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Children have specialduties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts offilial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude theory and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in structure and content from any that we are likely (...) to share with anyone apart from a parent. A more promising account will concentrate on what is unique about the parent-child relationship. I articulate and defend the 'special goods theory', according to whichfilialduties arise from the distinctive kinds of goods that healthy parent-child relationships typically involve. (shrink)

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A central feature of Confucianism is the doctrine that an adult child has, for want of a better word, the ‘duty’ to care for his elderly parents1. Whether this doctrine should be framed in terms of an ethic ofduties as opposed to an ethic of virtues is a vexed question. It might be argued that the doctrine is best framed in terms of the behaviour and dispositions appropriate to an agent who is, within the Confucian moral vision, good. (...) Nonetheless, in both popular discourse and in much the secondary literature, the doctrine is characterized in terms of a moral ‘ought’. We will adopt this perspective, and talk of the ‘filial duty of care’. We investigate the empirical question of whether Chinese communities still have a strong sense of this duty. We conclude that although there is a widespread perception among Chinese communities that their sense offilial duty of care has been eroded, in fact the adherence to it remains robust. (shrink)

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As people grow old, many risk becoming chronically lonely which is associated with e.g. depression, dementia, and increased mortality. Whoever else should help to protect them from this risk, various philosophers have argued that any children that they might have will often be among them. Proceeding on this assumption, this article considers whatfilialduties to protect ageing parents from loneliness consist of, or might consist of. I develop my answer by showing that a view that may be (...) intuitively plausible, namely that they simply require children to visit their ageing parents regularly when they can do so at reasonable cost and call, text, and/or email them from time to time, is defective in three respects. First, it ignores children’s potential responsibilities to encourage and/or facilitate social interaction between their parents and third parties. Second, it ignores their potential responsibilities to help provide their parents with non-human companionship. Third, it elides over theirduties to coordinate their efforts to offer loneliness protection with others. What I end up proposing instead, then, is an approach for protecting ageing parents from loneliness that is multi-faceted. (shrink)

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Do adult children have a particular duty, or set ofduties, to their aging parents? What might the normative source and content offilial obligation be? This chapter examines Kant’s duty of beneficence in The Doctrine of Virtue and the Groundwork, suggesting that at its core, performance offilial duty occurs in response to the needs of aging parents. The duty of beneficence accounts for inevitable vulnerabilities that befall human rational beings and reveals moral agents as situated (...) in communities of dependence and mutual aid. Other accounts offilial obligation, such as those based on a notion of gratitude, virtue, or friendship, generate various difficulties and fail to adequately address and emphasize four morally significant features of the adult child/ aging parent relationship. First, the relationship between adult children and their aging parents is one of dependency created by the increasing frailty and need of those parents. Second, the obligations that adult children have to aging parents take place in the context of a relationship not voluntarily assumed, but not coerced. Third, given a cultural tendency toward paternalistic care of elderly individuals, the content offilial obligation should safeguard against such treatment. Fourth, because dependency relations between adult children and aging parents can involve an immense degree of sacrifice on the part of the caretaker, an acknowledgment ofduties should be accompanied by a concurrent acknowledgment of the necessary limitation ofduties. Addressing these four issues is essential in offering a coherent account of the normative source, content, nature, and scope of adult children’s duty to care for their aging parents. This essay demonstrates that the Kantian duty of beneficence, when functioning as the philosophical foundation offilial obligation, allows for ample light to be shed upon and for proper analysis to take place of these four issues. (shrink)

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A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question whatfilial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories offilial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent–child relationship after childhood. A theory of friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust (...) to those on whom a needs-based claim is laid. To comparefilial obligations with promises makes too much of parents’ expectations, however reasonable they may be. The good of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis forfilial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer capable of consciously contributing to it. We argue that this entails a duty to care about one’s parents, not for one’s parents. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the first place a task for adult children. (shrink)

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A continuing need for care for elderly, combined with looser family structures prompt the question whatfilial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly have a duty to care? Several theories offilial obligation are reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the parent–child relationship after childhood. A theory of friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the relationship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust (...) to those on whom a needs-based claim is laid. To comparefilial obligations with promises makes too much of parents’ expectations, however reasonable they may be. The good of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis forfilial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer capable of consciously contributing to it. We argue that this entails a duty to care about one’s parents, not for one’s parents. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the first place a task for adult children. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is to argue that the normative significance of the inner aspects offilial piety – in particular,filial love – is better captured when we understandfilial love as part of the virtue offilial piety rather than as an object of duty. After briefly introducing the value offilial love, I argue that the idea of a duty to love one's loving parents faces serious difficulties in making sense of (...) the normative significance offilial love. Then I show why the virtue-ethical approach tofilial love, which viewsfilial love as a constitutive part of the virtue offilial piety, can do justice to its normative significance while avoiding the difficulties. (shrink)

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A hallmark of Confucian morality is its emphasis onduties to family and kin as weighty features of moral life. The virtue of ‘filiality’ or ‘filial piety’ (xiao 孝), for example, is one of the most important in the Confucian canon. This aspect of Confucianism has been of renewed interest recently. On the one hand, some have claimed that, precisely because it acknowledges the importance of kinduties, Confucianism should be seen as an ethics rooted in human (...) nature that remains a viable system of morality today. On the other hand, some have argued that the extreme emphasis onfilialduties is precisely the aspect of Confucian moral philosophy that ought to be jettisoned in favor of greater impartialism; without mitigating its emphasis onfilial piety, Confucianism risks irrelevance to modern concerns. In this paper, I will outline the nature offilial morality in the Confucian tradition and discuss these recent contributions to the literature. (shrink)

