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Many theories ofactualcausation implicitly endorse the claim that if c is anactual cause of e, then either c causes e directly or every intermediary by which c indirectly causes e is itself both anactual cause of e and also anactual effect of c. We think this compositionality constraint is plausible. However, as we show, it is not always satisfied by the causal attributions ordinary people make. We conclude by considering what (...) philosophers working oncausation should do when the deliverances of their theories diverge from what ordinary people say. (shrink)

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We argue that current discussions of criteria foractualcausation are ill-posed in several respects. (1) The methodology of current discussions is by induction from intuitions about an infinitesimal fraction of the possible examples and counterexamples; (2) cases with larger numbers of causes generate novel puzzles; (3) “neuron” and causal Bayes net diagrams are, as deployed in discussions ofactualcausation, almost always ambiguous; (4)actualcausation is (intuitively) relative to an initial system state (...) since state changes are relevant, but most current accounts ignore state changes through time; (5) more generally, there is no reason to think that philosophical judgements about these sorts of cases are normative; but (6) there is a dearth of relevant psychological research that bears on whether various philosophical accounts are descriptive. Our skepticism is not directed towards the possibility of a correct account ofactualcausation; rather, we argue that standard methods will not lead to such an account. A different approach is required. Once upon a time a hungry wanderer came into a village. He filled an iron cauldron with water, built a fire under it, and dropped a stone into the water. “I do like a tasty stone soup” he announced. Soon a villager added a cabbage to the pot, another added some salt and others added potatoes, onions, carrots, mushrooms, and so on, until there was a meal for all. (shrink)

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This paper explores the prospects of employing a functional approach in order to improve our concept ofactualcausation. Claims ofactualcausation play an important role for a variety of purposes. In particular, they are relevant for identifying suitable targets for intervention, and they are relevant for our practices of ascribing responsibility. I argue that this gives rise to the _challenge of purpose_. The challenge of purpose arises when different goals demand adjustments of the concept (...) that pull in opposing directions. More specifically, I argue that a common distinction between certain kinds of preempted and preempting factors is difficult to motivate from an interventionist viewpoint. This indicates that an appropriately revised concept ofactualcausation would not distinguish between these two kinds of factors. From the viewpoint of retributivist responsibility, however, the distinction between preempted and preempting factors sometimes is important, which indicates that the distinction should be retained. (shrink)

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We argue that current discussions of criteria foractualcausation are ill-posed in several respects. (1) The methodology of current discussions is by induction from intuitions about an infinitesimal fraction of the possible examples and counterexamples; (2) cases with larger numbers of causes generate novel puzzles; (3) "neuron" and causal Bayes net diagrams are, as deployed in discussions ofactualcausation, almost always ambiguous; (4)actualcausation is (intuitively) relative to an initial system state (...) since state changes are relevant, but most current accounts ignore state changes through time; (5) more generally, there is no reason to think that philosophical judgements about these sorts of cases are normative; but (6) there is a dearth of relevant psychological research that bears on whether various philosophical accounts are descriptive. Our skepticism is not directed towards the possibility of a correct account ofactualcausation; rather, we argue that standard methods will not lead to such an account. A different approach is required. (shrink)

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This dissertation begins by addressing the question of when a causal model is apt for deciding questions ofactualcausation with respect to some target situation. I first provide relevant background about causal models, explain what makes them promising as a tool for analyzingactualcausation, and motivate the need for a theory of aptness as part of such an analysis (Chapter 1). I then define what it is for a model on a given interpretation to (...) be accurate of, that is, say only true things about, some target situation. This involves a systematization of various representational principles mentioned and/or discussed throughout the literature into a method of interpretation, which I propose be taken as standard (Chapter 2). Next, I explain and address two reasons for which accuracy as I’ve defined it is insufficient for aptness. The first reason – already discussed in the literature – is the problem of structural isomorphs. In response, I propose the aptness condition of Explicit Partial Mediation (Chapter 3). The second reason – which has yet to be noticed – is the problem of the indeterminacy of accuracy. As I demonstrate, a model is accurate of a target situation only relative to a set of background possibilities – what I call a modal profile. It follows that a model represents a situation only relative to some modal profile or other. I go on to discuss the ramifications of this observation for a theory ofactualcausation in terms of models. I argue that the relativity be taken at face value and built into our metaphysical account ofcausation, resulting in a view that I call causal relativism (Chapter 4). I explore one advantage of this view in detail: that the resulting account can defend the principle of strong proportionality against several objections (Chapter 5). Finally, I apply the earlier discussion of aptness to attempts to provide a semantics of counterfactuals in terms of causal models – an interventionist semantics. I show how just as a similarity semantics relies on an opaque notion of similarity, an interventionist semantics relies on an analogous notion of aptness. The challenge of articulating aptness thus undermines the claim that an interventionist semantics avoids representational problems inherent in a similarity semantics (Chapter 6). I close with a recap and suggestions for future research (Chapter 7). -/- . (shrink)

