Results for 'perdurance'
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- A perdurant ontology for interoperating information systems based on interlocking institutional worlds.Robert M. Colomb &Mohammad Nazir Ahmad -2010 -Applied ontology 5 (1):47-77.In this work we have developed a formal ontology for perdurants suitable for representing interlocking institutional worlds in the general area of interoperating information systems. The formal ont...No categories
- Perdurance, Endurance, and 'Having a Property Atemporally'.Pablo Rychter -2008 -Metaphysica 9 (2):159-171.In this paper, I argue that bothperdurance theory and the ‘relations-to-times’ endurantist view rely on an atemporal notion of property instantiation and relation bearing. I distinguish two possible meanings of ‘atemporal’ which result in two different understandings of what it is for an object to have a property or to bear a relation atemporally. I show that standard presentations of the theories considered are indeterminate as to which of these two understandings is the intended one. I claim that (...) even if both understandings are admissible, one of them is more attractive and has more to recommend than the other. (shrink)
- Location andperdurance.Antony Eagle -2009 - In Dean Zimmerman,Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 53-94.Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.
- Perdurance, location and classical mereology.Harold Noonan -2009 -Analysis 69 (3):448-452.In his Ted Sider takes care to define the notion of a temporal part and his doctrine of perdurantism using only the temporally indexed notion of parthood – ‘ x is part of y at t’ – rather than the atemporal notion of classical mereology – ‘ x is a part of y’ – in order to forestall accusations of unintelligibility from his opponents. However, as he notes, endurantists do not necessarily reject the classical mereological notion as unintelligible. They allow (...) that it makes sense and applies to atemporal subject matters and to temporal subject matters when the entities under discussion are not continuants. Thus, they allow that it makes sense to say that metaphysics is a part of philosophy, or that football is a game of two halves. What endurantists deny is only that the classical mereological notion is applicable to continuants: continuants , they say, have no proper parts simpliciter , either because it is false to say that they have or because it is unintelligible.Thus perdurantists do not have to embrace Sider's excessive caution in defining their position. 1 They can safely allow themselves classical mereological notions as long as it is a consequence of their definitions that continuants are perdurers/have temporal proper parts only if they have atemporal proper parts. 2In his Josh Parsons illuminatingly takes on the task he describes as ‘get[tting] the allegedly technical concepts of temporal part,perdurance and so on by ratcheting up from mereological relations, subregion relations among times and the concept of exact temporal location ’. He continues, ‘My definitions provide a good answer to those endurantists who claim …. (shrink)
- Perdurance and causal realism.M. Gregory Oakes -2004 -Erkenntnis 60 (2):205-227.While there has been considerable recent criticism ofperdurance theory in connection with a Humean understanding of causality,perdurance theory conjoined with causal realism has received relatively little attention. One might, then, form the impression thatperdurance theory under the auspices of causal realism is a relatively safe view. I shall argue, however, to the contrary. My general strategy is to show that there is no plausible way of spelling out theperdurance position (of the non-Humean, (...) causal realist sort). I implement this strategy by revealing several general problems concerning the causally-connected temporal parts scheme. I begin with a short account ofperdurance theory. There follows a description of two general views of causality and the two subsequent accounts of the perduring object; then, the criticism. (shrink)
- Perdure and Murder.David B. Hershenov -unknownThe rich resources of the Four-Dimensional metaphysics have been brought to bear upon many traditional philosophical problems in recent years. Alas, the implications of Four-Dimensionalism for bioethics have gone largely unexplored. Hud Hudson is the rare exception. Relying upon a Four- Dimensional metaphysics of temporal parts and a belief in unrestricted composition, he argues that there is little reason to identify the perduring human embryonic animal and the perduring human person. He makes the intriguing claim that if abortion is wrong, (...) then it is not because the human animal within its mother’s womb is a person. This he rightly claims “is a very significant result†for “an overwhelming amount of the literature on abortion and infanticide (as well as much of the public debate on these topics) seems to turn on the question of whether or not the human fetus is a person.†[3, p. 153]. (shrink)
- Perdurance and Psychological Continuity.Trenton Merricks -2000 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-198.If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity’ (PPR, 1999). Rea and Silver (PPR, 2000) claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. (...) My argument is sound but the parallel argument is not. (shrink)
- Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski.Yuri Balashov -unknownI examine the issue of persistence over time in the context of the special theory of relativity (SR). The four-dimensional ontology of perduring objects is clearly favored by SR. But it is a different question if and to what extent this ontology is required, and the rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by this theory. In addressing this question, I take the essential idea of endurantism, that objects are wholly present at single moments of time, and argue that it commits one (...) to unacceptable conclusions regarding coexistence, in the context of SR. I then propose and discuss a plausible account of coexistence for perduring objects, which is free of these defects. This leaves the endurantist room for some maneuvers. I consider them and show that they do not really help the endurantist out. She can accommodate the notion of coexistence in the relativistic framework only at the cost of renouncing central endurantist intuitions. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - The Endurance/Perdurance Controversy is No Storm in a Teacup.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg -2014 -Axiomathes 24 (4):463-482.Several philosophers have maintained in recent years that the endurance/perdurance debate is merely verbal: these prima facie distinct theories of objects’ persistence are in fact metaphysically equivalent, they claim. The present paper challenges this view. Three proposed translation schemes are examined; all are shown to be faulty. In the process, constructive reasons for regarding the debate as a substantive one are provided. It is also suggested that the theories may have differing practical implications.
- Beyond Endurance andPerdurance: Recurrent Dynamics.Johanna Seibt -2007 - In Christian Kanzian,Persistence. Ontos. pp. 133-164.
- Lewis onPerdurance versus Endurance.E. J. Lowe -1987 -Analysis 47 (3):152 - 154.
- Enduring and perduring objects in Minkowski space-time.Yuri Balashov -2000 -Philosophical Studies 99 (2):129-166.I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. (...) I then propose anddiscuss a plausible account of coexistence forperduring objects, which is free of these defects. This leaves the endurantist room for some maneuvers. I consider them and show that they do not really helpthe endurantist out. She can accommodate the notionof coexistence in the relativistic framework only atthe cost of renouncing central endurantist intuitions. (shrink)
- Endurants and Perdurants in Directly Depicting Ontologies.Thomas Bittner,Maureen Donnelly &Barry Smith -2004 -AI Communications 13 (4):247–258.We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and the enduring entities that participate therein. For this purpose we introduce the notion a directly depicting ontology. Directly depicting ontologies are based on relatively simple languages and fall into two major categories: ontologies of type SPAN and ontologies of type SNAP. These represent two complementary perspectives on reality and employ distinct though compatible systems of categories. A SNAP (snapshot) ontology comprehends enduring entities such as (...) organisms, geographic features, or qualities as they exist at some given moment of time. A SPAN ontology comprehends perduring entities such as processes and their parts and aggregates as they unfold themselves through some temporal interval. We give an axiomatic account of the theory of directly depicting ontologies and of the core parts of the metaontological fragment within which they are embedded. (shrink)
- Visual Endurance and AuditoryPerdurance.Błażej Skrzypulec -2020 -Erkenntnis 85 (2):467-488.Philosophers often state that the persistence of objects in vision is experienced differently than the persistence of sounds in audition. This difference is expressed by using metaphors from the metaphysical endurantism/perdurantism debate. For instance, it is claimed that only sounds are perceived as “temporally extended”. The paper investigates whether it is justified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities: endurants and perdurants respectively. This issue is analyzed from the perspective of major specifications of (...) the endurance/perdurance distinction connected, inter alia, with the notions of temporal parts and temporal localization. It is argued that it is unjustified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities in respect of how they persist. On the other hand, the apparent difference in the way of persisting can be explained by the presence of contingent differences between typical visual and auditory experiences. (shrink)No categories
- Four-dimensionalism and modal perdurants.Jiri Benovsky -2006 - In Paolo Valore,Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher. pp. 137.This paper is about persistence of material objects through time and across possible worlds. It starts with the well-known argument from undetached parts, that is put as an objection to endurantism raised by four-dimensionalists who claim to have a nice treatment of it themselves. While it will be acknowledged that, indeed, four-dimensionalism has a good explanatory power here, and has an advantage over endurantism, we will then see a modified (modalized) version of the argument that will not be so easily (...) dismissed by the four-dimensionalist. To provide a solution to this second puzzle, a proposal will be made to use the four-dimensionalist's strategy in the case of modality and use this notion ofperdurance across possible worlds to answer the modalized version of the objection. Finally, I examine some objections to this theory of modal perdurants, and try to answer them. (shrink)
