Works by W. Seager
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- The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism.William Seager (ed.) -2019 - Routledge.Panpsychism is the view that consciousness a sh the most puzzling and strangest phenomenon in the entire universe a sh is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the.
- Consciousness, information, and panpsychism.William Seager -1995 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):272-88.The generation problem is to explain how material configurations or processes can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that this is what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposes to side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness is an absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agree that the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousness to be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about what it is to be (...) a fundamental feature of the world. In fact, I argue that taking the idea seriously ought to lead to some form of panpsychism. Powerful objections have been advanced against panpsychism, but I attempt to outline a form of the doctrine which can evade them. In the end, I suspect that we will face a choice between panpsychism and rethinking the legitimacy of the generation problem itself. (shrink)
- Panpsychism, aggregation and combinatorial infusion.William Seager -2010 -Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.Deferential Monadic Panpsychism is a view that accepts that physical science is capable of discovering the basic structure of reality. However, it denies that reality is fully and exhaustively de- scribed purely in terms of physical science. Consciousness is missing from the physical description and cannot be reduced to it. DMP explores the idea that the physically fundamental features of the world possess some intrinsic mental aspect. It thereby faces a se- vere problem of understanding how more complex mental states (...) emerge from the mental features of the fundamental features. Here I explore the idea that a new form of aggregative emergence, which I call 'combinatorial infusion', could shed light on this problem and bolster the prospects for this form of panpsychism. (shrink)
- Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction.William Seager -1999 - New York: Routledge.The most remarkable fact about the universe is that certain parts of it are conscious. Somehow nature has managed to pull the rabbit of experience out of a hat made of mere matter. Making its own contribution to the current, lively debate about the nature of consciousness, Theories of Consciousness introduces variety of approaches to consciousness and explores to what extent scientific understanding of consciousness is possible. Including discussion of key figures, such as Descartes, Foder, Dennett and Chalmers, the book (...) covers identity theories, representational theories, intentionality, externalism, and the new information-based theories. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager &David Bourget -2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider,The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 261-276.A representationalist-friendly introduction to representationalism which covers a number of central problems and objections.
- The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism.William E. Seager -2006 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.Strawson’s case in favor of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I’ll call the ‘intrinsic nature’ argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high caliber metaphysical weaponry (despite the ‘down home’ appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let’s spend some time trying to articulate its general form.
- (1 other version)Panpsychism.William Seager -2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.No categories
- Metaphysics of Consciousness.William Seager -1991 - London ;: Routledge._Metaphysics of Consciousness_ opens with a development of the physicalist outlook that denies the need for any explanation of the mental. This "inexplicability" is demonstrated not to be sufficient as refutation of physicalism. However, the inescapable particularity of modes of consciousness appears to overpower this minimal physicalism. This book proposes that such an inference requires either a wholly new conception of how consciousness is physical or a deep and disturbing new kind of physical inexplicability.
- Emotional introspection.William E. Seager -2002 -Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines emotional consciousness from the standpoint of the representational theory of consciousness . Two interesting developments spring from this. The first is the need for the (...) representation of value, which is distinctive of emotional experience. The second is an extension of RTC’s theory of introspection to emotional states, revealing why emotional consciousness is so often introspective even though introspective abilities are not needed to experience emotions, and also explaining why introspection of emotional states is so much less reliable than that of other states of consciousness. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Metaphysics of Consciousness.John Heil &William Seager -1993 -Philosophical Review 102 (4):612.
- Representational theories of consciousness, parts I and II.William E. Seager -1999 - In William Seager,Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction. New York: Routledge.
- A cold look at HOT theory.William E. Seager -2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro,Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
- Emergentist panpsychism.William Seager -2012 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.There are many possible forms of panpsychism. In this paper, I discuss a type of panpsychism in which the complex mental states of higher-level entities emerge from a system, or organization, of fundamental entities which possess extremely simple forms of mentality. I argue that this sort of panpsychism is surprisingly plausible, especially in light of the notorious difficulties raised by consciousness. Emergentist panpsychism faces a distinctive challenge, however. In so far as panpsychism embraces emergentism of the mental, a purely physicalist (...) emergence seems to be metaphysically more economical. I will argue that a basic analysis of emergence throws this claim into doubt. (shrink)
- Disjunctive laws and supervenience.William E. Seager -1991 -Analysis 51 (2):93-98.
