Results for 'William J. Demarest'
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- Does familiarity necessarily lead to erotic indifference and incest avoidance because inbreeding lowers reproductive fitness?William J.Demarest -1983 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):106-107.
- Heidegger.William J. Richardson -1967 - The Hague,: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology.William J. Rapaport -1985 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):61-95.This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.
- (1 other version)Logical foundations for belief representation.William J. Rapaport -1986 -Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the (...) embedding sentence. Therefore, the referent of the quasi-indicator must be represented in such a way that no invalid coreferential claims are entailed. The importance of quasi-indicators is discussed, and it is shown that all four of the above categories of belief reports can be handled by a single representational technique using belief spaces containing intensional entities. Inference rules and belief-revision techniques for the system are also examined. (shrink)
- How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room.William J. Rapaport -2006 -Minds and Machines 16 (4):381-436.A computer can come to understand natural language the same way Helen Keller did: by using “syntactic semantics”—a theory of how syntax can suffice for semantics, i.e., how semantics for natural language can be provided by means of computational symbol manipulation. This essay considers real-life approximations of Chinese Rooms, focusing on Helen Keller’s experiences growing up deaf and blind, locked in a sort of Chinese Room yet learning how to communicate with the outside world. Using the SNePS computational knowledge-representation system, (...) the essay analyzes Keller’s belief that learning that “everything has a name” was the key to her success, enabling her to “partition” her mental concepts into mental representations of: words, objects, and the naming relations between them. It next looks at Herbert Terrace’s theory of naming, which is akin to Keller’s, and which only humans are supposed to be capable of. The essay suggests that computers at least, and perhaps non-human primates, are also capable of this kind of naming. (shrink)
- The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of “Closeness”.William J. Fitzpatrick -2006 -Philosophical Studies 128 (3):585-617.The distinction between harm that is intended as a means or end, and harm that is merely a foreseen side-effect of one’s action, is widely cited as a significant factor in a variety of ethical contexts. Many use it, for example, to distinguish terrorist acts from certain acts of war that may have similar results as side-effects. Yet Bennett and others have argued that its application is so arbitrary that if it can be used to cast certain harmful actions in (...) a more favorable light, then it can equally be manipulated to do the same for any kind of harmful action. In response, some have tried to block such extensions of the intend/foresee distinction by rejecting its application in cases where the relation between the plainly intended means and the harm is “too close”. This move, however, has been attacked as vague and obscure, and Bennett has argued that all the plausible candidates for explicating the idea of excessive closeness ultimately fail. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of excessive closeness with the aim of rescuing the intend/foresee distinction from such charges of arbitrariness. The account is based on the distinction between merely causal and constitutive relations among states of affairs, and I show both how it escapes Bennett’s objections to other accounts and how it applies to a variety of cases. Finally, I also examine Quinn’s alternative move of shifting the focus of the intend/foresee distinction in an attempt to sidestep the issue of closeness, and argue that it is not ultimately successful. In fact, Quinn’s view has shortcomings that can be resolved only by returning to an appeal to some notion of closeness, underscoring the need for the sort of account I offer. (shrink)
- Adding Closed Unbounded Subsets of ω₂ with Finite Forcing.William J. Mitchell -2005 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (3):357-371.An outline is given of the proof that the consistency of a κ⁺-Mahlo cardinal implies that of the statement that I[ω₂] does not include any stationary subsets of Cof(ω₁). An additional discussion of the techniques of this proof includes their use to obtain a model with no ω₂-Aronszajn tree and to add an ω₂-Souslin tree with finite conditions.