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There exists a serious shortage of organs for transplantation in China, more so than in most Western countries. Confucianism has been commonly used as the cultural and ethical reason to explain the reluctance of Chinese and other East-Asian people to donate organs for medical purposes. It is asserted that the Confucian emphasis on xiao (filial piety) requires individuals to ensure body intactness at death. However, based on the original texts of classical Confucianism and other primary materials, we refute this (...) popular view. We base our position on the related Confucian norms offilial piety and ren (humaneness, humanity or benevolence), the tension between differentiated love and universal love, and belief in the goodness of human nature. In light of this, we argue that the Confucian ethical outlook actually calls for organ donation at an individual level, and supports an opt-out (presumed consent) system at the level of social policy. Furthermore, because the popular view is based on a number of dominant but misleading modes of thinking about cultural differences, our revisionist account of Confucian moralduties regarding organ donation has implications for developing a more adequate transcultural and global bioethics. These will be discussed and expanded upon. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT This paper [1] is a defence of a modified version of Jane English's model offilial obligations based on adult children's friendship with their parents. Unlike the more traditional view thatfilial obligations are a repayment for parental sacrifices, the friendship model putsfilialduties in the appealing context of voluntary, loving relationships. Contrary to English's original statement of this view, which is open to the charge of toleratingfilial ingratitude, the friendship model can (...) generate obligations to help our parents even if we are no longer friendly with them. Joseph Kupfer has pointed out several ways in which parent‐child relationships differ from peer friendships; but his arguments do not preclude our enjoying a type of friendship with our parents. In response to Christina Hoff Sommers, who objects that feelings of friendship toward our parents are too flimsy a ground forfilialduties, the friendship model can provide a plausible, robust account offilial obligations. As for adult children who have never formed friendships with their loving, caring parents, and refuse to give them much‐needed assistance, they can be criticised by moral considerations independent of but compatible with the friendship model. (shrink)

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This essay investigates the demands on adult children to provide care for their elderly/ill parents from a socio-moral perspective. In order to narrow the examination, the question pursued here is agent-relative: What social and moral complexities are involved for the adult child when her parent(s) need care? First, this article examines our society’s expectation that adult children are morally obligated to provide care for their parents. Second, the essay articulates how transgressing against this normative expectation can inure significant moral criticism. (...) The final sections present these tensions within the context of disability. (shrink)

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Some moral philosophers in the West hold that adult children have no more moral obligation to support their elderly parents than does any other person in the society, no matter how much sacrifice their parents made for them or what misery their parents are presently suffering. This is because children do not ask to be brought into the world or to be adopted. Therefore, there is a "basic asymmetry between parental and thefilial obligations." I argue against the Daniels/English (...) thesis by employing the traditional Confucian view of the nature offilial obligation. On the basis of a distinction between 'moral duty' and 'moral responsibility' and the Confucian concept of justice, I argue that thefilial obligation of adult children to care respectfully for their aged parents is not necessarily self-imposed. I conclude that due to the naturalistic character of the family, the nature of our familial obligations cannot be consensual, contractarian and voluntarist, but instead existential, communal and historical. (shrink)

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This article discusses the application of artificially intelligent robots within eldercare and explores a series of ethical considerations, including the challenges that AI (Artificial Intelligence) technology poses to traditional Chinese Confucianfilial piety. From the perspective of Confucian ethics, the paper argues that robots cannot adequately fulfillduties of care. Due to their detachment from personal relationships and interactions, the “emotions” of AI robots are merely performative reactions in different situations, rather than actual emotional abilities. No matter how (...) “humanized” robots become, it is difficult to establish genuine empathy and a meaningful relationship with them for this reason. Even so, we acknowledge that AI robots are a significant tool in managing the demands of elder care and the growth of care poverty, and as such, we attempt to outline some parameters within which care robotics could be acceptable within a Confucian ethical system. Finally, the paper discusses the social impact and ethical considerations brought on by the interaction between humans and machines. It is observed that the relationship between humans and technology has always had both utopian and dystopian aspects, and robotic elder care is no exception. AI caregiver robots will likely become a part of elder care, and the transformation of these robots from “service providers” to “companions” seems inevitable. In light of this, the application of AI-augmented robotic elder care will also eventually change our understanding of interpersonal relationships and traditional requirements offilial piety. (shrink)

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Associativeduties are agent-centeredduties to give defeasible moral priority to our special ties. Our strongest associativeduties are to close friends and family. According to reductionists, our associativeduties are just specialduties—i.e.,duties arising from what I have done to others, or what others have done to me. These includeduties to abide by promises and contracts, compensate our benefactors in ways expressing gratitude, and aid those whom we have made especially (...) vulnerable to our conduct. I argue, though, that reductionism faces a problem: specialduties are not strong enough to account for the strength of our associativeduties. At the bar of associativeduties, we are required to do what no special duty can warrant. I then present an alternative reductionist analysis of associativeduties—the ‘Identity-Enactment Account’—which not only accounts for the peculiar strength of our associativeduties, but also characterizes them in an intuitively compelling way. On this account, our strongest associativeduties are specialduties to protect or promote the welfare of the duty’s beneficiary by adopting and enacting a practical identity in which the duty’s beneficiary features prominently. There are persons who can legitimately demand a prominent place in our mental lives, for the protection and intimacy it affords. They can, in effect, legitimately demand to be among our nearest and dearest. The correlative of such a demand is, on our part, an associative duty we have toward them. (shrink)