- Weak supervenience and materialism.William E. Seager -1988 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):697-709.THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT WEAK SUPERVENIENCE IS\nSUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE\nMATERIALISM. SUPERVENIENCE IS A RELATION BETWEEN FAMILIES\nOF PROPERTIES, SUCH THAT, ROUGHLY SPEAKING, FAMILY A\nSUPERVENES ON FAMILY B IF ANY OBJECTS WHICH ARE\nINDISCERNIBLE WITH RESPECT TO B ARE THEREBY INDISCERNIBLE\nWITH RESPECT TO A. WEAK SUPERVENIENCE IS SUPERVENIENCE\nRESTRICTED TO ONE POSSIBLE WORLD; STRONG SUPERVENIENCE IS A\n"NECESSARY" SUPERVENIENCE EXTENDING ACROSS SOME PRINCIPLED\nSET OF POSSIBLE WORLDS. THESE NOTIONS ARE MADE SOMEWHAT\nMORE RIGOROUS FOLLOWING JAEGWON KIM'S DEVELOPMENT OF THEM.\nKIM HAS ARGUED THAT ONLY (...) STRONG SUPERVENIENCE CAN GROUND A\n'ROBUST' MATERIALISM, SO THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY CRITICIZING\nHIS ARGUMENTS FOR THIS POSITION. IT ARGUES THAT ANY FORM OF\nSTRONG SUPERVENIENCE IS IN FACT TOO STRONG TO CHARACTERIZE\nMATERIALISM AS IT IS NORMALLY CONCEIVED, FOR MATERIALISM IS\nNEITHER LOGICALLY NOR PHYSICALLY NECESSARY. BUT THE DAY IS\nSAVED AS WEAK SUPERVENIENCE CAN BE SHOWN TO BE JUST\nSUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO GROUND MATERIALISM. IN PARTICULAR,\nIT IS SHOWN THAT SUPERVENIENCE CAN SUPPORT COUNTERFACTUALS\nWITHOUT REQUIRING ANY NOTION OF "NECESSARY"\nSUPERVENIENCE. (shrink)
- Ground truth and virtual reality: Hacking vs. Van Fraassen.William Seager -1995 -Philosophy of Science 62 (3):459-478.Hacking argues against van Fraassen's constructive empiricism by appeal to features of microscopic imaging. Hacking relies on both our practices involving imaging instruments and the structure of the images produced by these micropractices. Van Fraassen's reply is formally correct yet fundamentally unsatisfying. I aim to strengthen van Fraassen's reply, but must then extend constructive empiricism, specifically the central notion of "theoretical immersion." I argue that immersion is more analogous to entering a virtual reality than to learning a language. This metaphor (...) assimilates instrument-based practice as well as theoretical debate and explanation, and can provide an anti-realist view of our micro-practices consonant with constructive empiricism. (shrink)
- Dennett, part I and II.William E. Seager -1999 - In William Seager,Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction. New York: Routledge.
- Externalism and token identity.William E. Seager -1992 -Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):439-48.Donald Davidson espouses two fundamental theses about the individuation of mental events. The thesis of causal individuation asserts that sameness of cause and effect is sufficient and necessary for event identity. The thesis of content individuation gives only a sufficient condition for difference of mental events: if e and f have different contents then they are different mental events. I argue that given these theses, psychological externalism--the view that mental content is determined by factors external to the subject of the (...) relevant mental events--entails that the token identity theory is false. (shrink)
- Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager -2000 -Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.RésuméFred Dretske a développé, à titre de composante de sa théorie de la conscience, une théorie de I'introspection. Celle-ciprésente une plausibilityé indépendante, elle résiste à des objections qui affectent nombre d'autres théories et elle suggère des liens très féconds dans plusieurs domaines de la science cognitive. La version qu'en donne Dretske est restreinte à la connaissance introspective des états perceptuels. Mon objectif ici est d'étendre la théorie à tous les états mentaux. Le mécanisme qui est fondamental dans cette approche est (...) celui de la «conscience déplacée», c'est-à-dire le fait d'en venir à connaître quelque chose via l'expérience consciente que nous avons de quelque chose d'autre. Nous atteignons la connaissance introspective par l'application à notre propre expérience consciente du monde (et de nos corps) de la connaissance que nous avons de ce qui est de l'ordre du mental. (shrink)
- Consciousness, value and functionalism.William E. Seager -2001 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.Charles Siewert presents a series of thought experiment based arguments against a wide range of current theories of phenomenal consciousness which I believe achieves a considerable measure of success. One topic which I think gets insufficient attention is the discussion of functionalism and I address this here. Before that I consider the intriguing issue, which is seldom considered but figures prominently at the close of Siewert's book, of the value of consciousness. In particular, I broach the question of whether the (...) value of consciousness has any impact on our theoretical understanding of consciousness. (shrink)
- A brief history of the philosophical problem of consciousness.William E. Seager -2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson,Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 9--33.
- The Discreet Charm of Counterpart Theory.Graeme Hunter &William Seager -1980 -Analysis 41 (2):73 - 76.
- Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order.William Seager -2013 -Foundations of Physics 43 (4):548-567.Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals a powerful (...) and extremely interesting metaphysical view of the world. This view is akin to that of Russellian Monism, in which the empirical world studied by science is restricted to relational features that stand in need of some background intrinsic properties to ground their reality. This allows for a theory that can embrace a world which exhibits a reasonable and plausible sort of emergence (especially of domains that fall under classical concepts) while also making room for distinctive and scientifically intransigent properties such as consciousness. (shrink)
- Descartes on the Union of Mind and Body.William E. Seager -1988 -History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2):119 - 132.
