Emotions andEthics. A Conversation with Martha C. Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas.Vaiva Adomaityte -2015 -Dialogue and Universalism 25 (2):92-103.detailsThe paper tackles the question of the relevance ofemotions inethics. It argues thatemotions are discerning and thus inherent components of morality and they deserve a place in adequate ethical projects. The paper engages into a conversation with Martha C. Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas. Specifically, it presents accounts of compassion and anger to illustrate the discerning nature of theseemotions and the moral value they might signal.
Emotions and ethical life: perspectives from Asia.Suwanna Satha-Anand &Wasana Wongsurawat -2016 -Diogenes 63 (1-2):3-11.detailsThe royalist nationalist propaganda writings of King Vajiravudh Rama VI—acclaimed author of the infamous Jews of the Orient, published originally in Thai since 1914—represent some of the finest examples of Anti-Chinese propaganda penned by major nationalist leaders of Thailand in the 20th century. Vajiravudh was a prolific author who produced more than a thousand fictional and non-fictional pieces within his lifetime literary oeuvre. A significant portion of these works was intended as political propaganda, many of which could be justifiably categorized (...) as anti-Chinese pieces. As much of Vajiravudh’s writings also serve as the core texts in much of Thailand’s nationalist propaganda campaigns through much of the early-20th century, it has also come to define the problematic relationship between the Thai conservative ruling class and their ethnic Chinese financial patrons. This makes for very complex nationalemotions—despise of ethnic Chinese capitalists while venerating royalist conservative political leaders, most of whom, in fact, are of Chinese descent. This also unavoidably bleeds into the realm of everyday social values and relations between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese commoners in Thai society, their own interpretation of nationalist propaganda, and their own adaptedemotions toward each other. This article provides a textual and historical analysis of such writings. (shrink)
Emotion andEthics in Virtual Reality.Alex Fisher -forthcoming -Australasian Journal of Philosophy.detailsIt is controversial whether virtual reality should be considered fictional or real. Virtual fictionalists claim that objects and events within virtual reality are merely fictional: they are imagined and do not exist. Virtual realists argue that virtual objects and events really exist. This metaphysical debate might appear important for some of the practical questions that arise regarding how to morally evaluate and legally regulate virtual reality. For instance, one advantage claimed of virtual realism is that only by taking virtual objects (...) and events to be real can we explain our strong emotional reactions to certain virtual actions, as well as their potential immorality. This paper argues that emotional reactions towards, and wrongs within, virtual reality are consistent with its being merely fictional. The emotional and ethical judgments we wish to make regarding virtual reality do not provide any grounds for preferring virtual realism. (shrink)
Art, emotion andethics.Berys Nigel Gaut -2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.detailsThe long debate -- Aesthetics andethics : basic concepts -- A conceptual map -- Autonomism -- Artistic and critical practices -- Questions of character -- The cognitive argument : the epistemic claim -- The cognitive argument : the aesthetic claim -- Emotion and imagination -- The merited response argument.