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Contemporary ethical and political discourses frequently refer to the moral force of needs as justifying access to resources and rights to goods. Can needs make normative claims on anyone, and if so, how? What obligations do moral agents have to respond to the needs of other people? As finite creatures, humans inevitably experience need. Certain kinds of needs, namely fundamental needs, must be met if individuals are to avoid the harm of compromised agency. Fundamental needs involve agency-threatening events or circumstances (...) to which another must respond in order to cultivate, sustain or restore the agency of the one in need. I establish that fundamental needs have moral significance through an argument demonstrating the good of agency. I develop a robust account of agency, one that moves beyond the traditional identification of agency with rational capacities, to incorporate both emotional and relational abilities. Following the Kantian duty of beneficence, I then argue that our mutual and inevitable interdependence gives rise to a duty to care for the fundamental needs of others. Next, drawing upon care ethics, I suggest that moral agents are obligated not only to meet fundamental needs present in others, but also to do so in a manner indebted to forms of dignifying care. It is not enough that we meet the needs of others. How we do so carries with it the conferral or denial of dignity and inclusion in a moral community. Finally, I demonstrate the applied ethical import of the foregoing theoretical account by discussing practices of caring for the fundamental needs of elderly individuals, who are often relegated to the margins of agency. Specifically, I consider two cases: recommended rationing of healthcare resources for the elderly andfilial obligation. (shrink)

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In this essay, I reflect on the contradictions that arise from a personal experience of conflict with my father and the clash of traditional Filipino gender norms in the context of the practice of name changes within the institution of marriage and intersecting feminist critiques of patriarchy. My understanding of the Tagalog amor propio is self-love or self-pride within Filipino culture and signifies one's authority, place, and meaning in the community. As a concept of authority, amor propio encourages practices of (...) respect toward the authority figure. In the context of the home, amor propio is attributed to the father, and members of the family ought to respect his amor propio. This essay examines my own conflicted relationship with my father and my attempts to navigate the complex terrain of amor propio, as a Filipina, feminist/peminist, dutiful daughter. Filipino immigrant families face distinct challenges within family life owing to globalization, colonialism, and racism, so I find Jane Addams's social ethics offilial relations helpful in framing the tension between individual and social claims within the specific cultural values expected of Filipina women as dutiful daughters. Addams's feminist social sensibilities in her work at Hull House were attuned to the plight of daughters and the conflicting claims of the family emergent within the crowded immigrant neighborhoods in Chicago. She was able to articulate and sympathetically understand the generational divide within immigrant families at Hull House and sought to bridge these differences within the context of the family. I reflect on her work in my own experience as a dutiful Filipina daughter. (shrink)

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"What do grown children owe their parents?" Over two decades ago philosopher Jane English asked this question and came up with the startling answer: nothing (English 1979). English joins many contemporary philosophers in rejecting the once-traditional view that grown children owe their parents some kind of fitting repayment for past services rendered. The problem with the traditional view, as argued by many, is, first, that parents haveduties to provide fairly significant services to their growing children, and persons do (...) not owe repayment for others' mere performance of duty; second, even where parents go above and beyond duty in their loving and generous rearing of their children, the benefits are bestowed, at least on young children, without their voluntary acceptance and consent, and so, again, fail to generate any obligation of subsequent repayment on their part (see Blustein 1982: 182-3). Moreover, the entire idiom of obligation and repayment, in English's 1 words, "tends to obscure, or even to undermine, the love that is the correct ground offilial obligation" (352). English's alternative, however -- that children strictly "owe" their parents nothing except what flows naturally from whatever love and affection exist between them -- also strikes many as problematic. Christina Hoff Sommers offers examples of what seem to be clearly delinquent adult children, who simply don't "feel" like sharing their lives with their aging parents, or providing any emotional or financial support to them, and so don't (Sommers 1986: 440-41). Sommers points out that we need some talk of obligations in order to fill in the cracks in human relationships where love and affection fail: "The ideal relationship cannot be 'duty-free,' if only because sentimental ties may come unraveled, often leaving one of the parties at a material disadvantage'" (450-51). Sommers proposes as her alternative to English that legitimateduties arise out of special relationships defined by social roles: being a father or mother, a son or a daughter, "is socially as well as biologically prescriptive; it not only defines what one is; it also defines who one is and what one owes" (447).. (shrink)

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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. 自2019年COVID-19疫情爆發以來，醫療衛生人員承擔 了繁重的疫情防控工作。在這些工作中，他們承擔了更多的責 任，有些責任是相互衝突的，如照護患者的責任與照顧家庭的 責任。本文根據對部分中國醫療衛生人員的訪談，結合國內外 發表的相關文獻，對疫情防控中醫護人員面臨的責任衝突進行 梳理，並從儒家倫理的視角進行評析。 During the COVID-19 pandemic, healthcare providers faced many challenges and were loaded with heavy psychological burdens. This paper focuses on a moral dilemma between the duty of healthcare providers and the overall well-being of the providers and their families during the medical crisis of the pandemic in Huhan, China. Based on interviews, the paper takes a Confucian perspective to explicate theduties and (...) supererogatory acts of those who volunteered to help and the balance between the moralduties of loyalty andfilial piety. (shrink)

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For Confucianism nowadays, the characteristics and relationship between benevolence andfilial piety are crucial topics. This paper is a discussion of the relationship between benevolence andfilial piety in Confucianism from a new doctrine, i.e. the doctrine of ren wei tian sheng 人为天生 (humans are born of tian). Confucianists believed that man’s existence as a human was derived from tian. This was extended to mean that, in contrast to being born into a family, part of being ‘human’ was (...) also given by tian. The two virtues are applicable to different occasions, and require different moral competencies. Based on these premises, Confucianism conceived of an ideal order. Confucianism holds that junzi (gentlemen) involved in politics must fulfil the virtues of benevolence, justice, loyalty and trustworthiness, while xiaoren (ordinary people) are only expected to do theirfilial duty within the family. (shrink)

