The Voices ofWittgenstein: The Vienna Circle—LudwigWittgenstein and LudwigWaismann.Ludwig Josef JohannWittgenstein &FriedrichWaismann -2003 - London, England: Routledge.detailsThis work brings in both the original German and English translation of over one hundred short essays in philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind of historical importance to understandingWittgenstein's philosophical thought and development in the 1930's. Transcribed from the papers of FriedrichWaismann and dating from 1932-35, the majority are highly important dictations byWittgenstein toWaismann, but also includes texts of redrafted material byWaismann closely based on the dictations. Many of these (...) texts become the ultimate sources of material on philosophy of language that constitutes the bulk ofWaismann's book Logic, Sprache, Philosophy. The transcriptions throw light on the development ofWittgenstein's thought in this period and some of the topics are not covered in any of the existing publications of his writings, in particular his detailed attention to causal theories of meaning. They also contain texts covering psychological concepts such as expecting, intending and experience; these have no counterparts inWaismann's publications. (shrink)
The Voices ofWittgenstein: The Vienna Circle.FriedrichWaismann -2003 - Routledge.detailsThe Voices ofWittgenstein brings for the first time, in both the original German and in English translation, over one hundred short essays in philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. This text is of key historical importance to understandingWittgenstein's philosophical thought and development in the 1930's. Transcribed from the papers of FriedrichWaismann and dating from 1932 to 1935, the majority are highly important dictations byWittgenstein toWaismann. It also includes texts of (...) redrafted material byWaismann, closely based on these dictations. (shrink)
FriedrichWaismann - Causality and Logical Positivism.Brian Mcguinness,Mathieu Marion,FriedrichWaismann,Alexander Bird,Joachim Schulte &Hadwig Kraeutler -2011 - Springer.detailsFriedrichWaismann (1896–1959) was one of the most gifted students and collaborators of Moritz Schlick. Accepted as a discussion partner byWittgenstein from 1927 on, he functioned as spokesman for the latter’s ideas in the Schlick Circle, untilWittgenstein’s contact with this most faithful interpreter was broken off in 1935 and not renewed when exile tookWaismann to Cambridge. Nonetheless, at Oxford, where he went in 1939, and eventually became Reader in Philosophy of Mathematics (changing later (...) to Philosophy of Science),Waismann made important and independent contributions to analytic philosophy and philosophy of science (for example in relation to probability, causality and linguistic analysis). The full extent of these only became evident later when the larger (unpublished) part of his writings could be studied. His first posthumous work The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (1965, 2nd edn.1997; German 1976) and his earlier Einführung in das mathematische Denken (1936) have recently proved of fresh interest to the scientific community. This late flowering and new understanding ofWaismann’s position is connected with the fact that he somewhat unfairly fell under the shadow ofWittgenstein, his mentor and predecessor. Central to this book about a life and work familiar to few is unpublished and unknown works on causality and probability. These are commented on in this volume, which will also include a publication of new or previously scattered material and an overview ofWaismann’s life. (shrink)
Dictées deWittgenstein à FriedrichWaismann et pour Moritz Schlick.LudwigWittgenstein -1997 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Edited by Antonia Soulez & Gordon P. Baker.details1. Textes inédits, années 1930 / traduction de l'allemand selon des textes transcrits à partir de matériaux dictées parWittgenstein à Fr.Waismann et pour M. Schlick établis par Gordon Baker avec le concours de Brain McGuinness -- 2. Etudes critiques / par Gordon Baker ... [et al.].