(1 other version)Unreliableemotions and ethical knowledge.James Hutton -forthcoming -Philosophical Quarterly.detailsHow is ethical knowledge possible? One promising answer is Moral Empiricism: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experiences. But Moral Empiricism faces a serious problem. Ouremotions are unreliable guides toethics, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects, so the habit of basing ethical beliefs on one'semotions seems too unreliable to yield knowledge. I develop a new, virtue-epistemic solution to this problem, with practical implications for how we approach ethical decision-making. By (...) exploiting a frequently overlooked connection between reliability and defeaters, I argue that an agent can have a reliable belief-forming habit despite having unreliableemotions. The upshot is that emotion-based ethical knowledge is possible even for people whoseemotions are unreliable, but only if we cultivate the skill of noticing and responding to signs that a given emotion is unfitting. (shrink)
Emotion and ethical decision-making in organizations.Alice Gaudine &Linda Thorne -2001 -Journal of Business Ethics 31 (2):175 - 187.detailsWhile the influence of emotion on individuals'' ethical decisions has been identified by numerous researchers, little is known about howemotions influence individuals'' ethical decision process. Thus, it is not clear whether differentemotions promote and/or discourage ethical decision-making in the workplace. To address this gap, this paper develops a model that illustrates how emotion affects the components of individuals'' ethical decision-making process. The model is developed by integrating research findings that consider the two dimensions of emotion, arousal (...) and feeling state, into an applied cognitive-developmental perspective on the process of ethical decision-making. The model demonstrates that certain emotional states influence the individual''s propensity to identify ethical dilemmas, facilitate the formation of the individual''s prescriptive judgments at sophisticated levels of moral development, lead to ethical decision choices that are consistent with the individual''s prescriptive judgements, and promote the individual''s compliance with his or her ethical decision choices. In particular, the model suggests that individuals experiencing arousal and positive affect resolve ethical dilemmas in a manner consistent with more sophisticated cognitive moral structures. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)
Emotions and Ethical Considerations of Women Undergoing IVF-Treatments.Sofia Kaliarnta,Jessica Nihlén-Fahlquist &Sabine Roeser -2011 -HEC Forum 23 (4):281-293.detailsWomen who suffer from fertility issues often use in vitro fertilization (IVF) to realize their wish to have children. However, IVF has its own set of strict administration rules that leave the women physically and emotionally exhausted. Feeling alienated and frustrated, many IVF users turn to internet IVF-centered forums to share their stories and to find information and support. Based on the observation of Dutch and Greek IVF forums and a selection of 109 questionnaires from Dutch and Greek IVF forum (...) users, we investigate the reasons why users of IVF participate in online communities centered on IVF, their need for emotional expression and support, and how they experience and use the information and support they receive through their participation in the online community. We argue that the emotional concerns expressed in such forums should be taken into account by health careethics committees for IVF-related matters in order to promote more patient-oriented care and support for women going through IVF. (shrink)
Learningemotions andethics.Patricia Greenspan -2009 - In Peter Goldie,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.detailsInnate emotional bases ofethics have been proposed by authors in evolutionary psychology, following Darwin and his sources in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Philosophers often tend to view such theories as irrelevant to, or even as tending to undermine, the project of moral philosophy. But the importance ofemotions to early moral learning gives them a role to play in determining the content of morality. I argue, first, that research on neural circuits indicates that the basic elements or components (...) ofemotions need not be limited to what psychologists think of as basicemotions. But in that case, innate mechanisms of social transfer of emotion, such as infants’ tendency to facial imitation, gaze-following, and emotional contagion or empathy, provide a source of plasticity in developing the basic elements that letsemotions incorporate cultural influence from early on. This leaves room later for cognitive components of adult humanemotions and hence for the further role of language in conveying cultural influence. We can thus see how moral judgment might depend on innate emotional capacities that are both modifiable by culture and capable of registering objective values. I use Rawls’s treatment of the development of moral sentiments to illustrate the kind of supportive role thatemotions can play in a principle-based account – though my own account involves modifications I go on to indicate. (shrink)
