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Mitochondrial replacement techniques, known in the popular media as 'three-parent' or 'three-person' IVFs, have the potential to enable women with mitochondrial diseases to have children who are genetically related to them but without such diseases. In the debate regarding whether MRTs should be made available, an issue that has garnered considerable attention is whether MRTs affect the characteristics of an existing individual or whether they result in the creation of a new individual, given that MRTs involve the genetic manipulation of (...) the germline. In other words, do MRTs affect thequalitativeidentity or the numericalidentity of the resulting child? For instance, a group of panelists on behalf of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has claimed that MRTs affect only thequalitativeidentity of the resulting child, while the Working Group of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has argued that MRTs would create a numerically distinct individual. In this article, I shall argue that MRTs do create a new and numerically distinct individual. Since my explanation is different from the NCOB's explanation, I shall also offer reasons why my explanation is preferable to the NCOB's explanation. (shrink)

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Recent developments in the field of neurosurgery, specifically those dealing with the modification of mood and affect as part of psychiatric disease, have led some researchers to discuss the ethical implications of surgery to alter personality and personalidentity. As knowledge and technology advance, discussions of surgery to alter undesirable traits, or possibly the enhancement of normal traits, will play an increasingly larger role in the ethical literature. So far,identity and enhancement have yet to be explored in (...) a neurosurgical context, despite the fact that 1) neurological disease and treatment both potentially alteridentity, and 2) that neurosurgeons will likely be the purveyors of future enhancement implantable technology. Here, we use interviews with neurosurgical patients to shed light on the ethical issues and challenges that surroundidentity and enhancement in neurosurgery. The results provide insight into how patients approach theiridentity prior to potentiallyidentity-altering procedures and what future ethical challenges lay ahead for clinicians and researchers in the field of neurotherapeutics. (shrink)

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This study aimed to understand the preserved elements of self-identity in persons with moderate to severe dementia attributable to Alzheimer’s disease. A semi-structured interview was developed to explore the narrative self among residents with dementia in a residential care facility and residents without dementia in an independent living setting. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from audio recordings and analyzed for common themes, while being sensitive to possible differences between the groups. The participants with dementia showed evidence of self-reference even (...) though losses in explicit memory were evident. The most noticeable difference between the two groups was time frame reference. Nonetheless, all participants showed understanding of their role in relationships and exhibited concrete preferences. Our findings suggest that memory loss and other cognitive deficits associated with moderate to severe dementia do not necessarily lead to a loss of “self.”. (shrink)

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The illness immersion condition prevents patients from enjoying everything worth living life for. In any case, according to Frank, this condition could represent one of the most insightful experiences towards understanding the meaning of life. Using the metaphor of phoenix taken from May, Frank identified four kinds of embodiments through which the phoenix can reveal itself in a patient after an illness immersion experience: the phoenix that could ever be and the phoenix that might have been; the recurrent and cumulative (...) phoenix and the reluctant phoenix. Based on these considerations, aqualitative study was conducted in order to give voice to the different phoenix embodiments focusing on several autobiographies of patients afflicted with severe or terminal illness. The analysis highlights several similarities that the different phoenixes shared ; however, a deep difference emerged in their worldview which proves able to lead them towards different epiphanies. These evidences reveal that every sick person should be understood, stimulated and accompanied throughout his lived experience of illness by an expressly designed and dedicated care. (shrink)

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Many Western nations are emphasizing the importance of population health across health care delivery organizations and education systems. Despite significant momentum to integrate population health into nursing practice, a parallel effort to examine how these efforts impact practicing nurses' views of their professional role and workidentity has not occurred. This secondaryqualitative analysis, employing an abductive approach, explored processes public health nurses use in creating and maintaining their workidentity through three organizing themes: narrative self‐identity, (...) mandatedidentity, andidentity as struggle. The analysis was based on interview data collected from 30 US public health nurses residing in 17 states. ‘Being a real nurse’ describes public health nurses' efforts to balance a contradictory workidentity where at times they are expected to focus on populations and at other times, on individuals. Theidentity work revealed through this study should be further explicated and specific strategies developed for stabilizing a workidentity for public health nurses, as well as for any nurse charged with a population health role. (shrink)

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In this article I develop tools for analyzing the identities that emerge inqualitative material. I approach identities as historically, socially and culturally produced subject positions, as processes that are in a constant state of becoming and that receive their temporary stability and meaning in concrete contexts and circumstances. I suggest that the identities and subject positions that materialize inqualitative material can be analyzed from four different perspectives. They can be approached by focusing on (1) classifications that (...) define the boundary lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as (2) participant roles that refer to the temporal aspect of subject positions and outline their meaning for action, as (3) structures of viewpoint and focalization that frame meaning and order to opinions and experiences of the world, and as (4) interactive positions that articulate the roles and identities taken by the participants of communication. (shrink)