- What Is the “Context” for Contextual Vocabulary Acquisition?William J. Rapaport -2003 -Proceedings of the 4th Joint International Conference on Cognitive Science/7th Australasian Society for Cognitive Science Conference 2:547-552.“Contextual” vocabulary acquisition is the active, deliberate acquisition of a meaning for a word in a text by reasoning from textual clues and prior knowledge, including language knowledge and hypotheses developed from prior encounters with the word, but without external sources of help such as dictionaries or people. But what is “context”? Is it just the surrounding text? Does it include the reader’s background knowledge? I argue that the appropriate context for contextual vocabulary acquisition is the reader’s “internalization” of the (...) text “integrated” into the reader’s “prior” knowledge via belief revision. (shrink)
- Cognitive and Computer Systems for Understanding Narrative Text.William J. Rapaport,Erwin M. Segal,Stuart C. Shapiro,David A. Zubin,Gail A. Bruder,Judith Felson Duchan &David M. Mark -manuscriptThis project continues our interdisciplinary research into computational and cognitive aspects of narrative comprehension. Our ultimate goal is the development of a computational theory of how humans understand narrative texts. The theory will be informed by joint research from the viewpoints of linguistics, cognitive psychology, the study of language acquisition, literary theory, geography, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. The linguists, literary theorists, and geographers in our group are developing theories of narrative language and spatial understanding that are being tested by the (...) cognitive psychologists and language researchers in our group, and a computational model of a reader of narrative text is being developed by the AI researchers, based in part on these theories and results and in part on research on knowledge representation and reasoning. This proposal describes the knowledge-representation and natural-language-processing issues involved in the computational implementation of the theory; discusses a contrast between communicative and narrative uses of language and of the relation of the narrative text to the story world it describes; investigates linguistic, literary, and hermeneutic dimensions of our research; presents a computational investigation of subjective sentences and reference in narrative; studies children’s acquisition of the ability to take third-person perspective in their own storytelling; describes the psychological validation of various linguistic devices; and examines how readers develop an understanding of the geographical space of a story. This report is a longer version of a project description submitted to NSF. This document, produced in May 2007, is a L ATEX version of Technical Report 89-07 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Department of Computer Science, August 1989), with slightly.. (shrink)
- Yes, She Was!: Reply to Ford’s “Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room”.William J. Rapaport -2011 -Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.Ford’s Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room claims that my argument in How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room fails because Searle and I use the terms ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ differently, hence are at cross purposes. Ford has misunderstood me; this reply clarifies my theory.
- Contextual Vocabulary Acquisition: A Computational Theory and Educational Curriculum.William J. Rapaport &Michael W. Kibby -2002 - In Nagib Callaos, Ana Breda & Ma Yolanda Fernandez J.,Proceedings of the 6th World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics. International Institute of Informatics and Systemics.We discuss a research project that develops and applies algorithms for computational contextual vocabulary acquisition (CVA): learning the meaning of unknown words from context. We try to unify a disparate literature on the topic of CVA from psychology, first- and secondlanguage acquisition, and reading science, in order to help develop these algorithms: We use the knowledge gained from the computational CVA system to build an educational curriculum for enhancing students’ abilities to use CVA strategies in their reading of science texts (...) at the middle-school and college undergraduate levels. The knowledge gained from case studies of students using our CVA techniques feeds back into further development of our computational theory. Keywords: artificial intelligence, knowledge representation, reading, reasoning, science education, vocabulary acquisition. (shrink)
- In Defense of Contextual Vocabulary Acquisition: How to Do Things with Words in Context.William J. Rapaport -2005 - In Anind Dey, Boicho Kokinov, David Leake & Roy Turner,Proceedings of the 5th International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 3554. pp. 396--409.Contextual vocabulary acquisition (CVA) is the deliberate acquisition of a meaning for a word in a text by reasoning from context, where “context” includes: (1) the reader’s “internalization” of the surrounding text, i.e., the reader’s “mental model” of the word’s “textual context” (hereafter, “co-text” [3]) integrated with (2) the reader’s prior knowledge (PK), but it excludes (3) external sources such as dictionaries or people. CVA is what you do when you come across an unfamiliar word in your reading, realize that (...) you don’t know what it means, decide that you need to know what it means in order to understand the passage, but there is no one around to ask, and it is not in the dictionary (or you are too lazy to look it up). In such a case, you can try to figure out its meaning “from context”, i.e., from clues in the co-text together with your prior knowledge. Our computational theory of CVA—implemented in a the SNePS knowledge representation and reasoning system [28]—begins with a stored knowledge base containing SNePS representations of relevant PK, inputs SNePS representations of a passage containing an unfamiliar word, and draws inferences from these two (integrated) information sources. When asked to define the word, definition algorithms deductively search the resulting network for information of the sort that might be found in a dictionary definition, outputting a definition frame whose slots are the kinds of features that a definition might contain (e.g., class membership, properties, actions, spatio-temporal information, etc.) and whose slot-fillers contain information gleaned from the network [6–8,20,23,24]. We are investigating ways to make our system more robust, to embed it in a naturallanguage-processing system, and to incorporate morphological information. Our research group, including reading educators, is also applying our methods to the develop-. (shrink)
- Meinong, Defective Objects, and (Psycho-)Logical Paradox.William J. Rapaport -1982 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):17-39.Alexius Meinong developed a notion of defective objects in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for. However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects due (...) to Rapaport. One family of paradoxes remains, but it is argued that they are unavoidable and relatively harmless. (shrink)
- The True Believer; Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements.William J. MacKinnon -1959 -Philosophy of Science 26 (4):376-378.
