Do the Weak Stand a Chance? Distribution of Resources in a Competitive Environment.Judith Avrahami &Yaakov Kareev -2009 -Cognitive Science 33 (5):940-950.detailsWhen two agents of unequal strength compete, the stronger one is expected to always win the competition. This expectation is based on the assumption that evaluation of performance is complete, hence flawless. If, however, the agents are evaluated on the basis of only a small sample of their performance, the weaker agent still stands a chance of winning occasionally. A theoretical analysis indicates that, to increase the chance of this happening the weaker agent ought to give up on enough occasions (...) so that he or she can match the stronger agent on the remaining ones. We model such a competition in a game, present its game‐theoretic solution, and report an experiment, involving 144 individuals, in which we tested whether players (both weak and strong) are actually sensitive to their relative strengths and know how to allocate their resources accordingly. Our results indicate that they do. (shrink)
Games of Competition in a Stochastic Environment.Judith Avrahami,Werner Güth &Yaakov Kareev -2005 -Theory and Decision 59 (4):255-294.detailsThe paper presents a set of games of competition between two or three players in which reward is jointly determined by a stochastic biased mechanism and players’ choices. More specifically, a resource can be found with unequal probabilities in one of two locations. The first agent is rewarded only if it finds the resource and avoids being found by the next agent in line; the latter is rewarded only if it finds the former. Five benchmarks, based on different psychological and (...) game-theoretic assumptions are derived and their predictions compared to actual behavior of 120, 40, and 48 participants playing repeatedly. Of the five benchmarks—the unique (Nash) equilibrium, reinforcement learning, trust-based efficiency, maximum unpredictability, and regret-based (Impulse Balance) equilibrium—regret for missed opportunities best accounts for the qualitative aspect of participants’ behavior and regret attenuated by randomization best accounts for the quantitative aspect of behavior. (shrink)
When Unequals Compete: Where Do They Stand After the Competition?Einav Hart,Judith Avrahami &Yaakov Kareev -2022 -Cognitive Science 46 (1):e13082.detailsCognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 1, January 2022.