Coherent EEG indicators of cognitive binding during ambiguous figure tasks.W. R.Klemm,T. H. Li &J. L. Hernandez -2000 -Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):66-85.detailsWe tested the hypothesis that perception of an alternative image in ambiguous figures would be manifest as high-frequency (gamma) components that become synchronized over multiple scalp sites as a ''cognitive binding'' process occurs. For 171 combinations of data from 19 electrodes, obtained from 17 subjects and 10 replicate stimuli, we calculated the difference in correlation between the response to first seeing an ambiguous figure and when the alternative percept for that figure became consciously realized (cognitively bound). Numerous statistically significant correlation (...) differences occurred in all frequency bands tested with ambiguous-figure stimulation, but not in two kinds of control data (a reaction-time test to sound stimuli and a no-task, mind-wandering test). Statistically significant correlation changes were widespread, involving frontal, parietal, central, and occipital regions of both hemispheres. Correlation changes were evident at each of five frequency bands, ranging up to 62.5 Hz. Most of the statistically significant correlation changes were not between adjacent sites but between sites relatively distant, both ipsilateral and contralateral. Typically, these correlation changes occurred in more than one frequency band. These results suggest that cognitive binding is a distinct mental state that is reliably induced by ambiguous-figure perception tasks. Coherent oscillations at multiple frequencies may reflect the mechanism by which such binding occurs. Moreover, different coherent frequencies may mediate different components of the total cognitive-binding process. (shrink)
Hermeneutical Inquiry: Volume 2: The Interpretation of Existence.David E.Klemm -1986 - Oxford University Press USA.detailsThis two-volume work is a comprehensive reader in modern philosophical and theological hermeneutics. David E.Klemm has selected essays representing acknowledged classics in hermeneutics and the best modern hermeneutical thinkers. Volume One collects essays on the hermeneutics of texts. Volume Two collects works on the hermeneutics of existence. Each essay is preceded by an informative contextualizing introduction. Volume Two includes essays by: F. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey, E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, R. Bultmann, P. Tillich, P. Ricoeur, J. Habermas, H-G. Gadamer, (...) and R. Scharlemann. (shrink)
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Alexander of Aphrodisias. Supplement to "on the Soul".R. W. Alexander & Sharples (eds.) -2004 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.detailsThe "Supplement" transmitted as the second book of "On the Soul" by Alexander of Aphrodisias is a collection of short texts on a wide range of topics from psychology, including the general hylomorphic account of soul and its faculties, and the theory of vision; questions in ethics ; and issues relating to responsibility, chance and fate. One of the texts in the collection, "On Intellect", had a major influence on medieval Arabic and Western thought, greater than that of Alexander's "On (...) the Soul" itself. The treatises may all be by Alexander himself; certainly the majority of them are closely connected with his other works. Many of them, however, consist of collections of arguments on particular issues, collections which probably incorporate material from earlier in the history of the Peripatetic school. This translation is from a new edition of the Greek text based on a collation of all known manuscripts and comparison with medieval Arabic and Latin translations. (shrink)
De conceptie van Kali de Moeder.W. R. Van Brakell Buys -1938 -Synthese 3 (4):144 - 158.detailsLe culte grandiose de Kali, la Mère, son incomparable symbolisme, ses litanies et ses chants, embrasse l'âme de l'univers qu'il glorifie comme aucune conception religieuse ne le fit jamais. La terrifiante déesse sème la peste et les pires ravages sur ses pas, tout en accordant sa grâce et sa clémence à ses enfants assez hardis pour soulever l'horrible masque derrière lequel elle se cache la figure. Ceux-là retrouveront les traits radieux qui ont enchanté leur enfance. La sublime conception de Kali, (...) la Mère, découle d'une philosophie moniste qui s'écarte pourtant sensiblement de la philosophie Védanta de Shankara. Tous deux partent, il est vrai, de la même idée. Ils admettent l'un et l'autre une substance une, indivisible et éternelle, que les Védantins appellent Brahma et les adorateurs de Kali, la Mère, Siva. Mais il y a divergence quant aux manifestations. Pour Shankara il n'y a qu'illusion. Il tranche le lien qui rattache le phénomène à l'absolu. Il se demande qui a pu susciter l'apparence. Mais, l'absolu étant la vérité même, il n'a pu engendrer l'apparence pas plus que la lumière n'aurait pu engendrer l'obscurité. Qu'y avait-il donc de commun entre les Brahmas et Maya? A première vue il semble qu'il n'y a aucun rapport. Pour Shankara il n'était besoin d'aucune relation, puisque Maya