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The principles of linguistic philosophy.FriedrichWaismann -1965 - New York,: St. Martin's Press.detailsIn this study FriedrichWaismann gives a systematic presentation of insights into philosophical problems which can be achieved by clarifying the language in which the problems are posed. Much of the material and the method itself derive fromWittgenstein's work in the early 30s. The book was originally envisaged as a lucid and well organized account ofWittgenstein's distinctive form of linguistic philosophy to enable the Vienna Circle to incorporate these valuable methods into their own programme of (...) analysis. The project evolved over many years into a wide-ranging survey of the dissolution of many philosophical problems and the construction of a systematic philosophical grammar.Waismann shows in detail how puzzlement can be removed by careful description of the uses of the terms employed in framing problems. At the same time, he sketches a general framework for analysis of language, including chapters on names, general terms, logical operators, propositions, questions, etc. This book is an authoritative presentation ofWittgenstein's influential philosophy of language in a format much easier to follow than his own intricate and elusive texts.Waismann exhibits clearly the merits of this method of philosophizing. This book should serve as an important and useful text for those who wish to understand the method and power of linguistic philosophy. It has no equal as an introduction toWittgenstein's philosophy. (shrink)
Ethics and the Will: Essays.FriedrichWaismann,Brian Mcguinness,Moritz Schlick,Joachim Schulte &Y. Shechter -1994 - Springer.detailsINTRODUCTION The present volume unites contributions by the leading figure of the Vienna Circle and by two of his closest assoCiates, contributions that deal with an area of thought represented, indeed, in this Collection but certainly not the central one in the common picture ofthe Circle's activities. It is no accident that an interest in ethics and the philosophy of action was particularly marked in what Neurath was apt to call the right wing of the Circle. For them, as for (...)Wittgenstein (the respected mentorofSchlickandWaismanninparticular),theadvancetobehoped for in philosophy consisted not solely in freeing natural science from a confused sense of dependence on speculative metaphysics but also in seeingthatotherareasoflanguageandaction hadto bethoughtaboutin theirownterms, whichwereneitherthoseofnaturalsciencenorthoseof philosophy as traditionally conceived. The scepticismofSchlick about theprogrammeofUnifiedSciencewaswellknown: EinheizwissenschaJt he called it, as it might be 'boozified science'. And in sober truth the programme sometimes masked a left-wing set of values taken (surely illogically) for granted, though the membersofthe Circle entertained a wide range ofpolitical views. Schlick's own contribution to the present volume is a section from thenotesforoneofhisfinal lectureseries,forsightofwhich wewarmly thanktheonlysurvivingcontributortoourvolume,DrJosephSchachter: Schlick'sgrandsonDra. M. H. vandeVeldehaskindlyconsentedtotheir publication. This section poses the problem we have outlined: there are questionsandaneedforclarificationinethics,butthesenomoredemand a metaphysical solution than does a similar situation in epistemology. Here, as in his earlier Problems of Ethics,l Schlick sets his face against thewholeprocess,mostobviousin Kant,ofmakingtheconceptofvalue absolute. One might say that for Schlick there is no unhypothetical imperative. (shrink)
Origins of the logical theory of probability: Von Kries,Wittgenstein,Waismann.Michael Heidelberger -2001 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (2):177 – 188.detailsThe physiologist and neo-Kantian philosopher Johannes von Kries (1853-1928) wrote one of the most philosophically important works on the foundation of probability after P.S. Laplace and before the First World War, his Principien der Wohrscheinlich-keitsrechnung (1886, repr. 1927). In this book, von Kries developed a highly original interpretation of probability, which maintains it to be both logical and objectively physical. After presenting his approach I shall pursue the influence it had on LudwigWittgenstein and FriedrichWaismann. It seems (...) that von Kries's approach had more potential than recognized in his time and that puttingWaismann's andWittgenstein's early work in a von Kries perspective is able to shed light on the notion of an elementary proposition. (shrink)
Uma confer encia sobre etica.LudwigWittgenstein -2015 - [Coimbra]: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra. Edited by Leonel Lucas Azevedo, M. Ario Jorge de Carvalho & Ludwig Wittgenstein.detailsAbreviaturas das obras deWittgenstein -- A Lecture on Ethics/Uma confer encia sobre Etica -- Excertos das Conversas com FriedrichWaismann e Moritz Schlick relativas a LE.
Schriften.LudwigWittgenstein &Ingeborg Bachmann -1960 - Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.details[1] Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Tagebücher 1914-1916. Philosophische Untersuchungen. --3.Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis von FriedrichWaismann.--4. Philosophische Grammatik.--5. Das blaue Buch. Eine philosophische Betrachtung. Zettel.--6. Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik. --8. Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie.