Emotions andEthics: A Foucauldian framework for becoming an ethical educator.Richard Niesche &Malcom Haase -2012 -Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (3):276-288.detailsThis paper provides examples of how a teacher and a principal construct their ‘ethical selves’. In doing so we demonstrate how Foucault's four-part ethical framework can be a scaffold with which to actively connectemotions to a personal ethical position. We argue that ethical work is and should be an ongoing and dynamic life long process rather than a more rigid adherence to a ‘code ofethics’ that may not meaningfully engage its adherents. We use Foucault's four-part framework (...) of ethical practice as a framework through which an ‘ethical self’ can be purposely constructed. This is important work, as those who have authority over others must know how to monitor themselves against the misuse of the power of their positions. (shrink)
Emotions and Ethical Decision Making at Work: Organizational Norms, Emotional Dogs, and the Rational Tales They Tell Themselves and Others.Joseph McManus -2019 -Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):153-168.detailsOrganizations have become essential institutions that facilitate the vital coordination and cooperation necessary to create value across societies. Recent research within moral psychology and behavioralethics indicates thatemotions play a pivotal role in promoting ethical decision making. The theory developed here maintains that most organizations retain norms that disfavor the experience and expression of many strongemotions while at work. This dynamic inhibits individual’s ability to generate moral intuitions and reason about ethical issues they encounter. This (...) occurs as individuals utilize specific emotion regulation mechanisms that stifle the experience and expression of emotion in organizational decision making. Over time, individuals fail to register emotion within organizational decision processes, which increases the prevalence of amoral decision making. Organizational emotion norms also influence the chronic accessibility of specific moral foundations that effect the contents of both moral intuitions that do occur, as well as deliberate reasoning that generates moral judgments. (shrink)
Money,Emotions, andEthics Across Individuals and Countries.Long Wang &J. Keith Murnighan -2014 -Journal of Business Ethics 125 (1):1-14.detailsThis article presents two separate but closely related studies. We used a first sample to investigate the relationships among individuals’ reports of their income and their subjective well-being, and their approval of unethical behavior in 27 countries and a second sample to investigate the relationship between corruption in 55 countries and their populace’s aggregated feelings of subjective well-being (happiness). Analysis of data from 27,762 working professionals showed that, although reported feelings of subjective well-being were negatively related to their approval of (...) unethical behaviors, income was positively related to their approval of unethical behaviors. In addition, the effects for feelings of subjective well-being were particularly strong for high-income people. Analyses also showed that, after controlling for economic development and other country-level factors, corruption was negatively related to a country’s feelings of happiness. These findings suggest that feelings of subjective well-being may lead to more ethical, less corrupt behavior and that the tolerance of unethical, corrupt behavior may lead to less collective happiness and subjective well-being. (shrink)
Emotion andethics: An inter-(en) active approach. [REVIEW]Giovanna Colombetti &Steve Torrance -2009 -Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):505-526.detailsIn this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007 ) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself.
Emotion and Ethical Theory in Mencius.Manyul Im -1997 - Dissertation, University of MichigandetailsEarly Confucian thought is still not completely understood. This is particularly so, I argue, in the case of Mencius , who was the first prominent follower of Confucius. I present a new reading of this early figure. ;The key problem in traditional analyses is in attributing to Mencius the view that a person's motivational capacities, especially heremotions, require cultivation in order for her to act and feel correctly. That reading, combined with certain important passages of the text, make (...) it seem that Mencius is quite simply confused. For he seems in those passages to exhort people to do and feel what is right even though it is clear that they lack the kind of cultivation Mencius's view supposedly requires. What is more, he quite obviously expects such people to be able immediately to do and feel what is right. ;Once we leave the cultivation reading behind, I argue, pieces of Mencius's fall into place and a more or less systematic ethical theory begins to form. Far from being confused, I argue, Mencius combines a psychologically realistic account of the morally virtuous person, i.e. one which recognizes human limitations with respect to our emotional lives, with a plausible account of the control that we have and the responsibility that we bear for how we feel or don't feel toward one another. (shrink)
(1 other version)Ethics, Emotion and the Unity of the Self.Oliver Letwin -1987 - Croom Helm.detailsThis Routledge Revival reissues Oliver Letwina (TM)s philosophical treatise:Ethics, Emotion and the Unity of the Self, first published in 1987, which concerns ...