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Several prominent, contemporary theories ofactualcausation maintain that in order for something to count as anactual cause (in the circumstances) of some known effect, the potential cause must be a difference-maker with respect to the effect in some restricted range of circumstances. Although the theories disagree about how to restrict the range of circumstances that must be considered in deciding whether something counts as anactual cause of a known effect, the theories agree that (...) at least some counterfactual circumstances must be considered. I argue that the theories are still too permissive in the range of counterfactual circumstances they admit for consideration, and I present simple counter-examples that make use of this overpermissiveness. (shrink)

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In (Beckers, 2025) I introduced nondeterministic causal models as a generalization of Pearl’s standard deterministic causal models. I here take advantage of the increased expressivity offered by these models to offer a novel definition ofactualcausation (that also applies to deterministic models). Instead of motivating the definition by way of (often subjective) intuitions about examples, I proceed by developing it based entirely on the unique function that it can fulfil in communicating and learning a causal model. First (...) I generalize the more basic notion of counterfactual dependence, second I show how this notion has a vital role to play in the logic of causal discovery, third I introduce the notion of a structural simplification of a causal model, and lastly I bring both notions together in my definition ofactualcausation. Although novel, the resulting definition arrives at verdicts that are almost identical to those of my previous definition (Beckers, 2021, 2022). (shrink)

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How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is anactual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view ofactualcausation which fits with folk intuitions ofactualcausation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions ofactualcausation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range (...) of empirical evidence aimed at showing just how and where the folk go wrong in determining whether anactual causal relation obtains. The evidence suggests that folk intuitions ofactualcausation are generated by two epistemically defective processes. I situate the empirical evidence within a background discussion of debunking, arguing for a two-pronged debunking explanation of folk intuitions ofactualcausation. I conclude that those who wish to depart from folk intuitions ofactualcausation should not be compelled to square their account ofactualcausation with the verdicts of the folk. In the dispute overactualcausation, folk intuitions deserve to be rejected. (shrink)

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Actual causes - e.g. Suzy's being exposed to asbestos - often bring about their effects - e.g. Suzy's suffering mesothelioma - probabilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to tackle one of the thornier difficulties for traditional accounts of probabilisticactualcausation: namely probabilistic preemption.

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Several of the most prominent theories ofactualcausation make use of a minimality condition to prevent irrelevant elements from being tacked onto a cause so that the conjunction or sum passes for a cause. Focusing on one theory in particular—the influential Halpern-Pearl definition ofactualcausation—we argue that either the minimality condition or its rationale ought to be revised. We produce proposals showing that both are live options and demonstrate their potential usefulness within the larger (...) family of counterfactual approaches tocausation. (shrink)

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One part of the true theory ofactualcausation is a set of conditions responsible for eliminating all of the non-causes of an effect that can be discerned at the level of counterfactual structure. I defend a proposal for this part of the theory.

