Results for 'desires'
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- The Just Price and the Costs of Production According to St. Thoxnas Aquinas.Desire Barath -1960 -New Scholasticism 34 (4):413-430.
- American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 364.Argument From Desire -2013 -American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):363 - 364.
- Semiclassical and High-Temperature Expansions for Systems with Magnetic Field.Désiré Bollé &D. Roekaerts -1984 - In Heinrich Mitter & Ludwig Pittner,Stochastic methods and computer techniques in quantum dynamics. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 371--380.
- Le rôle des infiniment petits dans l'univers.Désiré Charnay -1911 - Paris,: Imprimerie générale Lahure.No categories
- Vers l'Unité.Désiré Mercier -1913 -Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie 20 (79):253-278.No categories
- Post-partum events and fertility control in Kinshasa, Zaire.Naissances Desirables -1990 -Journal of Biosocial Science 22:197-211.
- Music Education at School: Too Little and Too Late? Evidence From a Longitudinal Study on Music Training in Preadolescents.Desiré Carioti,Laura Danelli,Maria T. Guasti,Marcello Gallucci,Marco Perugini,Patrizia Steca,Natale Adolfo Stucchi,Angelo Maffezzoli,Maria Majno,Manuela Berlingeri &Eraldo Paulesu -2019 -Frontiers in Psychology 10.
- Physical exercise and fibrinolysis.Roger Lijnen &Desire Collen -1990 -Hermes 21:201-213.No categories
- Exploring the Effects of Personality Traits on the Perception of Emotions From Prosody.Desire Furnes,Hege Berg,Rachel M. Mitchell &Silke Paulmann -2019 -Frontiers in Psychology 10.
- Rapid Automatized Naming as a Universal Marker of Developmental Dyslexia in Italian Monolingual and Minority-Language Children.Desiré Carioti,Natale Stucchi,Carlo Toneatto,Marta Franca Masia,Martina Broccoli,Sara Carbonari,Simona Travellini,Milena Del Monte,Roberta Riccioni,Antonella Marcelli,Mirta Vernice,Maria Teresa Guasti &Manuela Berlingeri -2022 -Frontiers in Psychology 13:783775.Rapid Automatized Naming (RAN) is considered a universal marker of developmental dyslexia (DD) and could also be helpful to identify a reading deficit in minority-language children (MLC), in which it may be hard to disentangle whether the reading difficulties are due to a learning disorder or a lower proficiency in the language of instruction. We tested reading and rapid naming skills in monolingual Good Readers (mGR), monolingual Poor Readers (mPR), and MLC, by using our new version of RAN, the RAN-Shapes, (...) in 127 primary school students (from 3rd to 5th grade). In line with previous research, MLC showed, on average, lower reading performances as compared to mGR. However, the two groups performed similarly to the RAN-Shapes task. On the contrary, the mPR group underperformed both in the reading and the RAN tasks. Our findings suggest that reading difficulties and RAN performance can be dissociated in MLC; consequently, the performance at the RAN-Shapes may contribute to the identification of children at risk of a reading disorder without introducing any linguistic bias, when testing MLC. (shrink)
- Wetenschapsbeoefening.Eugène Antoine Désiré Émile Carp -1978 - Utrecht: Spectrum.
- Factory Farming and the Interests of Animals.Desires Are Possible -1991 - In Charles V. Blatz,Ethics and agriculture: an anthology on current issues in world context. Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho Press.Export citation
Bookmark - De la recherche de la verité.Nicolas Malebranche,Désiré Roustan &Paul Schrecker -1762 - Boivin Et Cie.
- La Raison et la Vie.Désiré Roustan &Armand Cuvillier -1946 -Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 51 (4):371-372.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- (1 other version)Déduction et induction.Désiré Roustan -1911 -Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (4):579 - 592.
- (1 other version)La science comme instrument vital.Désiré Roustan -1914 -Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 22 (5):612 - 643.
- Pour une édition de Malebranche.Désiré Roustan -1916 -Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 23 (1):163 - 175.
- Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology.David Copp &David Sobel -2002 -Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):243-76.
- Desires, Dispositions and Deviant Causal Chains.John Hyman -2014 -Philosophy 89 (1):83-112.Recent work on dispositions offers a new solution to the long-running dispute about whether explanations of intentional action are causal explanations. The dispute seemed intractable because of a lack of percipience about dispositions and a commitment to Humean orthodoxies about causation on both sides.
- 13Desires, beliefs, and language.Paul Harris -1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith,Theories of Theories of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 200.
- Psycho-politics and culturaldesires.Jan Campbell &Janet Harbord (eds.) -1998 - Bristol, Pa.: UCL Press.A cultural studies textbook that deals with issues of methodology, as well as mapping out the history and theories and ideas in cultural studies. The book examines the work of Raymond Williams, Lacan and Hoggart, among others, and explores notions of subculture, psychoanalysis, Marxist thought, narrative, autobiography, fiction, subjectivity, language, history and representation. The book focuses on the past, present and future of cultural studies, with the aim of providing readers with a clear overview of the central ideas within the (...) area, developing current debates and possible future avenues. (shrink)
- Beliefs,Desires and Reasons for Action.Don Locke -1982 -American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):241 - 249.