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One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the PSR; one type of challenge involves pinpointing a specific set of facts that resist metaphysical explanation. Certainidentity and distinctness facts seem to constitute such a set. For example, we can imagine a scenario in which we have two qualitatively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux. Castor is distinct from Pollux but it is unclear what (...) could metaphysically explain this distinctness fact. In this paper, I argue that we should not treatidentity and distinctness facts as metaphysically fundamental. As such,identity and distinctness facts do not challenge the PSR. We can metaphysically explain them. (shrink)

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The residency years comprise the last period of a physician’s formal training. It is at this stage that trainees consolidate the clinical skills required for independent practice and achieve a level of ethical development essential to their work as physicians, a process known as professionalidentity formation (PIF). Ethics education is thought to contribute to ethical development and to that end the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada (RCPSC) requires that formal ethics education be integrated within all (...) postgraduate specialty training programs. However, a formal ethics curriculum can operate in parallel with informal and hidden ethics curricula, the latter being more subtle, pervasive, and influential in shaping learner attitudes and behavior. This paper reports on a study of the formal, informal, and hidden ethics curricula at two postgraduate psychiatry programs in Canada. Based on the analysis of data sources, we relate the divergences between the formal, informal, and hidden ethics curricula to two aspects of professionalidentity formation (PIF) during psychiatry residency training. The first is the idea of group membership. Adherence to the hidden curriculum in certain circumstances determines whether residents become part of an in-group or demonstrate a sense of belonging to that group. The second aspect of PIF we explore is the ambiguous role of the resident as a student and a practitioner. In ethically challenging situations, adherence to the messages of the hidden curriculum is influenced by and influences whether residents act as students, practitioners, or both. This paper describes the hidden curriculum in action and in interaction with PIF. Our analysis offers a complementary, empirical perspective to the theoretical literature concerning PIF in medical education. This literature tends to position sound ethical decision-making as the end result of PIF. Our analysis points out that the mechanism works in both directions: how residents respond to hidden curriculum in ethics can be a driver of professionalidentity formation. (shrink)

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Beginning from the notion that self is constructed, contributors inIdentity Landscapes: Contemplating Place and the Construction of Self are particularly interested in how relationships with place informidentity development. Locatingidentity inquiry in methodologies that encourage an explicit examination of self (e.g. autoethnography, self-study, autobiographical inquiry, a/r/tography, and reflexive inquiry), authors situate themselves epistemologically and geographically as they explore where place andidentity converge. Through critical,qualitative, creative, and arts-integrated approaches, this collection aims to (...) advance thought regarding the myriad ways that place informsidentity development. (shrink)

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In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle ofidentity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of (...) the type-identity theory. (shrink)

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TheIdentity of Indiscernibles is the principle that there cannot be two individual things in nature that are qualitatively identical. The principle is not exactly popular. Michael Della Rocca tries to resurrect it by arguing that we must accept this principle, for otherwise we cannot explain the impossibility of completely overlapping indiscernible objects of the same kind that share all their parts and exist in the same place at the same time. I try to show that his argument goes (...) wrong: we need not embrace theidentity of indiscernibles to deal with the co-location problem. (shrink)

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An important factor in judging whether two retinal images arise from the same object viewed from different positions may be the presence of certain properties or cues that are 'qualitative invariants' with respect to the natural transformations, particularly affine transformations, associated with changes in viewpoint. To test whether observers use certain affinequalitative cues such as concavity, convexity, collinearity, and parallelism of the image elements, a 'same-different' discrimination experiment was carried out with planar patterns that were defined by (...) four points either connected by straight line segments (line patterns) or marked by dots (dot patterns). The first three points of each pattern were generated randomly; the fourth point fell on their diagonal bisector. According to the position of that point, the patterns were concave, triangular (three points being collinear), convex, or parallel sided. In a 'same' trial, an affine transformation was applied to one of two identical patterns; in a 'different' trial, the affine transformation was applied after the point lying on the diagonal bisector was perturbed a short, fixed distance along the bisector, inwards for one pattern and outwards for the other. Observers' ability to discriminate 'same' from 'different' pairs of patterns depended strongly on the position of the fourth, displaced, point: performance varied rapidly when the position of the displaced point was such that the patterns were nearly triangular or nearly parallel sided, consistent with observers using the hypothesisedqualitative cues. The experimental data were fitted with a simple probabilistic model of discrimination performance that used a combination of thesequalitative cues and a single quantitative cue. (shrink)

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Saunders has recently claimed that “identical quantum particles” with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects, just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black’s spheres, for example). Weakly discernible objects have all theirqualitative properties in common but nevertheless differ from each other by virtue of (a generalized version of) Leibniz’s principle, since they stand in relations an entity cannot have to itself. This notion of weak discernibility has been criticized as question begging, but (...) we defend and accept it for classical cases likes Black’s spheres. We argue, however, that the quantum mechanical case is different. Here the application of the notion of weak discernibility indeed is question begging and in conflict with standard interpretational ideas. We conclude that the introduction of the conceptual resource of weak discernibility does not change the interpretational status quo in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

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Suppose that all non-qualitative facts are grounded inqualitative facts. I argue that this view naturally comes with a picture in which trans-worldidentity is indeterminate. But this in turn leads to either pervasive indeterminacy in the non-qualitative, or else contingency in what facts about modality and possible worlds are determinate.

