Works by Ward Jones
34 found
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| Ward E. Jones [31] | Ward Jones [3] | Ward Eaton Jones [1] |
- Why Do We Value Knowledge?Ward E. Jones -1997 -American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):423 - 439.
- Dissident versus loyalist: Which scientists should we trust?Ward Jones -2002 -Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):511-520.
- Philosophy, Progress, and Identity.Ward E. Jones -2017 - In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick,Philosophy's Future. Hoboken: Wiley. pp. 227–239.Philosophy, as I use it here, is a conversation, one stretching back through various canonical European and Ancient Greek texts at least to Thales. Has this conversation progressed? The main objection to philosophy's having a linear progression is dissensus – the fact that philosophers all disagree but still accept each other as peers. In this chapter, I argue that we should conceive of philosophy as being capable of a branching kind of progression: philosophy progresses when it gives us more ways (...) of conceiving of ourselves. (shrink)No categories
- Explaining our own beliefs: Non-epistemic believing and doxastic instability.Ward E. Jones -2002 -Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.It has often been claimed that our believing some proposition is dependent upon our not being committed to a non-epistemic explanation of why we believe that proposition. Very roughly, I cannot believe that p and also accept a non-epistemic explanation of my believing that p. Those who have asserted such a claim have drawn from it a range of implications: doxastic involuntarism, the unacceptability of Humean naturalism, doxastic freedom, restrictions upon the effectiveness of practical (Pascalian) arguments, as well as others. (...) If any of these implications are right, then we would do well to have a precise statement of the nature of this phenomenon central to first-person doxastic explanations, as well as of our reasons for believing that it holds. Both of these are lacking in the literature. This paper is an attempt to elucidate and defend this claim. (shrink)
- Current periodical articles 465.Why do We Value Knowledge &Ward E. Jones -1997 -American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4).No categories
- (1 other version)The Politics of Doing Philosophy in Africa: A Conversation.Ward E. Jones &Thaddeus Metz -2015 -South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):538-550.The background to the present discussion is the prevalence of political and personal criticisms in philosophical discussions about Africa. As philosophers in South Africa—both white and black—continue to philosophise seriously about Africa, responses to their work sometimes take the form of political and personal criticisms of, if not attacks on, the philosopher exploring and defending considerations about the African continent. One of us (TM) has been the target of such critiques in light of his work. Our aim in this conversation (...) is not to diminish or deflect such critiques. On the contrary, our aim is to understand them, to make them as strong as possible, and to bring them into the cooler realm of philosophical discussion. (shrink)
- Religious conversion, self‐deception, and Pascal's wager.Ward E. Jones -1998 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (2):167-188.Religious Conversion, Serf- Deception, and Pascal's Wager WARD E.JONES BLAISE PASCAL'S Pens~es is a sustained attempt to convert, to lead its reader to form the belief in the articles of faith. Pascal does not hope to convert by a direct presentation of evidence or argument, but rather attempts to induce in the reader a desire for belief in the articles of faith. He hopes that this desire will lead the reader to put herself in a situation in which she will (...) form the belief. Pascal, in other words, wants the reader to take control over her belief, to form it because she wants to do so. We commonly put ourselves in a situation for the purpose of forming beliefs. This is what happens when we choose to go, say, to university; choos- ing to learn is choosing to form beliefs in a given field. Pascal urges something more paradoxical. ~ He wants to induce us to form a particular belief . His dual aim is to induce the unbeliever to want a belief, and then to induce her to do what she can to gain that belief. Now if I want a particular belief, I might place myself in a situation in which nonrational or pragmatic determinants would bring about the belief. I might, that is, visit a hypnotist or a brainwasher, choosing some process which will either directly bring about the desired belief without involving my epistemic capabilities, or one which will diminish my epistemic capabilities. Alternatively, I might search for evidence for the.. (shrink)
- Belonging to the Ultra-Faithful: A Response to Eze.Ward E. Jones -2001 -Philosophical Papers 30 (3):215-222.No categories
- The• Goods and the Motivation of Believing.Ward E. Jones -2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard,Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 139--62.