Confucian Relational Hermeneutics, theEmotions, and Ethical Life.Eric S. Nelson -2018 - In Paul Fairfield & Saulius Geniusas,Relational Hermeneutics: Essays in Comparative Philosophy. Bloomsbury. pp. 193-204.detailsIn paradigmatic Confucian (Ruist) discourses, emotion (qing) has been depicted as co-arising with human nature (xing) and an irreducible constitutive source of human practices and their interpretation. The affects are concurrently naturally arising and alterable through how individuals react and respond to them and how they are or are not cultivated. That is,emotions are relationally mediated realities given in and transformed through how they are felt, understood, interpreted, and acted upon. Confucian discourses have elucidated the ethical character of (...) theemotions and sought to understand and cultivate emotional life as a hermeneutical and ethical task in establishing expectable patterns of human flourishing that orient virtues, roles, and relations. In this chapter, I explore the extent to which classical Ruist and Neo-Confucian discourses offer hermeneutical models for interpreting the complex interconnections between moral psychology and their mediations in the ethical life world. By examining a range of Confucian sources, the author argues that Confucian “moral psychologies” clarify affective dimensions of human existence within the interpersonal nexus of ethical life and indicate ways of cultivating affective awareness for relationally understanding and interpreting others, one’s world, and oneself. (shrink)
Self-FocusedEmotions and Ethical Decision-Making: Comparing the Effects of Regulated and Unregulated Guilt, Shame, and Embarrassment.Cory Higgs,Tristan McIntosh,Shane Connelly &Michael Mumford -2020 -Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):27-63.detailsResearch has examined various cognitive processes underlying ethical decision-making, and has recently begun to focus on the differential effects of specificemotions. The present study examines three self-focused moralemotions and their influence on ethical decision-making: guilt, shame, and embarrassment. Given the potential of these discreteemotions to exert positive or negative effects in decision-making contexts, we also examined their effects on ethical decisions after a cognitive reappraisal emotion regulation intervention. Participants in the study were presented with (...) an ethical scenario and were induced, or not induced, to feel guilt, shame, or embarrassment, and were asked to reappraise, or not reappraise, the situation giving rise to thoseemotions. Responses to questions about the ethical case were evaluated for the quality of ethical sensemaking, perceptions of moral intensity, and decision ethicality. Findings indicate that guilt, shame, and embarrassment are associated with different sensemaking processes and metacognitive reasoning strategies, and resulted in different perceptions of moral intensity. Additionally, cognitive reappraisal had a negative impact on each of these factors. Implications of these findings for ethical decision-making research are discussed. (shrink)
MoralEmotions and Thick Ethical Concepts.Sunny Yang -2008 -Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:469-479.detailsMy aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whetheremotions, especially moralemotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify moral considerations (...) with anger in particular, it overly emphasizes one seemingly arbitrary emotion. In other words, I doubt whether ‘other’s anger’ can be the general concept corresponding to thick concepts such as courage or generosity. My doubt about the objectivity of Gibbard’s moral emotion depends on Bernard Williams’doubt about ethical objectivity in terms of a critical notice of the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts. Finally, I shall pose a challenge to the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts on the ground that it is not in fact a clear one. I shall argue that it is impossible clearly to classify various ethical concepts either as thick or thin. This is because, I shall argue, as Scheffler points out, “any division of ethical concepts into the two categories of the thick and the thin is itself a considerable oversimplication.” Indeed, I shall argue, our ethical vocabulary is tragically rich with an irreconcilable plurality of values. If my analysis is right, I argue Gibbard’s attempt to appeal to thick concepts to explain the rationality of moral emotion is open to question. (shrink)
Shame and Philosophy: Michael L. Morgan , On Shame. London: Routledge Philip Hutchinson , Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy ofEmotions andEthics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Richard Paul Hamilton -2010 -Res Publica 16 (4):431-439.detailsShame is a ubiquitous and highly intriguing feature of human experience. It can motivate but it can also paralyse. It is something which one can legitimately demand of another, but is not usually experienced as a choice. Perpetrators of atrocities can remain defiantly immune to shame while their victims are racked by it. It would be hard to understand any society or culture without understanding the characteristic occasions upon which shame is expected and where it is mitigated. Yet, one can (...) survey much of the literature in social and political theory over the last century and find barely a footnote to this omnipresent emotional experience. The two books under review aim to rectify this lacuna. (shrink)