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In conversations between native speakers, words such as ‘same’ and ‘identical’ do not usually cause much difficulty. We take it for granted that others use them with the same sense as we do. If it is unclear whether numerical orqualitativeidentity is intended, a brief gloss such as ‘one thing not two’ for the former or ‘exactly alike’ for the latter removes the unclarity. In this paper, numericalidentity is intended. A particularly conscientious and logically aware (...) speaker might explain what ‘identical’ means in her. (shrink)

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There is a category of objects such that for any two occurrences of an object in that category, Establishing the highest degree of theirqualitativeidentity will not be sufficient to establish that the object involved is one and the same. It is first argued that objects in this category occupy positions in a spatio-Temporal continuum and obey certain principles of conservation. And then two criteria for the numericalidentity of these objects are developed: (a) that there (...) are scientific laws which can, In principle, Predict or retrodict a continuous path for the object; (b) that the parts of the object and their arrangement are preserved in a certain specified way. (shrink)

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The doctrine of eternal recurrence (ER), understood as a cosmological theory, violates the principle of theidentity of indiscernibles (PII): if cycles of events are supposed to recur qualitatively identically, then there is actually only one cycle. Given Nietzsche’s views about logical principles, this conflict may not be too worrisome—were it not for the fact that he does seem to apply the principle within cycles. This article suggests that this apparent conflict can be reconciled by applying a weakened version (...) of PII that has been proposed on independent grounds in more recent philosophy. It allows for the possibility of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct events by employing a special kind of (“weakly discerning”) relations. It turns out that Paul Loeb’s proposal of relations of “recurrence awareness” between cycles is of the kind required by the weakened PII and thus serves to reconcile ER with the principle. (shrink)

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The Principle of theIdentity of Indiscernibles , according to which two objects are identical if they share all the same properties, has come in for much criticism. Michael Della Rocca has recently defended PII on the grounds that it is needed to forestall the possibility that where there appears to be only one object present, there is actually a multiplicity of exactly-overlapping such objects. Katherine Hawley has criticized this approach for violating a plausible “ground rule” in applying rules (...) of indiscernibility to questions ofidentity: where there is putative duplication, it must be qualitatively significant. Hawley further suggests that with this rule in hand, one can tell the difference between the presence of one and two indiscernible objects without recourse to either PII or brute, nonqualitative individuation. In this paper, I critically examine Hawley’s contention and find that her appeal to “qualitatively significant duplication” fails since its application to distinct indiscernibles involves a difference that is primarily quantitative anyway. The upshot is a different proposed set of “ground rules” for applying the criterion ofqualitative difference when seeking a grounding or explanation for distinctness andidentity. (shrink)

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Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by idetifying the categories of being and the relations of ontological dependency between entities of different categories. He proceeds to set out a unified and original metaphysical system: he defends a substance ontology, according to which the existence of the world s (...) one world in time depends upon the existence of persisting things which retain theiridentity over time and through processes ofqualitative change. And he contends that even necessary beings, such as the abstract objects of mathematics, depend ultimately for their existence upon there being a concrete world of enduring substances. Within his system of metaphysics Lowe seeks to answer many of the deepest and most challenging questions in philosophy. (shrink)

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Qualitative research from a feminist perspective in the postmodern era: methodological, ethical and reflexive concerns Developing methodology is an ongoing process in certain types ofqualitative research. This paper describes the process in a study of single midlife women, detailing reflexive concerns on the ethics of data collection and dissemination of research findings from a feminist postmodern perspective, as well as the way in which modification of techniques of analysis occurred as the study progressed. Beginning research questions were (...) concerned with identifying the impact of menopausal symptoms, and the debate surrounding HRT on the lives and decision‐making processes of single midlife women. Initial analysis of data, using grounded theory techniques, indicated a need to place greater emphasis on the way the women constructed or talked about the self, including the embodied self. This led to an exploration of the literature relating to reflexivity,identity construction and embodiment, including feminist poststructuralist interpretations of the discursive and embodied construction of self, and informed both the theoretical framework and the method. The way in which a type of analysis fitting under the broad rubric of discourse analysis, that is one that gave added emphasis to gendered subjectivity, directed further analysis is discussed, as well as the influence on the women of social and scientific discourses in circulation. (shrink)

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In non-philosophical discourse, “identity” is often used when the specific character of artefacts is described or evaluated. We argue that this usage of “identity” can be explicated as referring to the symbol properties of artefacts as they are conceptualized in the symbol theory of Goodman and Elgin. This explication is backed by an analysis of various uses of “identity”. The explicandum clearly differs from the concepts of numericalidentity,qualitativeidentity and essence, but it (...) has a range of similarities with the notion of self-concept used in psychology and practical philosophy. The proposed explication is used to analyse claims aboutidentity-pluralism andidentity-conflicts. Firstly, the explication allows us to distinguish various ways how the same artefact can have a plurality of identities. Secondly, more or less sharp conflicts within anidentity or between identities of an artefact are distinguished. Thirdly, many phenomena called “identity-conflicts” are only apparentlyidentity-conflicts and can be analysed as involving some other form of tension. (shrink)

