Movatterモバイル変換

How should rational believers pursue the aim of truth?Epistemicutility theorists have argued that by combining the tools of decision theory with anepistemic form of value—gradational accuracy, proximity to the truth—we can justify various epistemological norms. I argue that deriving these results requires using decision rules that are different in important respects from those used in standard (practical) decision theory. If we use the more familiar decision rules, we can’t justify theepistemic coherence norms (...) thatepistemicutility theory had hoped to justify. In short, those of us who are attracted to the project ofepistemicutility theory face a dilemma. If we choose “consequentialist” rules, then we can vindicate the idea that rational belief has the aim of accuracy—but at the cost of giving up attractiveepistemic norms. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   49 citations  

Epistemicutility theory seeks to establishepistemic norms by combining principles from decision theory and social choice theory with ways of determining theepistemicutility of agents’ attitudes. Recently, Moss, 1053–69, 2011) has applied this strategy to the problem of findingepistemic compromises between disagreeing agents. She shows that the norm “form compromises by maximizing average expectedepistemicutility”, when applied to agents who share the same properepistemicutility function, (...) yields the result that agents must form compromises by splitting the difference between their credence functions. However, this “split the difference” norm is in conflict with conditionalization, since applications of the two norms don’t commute. A common response in the literature seems to be to abandon the procedure of splitting the difference in favor of compromise strategies that avoid non-commutativity. This would also entail abandoning Moss’ norm. I explore whether a different response is feasible. If agents can useepistemicutility-based considerations to agree on an order in which they will apply the two norms, they might be able to avoid diachronic incoherence. I show that this response can’t save Moss’ norm, because the agreements concerning the order of compromising and updating it generates are not stable over time, and hence cannot avoid diachronic incoherence. I also show that a variant of Moss’ norm, which requires that the weights given to each agent’sepistemicutility change in a way that ensures commutativity, cannot be justified on epistemological grounds. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   16 citations  

Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifying anepistemicutility function and (...) a decision-theoretic norm; we then show that the decision-theoretic norm applied to theepistemicutility function yields the norm for credences that we wish to justify. We survey results already obtained using this strategy, and we suggest directions for future research. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   42 citations  

How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely,epistemicutility theory. That is, we assume that (...) doxastic attitudes have differentepistemic value depending on how accurately they represent the world. We then use the principles of decision theory to determine which of the putative logic-rationality bridge principles we can derive from considerations ofepistemicutility. (shrink)

Direct download(8 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   13 citations  

According toepistemicutility theory,epistemic rationality is teleological:epistemic norms are instrumental norms that have the aim of acquiring accuracy. What’s definitive of these norms is that they can be expected to lead to the acquisition of accuracy when followed. While there’s much to be said in favor of this approach, it turns out that it faces a couple of worrisome extensional problems involving the future. The first problem involves credences about the future, and the (...) second problem involves future credences. Examining prominent solutions to a different extensional problem for this approach reinforces the severity of the two problems involving the future. Reflecting on these problems reveals the source: the teleological assumption thatepistemic rationality aims at acquiring accuracy. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field dependency: that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next. Yet, little consensus exists concerning the nature and foundations of argument fields. This paper explores the question of whether Toulminian fields have any useful role to play in theepistemic evaluation of arguments.

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

William K. Goosens claims to show that my account ofepistemicutility runs into serious difficulties when confronted with certain attractive conditions of adequacy for the evaluation of experiments. I show that those conditions of adequacy which are, indeed, acceptable to both of us are satisfied by the procedures for evaluating experiments mandated by combining my theory ofepistemic utilities with the approach to evaluating experiments on which Goosens' argument is based. In particular, I demonstrate that my (...) theory does not violate the requirement that an "ideal experiment" be no worse than any alternative experiment. (shrink)

Direct download(8 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   36 citations  