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For Confucianism nowadays, the characteristics and relationship between benevolence andfilial piety are crucial topics. This paper is a discussion of the relationship between benevolence andfilial piety in Confucianism from a new doctrine, i.e. the doctrine of ren wei tian sheng 人为天生 (humans are born of tian). Confucianists believed that man’s existence as a human was derived from tian. This was extended to mean that, in contrast to being born into a family, part of being ‘human’ was (...) also given by tian. The two virtues are applicable to different occasions, and require different moral competencies. Based on these premises, Confucianism conceived of an ideal order. Confucianism holds that junzi (gentlemen) involved in politics must fulfil the virtues of benevolence, justice, loyalty and trustworthiness, while xiaoren (ordinary people) are only expected to do theirfilial duty within the family. (shrink)

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Zusammenfassung: Freundschaft ist ein wichtiges Thema der aristotelischen Moraltheorie. Aristoteles versteht unter Freundschaft die optimale Form der Beziehung, in der sich die Beteiligten gegenseitig schätzen und Wohltaten leisten. Im Rahmen seiner Freundschaftstheorie hat Aristoteles auch eine Auffassung der Freundschaft zwischen Eltern und Kindern entworfen. Im Vergleich zu seiner allge-meinen Freundschaftstheorie haben seine Ansätze zur Freundschaft zwischen Eltern und Kindern sowohl in der historischen als auch in der systematischen Forschung wenig Aufmerksamkeit gefunden. Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die Auffassung dieser (...) speziellen Beziehung im Kontext seiner Moral- und Freundschaftstheorie darzustellen, zu interpretieren, aber auch weiterzuentwickeln bzw. zu vervollständi-gen. Zudem wird eine kritische Beurteilung sowie Korrektur einiger Aspekte dieser Theorie, insbesondere der Gläubiger-Schuldner-Auffassung der Eltern-Kinder-Beziehung, vorgenommen. Diese Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles’ Theorie führt zu einer klareren, systematischeren, aber auch attraktiveren und angemesseneren aristotelischen Theorie der Eltern-Kinder-Freundschaft, als sie in den Schriften des Aristoteles vorliegt. -/- Summary: Friendship (philia), the optimal form of a relationship, in which the friends love and do good things for each other, is an important theme of Aristotle’s ethics. In the framework of his friendship theory, Aristotle also outlined an account of the specific friendship emerging within the relationship between parents and their children. In comparison to his general theory of friendship, which has been widely discussed both by historians of philosophy and by ethicists, has this account received little at-tention. The objective of this article is to present and interpret, but also to develop and qualify, this account of parent-child friendship in the context of Aristotle’s general friendship theory. I shall also suggest that some aspects of this theory, in particular the debtor-creditor account offilialduties, need to be reassessed. This interpretation and discussion should yield a clearer, more systematic but also more attractive and adequate Aristotelian account of the optimal parent-children relationship than the one we find in the texts of Aristotle. (shrink)

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This study examines the structure of violence within familial relationships and its justification in Confucianism. While violence is inherently evil in its essential context, certain forms of violence can be structurally justified depending on the context and the relationship between the subject and object. In Eastern traditions, the concept of ‘righteous killing’ (義殺) has existed since ancient times. Violence related to family members shows multilayered dynamics, particularly due to the unique concept of ‘filial piety’ (孝) which functions beyond blood (...) relations as a political grammar. This research attempts to examine how violence by or against parents has been justified through various logic and pretexts in Confucian discourse. In China and Joseon, there were moral aberrations where people mutilated their own or their children’s bodies, or killed others in revenge for their parents, all in the name offilial piety. How does Confucian discourse justify these unfilial attempts that occur in the process of performingfilial duty? Is the Confucian justification of violence related tofilial piety valid or meaningful? Through examining cases of family-related violence in China and Joseon, this study aims to investigate how violence derived from the performance offilial piety or the embodiment of righteousness was justified or denied within Confucianism. (shrink)

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The prospect of death, for Confucians, creates particular social and familialduties. Short of end‐of‐life issues, children, as a matter of generalfilial duty, certainly have a duty to provide care and comfort for parents as they experience the limitations of old age. Death is a major theme of Zhuangzi. At various points in the text, we are counseled to embrace the inevitable, to detach ourselves from the desire to preserve life beyond its natural bounds. When a loved (...) one dies, however he or she has died, feelings of loss and grief naturally arise in those closest to the deceased. Confucianism believes that these emotions are the deepest wellsprings of humanity, the most fundamental sentiments of human love. Instead of denying grief, Confucius and Mencius tell us to cultivate it, to bring it into the center of our daily lives through conscientious mourning. (shrink)

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Simon Keller's The Limits of Loyalty makes an important and valuable contribution to a neglected area of moral psychology, both in presenting a clear and subtle account of loyalty in its various manifestations, and in challenging some assumptions about the role of loyalty in a morally decent life. Loyalty's domain is that of special relationships, and for some relationship types, Keller argues that these relationships rightly carry some motivational force, as in his analysis offilialduties. In other (...) cases, such as patriotism, ‘there is always something unfortunate about such loyalties’ , for example, that they involve dispositions to ‘fall into bad faith’ or other confusions.Keller begins by examining diverse particular loyalties, then moves to more general questions about loyalty. He considers friendship patriotism , and the obligations of grown children to parents . He argues that loyalty tends to conflict with other values, such as epistemic integrity and draws the conclusion that loyalty as such should not …. (shrink)

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Filial obligation and its implications have been little-debated in ethics. The basis of informed consent in libertarian positions may be challenged by inclusion of others beyond the immediate doctorpatient relationship. Some of the literature arguing for and againstfilial duty, including feminist literature, is presented as a backdrop to the argument that a patient’s family, and further, his or her community, contains the source of a broader perspective regarding decisions concerning his or her medical treatment. Communitarian models allow (...) for a medical decision to be owned by some or all stakeholders in patient outcomes. Although such a position undoubtedly confronts traditional notions of autonomy, it offers an alternative that may positively impact the practice of medicine by providing a more holistic treatment context. New models premised on shared decision-making will be presented as frameworks that may provide a theoretical basis for greater physician input into medical decisions that impact a patient’s family members and in more global terms, his or her community. (shrink)