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BackgroundDefensive practice occurs when physicians provide services, such as tests, treatments and referrals, mainly to reduce their perceived legal or reputational risks, rather than to advance patient care. This behaviour is counter to physicians’ ethical responsibilities, yet is widely reported in surveys of doctors in various countries. There is a lack ofqualitative research on the drivers of defensive practice, which is needed to inform strategies to prevent this ethically problematic behaviour.MethodsAqualitative interview study investigated the views and (...) experiences of physicians in Australia on defensive practice and its contribution to low value care. Interviewees were recruited based on interest in medico-legal issues or experience in a health service involved in ‘Choosing Wisely’ initiatives. Semi-structured interviews averaged 60 min in length. Data were coded using the Theoretical Domains Framework, which encapsulates theories of behaviour and behaviour change.ResultsAll participants (n = 17) perceived defensive practice as a problem and a contributor to low value care. Behavioural drivers of defensive practice spanned seven domains in the TDF: knowledge, focused on inadequate knowledge of the law and the risks of low value care; skills, emphasising patient communication and clinical decision-making skills; professional role andidentity, particularly clinicians’ perception of patient expectations and concern for their professional reputation; beliefs about consequences, especially perceptions of the beneficial and harmful consequences of defensive practice; environmental context and resources, including processes for handling patient complaints; social influences, focused on group norms that encourage or discourage defensive behaviour; and emotions, especially fear of missing a diagnosis. Overall, defensive practice is motivated by physicians’ desire to avoid criticism or scrutiny from a range of sources, and censure from their professional peers can be a more potent driver than perceived legal consequences.ConclusionsThe findings call for strengthening knowledge and skills, for example, to improve clinicians’ understanding of the law and their awareness of the risks of low value care and using effective communication strategies with patients. Importantly, supportive cultures of practice and organisational environments are needed to create conditions in which clinicians feel confident in avoiding defensive practice and other forms of low value care. (shrink)

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Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to theIdentity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional andqualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, theIdentity Theory holds a contentiousidentity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, (...) this view faces a contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace theidentity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of theIdentity Theory without embracing theidentity between the dispositional and thequalitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of theidentity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if theidentity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities. (shrink)

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Until recently, the powerful qualities view about properties has been effectively identified with the so-calledidentity theory. Yet, the difficulties that the latter faces (especially concerning the interpretation of its core claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are identical) have led some metaphysicians to propose (at least provisionally) new versions of the powerful qualities view. This paper discusses the prospects of three such versions: the compound view, the higher-order properties theory and the dual aspect account. It is argued that the (...) compound view is in fact property dualism in disguise, while the higher-order properties theory does not by itself provide a metaphysically convincing solution to Armstrong’s dilemma concerning the modal status of the relation between dispositionality and categoricality. Finally, it is argued that it is not clear whether the dual aspect account is distinct fromidentity theory and pure powerism. (shrink)

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The distinction betweenqualitative and non-qualitative properties should be familiar from discussions of the principle of theidentity of indiscernibles: two otherwise exactly similar individuals, Castor and Pollux, might share all theirqualitative properties yet differ with respect to their non-qualitative properties—for while Castor has the property being identical to Castor, Pollux does not. But while this distinction is familiar, there has not been much critical attention devoted to spelling out its precise nature. I argue (...) that the class of non-qualitative properties is broader than it is often taken to be. When properly construed, it will not only include properties such as being identical to Castor, which somehow make reference to particular individuals, it will also include more general properties such asidentity, composition, set membership, as well as various peculiarly ontological properties. Given that some of these more general properties help to explain objective similarity, we have reason to believe that there are fundamental non-qualitative properties. (shrink)

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This article examines the influence of race/ethnicity and genderidentity on the politics of American Indian and Hispanic women leaders. The data are drawn from personal interviews with 50 public officials and grassroots leaders active in state, local, or tribal politics in New Mexico. Borrowing from Tolleson Rinehart's model of “gender consciousness,” the author creates a classification scheme for assessing the role that race/ethnicity and gender play in the political ideology and motives of the leaders. The findings reveal that (...) racial/ethnicidentity is generally more important to Native leaders and grassroots activists, while genderidentity is somewhat more salient for Hispanic leaders and public officials. Her classification system for measuring racial/ethnic and genderidentity is useful for analyzingqualitative data and may be helpful to other researchers. (shrink)