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Pearl opened the door to formally definingactualcausation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition ofactualcausation, the most prominent (...) of which are due to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl’s first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions ofactualcausation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition ofactualcausation. (shrink)

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Experiments in psychology and experimental philosophy suggest that judgments aboutactualcausation are partially governed by norms: norm violations are more likely to be singled out as causes, while structurally analogous factors that obey the norms are unlikely to be singled out. The norm-sensitivity of causal judgment has, in turn, lent support to a normative analysis ofcausation itself. In this paper, I question whether the support stands. I articulate and examine two principal reasons support might be (...) so derived. For each, I argue that, in fact, a non-normative analysis is better supported. (shrink)

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Philosophical works onactualcausation make wide use of thought experiments. The principal aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments are used in the contemporary debate overactualcausation and to discuss their role in relation to formal approaches in terms of causal models. I claim that a recourse to thought experiments is not something old fashioned or superseded by abstract models, but it is useful to interpret abstract models themselves and to use (...) our intuitions to judge the results of the model. Recent research onactualcausation has stressed the importance of integrating formal models with some notion of normality; I suggest that thought experiments can be useful in eliciting intuitions where normality is not intended in a statistical sense. The first expository part gives a short presentation of the notion ofactualcausation, summarising some typical problems of counterfactual approaches and how they are treated in causal and structural models. The second part focuses on the problems of model isomorphism and criticises some radical ideas opposing the role of thought experiments, claiming that they may also be of use in evaluating formal models. (shrink)

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The counterfactual tradition to definingactualcausation has come a long way since Lewis started it off. However there are still important open problems that need to be solved. One of them is the (in)transitivity ofcausation. Endorsing transitivity was a major source of trouble for the approach taken by Lewis, which is why currently most approaches reject it. But transitivity has never lost its appeal, and there is a large literature devoted to understanding why this is (...) so. Starting from a survey of this work, we will develop a formal analysis of transitivity and the problems it poses forcausation. This analysis provides us with a sufficient condition forcausation to be transitive, a sufficient condition for dependence to be necessary forcausation, and several characterisations of the transitivity of dependence. Finally, we show how this analysis leads naturally to several conditions a definition ofcausation should satisfy, and use those to suggest a new definition ofcausation. (shrink)

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In this dissertation I develop a pluralist theory ofactualcausation. I argue that we need to distinguish between total, path-changing, and contributingactualcausation. The pluralist theory accounts for a set of example cases that have raised problems for extant unified theories and it is supported by considerations about the various functions of causal concepts. The dissertation also analyses the context-sensitivity ofactualcausation. I show that principled accounts of causal reasoning in legal (...) inquiry face limitations and I argue that the context-sensitivity ofactualcausation is best represented by a distinction between default and deviant states in causal models. (shrink)

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I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts ofactualcausation: total, path-changing, and contributingactualcausation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts ofactualcausation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal (...) concepts is to guide agency, we are better off making a distinction between three concepts ofactualcausation. (shrink)

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In this paper we present a new proposal for definingactualcausation, i.e., the problem of deciding if one event caused another. We do so within the popular counterfactual tradition initiated by Lewis, which is characterised by attributing a fundamental role to counterfactual dependence. Unlike the currently prominent definitions, our approach proceeds from the ground up: we start from basic principles, and construct a definition ofcausation that satisfies them. We define the concepts of counterfactual dependence and (...) production, and put forward principles such that dependence is an unnecessary but sufficient condition forcausation, whereas production is an insufficient but necessary condition. The resulting definition ofcausation is a suitable compromise between dependence and production. Every principle is introduced by means of a paradigmatic example ofcausation. We illustrate some of the benefits of our approach with two examples that have spelled trouble for other accounts. We make all of this formally precise using structural equations, which we extend with a timing over all events. (shrink)

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We present a probabilistic extension to active path analyses of tokencausation (Halpern & Pearl 2001, forthcoming; Hitchcock 2001). The extension uses the generalized notion of intervention presented in (Korb et al. 2004): we allow an intervention to set any probability distribution over the intervention variables, not just a single value. The resulting account can handle a wide range of examples. We do not claim the account is complete --- only that it fills an obvious gap in previous active-path (...) approaches. It still succumbs to recent counterexamples by Hiddleston (2005), because it does not explicitly consider causal processes. We claim three benefits: a detailed comparison of three active-path approaches, a probabilistic extension for each, and an algorithmic formulation. (shrink)