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This paper asks whether adult children have aduty of justice to act as caregivers for theirfrail, elderly parents. I begin (Sections I.and II.) by locating the historical reasons whyrelationships within families were not thoughtto raise issues of justice. I argue that thesereasons are misguided. The paper next presentsspecific examples showing the relevance ofjustice to family relationships. I point outthat in the United States today, the burden ofcaregiving for dependent parents fallsdisproportionately on women (Sections III. andIV.). The paper goes on to (...) use Rawls''theoretical tool of the veil of ignorance toargue that caring for parents should not belinked to a person''s sex and more generally,that there is no duty of justice to assume therole of caregiver for dependent parents(Sections V.). Although justice does notprovide the moral foundations for parent care,I show that it nonetheless places importantlimits on the instinct to care. I concludethat the voice of justice should be audible,and is intrinsically present, withinfamilies. (shrink)

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Simon Keller's The Limits of Loyalty makes an important and valuable contribution to a neglected area of moral psychology, both in presenting a clear and subtle account of loyalty in its various manifestations, and in challenging some assumptions about the role of loyalty in a morally decent life. Loyalty's domain is that of special relationships, and for some relationship types, Keller argues that these relationships rightly carry some motivational force, as in his analysis offilialduties. In other (...) cases, such as patriotism, ‘there is always something unfortunate about such loyalties’, for example, that they involve dispositions to ‘fall into bad faith’ or other confusions.Keller begins by examining diverse particular loyalties, then moves to more general questions about loyalty. He considers friendship patriotism, and the obligations of grown children to parents. He argues that loyalty tends to conflict with other values, such as epistemic integrity and draws the conclusion that loyalty as such should not …. (shrink)

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Relationships between children and parents pervade the Star Wars saga, especially if people include surrogate parents. Anakin's relationship with his mother, Shmi, in the prequels impacts his trajectory toward the dark side. In The Mandalorian, Mando's role as a surrogate father to Grogu transforms them into a “Clan of Two”. But the most significant parent‐child relationship in the saga may be the one between Luke Skywalker and Darth Vader. Confucius's teachings highlight the importance of benevolence, social order, and ritual propriety (...) among other virtues and values. This chapter shows that understanding Luke's surrender to Vader in terms of Confucianfilial piety makes sense of how Luke is able to overcome the allure of the dark side and become a Jedi. Confucius's Analects has a moral framework called “exemplarism”. This is the idea that moral knowledge and practice do not start with principles, rules,duties, consequences, or character traits. (shrink)

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The unique mix of modern Western and traditional Confucian values in Singapore presents young people with contradictory views onduties to aging parents. It remains to be seen whether the changing demands of modern life will result in new generations giving up Confucian family ethics or whether the Confucian dynamic will find a way to adapt to the new pressures. It is the opinion of this author that the Confucian family structure has mixed potential for the growing crisis of (...) elder care. Alone, both Confucian traditions and typical Western institutional approaches toward elder care fall short of what is necessary for intergenerational social justice, yet a hybrid of the two has great potential for the growing aging crisis. To demonstrate this, I first give a brief account of the history offilial piety in Confucianism as well as the social environment from which it originated. Then I turn my attention to the present issues of an aging population and elder care that face much of the developed world in the twenty-first century. Finally, I show how adherence to Confucianfilial traditions can both help to address many of these issues and how it can potentially leave unjust gaps in elder care. Ultimately, I conclude that the crisis of elder care may be best dealt with through a hybrid of Confucian values and Western approaches. (shrink)

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: What does one do when the death of a parent demands reentry into an abandoned religious formalism? Raised in an orthodox Jewish home, schooled in the intricate discourse of rabbinic texts and yet long estranged from the ritualism of Jewish law, the prospect is maddening.Filial love compels a yearlong daily synagogue attendance where one recites a mourning prayer laden with myth and superstition. Kaddish is an exquisitely maneuvered headlong plunge into Judaism's expansive intellectual tradition. Thereby the current (...) literary editor of the New Republic fulfils his duty both as a Jew and a son, while never turning his back on another imperative he so cherishes "the moral obligation to be intelligent.". (shrink)

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People in rich countries increasingly rely on paid workers to care for many of their health and personal care needs. We expect that, in most families, love orfilial piety underpin caring relationships, and that these moral bonds ensure good quality care. If paid caring relationships are not underpinned by love, what moral bonds can they rely on? Exploring contract, professional duty, and compassionate gift as normative “resources” for good paid care, I conclude that we cannot expect paid carers (...) to reproduce an idealized private sphere. Instead we can expect “good enough” care, supported by a range of normative resources. (shrink)

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Loyalty is central to the philosophies of Confucius and Josiah Royce. In the case of Confucius, we see this significance in the emphasis placed in the Analects on zhong (“loyalty,” “other-regard,” or “dutifulness”) and xiao (“filial piety” or “filiality”). In the case of Royce, we see this significance in the emphasis placed on loyalty in The Philosophy of Loyalty. Moreover, in Confucius's and Royce's interactions with disciples and students, we witness appreciable loyalty, to their students and to their respective (...) philosophies. This article compares the teachings—in thought and action—of Confucius and Royce, highlighting the significance of loyalty therein. (shrink)