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   16 citations  

Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function, and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining new (...) evidence by conditionalizing on that evidence. Until recently, the central arguments for these claims have been pragmatic. But these putative justifications fail to identify what is epistemically irrational about violating Probabilism or Conditionalization. A new approach, which I will callepistemicutility theory, attempts to remedy this. It treats beliefs asepistemic acts; and it appeals to the notion of anepistemicutility function, which measures of how epistemically valuable a particular belief function is for a particular way the world might be. It then formulates fundamentalepistemic norms that are analogous to the fundamental practical norms that underlie decision theory. I survey the results obtained so far in this young research project, and present a sustained critique of certain assumptions that have been made by a number of philosophers working in this area. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations ofepistemicutility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument (...) in that paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present anepistemicutility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce’s assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms. (shrink)

Direct download(14 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   56 citations  

EpistemicUtility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms ofepistemic rationality purely in terms ofepistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology (...) need to justify a claim aboutepistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions aboutepistemic value. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

The paper addresses the issue of “epistemic permissivism”: doesepistemic rationality ever permit more than one doxastic attitude to some proposition, given some body of evidence? One approach has taken up William James’s idea that there are different ways of weighing our two central cognitive goals as believers: Believe truth! Shun error! This motivates an affirmative answer to the question: agents with the same evidence can rationally come to different conclusions about some proposition because they weigh the importance (...) of the goals differently. I examine the consequences of formulating the “Jamesian" argument usingepistemicutility theory. This more precise formulation turns out to predict the permissibility of different incompatible doxastic attitudes not just across agents, but for a single agent. That is, we get the possibility of intrapersonally permissive situations, where more than one attitude is rationally open to a single agent. The apparent arbitrariness of rational belief on this picture calls, or so I argue, for serious consideration. I suggest that looking to practical rationality and the practical aspects of belief can explain (away) the arbitrariness worries. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function (Probabilism), and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining (...) new evidence by conditionalizing on that evidence (Conditionalization). Until recently, the central arguments for these claims have been pragmatic. But these putative justifications fail to identify what is epistemically irrational about violating Probabilism or Conditionalization. A new approach, which I will callepistemicutility theory, attempts to remedy this. It treats beliefs asepistemic acts; and it appeals to the notion of anepistemicutility function, which measures of how epistemically valuable a particular belief function is for a particular way the world might be. It then formulates fundamentalepistemic norms that are analogous to the fundamental practical norms that underlie decision theory. I survey the results obtained so far in this young research project, and present a sustained critique of certain assumptions that have been made by a number of philosophers working in this area. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   6 citations  

Epistemic rationality is typically taken to be immodest at least in this sense: a rationalepistemic state should always take itself to be doing at least as well, epistemically and by its own light, than any alternativeepistemic state. Ifepistemic states are probability functions and their alternatives are other probability functions defined over the same collection of proposition, we can capture the relevant sense of immodesty by claiming thatepistemicutility functions are (strictly) (...) proper. In this paper I examine what happens if we allow for the alternatives to anepistemic state to include probability functions with different domains. I first prove an impossibility result: on minimal assumptions, I show that there is no way of vindicating strong immodesty principles to the effect that any probability function should take itself to be doing at least as well than any alternative probability function, regardless of its domain. I then consider alternative, weaker generalizations of the traditional immodesty principle and prove some characterization results for some classes ofepistemicutility functions satisfying each of the relevant principles. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

We use a theorem from M. J. Schervish to explore the relationship between accuracy and practical success. If an agent is pragmatically rational, she will quantify the expected loss of her credence with a strictly proper scoring rule. Which scoring rule is right for her will depend on the sorts of decisions she expects to face. We relate this pragmatic conception of inaccuracy to the purelyepistemic one popular amongepistemicutility theorists.

Direct download(8 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   23 citations  

Some propositions are more epistemically important than others. Further, how important a proposition is is often a contingent matter—some propositions count more in some worlds than in others.EpistemicUtility Theory cannot accommodate this fact, at least not in any standard way. For EUT to be successful, legitimate measures ofepistemicutility must be proper, i.e., every probability function must assign itself maximum expectedutility. Once we vary the importance of propositions across worlds, however, normal (...) measures ofepistemicutility become improper. I argue there isn’t any good way out for EUT. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure ofepistemicutility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by (...) Oaksford and Chater. First, it is shown that their analysis data reported in the recent article of K. N. Kirby is unsound; second, an EIG analysis is presented of the experiments of P. Pollard and J. St. B. T. Evans that provides a strong empirical disconfirmation of the theory. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   30 citations  