Emotions and ClinicalEthics Support. A Moral Inquiry intoEmotions in Moral Case Deliberation.Bert Molewijk,Dick Kleinlugtenbelt,Scott M. Pugh &Guy Widdershoven -2011 -HEC Forum 23 (4):257-268.detailsEmotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinicalethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role ofemotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach toemotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal withemotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role ofemotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the (...)emotions of the case presenter. In a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their ownemotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and theemotions therein leads to the participants’ conclusion that “compassion” is a more adequate emotion than “sadness”. The emotion “sadness” is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion “compassion” is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention toemotions in clinicalethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way. (shrink)
Emotional AI,Ethics, and Japanese Spice: Contributing Community, Wholeness, Sincerity, and Heart.Andrew McStay -2021 -Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1781-1802.detailsThis paper assesses leading Japanese philosophical thought since the onset of Japan’s modernity: namely, from the Meiji Restoration onwards. It argues that there are lessons of global value for AIethics to be found from examining leading Japanese philosophers of modernity andethics, each of whom engaged closely with Western philosophical traditions. Turning to these philosophers allows us to advance from what are broadly individualistically and Western-oriented ethical debates regarding emergent technologies that function in relation to AI, by (...) introducing notions of community, wholeness, sincerity, and heart. With reference to AI that pertains to profile, judge, learn, and interact with human emotion, this paper contends that Japan itself may internally make better use of historic indigenous ethical thought, especially as it applies to question of data and relationships with technology; but also that externally Western and global ethical discussion regarding emerging technologies will find valuable insights from Japan. The paper concludes by distilling from Japanese philosophers of modernity four ethical suggestions, or spices, in relation to emerging technological contexts for Japan’s national AI policies and international fora, such as standards development and global AIethics policymaking. (shrink)
Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence.Ethics -1969 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):66 – 104.detailsA set of basic static predicates, 'in itself, 'existing through itself, 'free', and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λ (...) μβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, 'The road to freedom through active emotion', introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including 'being in itself, 'freedom', etc. Activeemotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems. (shrink)
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Solicitude,Emotions, and Narrative in Technology DesignEthics.Paul Hayes &Noel Fitzpatrick -2024 -Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 15 (1):126-148.detailsThe first objective of this paper is to recognize the role of emotion and feeling in Ricœur’s “littleethics” and what they can further add to it, then to explore in more detail how solicitude as a virtue, and affective disposition more broadly, can contribute to a modernethics of technology. Ultimately,emotions help us to understand technologies and technological ways of being today; Ricœur’s “littleethics”, along with his narrative theory, provide a framework for understanding (...) the ethically salient aspects of technical practice, especially through the openness to the other demanded by solicitude, and essentially by emphasising emotion or feeling as a way of being in the world, and a mode of existence: one which is done with, if not sometimes because of, technology and technical practice. (shrink)
Integrating emotion and other nonrational factors intoethics education and training in professional psychology.Yesim Korkut &Carole Sinclair -2020 -Ethics and Behavior 30 (6):444-458.detailsAny professional or scientific discipline has a responsibility to do what it can to ensure ethical behavior on the part of its members. In this context, this paper outlines and explores the criticism that to date the emphasis inethics training in professional psychology, as with other disciplines, has been on the rational elements of ethical decision making, with insufficient attention to the role ofemotions and other nonrational elements. After a brief outline of some of the historical (...) background to the development and understanding of ethical decision making, relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the influence of emotional and other nonrational factors on our ethical decisions is reviewed. The implications of this literature forethics education and training are outlined, particularly with respect to the use of case studies. An integrative approach is proposed, and conclusions and recommendations are offered with respect to such an approach. (shrink)
Emotions, Evaluation, andEthics: The Role ofEmotions in Formulating and Justifying Ethical Judgments.P. S. Greenspan -unknowndetailsThe role ofemotions inethics is often taken by philosophers and others as antithetical to rationality. On the most basic level (in undergraduate philosophy exams and elsewhere), stating an opinion in the form "I feel that p" can be a way of sidestepping the demand for reasons. Butemotions can sometimes also be seen as supplying reasons for moral judgment to the extent that they involve evaluations--and a way of communicating them across different moral perspectives.