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In personal relationships, we conceive of the related person as an individual who is more than a combination of qualities, a bearer of claims or a role-occupant. She is envisaged as a distinct and irreplaceable particular. We have immediate concerns for her that are not mediated by consideration of principles such as the promotion of welfare or the fulfillment of duty. The aim of my dissertation is to analyze and defend this particularistic concern and show how it is anchored in (...) what I call an engaged perspective. Recent critics of Kantianism and utilitarianism claim that these theories endorse only an objective or impersonal perspective, which ignores the particularity of individuals. I contrast this with an engaged perspective which I explicate by building on insights embodied in the Confucian account of role-ethics in the period 550 B.C.-290 B.C. I argue that although Confucian ethics has been rightly interpreted to stress the way in which social role mediates between relationships, nonetheless its ideal concerns socially-mediated relations of love between individuals. ;I first examine the cardinal Confucian virtue of jen, or loving, and other role virtues such asfilial piety, and show how they help create connectedness and mutuality. People are connected when they share their emotional world and care for each other. And they share an exclusive mutuality when they generate a unique history of reciprocation and participate in the common good of their relationship. In addition, particularity functions as a structural factor to govern the caring, reciprocity, and emotions of love. Consequently, an engaged agent considers her beloved and the relationship she is engaged in as irreplaceable particulars. The engaged perspective is a distinctive "we" perspective arising from the awareness of such connectedness and mutuality. I also contrast the engaged perspective with the personal perspective. ;Finally, I analyze the motivational structure of a Confucian agent by examining the influence of propriety, emotions, thinking and will on Confucian agency. This confirms my analysis of the engaged perspective and further informs us about the type of agency required in engagement. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature, Imagination, and Human RightsWillie van Peer“the poet’s function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen”Aristotle: Poetics, 1451aAristotle’s dictum has been of vital importance to the development of literary theory, and its significance can still be felt today. It is the foundation of the distinction we make between journalism and literature, between history and fiction. Literature, Aristotle proposes, is (...) about things that could happen, not about things that have taken place in reality. Literature is thus inscribed in the realm of the imagination. However, imagination does not operate in an epistemological vacuum. A fictional text entertaining no relation with the world would have no meaning. Perhaps giants, dragons and witches do not really exist, and perhaps it is not really possible to cover seven miles with each step of those wonderful boots that Tom Thumb discovered. But we have no difficulty in imagining those things, precisely because they entertain an intimate relationship with forms and things, events and actions that happen in daily life. The details of the relationship between reality and fiction are less important for the present argument than the fact that fiction is embedded in our pragmatic attitudes. 1 Ernst Bloch has given this human tendency a name: The Hope Principle. Our desire for a better world expresses itself in hope, a distinctive feature of the species Homo Sapiens. The importance of the imagination in the project of humanity has received eloquent and systematic treatment in the philosophical work of Hans Vaihinger and Helmuth Plessner. 2 Imagination also gives impetus to history, because it drives us toward the realization of aims and plans that initially lived only in our hearts and minds: “Someone dreaming never remains in the same place.” 3 [End Page 276]Similar things have been asserted about literature, by Horace, Sidney, Matthew Arnold, and others. Reading is supposed to make us better humans, heightening our awareness, increasing our sensibility, and thus indirectly guiding our actions toward the establishment of a better world. Sometimes noble motives are associated with this function. Reading literature, it is then assumed, makes the reader more socially tolerant, more perceptive about other humans, and more politically conscious. This is the so-called Edification Hypothesis. Anthony Savile sums up this view when he submits the thesis that literature has a unique power to make us understand the thoughts and feelings of other human beings. This ethical perspective on literature has been expressed since Greek Antiquity. 4 It will be remembered that Plato condemned literature precisely for this reason: because it diverts our attention from the real world, itself already an imperfect reflection of Pure Ideas. Aristotle rejects this view and develops a theory squarely opposed to that of his teacher. According to him, literature contributes to the elevation of mankind, to paideia. By showing us that which is possible, and by involving us in the inescapable passage of tragic events, readers and spectators are drawn into emotions of fear and compassion, emotions that lead to katharsis, a process that purifies us of megalomania (hubris), safeguarding democratic government and protecting us from unrestrained tyranny. 5The Aristotelian view that literature has an edifying effect had been generally present in Western tradition till about 1800. Until then literature was viewed almost universally as an ethical category. Consider, for instance, the self-evident way in which Richardson prefaces Pamela: “If to divert and entertain, and at the same time to instruct and improve the minds of the YOUTH of both sexes: If to inculcate religion and morality in so easy and agreeable a manner, as shall render them equally delightful and profitable: If to set forth in the most exemplary lights, the parental, thefilial, and the socialduties....” 6The embarrassment a modern reader may feel when confronted with such overt claims to morality is largely a product of the nineteenth century, when literature came to be seen as a predominantly aesthetic category, eluding all attempts at moral categorization. This movement has resulted in a liberation of literature from moralism. At the same time, it has created nontrivial difficulties in thinking about ethical and political issues, so... (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature, Imagination, and Human RightsWillie van Peer“the poet’s function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen”Aristotle: Poetics, 1451aAristotle’s dictum has been of vital importance to the development of literary theory, and its significance can still be felt today. It is the foundation of the distinction we make between journalism and literature, between history and fiction. Literature, Aristotle proposes, is (...) about things that could happen, not about things that have taken place in reality. Literature is thus inscribed in the realm of the imagination. However, imagination does not operate in an epistemological vacuum. A fictional text entertaining no relation with the world would have no meaning. Perhaps giants, dragons and witches do not really exist, and perhaps it is not really possible to cover seven miles with each step of those wonderful boots that Tom Thumb discovered. But we have no difficulty in imagining those things, precisely because they entertain an intimate relationship with forms and things, events and actions that happen in daily life. The details of the relationship between reality and fiction are less important for the present argument than the fact that fiction is embedded in our pragmatic attitudes. 1 Ernst Bloch has given this human tendency a name: The Hope Principle. Our desire for a better world expresses itself in hope, a distinctive feature of the species Homo Sapiens. The importance of the imagination in the project of humanity has received eloquent and systematic treatment in the philosophical work of Hans Vaihinger and Helmuth Plessner. 2 Imagination also gives impetus to history, because it drives us toward the realization of aims and plans that initially lived only in our hearts and minds: “Someone dreaming never remains in the same place.” 3 [End Page 276]Similar things have been asserted about literature, by Horace, Sidney, Matthew Arnold, and others. Reading is supposed to make us better humans, heightening our awareness, increasing our sensibility, and thus indirectly guiding our actions toward the establishment of a better world. Sometimes noble motives are associated with this function. Reading literature, it is then assumed, makes the reader more socially tolerant, more perceptive about other humans, and more politically conscious. This is the so-called Edification Hypothesis. Anthony Savile sums up this view when he submits the thesis that literature has a unique power to make us understand the thoughts and feelings of other human beings. This ethical perspective on literature has been expressed since Greek Antiquity. 4 It will be remembered that Plato condemned literature precisely for this reason: because it diverts our attention from the real world, itself already an imperfect reflection of Pure Ideas. Aristotle rejects this view and develops a theory squarely opposed to that of his teacher. According to him, literature contributes to the elevation of mankind, to paideia. By showing us that which is possible, and by involving us in the inescapable passage of tragic events, readers and spectators are drawn into emotions of fear and compassion, emotions that lead to katharsis, a process that purifies us of megalomania (hubris), safeguarding democratic government and protecting us from unrestrained tyranny. 5The Aristotelian view that literature has an edifying effect had been generally present in Western tradition till about 1800. Until then literature was viewed almost universally as an ethical category. Consider, for instance, the self-evident way in which Richardson prefaces Pamela: “If to divert and entertain, and at the same time to instruct and improve the minds of the YOUTH of both sexes: If to inculcate religion and morality in so easy and agreeable a manner, as shall render them equally delightful and profitable: If to set forth in the most exemplary lights, the parental, thefilial, and the socialduties....” 6The embarrassment a modern reader may feel when confronted with such overt claims to morality is largely a product of the nineteenth century, when literature came to be seen as a predominantly aesthetic category, eluding all attempts at moral categorization. This movement has resulted in a liberation of literature from moralism. At the same time, it has created nontrivial difficulties in thinking about ethical and political issues, so... (shrink)