According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability pold(·|X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality—whence the normative force of the injunction to conditionalize? There are several existing justifications for conditionalization, but none directly addresses the idea that conditionalization will be epistemically rational (...) if and only if it can reasonably be expected to lead to epistemically good outcomes. We apply the approach of cognitive decision theory to provide a justification for conditionalization using precisely that idea. We assignepistemicutility functions to epistemically rational agents; an agent’sepistemicutility is to depend both upon the actual state of the world and on the agent’s credence distribution over possible states. We prove that, under independently motivated conditions, conditionalization is the unique updating rule that maximizes expectedepistemicutility. (shrink)

Direct download(14 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   244 citations  

Measures ofepistemicutility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations ofepistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis, but where the Brier rule (...) says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this ‘elimination experiment’ counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure ofepistemicutility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles forepistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   18 citations  

Export citation   Bookmark  

No categories

Export citation   Bookmark  

Epistemicutility theory is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamentalepistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms ofepistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly hasepistemic value, while believing falsely hasepistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect (...) of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind ofepistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect toepistemic risk. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   14 citations  

William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues thatepistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment inepistemicutility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain howepistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I (...) argue thatepistemic consequentialism doesn’t allow for this kind of permissivism and goes on to argue that this reveals a deep disanalogy between decision theory and the formally similarepistemicutility theory. This raises the question whetherepistemicutility theory is a genuinely consequentialist theory at all. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   19 citations  

How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis ofepistemic rationality. It's called (...) class='Hi'>epistemicutility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about theirepistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measureepistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes toepistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up inepistemicutility theory in two ways: in the way you measureepistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism aboutepistemic rationality: different attitudes toepistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes toepistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

Epistemology should take seriously the possibility of rationally evaluable changes in conceptual resources.Epistemic decision theory compares belief states in terms ofepistemic value. But it's standardly restricted to belief states that don't differ in their conceptual resources. I argue thatepistemic decision theory should be generalized to make belief states with differing concepts comparable. I characterize some possible constraints onepistemicutility functions. Traditionally, theepistemicutility of a total belief state has (...) been understood as a function of theepistemicutility of individual (partial) beliefs. The most natural ways of generalizing this account generate a kind of repugnant conclusion. I characterize some possible alternatives, reflecting differentepistemic norms. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   30 citations  

Our interest is in the possibility of there being a philosophically interesting set of useful false beliefs where theutility in question is specificallyepistemic. As we will see, it is hard to delineate plausible candidates in this regard, though several are promising at first blush. We begin with the kind of strictly false claims that are said to be often involved in good scientific practice, such as through the use of idealisations and fictions. The problem is that (...) it is difficult to see that there would be anyepistemicutility in believing such claims, as opposed, say, to merely accepting them. Next we turn to the challenge posed byepistemic situationism, which when embedded within a plausible form of virtue epistemology appears to show that sometimes purely situational factors can play a significant explanatory role in one’s cognitive success. But again it is hard to see how the role that these epistemically beneficial situational factors contribute can be cashed out in terms of epistemically useful false beliefs on the part of the subject. Finally, we turn to the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments, commitments that are held to be epistemically useful even if false. While theepistemicutility of these commitments is defended, it is argued that one cannot make sense of these commitments in terms of belief. Support is thus canvassed, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, for the thesis that the prospects for there being philosophically interesting cases of epistemically useful false belief are poor. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   3 citations  

An important issue in epistemology concerns the source ofepistemic normativity.Epistemic consequentialism maintains thatepistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive toepistemic value, whateverepistemic value may be. So, for example, theepistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve theepistemic value of accuracy. Thus (...) class='Hi'>epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expectedutility one maximizes expectedepistemicutility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—versions of consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related toepistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   18 citations  