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This commentary on Marilyn Strathern's article, “Binary License,” discusses certain implications of her assertion that intertribal relationships among urban migrants in Papua New Guinea are not “ethnic.” For if such social encounters do not involve a conventional politics ofidentity, what then might its politics be? By comparing Strathern's Melanesian case with ethnographic examples in Corsica and Mongolia, a novel relational modality of “intensive ethnicity” may be identified, one that differs qualitatively from the “extensive ethnicity” with which anthropologists have (...) usually been concerned. The two forms of ethnicity are equally relative, in that a given group's self-understanding and self-designation are in both cases the result of its relations with other groups. However, ethnically extensive relations of the standard anthropological variety involve symbolic processes of boundary making and boundary maintenance whereby contrasting cultural traits or contents are arbitrarily assigned to and distributed among preexisting social forms and social scales (whether individuals, communities, or nations). Conversely, the more intensive intertribal engagements described by Strathern and certain other anthropologists are relational all the way down, given that everything about the terms of these relations (including their form, scale, and dimensioning) is defined by the particular quality in question. Thus a contrast may be established between the politics ofidentity and what might be called non-identity politics. If the former amounts to an ethnic economy in which subjectivities are exchanged in a commodity-like, alienable way, then, in the latter, stereotypical naming and other seeming “ethnic” practices amount to gift-like, non-alienable insertions of selves into others. (shrink)

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This paper is an articulation and defense of a trope-bundle theory of material objects. After some background remarks about objects and tropes, I start the main defense in Section III by answering a charge frequently made against the bundle theory, namely that it commits a conceptual error by saying that properties are parts of objects. I argue that there’s a general and intuitive sense of “part” in which properties are in fact parts of objects. This leads to the question of (...)qualitative unity: in virtue of what are certain properties unified as parts of an object? In Section IV I defend an account of unity for complex material objects. It turns on the thesis that the properties of such objects are structural properties. After addressing some objections, I turn in Section V to the question of unity for simple material objects. Here a different and more radical account is needed, for simples, since they do not have structural properties, are not subsumed by the account of Section IV. I defend the view that a simple object just is a simple property, so thatidentity delivers the desired unity. (shrink)

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This volume explores the concepts of reference andidentity in public discourses. Its contributions study discourse-specific reference and labelling patterns, both from a historical and present-day perspective, and discuss their impact on self- and other-representation in the construction ofidentity. They combine multiple methodological approaches, including corpus-based quantitative as well asqualitative approaches, and apply them to a range of text types that are or were (intended to be) public, such as letters, newspapers, parliamentary debates, and online (...) communication in the form of reader comments, discussion pages and tweets. In addition to English, the languages studied include Polish as well as European and Latin American Spanish. The volume is aimed at researchers from different research paradigms in linguistics and related disciplines, such as media communication or the social and cultural sciences, who are interested in the interplay of reference andidentity. (shrink)

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The article defends the thesis that in the context of moral responsibility (MR) as it is un­derstood in modern Strawsonian theories of MR, psychological approach has significant advantages in comparison with competing approaches to personalidentity problem: bio­logical approach, substantialism and narrative view. In the Strawsonian theories, two gen­erally accepted necessary conditions of the appropriateness of holding someone responsi­ble are the conditions of moral agency and agency of action. The article shows that for these conditions to be satisfied a (...) person who is to be hold morally responsible now for some past action should stay not only numerically, but also qualitatively identical in re­spect to his quality of will and moral capacities. That raises the problem of personal iden­tity over time in the context of MR. It is shown that psychological approach helps to clar­ify the kind of personalidentity that is required for the conditions of moral agency and agency of action to be satisfied, it is compatible with all the Strawsonian theories of MR and copes with much of moral collisions that are usually presented as its problematic con­sequences. It is also shown that the competing approaches to personalidentity are either cannot clarify the relevant for MR kind of personalidentity, or incompatible with most of the Strawsonian theories of MR and leads to moral collisions. That gives strong reasons to prefer the psychological approach to personalidentity in the context of MR. (shrink)

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Autobiographical memory (AM) is closely linked to the self-concept, and fulfills directive,identity, social, and adaptive functions. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are now known to have atypical AM, which may be closely associated with social communication difficulties. This may result in qualitatively different autobiographical narratives, notably regarding socialidentity. In the present study, we sought to investigate this concept and develop a cognitive intervention targeting individuals with ASD. First, 13 adolescents with ASD and 13 typically developing (...) adolescents underwent an AM interview featuring an original coding system designed to analyze the social self. We observed that the narratives produced by the ASD group focused more on the family than on extended social spheres, compared with those of the comparison group. Moreover, participants with ASD did not include themselves in the social groups they mentioned, and produced more references to others, compared with typically developing participants. Second, we designed a cognitive intervention program consisting of individual and group sessions that targeted AM. We conducted a pilot study among three adolescents with ASD aged 12, 16, and 17 years. Preliminary results showed that the program increased extra-family narrative references by the two youngest adolescents, who produced more social integration markers. Our study of autobiographical narratives yielded interesting findings about social positioning in ASD and showed how AM can be targeted in rehabilitation programs as a vector of social interaction. (shrink)