Wittgenstein andWaismann's open texture.Hanoch Ben-Yami -forthcoming -Philosophical Investigations.detailsI track the origin inWittgenstein's work ofWaismann's concept of open texture and compare their related ideas. AlthoughWaismann published his work on open texture before the publication ofWittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, he had access to drafts of that work and to other writings ofWittgenstein and heard him present related ideas. A key example of his is closely derived fromWittgenstein's work. We shall see advantages ofWittgenstein's ideas overWaismann's. (...)Waismann does not satisfactorily distinguish semantic from epistemic points; he seems to think that drawing boundaries is done only by definitions; he unjustly sees open texture as the possibility of vagueness, which he problematically conceives as a fluctuating use of a word, and more. In all these respects,Wittgenstein is more precise in his characterisation of the idea. Accordingly, we better followWittgenstein in our use of the concept of open texture. (shrink)
Waismann's Critique ofWittgenstein.Anthony Birch -2007 -Analysis and Metaphysics 6:263-272.detailsFriedrichWaismann, a little-known mathematician and onetime student ofWittgenstein's, provides answers to problems that vexedWittgenstein in his attempt to explicate the foundations of mathematics through an analysis of its practice.Waismann argues in favor of mathematical intuition and the reality of infinity with a Wittgensteinian twist.Waismann's arguments lead toward an approach to the foundation of mathematics that takes into consideration the language and practice of experts.
Waismann: FromWittgenstein's Tafelrunde to His Writings on Analyticity.Gregory Lavers -2019 - In Dejan Makovec & Stewart Shapiro,Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 131--158.detailsGregory Lavers gives us a timeline ofWaismann’s career, an overview ofWaismann’s most significant publications in this later period and a detailed walkthrough from the first to the last paper ofWaismann’s series on analyticity, “Analytic - Synthetic”. Lavers closes his paper with comparisons ofWaismann and Quine as well asWaismann and Carnap. BothWaismann and Quine argue that the concept of analyticity is vague and both reject reductionism. However, behind these superficial (...) similarities we find fundamentally different epistemologies. According to Lavers, the web of inferential relations, spanning from every experience to any item of scientific knowledge, that supports the outlook suggested by Quine, is rejected as manifestly wrong byWaismann. Conversely, Lavers shows that despite superficial contrasts betweenWaismann and Carnap—Waismann being interested in the subtleties of natural language, Carnap in replacing these through explication—the two do not really oppose each other’s’ views on analyticity and necessary truth. (shrink)
Schlick,Wittgenstein, andWaismann: Three Responses to Nietzsche.Andreas Vrahimis -2023 - In Shunichi Tagaki & Pascal F. Zambito,Wittgenstein and Nietzsche. Routledge. pp. 47-76.detailsIt is commonly assumed that while Nietzsche’s intellectual influence significantly marked 20th century ‘continental’ philosophy, his sway over analytic philosophy was conspicuously minimal. To challenge this received view, this essay demonstrates that the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy formed a space of dialogue among three founding figures of analytic philosophy: Schlick,Wittgenstein, andWaismann. A significant Nietzschean influence guided Schlick’s project of naturalising ethics. Schlick nonetheless maintained a critical attitude towards various aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as his assertion (...) of the will to power. Despite their proximity,Wittgenstein’s understanding of several of Nietzsche’s views (under the influence of Spengler) deviated from Schlick’s more elaborate interpretation.Wittgenstein concurred with Schlick’s criticism of an absolute ‘ought’, despite his overall rejection of Schlick’s naturalisation of ethics. InWaismann’s articulation of his own view of the relation between ethics and science, we find an emphasis on an element that is common in Schlick andWittgenstein, namely their rejection of the possibility of scientifically justifying moral claims.Waismann’s criticisms of Nietzsche’s ethics can thus be brought into dialogue with Schlick’s andWittgenstein’s responses, especially in the case of the notion of eternal recurrence. (shrink)
Waismann as Spokesman forWittgenstein.Joachim Schulte -2011 -Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 15:225-241.detailsIn 1929Wittgenstein left Vienna for Cambridge, andWaismann grew into the role of spokesman for his absent hero. The story of his relation with the man so greatly esteemed by his much-admired mentor Schlick contains dramatic elements: there were moments of friction and of coldness, announcements of withdrawal from a shared project, accusations of plagiarism or, at least, insuffi cient acknowledgement. What we know of this story has been told by Brian McGuinness and Gordon Baker. If one (...) wishes to gauge the extent to whichWaismann succeeded in fulfi lling his task as spokesman forWittgenstein, one must start from the basic fact that between 1929 and 1936 the two men collaborated, trying to realize the common plan of producing a systematic exposition ofWittgenstein’s philosophy. (shrink)