- CASTANEDA, Hector-Neri (1924–1991).William J. Rapaport -2005 - In John R. Shook,The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, 1860-1960. Thoemmes Press.H´ector-Neri Casta˜neda-Calder´on (December 13, 1924–September 7, 1991) was born in San Vicente Zacapa, Guatemala. He attended the Normal School for Boys in Guatemala City, later called the Military Normal School for Boys, from which he was expelled for refusing to fight a bully; the dramatic story, worthy of being filmed, is told in the “De Re” section of his autobiography, “Self-Profile” (1986). He then attended a normal school in Costa Rica, followed by studies in philosophy at the University of San (...) Carlos, Guatemala. He won a scholarship to the University of Minnesota, where he received his B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952), and Ph.D. (1954), all in philosophy. His dissertation, “The Logical Structure of Moral Reasoning”, was written under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. He returned to teach in Guatemala, and then received a scholarship to study at Oxford University (1955–1956), after which he took a sabbatical-replacement position in philosophy at Duke University (1956). His first full-time academic appointment was at Wayne State University (1957– 1969), where he founded the philosophy journal Noˆus (1967, a counter-offer made to him by Wayne State to encourage him to stay there rather than to take the chairmanship of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania). In 1969, he moved (along with several of his Wayne colleagues) to Indiana University, where he eventually became the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy and, later, its first Dean of Latino Affairs (1978–1981). He remained at Indiana until his death. He was also a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin (1962–1963) and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1981–1982). He received grants and fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation (1967–1968), the T. Andrew Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Science Foundation. He was elected President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1979– 1980), named to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1990), and received the Presidential Medal of Honor from the Government of Guatemala (1991). Casta˜neda’s philosophical interests spanned virtually the entire spectrum of philosophy, and his theories form a highly interconnected whole.. (shrink)
- A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning.William J. Talbott -2016 -Synthese 193 (10).The author uses a series of examples to illustrate two versions of a new, nonprobabilist principle of epistemic rationality, the special and general versions of the metacognitive, expected relative frequency principle. These are used to explain the rationality of revisions to an agent’s degrees of confidence in propositions based on evidence of the reliability or unreliability of the cognitive processes responsible for them—especially reductions in confidence assignments to propositions antecedently regarded as certain—including certainty-reductions to instances of the law of excluded (...) middle or the law of noncontradiction in logic or certainty-reductions to the certainties of probabilist epistemology. The author proposes special and general versions of the MERF principle and uses them to explain the examples, including the reasoning that would lead to thoroughgoing fallibilism—that is, to a state of being certain of nothing. The author responds to the main defenses of probabilism: Dutch Book arguments, Joyce’s potential accuracy defense, and the potential calibration defenses of Shimony and van Fraassen by showing that, even though they do not satisfy the probability axioms, degrees of belief that satisfy the MERF principle minimize expected inaccuracy in Joyce’s sense; they can be externally calibrated in Shimony and van Fraassen’s sense; and they can serve as a basis for rational betting, unlike probabilist degrees of belief, which, in many cases, human beings have no rational way of ascertaining. The author also uses the MERF principle to subsume the various epistemic akrasia principles in the literature. Finally, the author responds to Titelbaum’s argument that epistemic akrasia principles require that we be certain of some epistemological beliefs, if we are rational. (shrink)
- Is post-marketing drug follow-up research or advertising?Gary B. Weiss &William J. Winslade -1986 -IRB: Ethics & Human Research 9 (4):10-11.
- Between justification and pursuit: Understanding the technological essence of science.William J. McKinney -1995 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):455-468.
- Efforts to Encourage Multidisciplinarity in the Cognitive Science Society.James G. Greeno,William J. Clancey,Clayton Lewis,Mark Seidenberg,Sharon Derry,Morton Ann Gernsbacher,Patrick Langley,Michael Shafto,Dedre Gentner,Alan Lesgold &Colleen M. Seifert -1998 -Cognitive Science 22 (1):131-132.No categories
- On the Appropriate Social Responsibilities of Successful Entrepreneurs.William J. Baumol -2016 -Business and Society 55 (1):14-22.This article offers proposed guidelines intended to protect the public interest in relationship to the advocated social responsibilities of successful entrepreneurs. The author argues that the most effective approach, then, is not preaching about obligations but, rather, establishing financial incentives for doing well by doing good. One example is the U.S. patent system. Another is a redesigned tax system that uses imposts to make socially damaging activities expensive, while reducing the financial burden on virtuous behavior.