- Endurance,Perdurance and Metaontology.Jiri Benovsky -2011 -SATS 12 (2):159-177.The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...) of how material objects persist through time : the endurantism vs. perdurantism controversy. It has been argued that this debate is a good example of a merely verbal one, where two allegedly competing views are in fact translatable one into each other – they end up, contrary to appearances, to be equivalent. In my closer look at this debate, I will conclude that this is correct, but only to some extent, and that there does remain room for substantive disagreement. The second thing that I wish to achieve in this paper, and that I hope will stem from my considerations about the persistence debate, is to defend a metaontological view that emphasizes that when asking the question "Are metaphysical debates substantive or verbal?" the correct answer is "It depends." Some debates are substantive, some debates are merely verbal, sometimes it is true that a problem or a question can be formulated in equally good frameworks where there is no fact of the matter as to which one is correct or where we just cannot know it. Furthermore, importantly, as my examination of the persistence debate will show, there is room for the view that a debate is largely merely verbal but not entirely and that some parts of it are substantive, and decidable by philosophical methods. It is possible, and it is the case with respect to the persistence debate, that inside a debate some points are merely verbal while other are places of substantive disagreement. A moral of this is that, at the end of the day, the best way to do meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics. (shrink)
- Aristotle’s Alternative to Enduring and Perduring: Lasting.John M. Pemberton -2022 -Ancient Philosophy Today 4 (2):217-236.Although Aristotle does not explicitly address persistence, his account of persisting may be derived from a careful consideration of his account of change. On my interpretation, he supposes that motions are mereological unities of their potential temporal parts – I dub such mereological unities ‘lasting’. Aristotle’s persisting things, too, are lasting, I argue. Lasting things are unlike enduring things in that they have temporal parts; and unlike perduring things in that their temporal parts are not actual, but rather are potential. (...) Lasting, that is Aristotle’s persisting, is thus a distinctive alternative to enduring and perduring. I assess this alternative showing it to be attractive. (shrink)
- Pegs, boards, and relativisticperdurance.Yuri Balashov -2009 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):167-175.In an earlier work I developed an argument favoring one view of persistence (viz.,perdurance) over its rivals, based on considerations of the relativity of three-dimensional spatial shapes of physical objects in Minkowski spacetime. The argument has since come under criticism (in the works of Theodore Sider, Kristie Miller, Ian Gibson, Oliver Pooley, and Thomas Sattig). Two related topics, explanatory virtues and explanatory relevance, are central to these critical discussions. In this paper I deal with these topics directly and (...) respond to my critics by offering a new perspective on the issue. (shrink)
- On Work’sPerdurance: Artworkers, Artworks and Contents.Sue Spaid -2022 -Rivista di Estetica 79:19-32.This paper argues that “work” rather vividly captures the efforts of artworkers, who work tirelessly to ensure that myriad artworks “achieve work”, as Arthur Danto termed it. More basically, “work” is what we know about an “artwork” that guides artworkers, whether curators, writers or art lovers to know how to place it (historically, politically, socially, artistically, culturally), much like scores, scripts and texts facilitate performances of musical, theatrical and literary artworks. In cheering on artists such as Danto’s fictional artist J, (...) who carried the indiscernible red square “triumphantly across the boundary as if he had rescued something rare”, artworkers prompt their publics to appreciate such heroic events and/or unfamiliar objects as meaningful artworks. Being a shared, third-person account of an artwork’s significance, work typically begins as a public discussion that inspires additional artworkers to generate articles, books, catalogues and reviews. This paper thus links Danto’s focus on achieving work to Hannah Arendt’s account of work, such that artists’ actions yield artworks, whereas artworkers’ work makes the artworld where artworks perdure as work. I begin by reviewing Danto’s use of work and content in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. I next offer an alternative approach for “achieving” work and show how this process accords with Alfred North Whitehead’s having distinguished “eternal objects” from “actual entities”. My noting that work reflects the efforts of myriad artworkers working in tandem across the globe enables me to better assess how “work” as in effort and/or meaning relates to and/or survives an artwork’s varying contexts. (shrink)
- The Case forPerdurance.Harold Noonan -2001 - In Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt,Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- The endurance/perdurance distinction.Neil McKinnon -2002 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):288 – 306.