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In this paper we investigate the relations between cross-border mobility, national categorization and intergroup relations in a changing Europe. It focuses on young adults (N=34) commuting on a regular basis between the city of Bratislava (the capital of Slovakia) and the city of Vienna (the capital of Austria). Our study draws on the socialidentity perspective, however, we consider socialidentity as a discourse of (not) belonging, similarity and difference, which is continually (re)negotiated within a given social context. (...) Semi-structuredqualitative interviews, focus groups and drawings of the border area were used as research instruments. We have identified different types of experience in various subgroups of participants framed by (1) age at the time of arrival in Austria; (2) different mobility motivations and goals; (3) interaction setting; (4) the political and economic situation in Slovakia at the time of arrival to Austria linked to perceived status differences. On the individual level, the motivation to integrate or its lack seems to be a crucial element in the ingroup construction and perception of intergroup relations. (shrink)

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It is very natural to think that if two people, x and y, are qualitatively identical and have committed qualitatively identical actions, then it cannot be the case that one has committed something wrong whereas the other did not. That is to say, if x and y differ in their moral status, then it must be because x and y are qualitatively different, and not simply because x is identical to x and not identical to y. In this fictional dialogue (...) between Socrates and Cantor involving infinitely many qualitatively identical agents, this assumption is challenged. (shrink)

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Some properties such as having a beard and being a philosopher are intuitivelyqualitative, while other properties such as being identical to Plato and being a student of Socrates are intuitively non-qualitative. It is often assumed that, necessarily, a property isqualitative if and only if it can be designated descriptively without the aid of directly referential devices. I argue that this linguistic thesis fails in both directions: there might be non-qualitative properties that can be designated (...) descriptively, and there appear to bequalitative properties that can only be designated directly. I conclude that while the linguistic thesis is ultimately untenable as stated, it can be plausibly recast as a thesis about our concepts rather than the properties they designate. (shrink)

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Zu den großen Rätseln der Philosophie des Geistes, ja der Philosophie überhaupt, gehört die folgende Frage: Wie lässt sich derqualitative oder phänomenale Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse beschreiben, erklären oder verstehen? Wie lässt sich beispielsweise erklären, wie es ist, eine Rose zu riechen? Einerseits erscheint angesichts der Erfolgsgeschichte der modernen Naturwissenschaften die Annahme plausibel, dass sich letztlich alles physikalisch erklären lässt, auch bewusste Erlebnisse. Bei dieser Annahme handelt es sich um die physikalistische Intuition, die in der analytischen Philosophie des Geistes (...) die Hauptmotivation der gegenwärtig dominierenden Position darstellt: der Position des Physikalismus. Andererseits stellt der nur subjektiv erfassbarequalitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse das Kernproblem für eine physikalische Erklärung des Bewusstseins dar: Wie sollte das Erlebnis von Rosenduft physikalisch erklärbar sein? Dabei handelt es sich um die antiphysikalistische Intuition, auf deren Grundlage in den letzten Jahren verschiedene Argumente gegen den Physikalismus vorgebracht worden sind. Indem in der vorliegenden Studie diesen beiden, zumindest auf den ersten Blick unvereinbar erscheinenden Intuitionen ausführlich und vorbehaltlos Rechnung getragen wird – sie stellen sowohl den Ausgangspunkt als auch den argumentativen Rahmen der Studie dar –, wird untersucht, wie sich derqualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse im Rahmen einer Theorie des Bewusstseins fassen lässt. (shrink)

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Despite the prevalence of beliefs across religions regarding repentance and divine forgiveness and their recognition in theoretical and religious studies, these constructs are relatively understudied phenomena in the social sciences. Furthermore, in recent years, multiple scholars have argued for the need for research to systematically study and highlight the experience and processes of repentance and divine forgiveness. Subsequently, this study explored processes of repentance, antecedents and motivations of repentance, resources to aid in repentance, and outcomes of repentance that should be (...) further examined. This analysis was done using in-depthqualitative interviews with 15 emerging adult religious exemplars identifying with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The authors used NVivo 12 and team-basedqualitative coding processes to identify themes. Repentance processes included personal change, took various lengths of time, were a part of participants’ religiousidentity, were recurrent processes, and were influenced by participants’ view of God. Antecedents and motivations included religious practices and rituals, emotions, interpersonal interactions, and their relationship with God. Resources that aided in repentance included religious practices and rituals, interpersonal relationships, and a relationship with God. Finally, participants reported experiencing personal changes in their behavior and character, positive emotions (including feelings of divine forgiveness), improved interpersonal relationships, and a better relationship with God. These processes align with some previously discovered and theorized findings on repentance, contribute a number of novel findings, and offer future direction regarding the motivations, resources, and transformative experiences that participants reported in their personal repentance and experience of forgiveness. (shrink)