- A Lover’s Shame.Ward E. Jones -2012 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):615-630.Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for (...) beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed. (shrink)
- Being moved by a way the world is not.Ward E. Jones -2011 -Synthese 178 (1):131-141.At the end of Lecture 3 of The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen suggests that we see the change of view involved in scientific revolutions as being, at least in part, emotional. In this paper, I explore one plausible way of cashing out this suggestion. Someone’s emotional approval of a description of the world, I argue, thereby shows that she takes herself to have reason to take that description seriously. This is true even if she is convinced—as a scientific community (...) is when it considers alternative theories—that this description is false, that it is not the way the world is. (shrink)
- The function and content of amusement.Ward E. Jones -2006 -South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):126-137.Once we establish that the fundamental subject matter of the study of humour is a mental state – which I will call finding funny – then it immediately follows that we need to find the content and function of this mental state. The main contender for the content of finding funny is the incongruous (the incongruity thesis ); the main contenders for the function of finding funny are grounded either in its generally being an enjoyable state (the gratification thesis ) (...) or its tendency to lead to biased social attitudes (the favouritism thesis ). While all three of these families of claims are well-supported and individually plausible, the situation looks different once we attempt to unify our accounts of the content and function of finding funny . While functions based in the gratification thesis readily combine with the incongruity thesis, it is not at all clear how the phenomenon described by the favouritism thesis arises from a state with this content. The upshot is that we may have to sideline the favouritism thesis in our theory of humour. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25(2) 2006: 126-137. (shrink)
- Can we infer naturalism from scepticism?Ward E. Jones -2000 -Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):433-451.
- El creer pragmático y su explicación.Ward E. Jones -2004 -Critica 36 (108):3-36.
- Philosophers, their context, and their responsibilities.Ward E. Jones -2006 -Metaphilosophy 37 (5):623-645.It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher or community of philosophers (...) of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts. (shrink)
- Is scientific theory-commitment doxastic or practical?Ward E. Jones -2003 -Synthese 137 (3):325 - 344.Associated with Bayesianism is the claim that insofar as thereis anything like scientific theory-commitment, it is not a doxastic commitment to the truth of the theory or any proposition involving the theory, but is rather an essentiallypractical commitment to behaving in accordance with a theory. While there are a number of a priori reasons to think that this should be true, there is stronga posteriori reason to think that it is not in fact true of current scientific practice.After outlining a (...) feature that distinguishes doxastic from practical commitment, I presentempirical evidence that suggests that, like perhaps all other theoretical commitment,scientific theory-commitment is doxastic. (shrink)
- Underdetermination and the explanation of theory-acceptance: A response to Samir Okasha.Ward E. Jones -2000 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):299 – 304.After a thorough examination of the claim that "the underdetermination of theory by evidence forces us to seek sociological explanations of scientists' cognitive choices", Samir Okasha concludes that the only significant problem with this argument is that the thesis of underdetermination is not adequately supported. Against Okasha, I argue (1) that there is a very good reason to question the inference from the underdetermination of a theory to a sociological account of that theory's acceptance, and (2) that Okasha's own objection (...) to the argument is too weak. (shrink)
- Wisdom as an Aim of Higher Education.Ward E. Jones -2015 -Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):1-15.IntroductionA central concern of theoretical speculation about education is the kind of epistemic states that education can and should aim to achieve. One such epistemic state, long neglected in both education theory and philosophy, is wisdom. Might wisdom be something that educators should aim for? And might it be something that their students can achieve? My answer will be a qualified yes.One qualification derives from the fact that in the present paper I will only be concerned with the potentiality of (...) wisdom to be an aim of higher education . Because my argument will depend upon some of the particular features of HE, it may not be extendable to primary or secondary education. A second qualification is that I will defend a place for only one kind of wisdom – what I will call epistemic wisdom – as an aim of HE. The limitation to epistemic wisdom, as we will see, derives in large part from the fact that in this paper I am seeking to establish wisdom as an achievable aim of all disc .. (shrink)
- The Philosophy of Motion Pictures, by Noël Carroll.Ward E. Jones -2013 -Mind 122 (486):fzt066.