DisruptiveEmotions and Affective Injustice Within an African-Inspired RelationalEthics.Mary Carman -2024 -Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 71 (179):28-52.detailsForms of African relationalethics that prioritise the value of harmony struggle to accommodate arguably valuable disharmony, such as disruptiveemotions like anger. A wider literature on politicalemotions has defended the value of suchemotions and even proposed that a particular form of injustice, affective injustice, can arise if we fail to create space for them. While it has recently been proposed that Thaddeus Metz's African-inspired relational moral theory can accommodate disruptiveemotions and address (...) affective injustice, in this philosophical article I argue that any success that Metz's account has in this regard is superficial. This critique has important implications: either we need to engage further with disruptiveemotions and affective injustice within an African relationalethics, or it may be the case that we instead need to return to how we conceptualise affective injustice to ensure that it does the justice-promoting work that we want it to do. (shrink)
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Theoretical and ethical considerations of facial recognition ofemotions in the context of a pandemic.Cristhian Almonacid Díaz -2020 -Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 46:55-75.detailsResumen El reconocimiento facial es una tecnología que se ha utilizado para el control de la población a fin de combatir los efectos de la pandemia por COVID-19. Sin embargo, esta tecnología se utiliza hace bastante tiempo en muchos ámbitos del quehacer económico, social y político. Este trabajo analiza el reconocimiento fa cial entendida como la captura de micro expresiones faciales mediante la cual se puede medir y evaluar emociones con el fin de vigilar movimiento, predecir com portamientos y anticipar (...) intenciones de compra y de voto. Nuestro objetivo es revisar los enfoques teóricos que sustentan esta tecnología que ha devenido en una nueva oportunidad de negocio, para proponer después algunas reflexiones éticas derivadas.Facial recognition is a technology that is used to control people in order to fight the impacts of COVID-19. However, this technology has been used formany years in many economical, social and political areas. This work provides an analysis of the new business based on technologies of facial micro-expressions recognition. By means of this procedure, the involved companies measure and evaluateemotions with the aim of monitoring the movement, predicting behaviors, intentions of purchase and vote, between other applications. Our purpose is to check the theoretical suppositions that sustain this business, to propose later some ethical derivative reflections. (shrink)
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Shame and philosophy: an investigation in the philosophy ofemotions andethics.Phil Hutchinson -2008 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.detailsExperimental methods and conceptual confusion : philosophy, science, and whatemotions really are -- To 'make our voices resonate' or 'to be silent'? : shame as fundamental ontology -- Emotion, cognition, and world -- Shame and world.
Epistemology,Ethics, and Meaning in Unusually Personal Scholarship.Amber Esping -2018 - Cham: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan.detailsThis book uses Viktor Frankl's Existential Psychology (logotherapy) to explore the ways some professors use unusually personal scholarship to discover meaning in personal adversity. A psychiatrist imprisoned for three years in Nazi concentration camps, Frankl believed the search for meaning is a powerful motivator, and that its discovery can be profoundly therapeutic. Part I begins with four stories of professors finding meaning. Using the case studies as a foundation, Part II investigates issues of epistemology andethics in unusually personal (...) research from an existential perspective. The book offers advice for graduate students and faculty who want to live and work more meaningfully in the academy. (shrink)
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Relationship Between Emotional Intelligence and Ethical Sensitivity in Turkish Nursing Students.Emine Ergin,Arzu Koçak Uyaroğlu &Büşra Altınel -2022 -Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 19 (2):341-351.detailsProviding effective care to patients and making the right decisions in difficult working environments depend on moral sensitivity. Emotional intelligence and ethical sensitivity affect nursing care. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between nursing students’ emotional intelligence and ethical sensitivity levels. The research employed a descriptive-correlational design, 201 nursing students studying at a university in the Central Anatolia region, Turkey, participated in the study. Students’ ethical sensitivity was found to be significant. The nursing students received the highest score in (...) the “Interpersonal Orientation” sub-dimension of the Moral Sensitivity Scale, while their lowest score was observed in the “Experiencing ethical dilemma” sub-dimension. The SSREIT and MMSQSN total scores of the students who willingly chose the nursing department and loved their field were found to be higher. It was found that the ethical sensitivity of nursing students was at a significant level and gender, family type, having sibling and perception of economic status affected the level of ethical sensitivity. (shrink)