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Probabilisticactualcausation is a theory aboutactual causal relations in probabilistic scenarios. Compared with general (or type) causal connections,actual (or token, singular)causation involves specific andactual events occurring in a particular time and space. Halpern and Pearl proposed three mathematical definitions onactualcausation via structural equation models (or causal models). Fenton-Glynn extended one of their definitions into a probabilistic version by following the probability-raising principle in the tradition of (...) theorizing about probabilisticcausation. The basic idea of this principle is that a cause shall raise the probability of its effect. He adopted interventional probabilities to analyseactualcausation in causal Bayesian networks. According to Pearl, interventional probabilities of the form P(Y = yX=x) are used to form type-level causal claims, while it is counterfactual probabilities of the form P(Y = yX=x | X = x1, Y = y1) that help us characterize token-level causal relations as the conditionalization part takesactual situations into account; the more facts we condition upon, the closer we come toactualcausation. In this dissertation, we modify Fenton-Glynn’s probabilistic definition ofactualcausation in probabilistic causal models by employing counterfactual probability raising instead of his interventional probability raising. Our new definitions PAC and PAC’ are capable of dealing with a number of probabilistic versions of causal examples in which Fenton-Glynn’s definition fails, such as voting, overlapping, trumping, etc. Alternatively, we can exploit elaborate and plausible counterfactual definitions ofactualcausation, once counterfactuals are interpreted probabilistically, essentially we turn the deterministic theories ofactualcausation into their indeterministic versions. That can be seen as the second or new approach to defining probabilisticactualcausation compared with the traditional straightforward probability-raising approach. In order to realize this idea, we propose a probabilistic semantics for causal counterfactuals in probabilistic causal models using counterfactual probabilities. Causal counterfactuals or interventional sentences have the form [X ←x]Y = y with the meaning “if X is manipulated to take value x, Y has value y.”Causation definitions in the causal modeling framework take interventional sentences as counterfactuals. Our proposed semantics for [X ← x]Y = y is its corresponding counterfactual probability being very high (e.g. P(Y = yX=x | e) = 1). For this semantics, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization. Based on this logical result, Halpern’s latest definition ofactualcausation can be translated as a probabilistic version by interpreting interventional statements in it with our semantics. The difference between definitions from this approach and the traditional one turns out to be the extent of probability increase, namely, slight (traditional approach) or significant (new approach) probability raising. We compare the logical properties of our conception PAC of probabilisticactualcausation and the new indeterministic version of Halpern’s latestactualcausation by treating these two definitions as the semantics for causal conditionals. (shrink)

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Our concept ofactualcausation plays a deep, ever-present role in our experiences. I first argue that traditional philosophical methods for understanding this concept are unlikely to be successful. I contend that we should instead use functional analyses and an understanding of the cognitive bases of causal cognition to gain insight into the concept ofactualcausation. I additionally provide initial, programmatic steps towards carrying out such analyses. The characterization of the concept ofactual (...) class='Hi'>causation that results is quite different from many standard views: it is graded, context-sensitive, and extrinsic. (shrink)

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In the last decade, several researchers have proposed theories ofactualcausation that make use of structural equations and directed graphs. Many of these researchers are committed to a widely-endorsed folk attribution desideratum, according to which an important constraint on the acceptability of a theory ofactualcausation is agreement between the deliverances of the theory with respect to specific cases and the reports of untutored individuals about those same cases. In the present article, we consider (...) a small collection of related theories ofactualcausation, including a purely structural theory and two theories that supplement the structural equations with considerations of defaults, typicality, and normality. We argue that each of these three theories are meant to satisfy the FAD, and then we present empirical evidence that they fail to do so for several variations on a simple scenario from the literature. Drawing on our previous work on the responsibility view of folk causal attribitons, we conclude by offering a solution that allows the latter two theories to satisfy the FAD for these cases. The solution is to give up on concerns with typicality and focus on injunctive norms in supplementing the graphical modeling machinery. (shrink)

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The majority of the currently flourishing theories ofactualcausation are located in a broadly counterfactual framework that draws on structural equations. In order to account for cases of symmetric overdeterminiation and preemption, these theories resort to rather intricate analytical tools, most of all, to what Hitchcock has labeled explicitly nonforetracking counterfactuals. This paper introduces a regularity theoretic approach toactualcausation that only employs material conditionals, standard Boolean minimization procedures, and a stability condition that regulates (...) the behavior of causal models under model expansions. Notwithstanding its lightweight analytical toolbox, this regularity theory performs at least as well as the structural equations accounts with their heavy appliances. (shrink)