- La jurisprudence Perruche perdure pour les enfants nés avant le 7 mars 2002.Cécile Manaouil -2023 -Médecine et Droit 2023 (182):94-99.No categories
- Commemoration andperdurance in the analects. Books I and II.Edward S. Casey -1984 -Philosophy East and West 34 (4):389-399.
- Notes sur laperdurance en architecture.Adelfo Scaranello -2019 -Philosophique 22.Le musée des Beaux-arts et d’Archéologie de Besançon (MBAB) restructuré est une stratification d’architectures de différentes époques. L’enveloppe initiale de l’architecte Pierre Marnotte datant du XIXème siècle abritait à l’origine une halle à grains. Ce bâtiment fût transformé progressivement en musée. En 1967, l’architecte Louis Miquel construit dans la cour de cet édifice une extension afin de recevoir une énième donation d’œuvres qui caractérisent les collections de cette institution. No...
- Prudence andPerdurance.Kristie Miller &Caroline West -2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman,Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.Many philosophers are sympathetic to a perdurantist view of persistence. One challenge facing this view lies in its ability to ground prudential rationality. If, as many have thought, numerical identity over time is required to ground there being sui generis (i.e. non-instrumental) prudential reasons, then perdurantists can appeal only to instrumental reasons. The problem is that it is hard to see how, by appealing only to instrumental reasons, the perdurantist can vindicate the axiom of prudence: the axiom that any person-stage (...) has reason to promote the wellbeing of any other person-stage that is part of the same person as that stage. The claim that perdurantists cannot vindicate the axiom, and hence that the view should be rejected, is what we call the normative argument against perdurantism. In this paper we argue that purely instrumental rationality can ground the truth of this axiom, and hence that the normative argument against perdurantism fails. (shrink)
- A flawed argument forperdurance – reply to braddon-Mitchell and Miller.Harold W. Noonan -2005 -Analysis 65 (2):164-166.
- Persistence in Minkowski spacetime: The irrelevance of the endurance/perdurance distinction.Cord Friebe -unknownUnder the eternalist hypothesis that objects or events exist independently of being present two different views of persistence are on the market: Persisting objects endure if they are multiply located in time, and persisting objects perdure if they are singly located by having numerically different temporal parts. Recently, several authors have argued that special relativity favours perdurantism over its endurantist rival. In my talk, I want to show that in fact the purported arguments are only those against endurantism, and that (...) with similar ones we should argue against perdurantism, as well: Enduring and perduring entities are both in conflict with SR which undermines the eternalist hypothesis. For arguing in favour of perdurantism Yuri Balashov, on the one hand, considers spatially unextended objects in Minkowski space-time and claims that for the endurantists there are unwelcome consequences from an adequate concept of their coexistence. On the other hand, spacelike extended objects are under investigation. Concerning point-like objects, Cody Gilmore has convincingly shown that Balashov’s arguments fail and, therefore, I will confine me to extended object. My paper has two parts following the two different strategies – namely, concerning the problem of the endurantist “explanatory deficiency” according to Balashov, and the problem of criss-crossing hyperplanes according to Gilmore. (shrink)
- A flawed argument forperdurance.Harold Noonan -2003 -Analysis 63 (3):213-215.