- The correspondence of Thomas Dale (1700–1750).William J. Cook -2012 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):232-243.
- Misidentifying the Evolutionary Debunkers’ Error: Reply to Mogensen.William J. FitzPatrick -2016 -Analysis 76 (4):433-437.Andreas Mogensen has recently argued that the current debate over evolutionary debunking in ethics is mired in confusion due to a simple fallacy committed by debunkers and uncritically taken on board by their opponents. I argue that no party to this debate is involved in the type of confusion and fallacy Mogensen has in mind, which he himself notes would be an absurd and outlandish mistake for anyone to make in other domains. Debunkers do plausibly commit an error in their (...) explanatory claims about our moral beliefs, and it is related to an issue Mogensen discusses, but it is not the confusion and fallacy he identifies. (shrink)
- Private Self-Creation and Public Solidarity.William J. Garland -1996 -Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):207-215.
- The Limits of Compulsion in Controlling AIDS.Larry Gostin &William J. Curran -1986 -Hastings Center Report 16 (6):24-29.
- Preliminary Exams and Graduate Education.John H. Williams &William J. Berg -1971 -Substance 1 (2):135.
- The Parisian Faculty of Theology in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries.William J. Courtenay -2001 - In Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery & Andreas Speer,Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 / After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte / Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of. De Gruyter. pp. 235-247.No categories
- The British industrial revolution and the ideological revolution: Science, Neoliberalism and History.William J. Ashworth -2014 -History of Science 52 (2):178-199.During the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries interpretations of the British Industrial Revolution became embedded within debates over competing systems of political economy, primarily liberal democracy (free trade) versus socialism (state regulation). At the heart of this contest was also the question of epistemology. A picture emerged of the Industrial Revolution that reflected such contrasting perspectives; for those with a Western liberal bent Britain industrialized first due to a weak state, an emphasis upon individual liberty, the right institutions and culture of (...) creativity born of free minds and free markets. At the heart of this was the emergence of science; objectivity and Western democracy became a key cornerstone of this perspective. This view was first especially spearheaded by the Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) and, slightly later, Friedrich A. Hayek (1899–1992). The debate subsequently became particularly fierce during the Cold War, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall the role of the state and protectionism within Britain’s industrial history has greatly diminished. Indeed today’s dominant historiography continues to erase Britain’s actual industrial experience and, instead, reflect entrenched liberal and neoliberal prescriptions. A major axiom of this ideological viewpoint is the centrality of science and its history. (shrink)No categories
- The Presence of Evil and the Falsification of Theistic Assertions.William J. Wainwright -1969 -Religious Studies 4 (2):213 - 216.The falsifiability of theistic assertions no longer appears to be the burning issue it once was, and perhaps this is all to the good. For one thing, it was never entirely clear just what demand was being made of the theist. In this paper I shall not discuss the nature or legitimacy of the falsification requirement as applied to theistic assertions. Instead I shall argue that some of the reasons which have been offered to show that these assertions are not (...) falsifiable are by no means conclusive. Since the most plausible bit of anti-theistic evidence is the existence of evil, it would seem to be legitimate for us to devote our attention to arguments which are designed to show that the theist does not allow the presence of evil to count against his claims. (shrink)
- Why Believe in the Intrinsic Dignity of Persons and Their Entitlement to Treatment as Equals?William J. Zanardi -1998 -Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):151-168.
- Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: A Course Outline.William J. Rapaport -1986 -Teaching Philosophy 9 (2):103-120.In the Fall of 1983, I offered a junior/senior-level course in Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, in the Department of Philosophy at SUNY Fredonia, after returning there from a year’s leave to study and do research in computer science and artificial intelligence (AI) at SUNY Buffalo. Of the 30 students enrolled, most were computerscience majors, about a third had no computer background, and only a handful had studied any philosophy. (I might note that enrollments have subsequently increased in the Philosophy Department’s (...) AI-related courses, such as logic, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and that several computer science students have added philosophy as a second major.) This article describes that course, provides material for use in such a course, and offers a bibliography of relevant articles in the AI, cognitive science, and philosophical literature. (shrink)
- The pastor and the patient.William J. Jacobs -1973 - New York,: Paulist Press.
- Reason and Moral Judgment, Logos, vol. 10.William J. Prior (ed.) -1989 - Santa Clara University.Export citation
Bookmark - A simple generalization of Turing computability.William J. Thomas -1979 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (1):95-102.