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Anactual cause of some token effect is itself a token event that helped to bring about that effect. The notion of anactual cause is different from that of a potential cause – for example a pre-empted backup – which had the capacity to bring about the effect, but which wasn't in fact operative on the occasion in question. Sometimesactual causes are also distinguished from mere background conditions: as when we judge that the struck match (...) was a cause of the fire, while the presence of oxygen was merely part of the relevant background against which the struck match operated.Actualcausation is also to be distinguished from typecausation:actualcausation holds between token events in a particular, concrete scenario; typecausation, by contrast, holds between event kinds in scenario kinds. (shrink)

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Livengood and Sytsma (2020) challenge the Compositionality Constraint ofActualCausation (CCAC), according to which each intermediary of a causal chain is an effect of its predecessor and a cause of its successor link. In several studies, they find support for their hypothesis that the CCAC is not in accordance with ordinary causal attributions of laypeople. We argue that there are three interrelated problems in their studies’ design that we call the Causality-Responsibility Confusion (CRC), the Intermediary-Ontology Confusion (IOC), (...) and the Cause-End Questioning (CEQ). Avoiding the CRC, the IOC, and the CEQ leads to strong empirical support for the CCAC. (shrink)

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There have been several recent attempts to model ordinary intuitions aboutactualcausation by combining a counterfactual definition of the causal relation with an abnormality-based account of causal judgments. In these models, the underlying psychological theory is that people automatically focus on abnormal events when judging theactual causes of an effect. This approach has enabled authors such as Halpern and Hitchcock to capture an impressive array of ordinary causal intuitions. However, in this paper I demonstrate how (...) these abnormality-based accounts still systematically fail to predict ordinary causal judgments in specific types of scenarios: those in which the effect is normal. I will argue that the reason for this is that the underlying psychological theory is wrong: the idea that intuitiveactual causes are abnormal events is only partially correct. To model ordinary judgments more realistically, researchers working in this area must adopt a more plausible underlying psychological theory: the correspondence hypothesis about judgments ofactualcausation. One of the consequences of this correspondence hypothesis is that normal effects are judged to have normal causes. (shrink)

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A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09632-6.

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Recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy has shown that judgments ofactualcausation are often influenced by consideration of defaults, typicality, and normality. A number of philosophers and computer scientists have also suggested that an appeal to such factors can help deal with problems facing existing accounts ofactualcausation. This article develops a flexible formal framework for incorporating defaults, typicality, and normality into an account ofactualcausation. The resulting account takes (...) class='Hi'>actualcausation to be both graded and comparative. We then show how our account would handle a number of standard cases. 1 Introduction2 Causal Models3 The HP Definition ofActual Causation4 The Problem of Isomorphism5 Defaults, Typicality, and Normality6 Extended Causal Models7 Examples7.1 Omissions7.2 Knobe effects7.3 Causes versus background conditions7.4 Bogus prevention7.5 Causal chains7.6 Legal doctrines of intervening causes7.7 Pre-emption and short circuits8 Conclusion. (shrink)

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I argue thatcausation is a contrastive relation: c-rather-than-C* causes e-rather-than-E*, where C* and E* are contrast classes associated respectively withactual events c and e. I explain why this is an improvement on the traditional binary view, and develop a detailed definition. It turns out thatcausation is only well defined in ‘uniform’ cases, where either all or none of the members of C* are related appropriately to members of E*.

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Beckers & Vennekens recently proposed a definition ofactualcausation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate oncausation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that their definition is in fact a formalization of Wright’s famous NESS definition ofcausation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that their definition integrates two (...) highly influential approaches tocausation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify their definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken their difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids their problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition ofcausation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach. (shrink)

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This paper articulates an account ofcausation as a collection of information-theoretic relationships between patterns instantiated in the causal nexus. I draw on Dennett’s account of real patterns to characterize potential causal relata as patterns with specific identification criteria and noise tolerance levels, andactual causal relata as those patterns instantiated at some spatiotemporal location in the rich causal nexus as originally developed by Salmon. I develop a representation framework using phase space to precisely characterize causal relata, including (...) their degree of counterfactual robustness, causal profiles, causal connectivity, and privileged grain size. By doing so, I show how the philosophical notion ofcausation can be rendered in a format that is amenable for direct application of mathematical techniques from information theory such that the resulting informational measures are causal informational measures. This account provides a metaphysics ofcausation that supports interventionist semantics and causal modeling and discovery techniques. (shrink)