Schlick,Waismann,Wittgenstein et la grammaire des lois de la nature.Jean-Jacques Rosat -2001 -Les Etudes Philosophiques 58 (3):317.detailsEn 1931, Schlick propose de considérer les lois de la nature non comme des propositions au sens strict mais comme des instructions ou des règles pour la formation d’assertions et de prédictions. « Je dois, ajoute-t-il, cette idée et cette terminologie àWittgenstein. » Cette conception a été couramment considérée comme typiquement instrumentaliste . À partir d’une lecture minutieuse des textes contemporains deWittgenstein et deWaismann, on montre que ces auteurs proposent non pas une théorie mais (...) une analyse de la grammaire des lois de la nature, laquelle est tout à fait compatible avec une attitude réaliste correctement comprise.In 1931, Schlick suggests that we should consider the laws of nature not as propositions in a narrow sense, but as prescriptions or rules for the making of assertions and predictions. He adds : « I owe this idea and terminology toWittgenstein. » This view has been frequently considered as typically instrumentalist . Through a minutely detailed reading of contemporary texts byWittgenstein andWittgenstein, it is shown here that these authors suggest not a theory but an analysis of the grammar of the laws of nature, which is absolutely compatible with a realistic attitude, if correctly understood. (shrink)
Waismann’s Testimony ofWittgenstein’s Fresh Starts in 1931–35.Juha Manninen -2011 -Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 15:243-265.detailsIn the Vienna Circle archives in Haarlem, NL, there are a great number of protocols connected with Moritz Schlick’s philosophical chair – manuscripts, typescripts and shorthand manuscripts. They contain extensive and detailed information about Schlick’s seminars and also about the elementary seminars, so-called proseminars, which were held, as the documents explain: “bei Prof. Schlick”, but actually after 1929 not by him. Since his arrival in Vienna, Schlick was responsible for these both types of seminars and they were under his supervision. (...) They are documented mainly by students. The different participants had the task of producing a handwritten report of the meeting, later also typescripts. It is not mentioned in the protocols who was responsible for the elementary seminars. The professor was the person who mattered. It is interesting to observe that while Schlick’s seminars mainly contained descriptions of chapters in philosophical books, the proseminars were more ambitious. (shrink)
Morphology and Metaphilosophy: Goethe,Wittgenstein andWaismann.Annalisa Coliva -2024 -Nordic Wittgenstein Review 13.detailsThe paper explores howWittgenstein andWaismann interpreted Goethe’s ideas from The Metamorphosis of Plants. These ideas laid the foundation forWittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblance”, whichWaismann also embraced in The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. However, the paper argues thatWittgenstein’s andWaismann’s metaphilosophical implications evolved differently in their later works. Notably, it isWaismann, rather thanWittgenstein, who took these ideas to their extreme, concluding in How I See Philosophy that (...) all forms of philosophical theorizing should be rejected. By contrast,Wittgenstein rejected only the kind of theorizing in philosophy which aims at offering monistic and reductionist explanations of key philosophical concepts. (shrink)
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FriedrichWaismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy.Dejan Makovec &Stewart Shapiro (eds.) -2019 - Palgrave Macmillan.detailsThis edited collection covers FriedrichWaismann's most influential contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of language: his concepts of open texture and language strata, his early criticism of verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction, as well as their significance for experimental and legal philosophy. -/- In addition,Waismann's original papers in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics are here evaluated. They introduceWaismann's theory of action along with his groundbreaking work on fiction, proper names and Kafka's Trial. -/- (...)Waismann is known as the voice of LudwigWittgenstein in the Vienna Circle. At the same time we find in his works a determined critic of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, who anticipated much later developments in the analytic tradition and devised his very own vision for its future. (shrink)