n'existe pas en réalité et que le monde n'est que mirage. Le monde n'existe que pour l'esprit qui est lui-même sujet aux hallucinations. Adorer la Mère, c'est accepter l'univers dans ses aspects les plus terrifiants. Cette philosophie est diamétralement opposée au christianisme dans son culte du Dieu d'amour, du Père plein de miséricorde. Le christianisme enseigne que tout se fait pour notre bien, tandis que pour les adorateurs de Kali, l'univers est féroce et hostile à l'homme, qui avant tout doit se montrer supérieur aux événements. Mais Kali n'est pas seulement la destructrice. Si elle démolit inexorablement toutes les formes vitales qui ont fait leur temps et qui se détériorent, elle en crée au fur et à mesure des nouvelles. C'est dans cette conception de la Mère qu'il faut chercher tout d'abord le mystère de l'esprit indien. Dans son essence la plus intime la mère du monde est l'absolu, est Siva même. Comme telle elle représente la connaissance, l'entité et la joie absolues. Pour les adorateurs de Kali les mots Mantram Saham (je suis elle) renferment la clef de la vie et dissipent crainte et tristesse. (shrink)
Mensch en Kosmos bij Plotinus.W. R. Van Brakell Buys -1939 -Synthese 4 (6):293 - 308.detailsNotre époque, traversée de courants mystiques, manifeste un intérêt tout particulier pour les idées du neo-platonicien Plotin. Pour le platonicien l'univers participe à l'idée. Platon considérait les choses comme le reflet de l'idée, ce que Plotin se refusait à admettre. La diversité dont la vie fait preuve atteste son inépuisable richesse, et si les choses dans leur état particulier sont imparfaites et défectueuses, c'est que chaque chose représente sa particularité d'une façon imparfaite. Le dualisme platonicien se retrouve chez Plotin; à (...) côté du monde de l'erreur et de l'apparence il situe celui de la vérité et de la réalité. Mais l'ordre des deux mondes étant différent, nécessairement les catégories qui y règnent diffèrent. Contrairement au monde du temps et de l'espace, où tout est désaccord et combat, l'accord et l'harmonie règnent dans le monde de l'idée. D'après Platon l'idée de l'être implique l'idée du repos. Pour Plotin le mouvement et le repos ne sont pas incompatibles. Il y a encore un point de divergence entre les deux philosophes. Tandis que Platon conçoit le bien comme idée, Plotin le superpose au monde des idées et l'en sépare. A l'oppossé du maître il n'était pas dualiste mais moniste. La conception platonicienne du bien est purement éthique, c.a.d. humaine, la conception de Plotin est plus cosmique. L'univers lui apparaît comme une trinité: le monde sensoriel, le monde idéal et l'unité suprême, et il leur découvre une base commune. Tout en admettant l'imperfection du monde, Plotin nie qu'il soit mauvais et méprisable. Il se tourne contre les Gnostiques chrétiens qui prêchent le mépris du monde, et s'oppose vigoureusement aux doctrines qui font des jouissances sensuelles l'unique but de la vie. L'exercice de la vertu n'est autre chose que le moyen de s'unir à Dieu. Pour Plotin la vertu n'est donc pas une fin en elle-même, mais elle est subordonnée à un but qui la dépasse. (shrink)
La identidad social del hombre americano y argentino: Leopoldo Zea y José Ortega y Gasset.: Social Identity of the American and the Argentinean Man: Leopoldo Zea and José Ortega y Gasset.W. R. Daros -2006 -Estudios de Filosofía Práctica E Historia de Las Ideas 8:31-44.detailsEn el presente artículo se presenta, desde la filosofía, primeramente la tesis de L. Zea, según el cual la universidad del hombre americano, se halla en la aceptación de la diversidad concreta de las pluriformes maneras de ser de los americanos. Europa recién ahora se pone filosóficamente el problema de la pluralidad cultural. Se analiza luego la forma de considerar el gobierno y las leyes tanto de los americanos sajones como de los americanos latinos, cuando construyen sus propias formas de (...) ser. Se considera el intento y el fracaso al querer éstos imitar a aquéllos. Trata, además, la hipótesis de L. Zea según el cual la identidad de los pueblos latinoamericanos está en no tener ninguna que lo marque como pueblo y hombre común a toda América Latina, salvo ciertos rasgos de conducta común, derivados del talante conquistador español. Ortega y Gasset prolonga este análisis y lo centra en las influencias de la inmigración en Argentina, de lo que -entre otras causas- surge una explicación para ciertas conductas que dan forma a la identidad de los argentinos. Algo no ha cambiado en el modo de ser argentino: éste no se dedica primeramente a vivir la vida, sino a hacer fortuna y defenderse. Se identifica por lo que posee o desea poseer.This article presents, from a philosophical stand, firstly Leopoldo Zea's thesis according to which the American man's universality resides in his acceptance of the concrete diversity of the various ways of being American. Only now Europe is starting to consider philosophically the problem of cultural pluralism. Secondly, we analyze the way the Saxon Americans and the Latin Americans consider government and laws during their respective processes of becoming their own selves. We examine the intent and subsequent failure of the latter at trying to imitate the former; also, Zea's thesis according to which the identity of Latin American peoples lies precisely in not having a unique identity that define them as a man and people common to all Latin America, except for some behavioral traits deriving from the Spanish conqueror temper. Ortega y Gasset extends this analysis focusing on Argentina's immigration and concluding that this partially accounts for the Argentinean behavior and identity, their priority being to make a fortune and to defend themselves. Their identity rises from what they have or what they want to have. (shrink)
