are facts and thatreasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice. I argue that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the difference between synchronic and diachronicreasons, i.e.reasons for acting immediately andreasons for acting at (...) some later point in time. I provide a general account of the relation between synchronic and diachronicreasons, demonstrate its implications for the evidence-sensitivity ofreasons and finally present and defend an argument for my view. (shrink)
- NormativeReasons asReasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel -2019 -Mind 128 (510):459-484.I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence ofreasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there arereasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and (...) reject some ways of understanding "ought" so that the principle is compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why the principle should be expected to fail. (shrink)
- Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way -2018 - In Daniel Star,The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.This article gives an overview of some recent debates about the relationship betweenreasons and rational requirements of coherence - e.g. the requirements to be consistent in our beliefs and intentions, and to intend what we take to be the necessary means to our ends.
- ReducingReasons.Matthew Silverstein -2016 -Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view thatreasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, (...) one we can pick out with purely descriptive terms, and that the connection between normativereasons and sound reasoning therefore provides the basis for a reductive account ofreasons. Like all proposed reductions, this one must confront some version of G. E. Moore’s open question argument. I argue that a reductive view rooted in the idea thatreasons figure in sound reasoning is well-equipped to meet the open question challenge head on. (shrink)
- Handbook of Action Research. Participative.P. Reason &H. Bradbury -forthcoming -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
- Practicalreasons, theoreticalreasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero -2022 -Synthese 200 (2):1-23.Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoreticalreasons when it comes to cases involving equally balancedreasons. When there are strong practicalreasons for A-ing, and equally strong practicalreasons for some incompatible option, B-ing, the agent is permitted to make an arbitrary choice between them, having sufficient reason to A and sufficient reason to B. But when there is strong evidence for P and equally strong evidence for ~ P, one isn’t permitted (...) to simply believe one or the other. Instead, one must withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~ P. This paper examines what explains this contrast, focusing in particular on a proposal recently developed by Mark Schroeder across several papers. Schroeder aims to explain the contrast by an appeal to non-evidential, epistemicreasons against belief. But, I argue, it’s not clear exactly what thosereasons are, nor how thosereasons are to be weighed against evidentialreasons. Despite these challenges, I argue that there are grounds for optimism that the contrast can be explained within the broad framework Schroeder provides, and I aim to provide resources to meet the aforementioned challenges. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Commitments,Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang -2013 -Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.This chapter argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain thereasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model—as triggeringreasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...) make a promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the specialreasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of suchreasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity. (shrink)
- Perceptualreasons.Juan Comesana &Matthew McGrath -2016 -Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.The two main theories of perceptualreasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptualreasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptualreasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (...) or where there is no perceived object at all. The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptualreasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow ourreasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states. (shrink)
- Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns &Daniel Star -2009 -Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normativereasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim aboutreasons for belief to one side, (...) we present several arguments in favor of our analysis ofreasons for action. We then turn to consider a series of objections to the analysis. We conclude that there are goodreasons to accept the analysis and that the objections do not succeed. (shrink)
- TwelveReasons Hawai”i Should Lead in Social Studies Education.Mara Miller -2011 -The Hawaii Independent Aug. 12, 2012 8 (12):2011.Export citation Bookmark
- Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin -2016 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these tworeasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind ofReasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between (...) the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ kind ofreasons wherever it appears. In this article I argue that two recent proposals for solving the Wrong Kind ofReasons Problem do not work. I then offer an alternative solution that provides a unified, systematic explanation of the difference between the two kinds ofreasons. (shrink)
- Possessingreasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva -2021 -Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.[Significantly updated in Chapter 6 of Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge] In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession ofreasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing (...) P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of thereasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord’s view that possessingreasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession. (shrink)
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