FriedrichWaismann: A vision of philosophy.Gordon Baker -2003 -Philosophy 78 (2):163-179.detailsWaismann'sWittgenstein-influenced ‘How I see Philosophy’ presents a radical vision of philosophy. But its two most general themes—its stress on freedom and vision, and its emphasis on describing the grammar of our language—seem hard to reconcile. This paper elaborates four interrelated themes: 1)Waismann offers his conception of philosophy, not a delineation of the nature of philosophy. 2) His method is radically therapeutic. 3) He offers a diagnosis of the source of philosophical problems: unconscious analogies or conceptions. (...) 4) He advocates a particular form of therapy: offering alternative analogies or conceptions to individuals. Against this background the apparent paradox can be dissolved. (shrink)
Waismann’s Lectures on Causality: An Introduction.Mathieu Marion -2011 -Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 15:31-51.detailsWaismann’s writings can be divided into three periods. The fi rst corresponds to his early work in Vienna under the aegis of Schlick, thus mainly to his collaboration withWittgenstein on the fi rst drafts of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, out of which came not only the book itself many years later but also transcriptions of conversations with Schlick andWittgenstein and numerous dictations reworked byWaismann, now published under the title The Voice ofWittgenstein. The (...) Vienna Circle.Waismann also did at that stage independent work, albeit largely infl uenced byWittgenstein, on probability and identity. The second period runs roughly from the moment relations withWittgenstein were severed – towards the end of 1934 – to his arrival in Oxford, where he started lecturing in Michaelmas Term 1939. (shrink)
FriedrichWaismann’s Open Texture Argument and Definability of Empirical Concepts.Vitaly Ogleznev -2022 -Philosophia 51 (1):273-286.detailsThe appearance in 1945 of the idea of the open texture of empirical concepts, which anticipated FriedrichWaismann’s thesis of a many-level-structure of language, led to a re-evaluation of “context”. It widens the sense of context that we are accustomed to mentioning as beingWittgenstein’s conception of meaning in his later philosophy. The new ideaWaismann brought into the landscape is how to “clarify the context”, which is in a way a very non-Wittgensteinian question as well as (...) an “explanation of context”, where open texture plays a key role. But despite the amount of literature about open texture, this idea ofWaismann is still not properly understood. Open texture must be situated as an obstacle to exhaustiveness of definition for internal reasons not only because of unforeseen conditions that could always arise in the future, but also by virtue of an a priori aspect of the texture of concepts. Thus, the main goal of this paper is to propose an interpretation of open texture as an immanent property of a concept, that is, as something that is underlying its nature. (shrink)
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Linguistic Legislation and Psycholinguistic Experiments: RedevelopingWaismann’s Approach.Eugen Fischer -2019 - In Dejan Makovec & Stewart Shapiro,Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 211-241.detailsThis paper presents a neglected philosophical approach, redevelops it on fresh empirical foundations, and seeks to bring out that it is of not merely historical interest. Building on ideas LudwigWittgenstein mooted in the early 1930s, FriedrichWaismann developed a distinctive metaphilosophy: Through case studies on particular philosophical problems, he identified a characteristic structure and genesis displayed by several philosophical problems and presented a distinctive dialogical method for dissolving problems of this kind. This method turns on exposing the (...) need to endow philosophical questions or claims with more determinate meaning and meeting this need by proposing linguistic rules and explanations which the problems’ proponents are free to accept or reject. The approach is embedded in the view that unconscious thought decisively shapes the formulation of philosophical problems. This paper first presents the approach on the basis ofWaismann’s texts and then redevelops it through a case study on the ‘problem of perception’ and within a post-Freudian conception of unconscious thought: We will draw on psycholinguistic findings about automatic inferences in language comprehension and production, to examine how unconscious cognition shapes the problem formulation. Findings provide fresh, empirical foundations for the approach which has advantages over more familiar critical projects in ordinary language philosophy, to which it is kindred in spirit. (shrink)
Wittgenstein on Probability.Brian McGuinness -1982 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):159-174.detailsWittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further byWaismann).Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)
Wittgenstein on Probability.Brian McGuinness -1982 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):159-174.detailsWittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further byWaismann).Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)