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This paper evaluates six contenders which might be invoked by essentialists in order to meet Quine’s challenge, viz., to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the crossworldidentity of individuals: (i) an object’squalitative character; (ii) matter; (iii) origins; (iv) haecceities or primitive non-qualitative thisness properties; (v) “world-indexed properties”; and (iv) individual forms. The first three candidates, I argue, fail to provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the crossworldidentity of individuals; the fourth (...) and fifth criteria are open to the charge that they do not succeed in meeting Quine’s demand in an explanatorily adequate fashion. On balance, then, individual forms, or so I propose, deserve to be taken very seriously as a possible response to Quine’s challenge, especially by neo-Aristotelians who are already committed to a hylomorphic conception of composite concrete particular objects for other reasons. Theorists who also accept a non-modal conception of essence, i.e., a conception according to which essence is not reducible to modality, in addition face the further difficult task, over and above what is required to meet Quine’s challenge, of having to explain how an object’s de re modal profile in some way follows from facts about its essence. Haecceities and world-indexed properties, as I indicate, are unlikely to be of much help with respect to this second challenge, while the forms of hylomorphic compounds are in fact well-suited for this purpose. (shrink)

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This paper offers a metaphysical explanation of theidentity and distinctness of concrete objects. It is tempting to try to distinguish concrete objects on the basis of their possessing differentqualitative features, wherequalitative features are ones that do not involveidentity. Yet, this criterion for objectidentity faces counterexamples: distinct objects can share all of theirqualitative features. This paper suggests that in order to distinguish concrete objects we need to look not only (...) at which properties and relations objects instantiate but also how they instantiate these properties and relations. I propose that objects are identical when they stand in certainqualitative relations in virtue of their existence. And concrete objects are distinct when they do not stand in the same kinds of relations to one another in virtue of their existence. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 273-298 Hume's Psychology ofIdentity Ascriptions ABRAHAM SESSHU ROTH Introduction Hume observes that we naturally believe ordinary objects to persist through time and change. The question that interests him in the Treatise1 is, What causes such a belief to arise in the human mind? Hume's question is, of course, the naturalistic one we would expect given that the project (...) of the Treatise is the construction of a "science of man." This paper seeks to clarify Hume's discussion of how we acquire the notion of persisting objects. In the first section, I note that several observations Hume makes about the actions of the mind may all come under the heading of "seeing successions as simple." These observations pose a problem for Hume's system, revealing a tension between his accounts of our ideas of time and persistence: if (as Hume believes) only successions, which are not simple, endure through time, how is it that bodies seen as simple are nevertheless thought to endure or have duration as well? In the second section I show how Hume answers this question. The third section is devoted to an interpretation of Hume's notions of theidentity relation and what he calls an "object existent at a time."Identity through time is standardly treated in contemporary analytic philosophy using the notion of a unity relation connecting various temporal parts or stages of a persisting object. One interpretation of Hume takes his talk of theidentity relation as signifying just such a unity relation, and "object existent at a time" as referring to a temporal part of an object. Another interpretation makes use of the notion of substance Abraham Sesshu Roth is at the Department of Philosophy, Brandeis University, Waltham MA 02254-9110 USA. Email:[email protected] 274 Abraham Sesshu Roth and of qualities inhering in a substance at different times. These interpretations concentrate upon metaphysical issues, and neglect the psychological aspects of Hume's discussion ofidentity. I demonstrate that these interpretations are unacceptable because they cannot be reconciled with Hume's psychologically significant distinction between vulgar or commonplace views on the one hand, and those views held by philosophers on the other. Finally, I propose and defend an alternative view of Hume's account ofidentity. This new understanding makes use of the notion of distinctions of reason to interpret Hume's idea of an object existent at a time. It turns out that a focus upon Hume's psychology ofidentity ascriptions will allow us to discern an interesting metaphysical alternative to the temporal parts view ofidentity. 1. Seeing Successions as Simples There has been some dispute in the literature about the temporal nature of Humean impressions. According to Barry Stroud, Hume holds that if one stares at an unchanging object (in unchanging conditions) for some more than minimal amount of time, one's experience takes the form of a sequence of qualitatively identical impressions, each of which occupies a temporal minimum.2 Thus when I fix my gaze upon an object, I am subject to a temporal series of impressions which may be represented as follows: (1) A A A A Eli Hirsch and Don Baxter question Stroud's assumption that a Humean perception occupies only a temporal minimum.3 Baxter holds that in Hume's view an impression will last as long as you keep looking and the conditions under which you look remain unchanged. So to stare fixedly at an object would on his view be represented in this way: (I') A I side with Baxter and Hirsch on this matter.4 But the dispute in any case has minimal ramifications for the purposes of this paper. My concern is with how Hume thinks a sequence or succession of impressions such as (1) would normally be experienced, i.e., with what idea the common person would derive from such a succession, and with how such an individual would characterize this succession. According to Hume, regardless of whether or not perceptions are extended, if a perceiver were to be presented with a succession like (1), it would be experienced or taken as (V). Hume... (shrink)

