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This paper presents an objection to Peter Railton’s full-information account of non-moral value. According to this account, if an idealized individual A who is fully rational and has full information wants the non-idealized A to desire X, then X is good for A. Those desires like X are called objective interests. Railton’s analysis holds that non-moral values are constituted by natural facts that are independent of subjective opinions. I argue that it is hard for the full-information analysis to achieve all (...) its goals. My discussion focuses on intrinsic interests—those good for an individual without reference to any other objective interests. I attempt to show that either it is hard for the full-information account to give a normative force on individuals, or the account is circular. The conclusion I reach is moderate: in its current version, the full-information analysis of non-moral value cannot explain the link between the normative and the empirical. (shrink)

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Relational egalitarians claim that a situation is just only if everyone it involves relates to one another as equals. It implies that relational egalitarians believe the ideal of “living as equals” (for short) is desirable, and furthermore, necessary for justice. In this paper, I distinguish three accounts of the desirability of the ideal: the instrumental value account, the non‐instrumental value account, and the non‐consequentialist account. I argue that the former two accounts cannot provide satisfying reasons for being a relational egalitarian. (...) Instead, the ideal of “living as equals” ought to be understood as fundamentally a moral requirement in a non‐consequentialist sense. In addition, a pluralist (though fundamentally non‐consequentialist) approach is welcome. (shrink)

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According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an (...) agent could reasonably trust moral testimony. Specifically, an agent could reasonably accept the testimony, when she can reasonably expect she would make the same or similar judgment with the testifier. Second, I show how moral testimony could work as a form of social cooperation. Given the principle of the same judgment, it is reasonable for the agent to form a moral belief and act with moral testimony. And it provides us higher efficiency in moral knowledge and shows respect for each moral agent. After that, I provide explanations for the problem of moral disagreement and moral understanding with such a principle for moral testimony. Finally, I respond to some possible objections and give some clarifications of my argument. (shrink)

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