- The king of pain.Ward E. Jones -2009 -The Philosophers' Magazine 47 (47):79-84.Dark comedies invite us to laugh at something which is, at least ostensibly, not funny at all. They take an act or event that would, under most descriptions or presentations, invite pity or anger, and give it characteristics that invite amusement. It is essential to the humour of the kidnapping in The King of Comedy that it is a kidnapping. The immorality of this event is crucial to its humour.
- Multiple Faces of Evil:: Our Human Response.Lyon Evans,Larry Harwood,Mary Hassinger,Ward Jones &Richard Morehouse -2000 -Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis 20 (2):127-154.Export citation
Bookmark - A Selective Bibliography of the Philosophy of Science.Ward Eaton Jones,Samir Okasha &W. Newton-Smith -1988 - Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral Philosopher.Ward E. Jones -2011 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2):209-220.
- Introduction.Ward E. Jones -2011 -South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):405-407.No categories
- John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding Reviewed by.Ward E. Jones -1997 -Philosophy in Review 17 (5):346-347.Export citation Bookmark
- Philosophers and the Poor.Ward E. Jones -2010 -Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 57 (125):99-123.This is a programmatic paper, calling for the renewal and modernisation of the therapeutic approach to philosophy found in Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics; and, in particular, for an application of the therapeutic approach to the life of poverty. The general assumption behind a therapeutic approach to philosophy is that it is possible for someone to be exposed to philosophical work which leads her to an improved understanding of herself and her situation, and for her life to be improved by this (...) understanding. After offering a sketch of how, given the current nature of academic philosophy, such work will be carried out and disseminated, I suggest three areas in which philosophical discourse could have a therapeutic affect on the poor. (shrink)
- Rumor, reproach, and the norms of testimony.Ward E. Jones -2005 -Public Affairs Quarterly 19 (3):195-212.
- South Africa.Ward E. Jones &Alexis Tabensky -2009 -The Philosophers' Magazine 45:40-44.
- Seeing Fictions in Film: The Epistemology of Movies, by George M. Wilson: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. viii + 220, £30.Ward E. Jones -2013 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):628 - 629.
- The Art of Dying.Ward E. Jones -2012 -Philosophical Papers 41 (3):435-454.Abstract In this paper, I explore what Jean Améry calls the ?aesthetic view of death?. I address the following three questions. To what extent, and how, do we take an aesthetic view of death? Why do we take an aesthetic view of death? Third, for those whose deaths are impending and have some choice over how they die?most prominently the elderly and the terminally ill?what would it mean for them to take an aesthetic view of their own impending deaths, and, (...) in particular, what would it mean for them to act in the light of such a view? (shrink)
- Venerating Death.Ward E. Jones -2015 -Philosophical Papers 44 (1):61-81.In this paper, I am concerned with elucidating and expanding our attitudes toward our own death. As it is, our common attitudes toward our death are the following: we fear our premature death, and we dread our inevitable death. These attitudes are rational, but I want to argue that our attitudes toward death should be more complicated than this. A condition upon our value, our preciousness, as creatures is that we are vulnerable, and our vulnerability is, at bottom, a vulnerability (...) to death. A corollary of this is that we could not be loved, either by ourselves or by others, for one cannot love—be concerned for—a being invulnerable to death. As a consequence, death plays a deep and abiding role in our value systems. Our susceptibility to premature and inevitable death is a condition upon our being valuable creatures and, in turn, it is a condition upon our being loved. Given the high value that we place on being valuable creatures who deserve love, we should equally place a high value on the const.. (shrink)
- Introduction.Ward E. Jones &Thomas Martin -2004 -Philosophical Papers 33 (3):243-250.No categories
- Miranda Fricker,Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. [REVIEW]Ward E. Jones -2009 -Ratio 22 (3):369-373.
- Review of Steven Luper (ed.),The Skeptics. [REVIEW]Ward E. Jones -2004 -Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (11).
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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