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Is time necessary forcausation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory ofcausation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory ofcausation, a possible world in whichcausation but not time exists that can be (...) reached by ‘stripping out’ time from theactual world, leaving quantum mechanical laws intact. (shrink)

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In this paper, we analyseactualcausation in terms of production. The latter concept is made precise by a strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals: \ iff, after suspending judgement about A and C, C is believed in the course of assuming A. This test allows us to verify or falsify that an event brings about another event. Complementing the concept of production by a weak condition of difference-making gives rise to a full-fledged analysis ofcausation.

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Carolina Sartorio argues that only theactual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played bycausation in a view of that kind.Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, theactual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they (...) reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence ofactual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one oncausation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

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A new approach for defining causality and such related notions as degree of responsibility, degrees of blame, and causal explanation. Causality plays a central role in the way people structure the world; we constantly seek causal explanations for our observations. But what does it even mean that an event C "actually caused" event E? The problem of definingactualcausation goes beyond mere philosophical speculation. For example, in many legal arguments, it is precisely what needs to be established (...) in order to determine responsibility. The philosophy literature has been struggling with the problem of defining causality since Hume. In this book, Joseph Halpern exploresactual causality, and such related notions as degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. The goal is to arrive at a definition of causality that matches our natural language usage and is helpful, for example, to a jury deciding a legal case, a programmer looking for the line of code that cause some software to fail, or an economist trying to determine whether austerity caused a subsequent depression. Halpern applies and expands an approach to causality that he and Judea Pearl developed, based on structural equations. He carefully formulates a definition of causality, and building on this, defines degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. He concludes by discussing how these ideas can be applied to such practical problems as accountability and program verification. Technical details are generally confined to the final section of each chapter and can be skipped by non-mathematical readers. (shrink)

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We propose that allactual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception ofcausation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views ofcausation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time.

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Existing research suggests that people's judgments ofactualcausation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure ofactual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed (...) in existing studies. More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect ("abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation. (shrink)

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There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective whichcan account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the (...) concept ofcausation and that therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires.Hay filósofos que niegan la existencia de relaciones causales en la naturaleza argumentando que no son sino producto de nuestra perspectiva como seres capaces de acciones intencionales. En este artículo expongo brevemente esta tesis y sostengo que debe contar con el complemento de una ontología no causal básica que dé razón de los fenómenos que se consideran causales. Luego describo lo que parece ser una buena candidata para tal ontología y concluyo que, sin embargo, ésta no puede prescindir del concepto de causalidad y que, por tanto, no es el tipo de ontología que necesita la mencionada tesis antirrealista respecto a la causalidad. (shrink)

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Downwardcausation is a widespread and problematic phenomenon. It is typically defined as thecausation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. Downwardcausation is widespread, as there are many examples of it across different sciences: a cell constraints what happens to its own constituents; a body regulates its own processes; two atoms, when they are appropriately related, make it the case that their own electrons are distributed in certain ways. However, downwardcausation is also problematic. Roughly, (...) it seems to be at odds with specific scientific and/or epistemological desiderata: first and foremost, that everything can be reduced (one day or another) to the fundamental, micro-physical constituents and goings-on of the universe, so as to provide a unified explanation of everything and a unification of all the sciences " from the bottom ". Indeed, downwardcausation (if it is an irreducible phenomenon) introduces special causings not only at the higher levels, but also at the lower ones: if, in principle, we cannot fully understand what happens to the electrons without paying attention to the atoms (at the higher level) and we cannot fully understand what happens to the atoms by only paying attention to the electrons (at the lower level), there is no fully lower-level explanation for both higher-level and lower-level goings-on. In this introduction, we shall try to describe the prospects for downwardcausation in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. After having delved into the connections between downwardcausation, emergence and levels (§1), we shall discuss the irreducibility of downwardcausation (§2). We shall then briefly consider how specific metaphysical and epistemological assumptions bear on our understanding of downwardcausation and of its possibility (§3) and describe some views according to which downwardcausation is actually non-causal (or it is a special causal relation) (§4). We shall also mention some problems for the connection between downwardcausation and mentalcausation (§5) and some scientific examples of downwardcausation (§6). Finally, we shall summarize the contents of the contributions in this book (§7). (shrink)

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Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts ofactualcausation, and then offers a new theory of his own. In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are then diagnosed.