- Provably recursive real numbers.William J. Collins -1978 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (4):513-522.
- Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason - Edited by Michael Byron.William J. Fitzpatrick -2007 -Philosophical Books 48 (3):281-283.
- The construction of a Steiner triple system on sets of the power of the continuum without the axiom of choice.William J. Frascella -1966 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 7 (2):196-202.
- In Defense of Non-Natural Theistic Realism.William J. Wainwright -2010 -Faith and Philosophy 27 (4):457-463.Eric Wielenberg and I agree that basic moral truths are necessarily true. But Wielenberg thinks that, because these truths are necessary, they require no explanation, and I do not: some basic moral truths are not self-explanatory. I argue that Wielenberg’s reasons for thinking that my justification of that claim is inadequate are ultimately unconvincing.
- (1 other version)Context over Foundation: Dewey and Marx.William J. Gavin -1990 -Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 26 (4):521-530.No categories
- Philosophy for Children and Other People.William J. Rapaport -1987 -American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy (Summer):19-22.It is a matter of fact—and has been so for a considerable amount of time—that philosophy is taught at the pre—college level. However, to teach philosophy at that (or at any) level is one thing; to teach it well is quite another. Fortunately, it can be taught well, as a host of successful experiences and programs have shown. But in what ways can it be taught? Are there differences in the ways in which it can or should be taught at (...) the pre-college level from the ways in which it is taught in college? Are there differences in the ways in which it can or should be taught at the elementary-school level from ways in which it can or should be taught at the secondary-school level? There are other questions, of a similar nature, that the beginning college-level teacher of philosophy might ask: “I have never taught Introduction to Philosophy before; how should I go about it?” And there is a further question: Should it be taught at all? This question can, of course, be raised at any educational level, but it is especially acute at the elementary level. (shrink)
- Why Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?William J. Prior -1997 -Apeiron 30 (4):109 - 123.I argue that it was not Plato's intention in his Socratic dialogues to provide a biography of Socrates. Rather, his intention was to describe and defend the philosophical life against its critics. The Socratic dialogues are "unhappy encounters" between Socrates, defender of the life of philosophy, and those who do not comprehend or who reject that life.
- The Socialism of H. G. Wells in the Early Twentieth Century.William J. Hyde -1956 -Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (2):217.
- Countertheses: Communication, material conditions, and future sociocultural development.William J. MacKinnon -1968 -World Futures 7 (1):41-53.No categories
- Right Reverend Charles A. Hart, Ph.D., LL.D.William J. McDonald -1959 -New Scholasticism 33 (1):133-137.
- The “New” Approach to Gospel Study.William J. McGarry -1936 -Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 11 (1):86-106.No categories
- Natural Rights.William J. Wainwright -1967 -American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1):79 - 84.
- Richard Walter Peltz 1927-1975.William J. Wainwright -1974 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48:178 - 179.
- The Interaction Between Typically Developing Students and Peers With Autism Spectrum Disorder in Regular Schools in Ghana: An Exploration Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour.Maxwell Peprah Opoku,William Nketsia, J.-F.,Wisdom Kwadwo Mprah,Elvis Agyei-Okyere &Mohammed Safi -2021 -Frontiers in Psychology 12:752569.The purpose of this study is to assess the intention of typically developing peers towards learning in the classroom with students with Autism Spectrum Disorder. In developing countries, such as Ghana, the body of literature on the relationship between students with disabilities and typically developing peers has been sparsely studied. Using Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour as a theoretical framework for this study, 516 typically developing students completed four scales representing belief constructs, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural controls, hypothesised (...) to predict behavioural intention. The data were subjected to a t-test, analysis of variance, and structural equation modelling. The modelling confirmed the combining ability of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural controls to predict intention. We conclude by revealing the need for policymakers to consider designing programmes aimed towards promoting social relationships between students with ASD and typically developing peers. (shrink)
- Behavioral explanations reduce retributive punishment but not reward: The mediating role of conscious will.Joshua A. Confer &William J. Chopik -2019 -Consciousness and Cognition 75 (C):102808.
- Bayesian Model Selection with Network Based Diffusion Analysis.Andrew Whalen &William J. E. Hoppitt -2016 -Frontiers in Psychology 7.
- The ins and outs of working memory: dynamic processes associated with focus switching and search.Paul Verhaeghen,John Cerella,Chandramallika Basak,Kara Bopp,Yanmin Zhang & Hoyer &J.William -2007 - In Naoyuki Osaka, Robert H. Logie & Mark D'Esposito,The Cognitive Neuroscience of Working Memory. Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
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Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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