Emotional Shock and Ethical Conversion.Ana Falcato -2021 - In Ana Falcato,The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 187-201.detailsIn a similar way to what happens when a wave of electricity impacts the animal body and provokes a convulsive stir of muscles and nerves which can burn and ultimately paralyze the affected surface, some rough emotional experiences may lead us to sudden numbness. Keeping abreast with the most sophisticated phenomenological tools to account for an extremely damaging kind of psychological experience that can ultimately defeat the purpose of a sheer descriptive approach, this chapter does provide a descriptive analysis of (...) the kind of emotional shock that risks threatening the moral integrity of an agent. I shall zoom in my analysis on the typically acknowledged moment when disturbing information from a socially shared context outside ourselves comes suddenly to the fore of our attention, thus disrupting the focus even of the the most trivial perceptive input. I argue that in the longer run the outcome of such an experience may amount to a reconfiguration of the subject’s core values, daily routines and even her life-long expectations and projects. (shrink)
Screen stories: emotion and theethics of engagement.Carl R. Plantinga -2018 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.detailsThe way we communicate with each other is vital to preserving the cultural ecology, or wellbeing, of a place and time. Do we listen to each other? Do we ask the right questions? Do we speak about each other with respect or disdain? The stories that we convey on screens, or what author Carl Plantinga calls 'screen stories,' are one powerful and pervasive means by which we communicate with each other. Screen Stories: Emotion and theEthics of Engagement argues (...) that film and media studies needs to move toward an an approach toethics that is more appropriate for mass consumer culture and the lives of its citizens. Primarily concerned with the relationship between media and viewers, this book considers ethical criticism and the emotional power of screen stories that makes such criticism necessary. The content we consume-- from television shows and movies to advertisements-- can significantly affect our welfare on a personal and societal level, and thus, this content is subject to praise and celebration, or questioning and even condemnation. The types of screen stories that circulate contribute to the cultural ecology of a time and place; through shared attention they influence what individuals think and feel. Plantinga develops a theory of the power of screen stories to affect both individuals and cultures, asserting that we can better respond ethically to such media if we understand the sources of its influence on us. (shrink)
Emotions and ChristianEthics: A Reassessment.Mark Wynn -2004 -Studies in Christian Ethics 17 (3):35-55.detailsIn recent years there have been various attempts to relate theories of emotion to the concerns of Christianethics. In this article, I consider two such attempts, those of Daniel Maguire and Paul Lauritzen, and thereby identify five ways in which a theory of emotion might in principle contribute to the formulation of a Christian ethic. I then argue that some recent developments in theoretical reflection on theemotions, especially the idea that feelings may be world-directed in their (...) own right, enable these five points of connection to be stated with new clarity and cogency. The article concludes that a theory of emotion can help to articulate the following claims: love is properly a cardinal concept for ethical theory; there are specifically Christianemotions, which make possible a specifically Christian moral personality; religious faith (informed by ‘real assent’) is a cognitive state which is of its nature motivationally effective. (shrink)
Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance.John J. Drummond &Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.) -2017 - New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.detailsEngaging with phenomenology, moral philosophy, politics and psychology, and authored by an international team of leading scholars in the field, this volume explores the ethical and social significance of a variety of humanemotions.
Bhaktiethics,emotions, and love in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava metaethics.Cogen Bohanec -2024 - Lanham: Lexington Books.detailsThis work explores an understanding of bhakti, "devotional love to the divine," wherebyemotions are sensory perceptions of the real ethical qualities of classes of actions. It centers on the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava psychology ofemotions in dialogue with methodologies such as virtueethics, theological voluntarism, and ecofeminist careethics.
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