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Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) provide one of the most powerful tools for modelling coarse-grained type-level causal structure. As in other fields (e.g., thermodynamics) the question arises how such coarse-grained characterisations are related to the characterisation of their underlying structure (in this case: token-level causal relations). Answering this question meets what is called a “coherence-requirement” in the reduction debate: How are different accounts of one and the same system (or kind of system) related to each other. We argue that CBNs as (...) tools for type-level causal inference are abstract enough to roughly fit any current token-level theory ofcausation as long as certain modelling assumptions are satisfied, but accounts ofactualcausation, i.e. accounts that attempt to infer token-causation based on CBNs, for the very same reason, face certain limitations. (shrink)

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The authors challenge the reigning “causal power framework” as an explanation for whether a particular outcome was actually caused by a specific potential cause. They test a new measure of causal attribution in two experiments by embedding the measure within the Structure Induction model of SingularCausation (SISC, Stephan & Waldmann, 2016).

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The philosophical problem of mentalcausation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about thecausation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be (...) overdetermined by two hammers striking it at the same time. So how are we to reconcile these two views about the causal origins of human behaviour? One philosophical doctrine effects a nice reconciliation. Neuralism, or the token-identity theory, states that every particular mental event is a neurophysiological event and that every action is a physically specifiable bodily movement. If these identities hold, there is no problem of causal overdetermination: the apparently different causal pathways to the behaviour are actually one and the same pathway viewed from different perspectives. This attractively simple view is enjoying a recent revival in fortunes. (shrink)

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In this essay, my goal is, first, to describe the most important contemporary philosophical approaches to the nature of time, and then, secondly, to discuss the ways in which those different accounts bear upon the question of the possibility of divine foreknowledge. I shall argue that different accounts of the nature of time give rise to different objections to the idea of divine foreknowledge, but that, in addition, there is a general argument for the impossibility of divine foreknowledge that is (...) independent of one’s account of the nature of time. (shrink)

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Counterfactual conditionals have been appealed to in various ways to show how the mind can be causally efficacious. However, it has often been overestimated what the truth of certain counterfactuals actually indicates aboutcausation. The paper first identifies four approaches that seem to commit precisely this mistake. The arguments discussed involve erroneous assumptions about the connection of counterfactual dependence and genuinecausation, as well as a disregard of the requisite evaluation conditions of counterfactuals. In a second step, the (...) paper uses the insights of the foregoing analyses to formulate a set of counterfactuals-based conditions that are characterized as sufficient to establish singular causal claims. The paper concludes that there are ample reasons to believe that some mental events satisfy all these conditions with respect to certain further events and, hence, that mental events sometimes are causes. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl draw upon structural equation models to develop an attractive analysis of ‘actual cause’. Their analysis is designed for the case of deterministiccausation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an elegant treatment of probabilisticcausation. 1Introduction 2Preemption 3Structural Equation Models 4The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’ 5Preemption Again 6The Probabilistic Case 7Probabilistic Causal Models 8A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition 9Twardy (...) and Korb’s Account 10Probabilistic Fizzling 11Conclusion. (shrink)

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This paper offers a new way to evaluate counterfactual conditionals on the supposition that actually, there is no time. We then parlay this method of evaluation into a way of evaluating causal claims. Our primary aim is to preserve, at a minimum, the assertibility of certain counterfactual and causal claims once time has been excised from reality. This is an important first step in a more general reconstruction project that has two important components. First, recovering our ordinary language claims involving (...) notions such as persistence, change and agency and, second, recovering enough observational evidence so that any timeless metaphysics is not empirically self-refuting. However, the project of investigatingcausation in a timeless setting has a greater relevance than its application to timeless physical theory alone. For, as we show, it can be used to model the assertibility conditions of causal claims more generally. (shrink)

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