- On the Relationship between Four-Dimensionalism andPerdurance.Michele Luchetti -2014 -Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 5 (2):43-53._ABSTRACT_ A relevant part of the literature about the metaphysical problem of persistence of concrete particulars exhibits, I believe, too much freedom as far as the use of terms like “Four-Dimensionalism”, “Perdurantism” and “Doctrine of temporal parts” is concerned. This attitude clashes against the rigorous and valid arguments of many four-dimensionalist views and it is mainly due to a lack of precision on the four-dimensionalist side. In this work I analyse Parsons’ attempt to clarify the content of these notions. His (...) clarification, based on the postulation of a difference between temporal parts and temporal extent, is aimed at demonstrating that Four-Dimensionalism and Perdurantism have not the same content and are not tied by any apriori connection. I endorse Parsons’ clarification as legitimate from a logical and semantic point of view, but I maintain that, despite his useful distinction between Perdurantism as a theory of persistence and Four-Dimensionalism as a theory of extension, these doctrines are ultimately equivalent, when it comes to formulating a general view about material objects. Indeed, I argue that objects extended four-dimensionally necessarily persist by perduring, and perduring objects necessarily extend four-dimensionally in space-time. (shrink)No categories
- On the incompatibility of enduring and perduring entities.Trenton Merricks -1995 -Mind 104 (415):521-531.
- "Un genio para la legislación". La perdurable atracción del pensamiento legal y político de Jeremy Bentham.Philip Schofield -2002 -Universitas Philosophica 39:49-78.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Terapeutas de zona gris. La perdurable persistencia de las artes de curar híbridas en la República Argentina, entre los siglos XIX y XXI.Julián Beaulieu -2023 -Astrolabio: Nueva Época 30:291-297.Reseña del libro Diego Armus (director). Sanadores, parteras, curanderas y médicas. Las artes de curar en la argentina moderna. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2022.].No categories
- The failed Sacromonto myth and its localperdurance in light of FJ Simonet's Arabophobic Mozarabism.J. A. Gonzalez Alcantud -2003 -Al-Qantara 24 (2):547-574.Export citation Bookmark
- Marías a propósito de la muerte y la vida perdurable.José Luis Caballero Bono -2009 - In José Luis Cañas & Juan Manuel Burgos,El vuelo del Alción: El pensamiento de Julián Marías. Madrid: Páginas de Espuma.Export citation Bookmark
- For a Moment or for Eternity: A Metaphysics of Perduring Lovers.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin &Hazel T. Biana -2021 - In Soraj Hongladarom & Jeremiah Joven Joaquin,Love and Friendship Across Cultures: Perspectives From East and West. Springer Singapore. pp. 179-190.This paper develops a philosophical account of the relata of romantic love, the nature of the objects in a love-relation. This account holds that the lover who loves and the beloved who is loved are particular people who persist through time by having temporal parts. We show how such a perdurantist account could provide models of different kinds of romantic love: from the love of transitory lovers to the love of immortal beings; from the love of lifelong companions to the (...) love of soulmates. Finally, two possible issues raised against this view will also be addressed. (shrink)No categories
- Duration in relativistic spacetime.Antony Eagle -2009 - In Dean Zimmerman,Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 113-17.In ‘Location andPerdurance’ (2010), I argued that there are no compelling mereological or sortal grounds requiring the perdurantist to distinguish the molecule Abel from the atom Abel in Gilmore’s original case (2007). The remaining issue Gilmore originally raised concerned the ‘mass history’ of Adam and Abel, the distribution of ‘their’ mass over spacetime. My response to this issue was to admit that mass histories needed to be relativised to a way of partitioning the location of Adam/Abel, but that (...) did not amount to relativising any fundamental natural intrinsic properties—the latter are all had unrelativised, and (so most perdurantists would say). (shrink)
- Temporal parts unmotivated.Michael C. Rea -1998 -Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.In debate about the nature of persistence over time, the view that material objects endure has played the role of "champion" and the view that they perdure has played the role of the "challenger." It has fallen to the perdurantists rather than the endurantists to motivate their view, to provide reasons for accepting it that override whatever initial presumption there is against it. Perdurantists have sought to discharge their burden in several ways. For example, perdurantism has been recommend on the (...) grounds that: (i) it solves several of the puzzles that raise the problem of material constitution; (ii) it is (at least) suggested by the special theory of relativity (hereafter "SR"); (iii) it is the only view that makes sense out of the possibility of intrinsic change; (iv) it is the only view consistent with the doctrine of Humean supervenience; and (v) it makes better sense than its competitor out of the possibility of fission. There are primary and most