OnWittgenstein’s Influence on the Logical Positivists.Vadim V. Vasilyev -2021 -Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (1):40-47.detailsIn this article, I consider the influence of the ideas of LudwigWittgenstein, and above all the ideas of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus on the philosophy of logical positivism. Agreeing that the question of such an influence is not a self-evident one, I clarify at first the concept of logical positivism and then turn to the evidence of the leading logical positivists about the influence ofWittgenstein upon them. An analysis of recollections of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, (...) FriedrichWaismann, and Alfred Ayer suggests that at least these thinkers themselves considered such an influence as very significant. (shrink)
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Wittgenstein on Probability.Brian McGuinness -1982 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):159-174.detailsWittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further byWaismann).Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)
Wittgenstein e o problema da consistência da aritmética.Anderson Nakano -2018 -Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 21 (1):143-169.detailsRESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é estruturar, em torno de uma única ideia fundamental, a saber, a de que não há atalhos pela lógica, os diversos comentários deWittgenstein à época das conversas comWaismann e o círculo de Viena sobre o problema da consistência da aritmética. Observações notórias sobre as noções de consistência, trivialidade e negação na matemática são consideradas do ponto de vista dessa sistematização. Analisa-se também em que medida esses comentários correspondem a um desenvolvimento crítico (...) do pensamento do autor.ABSTRACT: This work aims at structuring, around a single fundamental idea, namely, that there are no shortcuts through logic, the various comments byWittgenstein at the time of the conversations withWaismann and the Vienna circle on the problem of the consistency of arithmetic. Notable remarks on the notions of consistency, triviality and negation in mathematics are considered from the point of view of this systematization. It is also analyzed to what extent these comments correspond to a critical development of the author's thinking. (shrink)
Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle – The Vienna Circle andWittgenstein. A Critical Reconsideration.Friedrich Stadler -2023 - InWittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: 100 Years After the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Springer Verlag. pp. 3-33.detailsResearch and publications onWittgenstein and on the Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism have been steadily increasing in recent decades. Nevertheless, detailed comparisons between the single famous philosopher and the influential circle around Moritz Schlick are less often undertaken. To be sure, the reception and impact ofWittgenstein’s Tractatus (TLP) on the Vienna Circle is a familiar topic as are the conversationsWittgenstein had with Schlick andWaismann. This introductory essay suggests that a broader focus be (...) adopted. The first part provides an overview of the multi-faceted Vienna Circle based on recent historiography and primary sources; the second part offers a new perspective on the complex relations betweenWittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. To this end, a case study of a central relevant document is provided, namely of Rose Rand’s “Development of the Theses of the ‘Vienna Circle’” (1932/33). A close reading of this unique source sheds new light on the central philosophical triangle ofWittgenstein-Schlick-Waismann and opens up new avenues for future analyses. These considerations are offered to provide a thematic frame for the papers contained in this volume documenting the international conference on “Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle”, held in Vienna, June 2021 to mark the centenary of the publication ofWittgenstein’s Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (1921) / Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). (shrink)
Wittgensteins Nietzsche. Mit vergleichenden betrachtungen zur Nietzsche-rezeption im Wiener kreis.Marco Brusotti -2009 -Nietzsche Studien 38 (1):335-362.detailsDer Beitrag untersucht Wittensteins Stellungnahmen zu Nietzshe, die Thesen und Positionen, die er zu Recht oder zu Untrecht ihm zuschreibt, seine Auseinandersetzung mit ihnen und seine Einschätzung von Nietzsche historischer Bedeutung. An Zeugnissen einer direkten Lektüre fehlt es nicht, aber Wittgensteins Bild des Philosophen ist mindestens ebenso stark durch Autoren wie Spengler geprägt. Man hat "a troubling lack of reference to Nietzsche inWittgenstein's texts and lectures" festellen wollen. Die eingehendere Prüfung des Materials führt zu einem ganz anderen Ergebris. (...) Es werden eine Reihe von Szenarien skizziert, deren Synopse über Nietzsches Bedeutung