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 91.Present Desire Satisfaction,Past Well-Being,Volatile Reasons,Epistemic Focal Bias,Some Evidence is False,Counting Stages,Vague Entailment,What Russell Couldn'T. Describe,Liberal Thinking &Intentional Action First -2013 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4).No categories
- Wondering and EpistemicDesires.Richard Teague -forthcoming -Philosophical Quarterly.This paper explores the relationship between the questioning attitude of wondering and a class of attitudes I call 'epistemicdesires'. Broadly, these aredesires to improve one's epistemic position on some question. A common example is the attitude of wanting to know the answer to some question. I argue that one can have any kind of epistemic desire towards any question, Q, without necessarily wondering Q, but not conversely. That is, one cannot wonder Q without having at least (...) some epistemic desire directed towards Q. I defend this latter claim from apparent counterexamples due to Friedman (2013) and Drucker (2022), and finish with a proposal on which epistemicdesires, particularly the desire for understanding, play an explanatory role in distinguishing wondering from other forms of question-directed thought. (shrink)
- Autonomy, History, and the Origins of OurDesires.Mikhail Valdman -2011 -Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (3):415-434.A popular view among autonomy theorists is that facts about the history of a person'sdesires, and specifically facts about how they were formed or acquired, matter crucially to her autonomy. I argue that while there is an important relationship between a person's autonomy and the history of herdesires, a person's autonomy does not depend on how herdesires were formed or acquired. I argue that a desire's autonomy lies not in its origins but in whether (...) its bearer has a history of having engaged with it in the right sort of way. I argue that this view has important advantages, and no obvious disadvantages, over its historical and its non-historical rivals. (shrink)
- Symbolizing OurDesires.Agnes Rafferty -2005 -Feminist Theology 14 (1):35-46.This paper attempts to examine the symbols being used by the protagonists in the war in Iraq relative to traditional Christian theology, the myths on which it was built and ensuing praxis. In particular I wish to consider the value allotted to ‘the feminine’ in the cultural and religious symbolic realm that underpins societal understanding of the relational climate necessary for liberty and justice to be effective.No categories
- INDEX for volume 80, 2002.Eric Barnes,Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain,Matti Eklund,Deep Inconsistency,Barbara Montero,Harold Langsam,Self-Knowledge Externalism,Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration,Moral Sympathy &Josh Parsons -2002 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.Export citation Bookmark
- Why de dictodesires are fetishistic.Xiao Zhang -2021 -Ratio 34 (4):303-311.Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 303-311, December 2021.
- The problem of defectivedesires.Chris Heathwood -2005 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says, roughly, that one's life goes well to the extent that one'sdesires are satisfied. On standard 'actualist' versions of the theory, it doesn't matter what you desire. So long as you are getting what you actually want – whatever it is – things are going well for you. There is widespread agreement that these standard versions are incorrect, because we can desire things that are bad for us -– in other words, because there (...) are 'defectivedesires'. The aim of this paper is to defend the actualist desire-satisfaction theory against the problem of defectivedesires. I aim to show how the theory can accommodate the obvious fact that we can desire things that are bad for us. Admittedly, there are kinds of allegedly defective desire the theory cannot accommodate, but thesedesires, I argue, turn out not to be defective in the relevant way. (shrink)
- Longings in Limbo: A New Defence of I-Desires.Luke Roelofs -2023 -Erkenntnis 88 (8):3331-3355.This paper responds to two arguments that have been offered against the positing of ‘i-desires’, imaginative counterparts of desire supposedly involved in fiction, pretence, and mindreading. The Introspection Argument asks why, if there are both i-desires anddesires, the distinction is so unfamiliar and hard to draw, unlike the relatively clear distinctions between perception and mental imagery, or belief and belief-like imagining. The Accountability Argument asks how it can make sense to treat merely imaginative states as revealing (...) of someone’s psychology, the way we do with responses to fiction. I argue that carefully considering the relationship between other states and their imaginative counterparts sheds light on how we should expect i-desires to differ fromdesires, and suggests that we may often be in states that are _indeterminate_, in limbo between the two categories. This indeterminacy explains why the distinction is often hard to draw, and why these states can be revealing about us even without (determinately) being realdesires. (shrink)
- Walled States – PerformingDesires and Allaying Fears: Brown's Walled States, Waning Sovereignty.Jinee Lokaneeta -forthcoming -Theory and Event 15 (2).