Many Minds, No Persons.W. R. Carter -2002 -Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.detailsFour non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...) person. I take all of this to support the view that we (human persons) are identical with human animals. (shrink)
The D-Completeness of T→.R. K. Meyer &M. W. Bunder -2010 -Australasian Journal of Logic 8:1-8.detailsA Hilbert-style version of an implicational logic can be represented by a set of axiom schemes and modus ponens or by the corresponding axioms, modus ponens and substitution. Certain logics, for example the intuitionistic implicational logic, can also be represented by axioms and the rule of condensed detachment, which combines modus ponens with a minimal form of substitution. Such logics, for example intuitionistic implicational logic, are said to be D-complete. For certain weaker logics, the version based on condensed detachment and (...) axioms (the condensed version of the logic) is weaker than the original. In this paper we prove that the relevant logic T→, and any logic of which this is a sublogic, is D-complete. (shrink)
Freedom, authority and economics: essays on Michael Polanyi's politics and economics.R. T. Allen,Klaus R. Allerbeck,Viktor Geng,Tihamér Margitay,Richard W. Moodey,Carl Phillips Mullins,Endre Nagy &Simon Smith (eds.) -2016 - Wilmington, Delaware: Vernon Press.detailsThis edited volume of original contributions deals with the economic and political thought of Michael Polanyi. Requiring little prior knowledge of Polanyi, this volume further develops a somewhat neglected side of Polanyi's work. In particular it examines the 'tacit integration', of subsidiary details into focal objects or actions as central to all knowing and action. It traces ontological counterparts in the structures of comprehensive entities and complex actions, and a multi-level universe in which lower levels have their boundary conditions, the (...) extents to which they apply, determined by those of the next higher level, whilst each possessing its own laws or operative principles. This schema of 'dual control' preserves the reality and relative autonomy of each level, and its interactions with others, against the various reductions. The essays in this volume also employ and develop important additional concepts and distinctions such as: 'corporate' and 'spontaneous' order; 'public' and 'private' liberties; 'general' and 'specific authority'; and 'moral inversion'; which, as the essays show, are necessary for understanding and maintaining a free society and the freedom of institutions within it. Among the topics treated with them are: more of the prerequisites of freedom in public liberties dedicated to principles and transcendent values; totalitarianism and society as spontaneous order; the balance of general and specific authority in society and particular institutions; reductionism, totalitarianism and consumption in consumer societies, as moral inversions; the mutual interactions of economics and politics as distinct and autonomous but interacting levels; the sociological aspects of economics; and Polanyi's own contributions to sociology. Although, as indicated, Polanyi has his special terms, the essays in this volume, like his works, give them meaning with concrete examples and so avoid merely shuffling a mass of abstractions. Together the essays show that his work is a rich seam of ideas and inspiration for yet further extension and application--Publisher. (shrink)
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Authority, Autonomy and the Legitimate State.R. W. K. Paterson -1992 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 9 (1):53-64.detailsABSTRACT R. P. Wolff has argued that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the distinguishing mark of every state, viz. supreme authority over all its citizens, and the primary obligation of rational beings, viz. to act autonomously by taking moral responsibility for all of their actions. Utilitarian and consent theories which seek to justify the state's claim to possess a monopoly of the rightful use of force are shown to fail and the concept of a ‘legitimate state’to be morally incoherent. (...) However, Wolff's version of individualist anarchism does not follow. Human beings are by no means equally rational or homogeneously autonomous. There are ‘states’which have a contingent and variable right to enforce obedience over an indefinitely large number of their ‘subjects’, although not over those who are autonomous because rational in high degree. (shrink)