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This paper is about the nature of God’s pre-creation knowledge of possible creatures. I distinguish three theories: non-qualitative singularism,qualitative singularism, andqualitative generalism, which differ in terms of whether the relevant knowledge isqualitative or non-qualitative, and whether God has singular or merely general knowledge of creatures. My main aim is to argue thatqualitative singularism does not depend on a version of the Principle ofIdentity of Indiscernibles to the effect that, (...) necessarily, qualitatively indiscernible individuals are identical. It follows thatqualitative singularism does not depend on the view that possible creatures categorically havequalitative individual essences. (shrink)

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The problem of diachronic personalidentity is this: what explains why a person P1 at time T1 is numerically identical with a person P2 at a later time T2, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which (...) case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soulidentity, or souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personalidentity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personalidentity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views. (shrink)

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Asidentity and authenticity discourses increasingly saturate everyday life, so too have these concepts spread across the humanities and social sciences literatures. Many scholars may be interested inidentity and authenticity, but lack knowledge of paradigmatic or disciplinary approaches to these concepts. This volume offers readers insight into social constructionist approaches toidentity and authenticity. It focuses on the processes of identification and authentication, rather than on subjective experiences of selfhood. There are no attempts to settle what (...) authentic identities are. On the contrary, contributors demonstrate that neither identities nor their authenticity have a single or fixed meaning. Chapters provide exemplars of contemporary research onidentity and authenticity, with significant diversity among them in terms of the identities, cultural milieu, geographic settings, disciplinary traditions, and methodological approaches considered. Contributors introduce readers to a number of established and emergingidentity groups from sites around the world, from yogis and punks to fire dancers and social media influencers. Their conceptual work stretches from the micro-analytic to the ethno-national as authors employ a variety ofqualitative methods including ethnographic fieldwork, interviewing, and the collection and analysis of naturally-occurring interactions. Several of the chapters look directly at identification and authentication, while others focus on the social and cultural backdrops that structure these practices-what unites them is the adoption of social constructionist sensibilities. This book will appeal to anyone interested in understandingidentity and authenticity. (shrink)

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What is the relationship of “strong evaluation” and self-identity? What exactly is personalidentity? Doesidentity consist of interpretations or facts? Do strong evaluations have a constitutive role inidentity-formation? If there is no given individual essence or true self waiting to be found, butidentity is dialogically construed in self-interpretation, then can identities be criticized at all, when there is no pre-given true self, which would serve as the basis of criticism? I follow Charles (...) Taylor in defending an interpretational and evaluational conception of self-identity, but I hope to be more precise in distinguishing several meanings of “identity” and correspondingly several different roles that strong evaluation has foridentity in different senses. Further, I try to show that identities are criticizable despite the lack of pre-given essences. I will first differentiate between various meanings ofidentity: idem-identity, ipse-identity, collectiveidentity and speciesidentity (4.1). Then I take a closer look at ipse-identity in four different meanings: practicalidentity, biographicalidentity,qualitativeidentity and “singularity” (4.2). This survey tries to capture the most important meanings of the concept, but the concept ofidentity is used in philosophy, social psychology and human sciences in so many different ways that a comprehensive survey is probably impossible. However, this survey may help to sort out what sense ofidentity is relevant for strong evaluation, or for what “identities” strong evaluations are crucial. Having distinguished these several meanings, I turn to the formation ofidentity in self-interpretations. Charles Taylor has been (wrongly) accused of presupposing a pre-politicalidentity that persons or groups are supposed to have, and for which they want recognition. That would overlook the way in which identities are constituted dialogically, and in interpretations. I will defend the view that personalidentity is a matter of self-interpretation, and collectiveidentity is a matter of collective selfinterpretations. While dialogues and recognition by others plays a crucial role in the formation of one’sidentity, the views of others are not directly constitutive of a person’sidentity, unless the contents are known or accepted by the person herself. Being a person or a self is an active business. Having a self in a fullfledged sense means having a conception of oneself, and having conceptions is an active business. People don’t have beliefs like things have properties. As Sellars (1963) has stressed, the relation of two mental episodes has to be normative if it is to count as knowledge; it cannot be merely causal. And as the “transcendental tradition” from Kant onwards has stressed, being a subject is not merely a matter of having mental contents (which could possibly be caused by the world) but being aware of the reality, taking the mental contents to be about the world.144 In addition to normativity and intentionality, the activity of self-defining is one aspect of the spontaneous activity of the subject. One’s self-identity does not rest simply on having features, but on one’s activity, on identification with some actual or possible features. In this sense, everyone’sidentity is self-made. The point in saying this is not to overlook the cultural and social mediations that are intertwined in this self-definition, but to stress the fact that one’sidentity is not a matter of natural features. Self-identity is a tentative result of an ongoing process of self-interpretation. Depending on the precise meaning of self-identity, strong evaluation has a more or less central role (4.3). In the last section I ask whether identities can be criticized, or whether (in the absence of pre-given true selves) self-interpretations are the ultimate “court of appeal” not only in the sense of what constitutesidentity, but also in questions about their ethical and existential worth, or coherence, or authenticity or epistemic adequacy. I hope to show that self-interpretations stand open for criticism in these respects, even though self-interpretations are directly constitutive of one’sidentity (4.4). (shrink)

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