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Caregiving robots are often lauded for their potential to assist with geriatric care. While seniors can be wise and mature, possessing valuable life experience, they can also present a variety of ethical challenges, from prevalence of racism and sexism, to troubled relationships, histories of abusive behavior, and aggression, mood swings and impulsive behavior associated with cognitive decline. I draw on Confucian ethics, especially the concept offilial piety, to address these issues. Confucian scholars have developed a rich set of (...) theoretical resources for dealing with beloved but imperfect elders, and navigating the challenges of supporting seniors whose ethical commitments are unreliable. These resources provide a way to reconcile two important but conflicting desiderata: to value and care for seniors, but also to clear-mindedly deal with their moral shortcomings. In particular, they articulate a duty to remonstrate with our elders when they err. Confucianfilial piety can helpfully inform robot design and use in geriatric care. They can be used to strengthen and protect emotional connections in important relationships, but should not be used to reinforce patient preferences when doing so damages relationships or their ability to act morally. Rather than conceive of patient wellbeing as in tension with moral behavior, and care as a burden for caregivers, not a source of value and meaning, Confucian accounts offilial piety help identify both new areas of concern and new potential in the development of caregiving technologies, ones which see these goods as complementary. (shrink)

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Adult children’s particular obligations to their parents arefilial obligations. The gratitude offilial obligations that treats one’sfilial obligations asduties of gratitude to one’s parents is a mainstream view. However, in terms of the requirements of such obligations, the gratitude account fails to provide practical guidance. The general requirement seems that children should benefit their parents as the beneficiary should benefit the benefactor. The question is what kinds of benefits adult children should provide to (...) their parents? In some cases, adult children feel obligated to provide particular benefits to their parents like paying their medical bills or spending time with them. While in some other cases, it seems that they can use their own discretion to decide how to satisfy thefilial obligations so long as what they do benefits their parents. In this article, I am trying to argue that although the general requirement of thefilial obligations is to benefit the parents, there are two kinds of benefits that adult children are strongly obligated to provide. These are special goods that parents can only get from their children and things that meet their parents’ basic needs. In addition, although adult children havefilial obligations to benefit their parents, there should be some limitations on the requirements offilial obligation. Namely, adult children do not have afilial obligation to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of adult children’s liberty related to significant aspects of their lives, or to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of infringing their capacity to fulfil other importantduties. (shrink)