powerful claims that have been made on behalf of perdurantism. They are individually persuasive and together they constitute a formidable assault upon the hegemony of endurantism. Endurantists of course, have not been without reply. However, since endurantists typically respond to these claims one at a time and in different ways, it is easy to get the impression that perdurantism offers a single, neat solution to a host of problems whereas endurantism requires a patchwork of different strategies. But this impression is an illusion. In Rea 1995, I argued that though perdurantism does solve some of the puzzles that raise the problem of material constitution, it does not solve the problem of material constitution itself. Thus, the problem of material constitution really has no bearing on the debate between endurantists and perdurantists. In his paper, I will show that the same is true with respect to SR, the problem of intrinsic change, the doctrine of Humean supervenience, and the possibility of fission. In short, I will argue that none of (ii-v) is true and that therefore the doctrine of temporal parts stands unmotivated. (shrink)
- Persistence and Responsibility.Neal A. Tognazzini -2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein,Time and Identity. Bradford.In this paper I argue that adopting aperdurance view of persistence through time does not lead to skepticism about moral responsibility, despite what many theorists have thought.
- Hesperus is phosphorus, indeed.István Aranyosi -2009 -Axiomathes 19 (2):223-224.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg argues in a recent article (2009) that the truth of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” depends on the assumption that the endurance theory of persistence is true. The statement is not true (or at least can reasonably be doubted), he argues, if one assumes (a) the theory of persistence according to which objects are four-dimensional entities, persisting throughperdurance, i.e. by having temporal parts that are numerically distinct, and (b) the thesis of unrestricted mereological composition (UMC), that is, (...) that any two things, however scattered in space or time, compose a sum. (shrink)
- Is Phosphorus Hesperus?Tobias Hansson Wahlberg -2009 -Axiomathes 19 (1):101-102.It is argued that philosophers who adopt theperdurance theory of persistence and who subscribe to the principle of Unrestricted Mereological Composition (UMC) are in a position to regard “Phosphorus is Hesperus” as false.
- Enduring States.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski -2007 - In Christian Kanzian,Persistence. Ontos. pp. 19-32.The problem of how a concrete individual survives changes of its properties has long divided the philosophical community into ‘enduratists’ and ‘perduratists’. Enduratists take the idea of a surviving individual ontologi-cally seriously. They claim that many objects we encounter in our every-day (and for that matter also scientific) life endure in time, which means that these entities are wholly present at any time at which they exist. For those who are in principle happy with the conceptual framework of our ‘everyday’ (...) or ‘folk’ ontology it is common to assume that such things as human beings, animals, and plants are endurants in this sense, and the most famous articulation of this view is to be found in Aristotle’s concept of substance. Enduring entities are to be contrasted with perdurants, such as a life of a human being or a process of growing of a plant. Think of the process of writing this very paper. The beginning of the writing, the actual phase of it and the final completion of the paper are not points at which the process of writing could be wholly present. Rather they constitute phases or parts of the process in question. This means that perduring entities have a temporal dimension whereas enduring ones do not. Most of us are prepared to accept that in the world around us there are many entities of this kind, but perdu-ratists try to defend a far stronger thesis. They claim that in fact there are only perdurants. In our everyday language it is equally common to speak of enduring objects and enduring states. But it was the first idiom which mainly attracted philosophers’ attention. Yet in this paper I want to concentrate on the sec-ond figure of speech. I will investigate, whether it is ontologically legiti-mate to distinguish between enduratist and perduratist perspectives with respect to states. (shrink)
- Julián Marías, Inculturizador de la Fe.José Luis Sánchez García -2020 -SCIO Revista de Filosofía 9:117-143.La filosofía de Ortega sirve a Marías para estructurar un pensamiento que se abre, desde el concepto de razón y la antropología, a la teología. Para ello, creará unas nuevas categorías filosóficas que llevan al ser humano a plantearse la realidad de Dios. El presente artículo llegará a esta concreción, desde el análisis de dichas categorías, y los conceptos de amor, creación, persona y vida perdurable.No categories