fürWittgenstein Aufschluss gibt. Die erste belegt Begegnung datiert von 1914: And der Front denkt er über Nietzsches "Feindschaft gegen das Christentum" nach: Dass er sich dabei auf den Antichrist bezieht, wie in derWittgenstein-Forschung gegnerell angenommen, erweist sich als keineswegs sicher. In den dreißsiger Jahren wird ihm die 'Umwertung aller Werte" zu einer Formel zuerst für die geschichtlich Epoch und dann für seine eigene neue 'Gedankenbewegung'. Nietzsches Präsenz im Wiener Kreis, Wittgensteins zwiespältige Beziehung zu diesem und eine damalige Sicht auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den zwei Philosophien werden ausgehend von Waismanns Buch Logik, Sprach und Philosophie dargestellt. Zu Zarathustras Diktum "Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe" hatWittgenstein seit Eine philosophische Betrachtung wiederholt Stellung genommen. Der Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit und die Auseinandesetzung mit dem Wiederkunftsgedanken sind Gegenstand der letzen Abschnitte. (shrink)
Wittgenstein on Probability.Brian McGuinness -1982 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):159-174.detailsWittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further byWaismann).Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)
Schlick andWittgenstein on games and ethics.Andreas Vrahimis -2023 -Philosophical Investigations 47 (1):76-100.detailsIn conversations with Schlick andWaismann from June and December 1930,Wittgenstein began to turn his attention to the topic of games. This topic also centrally concerned Schlick. In his earliest philosophical output, Schlick had relied on the results of evolutionary biology in setting out an account of the emergence of the human species’ ability to play [Spiel] as a prerequisite for the genesis of scientific knowledge. Throughout his subsequent works one finds fragmentary appeals to this early view, (...) e.g. in his oft misunderstood claim that play constitutes the meaning of life.Wittgenstein’s turn to the topic of games in 1930 not only happened while Professor Schlick was in the room, but was also coupled with an explicit response to Schlick’s 1930 book Fragen der Ethik. Schlick here employs the example of chess to distinguish between rules and their application – a distinction which underlies his whole attempt to naturalise ethics as a descriptive psycho-sociological discipline. This paper investigates the relation betweenWittgenstein’s and Schlick’s accounts of games in light ofWittgenstein’s criticisms of Schlick’s ethics.Wittgenstein’s objections can be answered by taking Schlick’s theory of play into consideration. (shrink)
Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: 100 Years After the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Friedrich Stadler (ed.) -2023 - Springer Verlag.detailsThis book offers a critical update of currentWittgenstein research on the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (TLP) and its relation to the Vienna Circle. The contributions are written by renownedWittgenstein scholars, on the occasion of the "Wittgenstein Years" 1921/1922 with a special focus on its origin, reception, and interpretation then and now. The main topic is the mutual relation betweenWittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (esp. Schlick,Waismann, Carnap, Gödel), but also Russell and Ramsey. In addition, (...) included in this volume are new studies onWittgenstein's life and work, on the philosophy of the TLP, and on theWittgenstein family in philosophical and historical context. Furthermore, unpublished documents onWittgenstein andWaismann from the archives are provided in form of edited and commented primary sources. As per the book series' usual format, a general part of this Yearbook covers a study on Neurath's economy as well as reviews of related publications. (shrink)
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A Confusion of Categories:Wittgenstein's Kierkegaardian Argument Against Heidegger.Jonathan Beale -2010 -Philosophical Writings (Special Issue):15-26.detailsA mysterious remark to FriedrichWaismann on 30 December 1929 marks the only occasion whereWittgenstein refers to both Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Yet although this has generated much controversy, little attention has been paid to the charge of nonsense thatWittgenstein here appears to bring against Heidegger; thus, the supporting argument that may be latent has not been unearthed. Through analysis of this remark,Wittgenstein's arguments in the Tractatus and 'A Lecture on Ethics', and Heidegger's account (...) of anxiety (Angst) in Being and Time, I argue that we can extract an argument against the central question of Heidegger's philosophy: the question of being. To understand this, I examine the Kierkegaardian ideas employed byWittgenstein and Heidegger and attempt to show that this argument can be partly understood in Kierkegaardian terms. I further argue that examining what Heidegger means by 'being' (Sein) shows thatWittgenstein's argument does not meet its target. (shrink)