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My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship and friendship by developing my own version of a virtue-ethical approach. -/- In Chapter 1, I critically examine important contemporary Western theories offilial piety and argue that they do not adequately capture the nature of a desirable parent-child relationship andfilial piety. -/- In Chapter 2, I show why the duty-centered approach tofilial piety is inadequate focusing (...) on why it fails to make sense offilial love and argue thatfilial piety is better understood as a virtue by showing how it can do justice to the normative significance offilial love. -/- In Chapter 3, I introduce what I call ‘gratitude for being’ to capture the distinctive type of gratitude we owe to people who have consistent and particularized care for us, especially our parents. I argue that the idea of gratitude for being can best make sense of deep gratitude typically found among intimates who care for each other. -/- In Chapter 4, I introduce what I call ‘relational virtues,’ which are virtues required for the participants of a given type of personal relationship and argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate personal relationships. Next, I propose my own relational virtue theory offilial piety. -/- In Chapter 5, I discuss several aspects of the Confucian conception offilial piety—earlyfilial piety, the close connection between self-cultivation andfilial piety, and postmortemfilial piety—and show how my relational virtue theory can defend and make sense of them. Lastly, I show how my view offilial piety is different from the Confucian view, or at least a version of it. -/- In Chapter 6, I discuss the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue and show how it can make sense of the nature and value of friendship. In particular, I show why the virtue of friendship is distinct from general virtues such as benevolence or generosity and why it is morally important to have this virtue. -/- Finally, in Chapter 7, I propose what I call ‘relational activity view’ on partiality. After critically examining existing views on partiality, I suggest a picture of how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate relationships. -/- . (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When Our Fathers Fall:A Thomistic-Confudan Approach to Lay Moral Correction of ClergyJoshua R. BrownIn this article, I seek to draw upon the resources of Thomas Aquinas and early Confucian philosophy in order to answer the following question: what are the responsibilities of lay Catholics to our priests and bishops as regards their personal moral rectification? This justifiably provokes two questions in reaction: why is this question worth pursuing, and (...) why pursue it via a comparative reading of Aquinas and Confucian philosophy?As to the first of these, the question I pose here is a specification of the larger responsibilities that fall to Christians according to the Scriptures. Galatians 5:1–2 puts the matter this way: "Brothers, even if a person is caught in some transgression, you who are spiritual should correct that one in a gentle spirit, looking to yourself, so that you may also not be tempted. Bear one another's burdens and so you will fulfill the law of Christ."1 In the theological tradition, "bearing one another's burdens" has been neatly and aptly represented in the principle of fraternal correction. The question I am focused on here, then, is how is fraternal correction properly offered from laity to clerics.Ultimately, articulating the shape or form of virtuous lay correction of clergy is actually a rather knotty problem. This is because the manner of the relationship between laity and clergy is not simply understood in terms [End Page 1025] of the bonds of Christian fraternity. Certainly, all Christians are brothers and sisters in Christ, for through His grace we have been adopted into the inheritance of the Kingdom of God as children of God (see Eph 5:1–5; 1 John 3:1–3). Yet the Church also recognizes that priests and bishops possess not simply a fraternal but also a paternal relationship to laity. As St. Paul again puts it to the church in Corinth, "I became your father in Christ Jesus through the gospel. Therefore, I urge you, be imitators of me" (1 Cor 4:15–16).I propose here that, although fraternal correction is a still useful concept for understanding how laity can morally correct clergy, it has an obvious weakness in that it corresponds to a particular relational analogy, that of fraternity, within which the difference in authority is not as great as the parent–child bond. Thus, fraternal correction is exceptionally useful for understanding how relationships with more or less equal rank of authority can function in terms of moral remonstration, such as how a lay Christian might fraternally correct another lay Christian, or a cleric fraternally correct a cleric. However, when it comes to clergy–laity relations, the shape of fraternal correction is far less clear, for there is a just and genuine disparity between them in the order of ecclesial, magisterial authority underlying the relationship, even if there is equality in other important respects.I argue here that lay responsibilities for correcting clergy can be fruitfully understood in terms offilial remonstration as understood by the Confucian philosophical tradition. Of course, there is one tremendous dissimilarity between Confucian views on the responsibilities forfilial remonstration and those pertaining to the laity–clergy relationship: the former occur within and flow from the natural foundation of the parent–child bond, while the latter are not based on blood relations and naturalduties. Yet, the same can be said about the language of fraternal correction, which draws upon the analogousduties of blood-kin applied to the spiritual fraternity of the Christian life. And so, it must be admitted that although the father–child relationship is used only analogously to describe the priest–laity relationship, it also accurately depicts the reality of that relationship. As John Paul II observed, priestly celibacy entails "a singular sharing in God's fatherhood and in the fruitfulness of the Church."2 The call of the priest to the celibate life is thus a call to fatherhood, indeed, a call to imitate and participate in the paternity of the triune God in a special and spiritual way. It seems clear that only a materialistic conception of things that denies the spiritual its proper... (shrink)

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This paper analyzes two main pro-vengeance Confucian arguments in light of Desmond Tutu's thinking. In the absence of just authority, Confucianism argues that carrying out blood vengeance is fulfillment offilial piety and fulfillment of moral duty for deterring crime and reforming the wrongdoer's character. Confucianism does not propose a systematic theory of blood vengeance after laws have been installed to prohibit act of revenge. As Confucian ethics focuses on virtue cultivation and advocates moral learning over punishment, it may (...) find the Tutuist approach of addressing wrongdoing compatible and complementary. In line with Tutuism, we argue that revenge is not justified because engaging in vengeance fuels negative and obsessive emotions, which undermine virtue and may lead to undesirable results, such as escalation of violence and harming of the innocent. Moreover, we defend that more conditions need to be met than the ones enunciated by the pro-vengeance standpoint to justify an act of revenge. (shrink)

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Humans must take moral and criminal responsibility for making a free choice between good and evil, according to Chŏng Yakyong, and this view was influenced by Matteo Ricci. Choosing to commit an evil action means committing a willful crime, so one must take responsibility for this action in the form of punishment. However, unintentional wrongdoings can be forgiven. For example, a man stealing to survive or killing a robber in order to live should not be punished, because these individuals have (...) no choice but to do so. Those claims of Chŏng are his own creation, not influenced by Ricci or Confucianism. By contrast, the idea that a child’s intentional hiding of his father’s crime should not be punished because of the child’s duty offilial piety was influenced by Confucianism. However, a large crime committed by a child on the basis offilial piety, such as committing murder to rescue one’s mother, only lends cause for commutation. Unlike Chŏng, Ricci regarded a child’s act of stealing bread to feed his family as an action of evil rather than an act offilial piety, since theft is an evil action. (shrink)

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Current studies of anti/‐natalism have been carried out mainly in the context of western philosophy. In this article, we offer a pro‐natalist view based on Confucian and Afro‐communitarian philosophy (Sino‐African ethics). Grounded in this Sino‐African perspective, we uphold that there is, at least, one reason to believe that not only is it morally permissible to procreate, but also that on some occasions, procreating is what morality prescribes. Specifically, we contend that, from a Sino‐African perspective, procreating sometimes is the best way (...) to fulfilduties of reciprocity and care towards our parents. (shrink)

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