- Powers, Persistence and Process.Anne Sophie Meincke -2020 - InDispositionalism: Perspectives From Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.Stephen Mumford has argued that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists because perdurantism, by breaking down persisting objects in sequences of static discrete existents, is at odds with a powers metaphysics. This has been contested by Neil Williams who offers his own version of ‘powerful’perdurance where powers function as links between the temporal parts of persisting objects. Weighing up the arguments given by both sides, I show that the profile of ‘powerful’ persistence crucially depends on how one conceptualises the (...) processes involved in the manifestation of powers. As this turns out not to be determined per se by subscribing to some view labelled ‘powers view’, further discussion is needed as to what processes are and to what kind of process theory a powers metaphysics should commit itself in order to be convincing. I defend the claim that dispositionalism is best combined with a version of process ontology that is indeed incompatible with a perdurantist analysis of persistence. However, I argue that this does not imply that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists. (shrink)
- Tensed Mereology.Paul Hovda -2013 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):241-283.Classical mereology (CM) is usually taken to be formulated in a tenseless language, and is therefore associated with a four-dimensionalist metaphysics. This paper presents three ways one might integrate the core idea of flat plenitude, i.e., that every suitable condition or property has exactly one mereological fusion, with a tensed logical setting. All require a revised notion of mereological fusion. The candidates differ over how they conceive parthood to interact with existence in time, which connects to the distinction between endurance (...) andperdurance. Similar issues arise for the integration of mereology with modality, and much of our discussion applies to this project as well. (shrink)
- An epistemic argument for enduring human persons.Gary Rosenkrantz -2005 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):209-224.A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else. Yet, a perduring human person, $S_p$, i.e., a human person with (...) temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because $S_p$ is diverse from any incomplete series of its temporal parts, and because $S_p$ cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory, $S_p$ cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures, i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists. (shrink)
- Change and Identity Over Time.Dana Lynne Goswick -2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke,A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 365–386.This essay explores what is at stake while considering the change and identity of objects over time. Philosophers worry about an object having incompatible properties in part due to the fact that it is ruled out by Leibniz's Law. They have preferred to hold on to Leibniz's Law and to find some other way to resolve the problem of an object's changing its properties over time. The chapter examines three accounts of how objects change over time without violating Leibniz's Law: (...) endurance,perdurance, and exdurance. The chapter finally provides a brief discussion of something that has been much neglected in the literature on persistence, namely, mixed theories. (shrink)No categories
- Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?Tobias Hansson Wahlberg -2011 -Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic (...) theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and theperdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed. (shrink)
- What to consider about events: A survey on the ontology of occurrents.Fabrício Henrique Rodrigues &Mara Abel -2019 -Applied ontology 14 (4):343-378.This work presents a review of the ideas that are currently in use on the ontology-based conceptual modeling of occurrents (sometimes referred to as “events”, “perdurants”, or “processes”). It coll...No categories
- Institutional objects, reductionism and theories of persistence.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg -2014 -Dialectica 68 (4):525-562.Can institutional objects be identified with physical objects that have been ascribed status functions, as advocated by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality (1995)? The paper argues that the prospects of this identification hinge on how objects persist – i.e., whether they endure, perdure or exdure through time. This important connection between reductive identification and mode of persistence has been largely ignored in the literature on social ontology thus far.
- The loneliness of stages.David Braddon-Mitchell &Kristie Miller -2004 -Analysis 64 (3):235-242.Harold Noonan has recently argued (2003) that one of Lewis’s (1983: 76– 77) arguments for the view that objects persist by perduring is flawed. Lewis’s argument can be divided into two main sections, the first of which attempts to show that it is possible that there exists a world of temporal parts or stages, and the second, which attempts to show that our world is such a world. Noonan claims that there is a flaw in each of these two stages.We (...) argue to the contrary. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
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David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
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Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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