Practices of concept-revision among scientists seem to indicate that concepts can be improved. In 2006, the International Astronomical Union revised the concept "Planet" so that it excluded Pluto, and insisting that the result was an improvement. But what could it mean for one concept or conceptual scheme to be better than another? Here we draw on the theory ofepistemicutility to address this question. We show how the plausibility and informativeness of beliefs, two features that contribute to (...) theirutility, have direct correlates in our concepts. These are how inclusive a concept is, or how many objects in an environment it applies to, and how homogeneous it is, or how similar the objects that fall under the concept are. We provide ways to measure these values, and argue that in combination they can provide us with a single principle of conceptutility. The resulting principle can be used to decide how best to categorize an environment, and can rationalize practices of concept revision. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justifyepistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1)epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief andepistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we callepistemic puritanism, undermines the second.

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

Veritism says that the fundamental source ofepistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamentalepistemic value is deter...

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   10 citations  

I propose a general alethic theory ofepistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that theepistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy. This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes toepistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules inepistemicutility theory, (...) and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally. (shrink)

Direct download(9 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   17 citations  

This book concerns the foundations ofepistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature ofepistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates howepistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to theepistemic status of large (...) cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter 2 argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamicepistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamicepistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter 3 provides an abstraction principle forepistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter 4 advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with theepistemic and metasemantic. Chapter 5 applies the fixed points of the modal μ-calculus in order to account for the iteration ofepistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal μ-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal μ-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration ofepistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter 6 advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter 7 provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitiveepistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters 2 and 4 are availed of in order forepistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapters 8-12 provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitiveepistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter 8 examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms ofepistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, theEpistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of Ω-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensionalEpistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensionalepistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter 9 examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, andepistemic hyperintensionality,epistemicutility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. I countenance a hyperintensional semantics for novelepistemic abstractionist modalities. I suggest, too, that observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter 10 examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional Ω-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter 11 provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter 12 avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensionalepistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities and truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals while bypassing the category of Set in category theory. Chapter 13 examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter 14 examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

No categories

Export citation   Bookmark   8 citations  

The emergence of economic inequality has often been linked to individual differences in mental or physical capacities. By means of an agent-based simulation this paper shows that neither of these is a necessary condition. Rather, inequality can arise from iterated interactions of fully rational agents. This bears consequences for our understanding of both inequality and rationality. In a setting of iterated bargaining games, we claim that expectedutility maximizing agents perform suboptimally in comparison with other strategies. The reason for (...) this lies in complex feedback effects between an agents’ action and the quality of beliefs used to calculate expectedutility. Consequentially, we argue that the standard notion of rationality as maximizing expectedutility is insufficient, even for certain standard cases of economic interaction. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Living fossils, taxa with similar members now and in the deep past, have recently come under scrutiny. Those who think the concept should be retained have argued for itsepistemic and normativeutility. This article extends theepistemicutility of the living fossils concept to include ways in which a taxon’s living fossil status can serve as evidence for other claims about that taxon. I will use insights from developmental biology to refine these claims. Insofar as (...) these considerations demonstrate theepistemicutility of the living fossils concept, they support retaining the concept and using it in biological research. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

In recent years, several authors have called to ground descriptive and normative decision theory on neuro-psychological measures ofutility. In this paper, I combine insights from the best available neuro-psychological findings, leading philosophical conceptions of welfare and contemporary decision theory to rebut these prominent calls. I argue for two claims of general interest to philosophers, choice modellers and policy makers. First, severe conceptual,epistemic and evidential problems plague ongoing attempts to develop accurate and reliable neuro-psychological measures of (...) class='Hi'>utility. And second, even if these problems are solved, neuro-psychological measures ofutility lack the potential to inform welfare analyses and policy evaluations. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   9 citations  