- The impossibility of reliably determining the authenticity ofdesires: implications for informed consent.Jesper Ahlin -2018 -Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (1):43-50.It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’sdesires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn (...) that, in practice, the authenticity ofdesires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent practices in healthcare. (shrink)
- Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments,Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson -2014 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrentdesires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper (...) I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible. (shrink)
- Beliefs andDesires: from Attribution to Evaluation.Uku Tooming -2017 -Philosophia 45 (1):359-369.The ability to attribute beliefs anddesires is taken by many to be an essential component of human social cognition, enabling us to predict, explain and shape behaviour and other mental states. In this paper, I argue that there are certain basic responses to attributed attitudes which have thus far been overlooked in the study of social cognition, although they underlie many of the moves we make in our social interactions. The claim is that belief and desire attributions allow (...) for the possibility to agree or disagree and to approve or disapprove, respectively. These evaluative responses may seem obvious but they are of considerable theoretical interest because they can’t be reduced to other roles of belief and desire attribution and are always an open possibility for attributers. What’s more, the responses of agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval are indispensable for such attributions to be intelligible to us in the first place. (shrink)
- Sumner OnDesires and Well-Being.Krister Bykvist -2002 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):475-490.A person's welfare or well-being concerns what is good for him, what makes his life worth living. It therefore depends crucially on facts about the person and his life. As William James once remarked, whether a life is worth living depends on the liver. How this dependency should be spelled out is a controversial question. Desire theorists, or as I shall call them well-being preferentialists, claim that a person's well-being depends on hisdesires and preferences.
- How does pornography changedesires? A pragmatic account.Junhyo Lee &Eleonore Neufeld -2024 -Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):1228-1250.Rae Langton and Caroline West famously argue that pornography operates like a language game, in that it introduces certain views about women into the common ground via presupposition accommodation. While this pragmatic model explains how pornography has the potential to change its viewers’ beliefs, it leaves open how pornography changes people'sdesires. Our aim in this paper is to show how Langton and West's discourse-theoretic account of pornography can be refined to close this lacuna. Using tools from recent developments (...) in discourse theory, we propose that pornography issues implicit directives, and thereby introduces bouletic components into the discourse. (shrink)
- Second OrderDesires and Strength of Will.Mark Stephen Pestana -1996 -Modern Schoolman 73 (2):173-182.
- CategoricalDesires and the Future.Yossi Yonah -1994 -Dialogue 33 (4):581-.
- (1 other version)Rights, Interests,Desires and Beliefs.R. G. Frey -1979 -American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):233-239.No categories
- Doctoring ParentalDesires.Robert J. Comiskey -1976 -Hastings Center Report 6 (3):4-4.
- Divine Will Theory:Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller -2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan,Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is (...) supposed to ground S‟s obligation; it could be God‟sdesires, beliefs, intentions, or emotions. My purpose here is not to challenge this view. Rather, I want to examine the decision by Murphy and Quinn to base their version of divine will theory on God‟s intentions, and argue that this may have been an unwise move. As an alternative, I suggest that those who are initially attracted to divine will theory would be better served to develop the view with a focus on God‟sdesires rather than intentions. (shrink)
- Are There PassiveDesires?David Wall -2009 -Dialectica 63 (2):133-155.What is the relation between desire and action? According to a traditional, widespread and influential view I call ‘The Motivational Necessity of Desire’ (MN), having a desire that p entails being disposed to act in ways that you believe will bring about p. But what aboutdesires like a desire that the committee chooses you without your needing to do anything, or a desire that your child passes her exams on her own? Such ‘self-passive’desires are often given (...) as a counter-example to MN. If MN is true then self-passivedesires seem absurd: if someone has a self-passive desire she will be disposed to act, thereby preventing her from getting what shedesires. But it seems that we can reasonably, and often do, have suchdesires. However, I argue that self-passivedesires are not, in fact, counter-examples to MN: close consideration of the content of thesedesires, the contexts in which we ascribe them, and what is claimed by MN show that they are not a problem for that view. I also argue that strengthened versions of the examples are unsuccessful, and I offer a diagnosis of why these kinds of case are commonly thought to raise a challenge to MN. (shrink)
- RelationalDesires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism.Joshua May -2011 -European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):39–58.Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person's intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the "empathy-altruism hypothesis" that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the (...) data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson’s conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson's purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism. (shrink)
- Reasons for actions anddesires.Ulrike Heuer -2004 -Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's givendesires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its (...) mistake. I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation. (shrink)
- The world'sdesires.Edgar A. Ashcroft -1905 - Chicago,: The Open Court Publishing Co..Export citation Bookmark
- GrandDesires and F.H. Bradley's Views on Moral Life.D. Babushkina -2018 -Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 24 (1):41-69.
- Beliefs,Desires and Moral Realism.Daniel Goldstick -2006 -Philosophy 81 (315):153 - 160.An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.
- Why change your beliefs rather than yourdesires? Two puzzles.Olav Benjamin Vassend -2021 -Analysis 81 (2):275-281.In standard decision theory, the probability function ought to be updated in light of evidence, but the utility function generally stays fixed. However, there is nothing in the formal theory that prevents one from instead updating the utility function, while keeping the probability function fixed. Moreover, there are good arguments for updating the utilities and not just the probabilities. Hence, the first puzzle is whether there is anything that justifies updating beliefs, but notdesires, in light of evidence. The (...) paper argues that there is not, but that this raises a second puzzle. (shrink)
- Desires as demands: How the second-person standpoint might be internal to reflective agency.Tamar Schapiro -2010 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):229-236.
- KinkyDesires: Why There Is No Connative Moore's Paradox.John N. Williams -unknown
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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David Chalmers
James Chase
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Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
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Brandon Look
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Susana Nuccetelli
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