Many people, such as Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Irving Fisher, and William Sharpe, assume that free markets full of rational people automatically lead to ethical actions and outcomes. After all, at its equilibrium point, a perfectly competitive free market maximizesutility, respects autonomy, and fulfills justice’s dictates. Unfortunately, in some technology markets, there are a significant number of people who have undergoneepistemic closure.Epistemic closure entails that all reliable evidence that would challenge deeply held beliefs is (...) dismissed as corrupted, whereas all supporting evidence, no matter how unreliable, is accepted as incontrovertible. Those who have the condition act irrationally within that domain. As a result, business decisions become much more difficult than they would be in a rational market. In this article,epistemic closure’s ethical issues are developed. First, although they are acting irrationally within the closure’s domain, those withepistemic closure can still be held accountable for their actions. Second, to deal ethically withepistemic closure and its consequences, then it is vital to know what it is and its root causes, as well as to have a practical principle that can assist in making pragmatic decisions. Because some new technologies faceepistemic closure, then focusing on a particular representative case of it will help to illustrate the issue’s ethical dimensions. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account ofepistemic value to delineate a class of reasonableepistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure ofepistemic value orutility, then a popular (...) family of decision rules recommends imprecise credences. In particular, a range of Hurwicz criteria, which generalise the Maximin decision rule, recommend imprecise credences. If correct, the moral is this: an agent who adopts precise credences, rather than imprecise ones, in the face of unspecific and incomplete evidence, goes wrong by gambling with theepistemicutility of her doxastic state in too risky a fashion. Precise credences represent an overly riskyepistemic bet, according to the Hurwicz criteria. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   31 citations  

In addition to purely practical values, cognitive values also figure into scientific deliberations. One way of introducing cognitive values is to consider the cognitive value that accrues to the act of accepting a hypothesis. Although such values may have a role to play, such a role does not exhaust the significance of cognitive values in scientific decision-making. This paper makes a plea for consideration ofepistemic value —that is, value attaching to a state of belief—and defends the notion of (...) cognitiveepistemic value against some criticisms that have been raised. A stability requirement forepistemic value functions is argued for on the basis of considerations of diachronic coherence. This stability requirement is sufficient to obtain the Value of Learning Theorem, which says that the expectedutility of cost-free learning cannot be negative. This holds also for cognitiveepistemic values, provided that the stability requirement is met. (shrink)

Direct download(9 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   14 citations  

This book concerns the foundations ofepistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. David Elohim examines the nature ofepistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates howepistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to theepistemic status of (...) large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal and hyperintensional cognitivism and modal and hyperintensional expressivism. Elohim develops a novel, topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamicepistemic logic, and develops a novel, dynamic two-dimensional semantics grounded in two-dimensional hyperintensional Turing machines. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for two-dimensional (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with theepistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration ofepistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration ofepistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitiveepistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is availed of in order forepistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. -/- Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitiveepistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between Elohim's hyperintensional semantics and the axioms ofepistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, theEpistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensionalEpistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensionalepistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, andepistemic hyperintensionality,epistemicutility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Elohim countenances a hyperintensional semantics for novelepistemic abstractionist modalities. Elohim suggests, too, that higher observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for two-dimensional hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter \textbf{11} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{12} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensionalepistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between interpretational and objective modalities and the truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. Elohim invents a new mathematical trick in which first-order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals in the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Elohim provides a counter-example toepistemic closure for logical deduction. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

I want to discuss a puzzle about the semantics ofepistemic modals, like “It might be the case that” as it occurs in “It might be the case that Goldbach’s conjecture is false.”1 I’ll argue that the puzzle cannot be adequately explained on standard accounts of the semantics ofepistemic modals, and that a proper solution requires relativizing utterance truth to a context of assessment, a semantic device whoseutility and coherence I have defended elsewhere for future (...) contingents (MacFarlane.. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   22 citations  

Health policymakers employutility measures to inform resource allocation decisions. They often rely on a conceptual tool called the quality-adjusted life year that discounts the value of years lived in a state of disability relative to years lived in full health. A representative sample of the general public is asked to place values on hypothetical health states as part of a standard gamble or time trade-off task. Policymakers use the resulting values to calculate the number of QALYs gained through (...) particular interventions. Utilitarian reasoning mandates that policymakers maximize QALYs gained per unit cost.Although many scholars have explored the problems of distributive justice that arise from this system... (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

This paper is about the alethic aspect ofepistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic (...) maximality, where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as inputand returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function α may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation isthat the project of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function α also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

In “How to Collaborate,” Paul Thagard tries to explain why there is so much collaboration in science, and so little collaboration in philosophy, by giving anepistemic cost-benefit analysis. In this paper, I argue that an adequate explanation requires a more fully developedepistemic value theory than Thagard utilizes. In addition, I offer an alternative to Thagard’s explanation of the lack of collaboration in philosophy. He appeals to its lack of a tradition of collaboration and to the a (...) priori nature of much philosophical research. I claim that philosophers rarely collaborate simply because they can usually get the benefits without paying the costs of actually collaborating. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   16 citations  

Social studies of knowledge have contributed many insights into the making and the character of scientific and technological knowledge. However, studies of knowledge use are scarce. This article engages with under-examined topics concerningepistemicutility. I posit and demonstrate that scientific and technological knowledge claims are functional. I argue that knowledge and its functions are mutually-enabling and mutually-sustaining constructs. To substantiate my claims, I present useful conceptualisations of ‘function’ and ‘functionality’ and employ them in an empirical case study. (...) I examine knowledge use in synthetic biology, a young form of biological engineering. I demonstrate that knowledge in the field is brought into existence with function in mind, kept in existence through functional use, qualified and situated by its functionality and evaluated by its functional operation. The case study reveals the effectiveness of my conceptualisations and offers lessons about knowledge as both an end-result ofepistemic work and a mechanism for practice. My theoretical and empirical contributions expand understanding of scientific and technological knowledge and shed light on an area of study awaiting investigation. I conclude with open-ended reflections on work yet to be done. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

This paper addresses the question of whether gathering additional evidence is always rationally required, both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and ofepistemic rationality. It is shown that in certain situations, it is not instrumentally rational to look for more evidence before making a decision. These are situations in which the risk of “misleading” evidence – a concept that has both instrumental andepistemic senses – is not offset by the gains from the possibility of (...) non-misleading evidence. These situations also undermine a particular argument for the claim that it is epistemically rational to look for more evidence, though it is argued that the relationship between instrumental andepistemic rationality makes such arguments flawed to begin with. Furthermore, these situations show us that ourepistemic and our practical goals sometimes point us in different directions, not merely because of our limited resources or because our desires are sometimes best served by being in particularepistemic states, but because of the nature of rational action. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   29 citations  

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Epistemic instrumentalism viewsepistemic norms andepistemic normativity as essentially involving the instrumental relation between means and ends. It construes notions likeepistemic normativity, norms, and rationality, as forms of instrumental or means-end normativity, norms, and rationality. I do two main things in this paper. In part 1, I argue that there is an under-appreciated distinction between two independent types ofepistemic instrumentalism. These are instrumentalism aboutepistemic norms and instrumentalism aboutepistemic normativity. (...) In part 2, I argue that this under-appreciated distinction matters for the debate surrounding the plausibility of EI. Specifically, whether we interpret EI as norm-EI or as source-EI matters for the widely discussed universality or categoricity objection to EI, and for two important motivations for adopting EI, namely naturalism and the practicalutility ofepistemic norms. I will then conclude by drawing some lessons forepistemic instrumentalism going forward. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing the following questions. First, whatepistemic functions do search engines perform? Second, what dimensions of assessment are appropriate for theepistemic evaluation of search engines? Third, how well do current search engines perform on these? The article explains why they fulfil the role of a surrogate expert, and proposes three ways of assessing theirutility as anepistemic tool—timeliness, authority prioritisation, and objectivity. “Personalisation” is (...) a current trend in Internet-delivered services, and consists in tailoring online content to the interests of the individual user. It is argued here that personalisation threatens the objectivity of search results. Objectivity is a public good; so there is a prima facie case for government regulation of search engines. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   36 citations  

Several different Bayesian models ofepistemic utilities (see, e. g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model-suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]-that assignsepistemicutility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward (...) class='Hi'>epistemic risk than the other Bayesian models that have been proposed. I also argue, however, that even the PSR model places unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist's attitude towardepistemic risk. As a result, such Bayesian models ofepistemic utilities fail as normative accounts-not just as descriptive accounts (see, e. g., [31], [14])-of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   26 citations