- Real patterns and surface metaphysics.William E. Seager -2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David Thompson,Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 95--129.Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas.
- Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness.William E. Seager -1994 -Analysis 54 (4):270-76.
- Rosenberg, reducibility and consciousness.William E. Seager -2006 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.Rosenberg’s general argumentative strategy in favour of panpsychism is an extension of a traditional pattern. Although his argument is complex and intricate, I think a model that is historically significant and fundamentally similar to the position Rosenberg advances might help us understand the case for panpsychism. Thus I want to begin by considering a Leibnizian argument for panpsychism.
- The elimination of experience.William Seager -1993 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):345-65.
- Functionalism, qualia and causation.William E. Seager -1983 -Mind 92 (April):174-88.
- The logic of lost lingens.William Seager -1990 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (4):407 - 428.
- The Worm in the Cheese Leibniz, Consciousness and Matter.William Seager -1991 -Studia Leibnitiana 23 (1):79-91.Leibniz argumentiert in der Monadologie, daß das Bewußtsein nicht auf rein mechanische und materielle Prozesse reduziert werden kann. Diesem wohlbekannten Argument wird bisweilen ein elementarer Trugschluß der Zusammensetzung vorgeworfen. Meiner Meinung nach hingegen weist dieses Argument eher auf ein grundlegendes Problem in unserem physikalischen Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes hin, einem Verständnis, das auch heute noch akzeptiert wird. Ich zeige jedoch weiterhin, daß Leibniz nicht erkannt hat, daß sein Argument die Möglichkeit offen läßt, daß es unsere begrifflichen Grenzen sind, die uns (...) daran hindern, das Bewußtsein durch materielle Prozesse zu verstehen. (shrink)No categories
- The constructed and the secret self.William E. Seager -2001 - In Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi,Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11. John Benjamins.
- The Problem of Consciousness by Colin McGinn. [REVIEW]William Seager -1994 -Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):327-330.
- Supervenience and Mind. [REVIEW]William Seager -1996 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):730-733.
- Emergence and supervenience.William E. Seager -manuscriptThe metaphysical relation of supervenience has seen most of its service in the fields of the philosophy of mind and ethics. Although not repaying all of the hopes some initially invested in it – the mind-body problem remains stubbornly unsolved, ethics not satisfactorily naturalized – the use of the notion of supervenience has certainly clarified the nature and the commitments of so- called non-reductive materialism, especially with regard to the questions of whether explanations of supervenience relations are required and whether (...) such explanations must amount to a kind of reduction. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Is self-representation necessary for consciousness?William Seager -2006 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I (...) also advance a speculative proposal that we are never aware of any distinctively mental attributes of our own states of consciousness except via an independent act of reflective conceptualization, although this goes rather farther than the first-order theory strictly requires. (shrink)
- A New Idea Of Reality: Pauli on the Unity of Mind and Matter.William Seager -2011 -Mind and Matter 9 (1):37-52.In his extraphysical speculations around the mid 20th century, the physicist Wolfgang Pauli proposed, together with the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, a kind of 'dual-aspect monism' as a framework for conceiving of the mind-matter problem. It is discussed how this framework can be related to more recent developments in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.Export citation
Bookmark - Yesterday’s Algorithm: Penrose and the Gödel Argument.William Seager -2003 -Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):265-273.Roger Penrose is justly famous for his work in physics and mathematics but he is _notorious_ for his endorsement of the Gödel argument (see his 1989, 1994, 1997). This argument, first advanced by J. R. Lucas (in 1961), attempts to show that Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem can be seen to reveal that the human mind transcends all algorithmic models of it1. Penrose's version of the argument has been seen to fall victim to the original objections raised against Lucas (see Boolos (...) (1990) and for a particularly intemperate review, Putnam (1994)). Yet I believe that more can and should be said about the argument. Only a brief review is necessary here although I wish to present the argument in a somewhat peculiar form. (shrink)
- Credibility, confirmation and explanation.William Seager -1987 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):301-317.
- (2 other versions)Emergence and efficacy.William Seager -2004 - In Christina E. Erneling,The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.No categories
- The anomalousness of the mental.William E. Seager -1981 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):389-401.
- (1 other version)Fodor's theory of content: Problems and objections.William E. Seager -1993 -Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77.Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everything's being literally meaningful (...) (since everything has a cause). I argue that a detailed examination of the theory reveals that neither burden can be successfully shouldered. (shrink)
- Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution.William Seager -2002 -Mind 111 (442):406-410.
- (1 other version)Thought and syntax.William E. Seager -1992 -Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.It has been argued that Psychological Externalism is irrelevant to psychology. The grounds for this are that PE fails to individuate intentional states in accord with causal power, and that psychology is primarily interested in the causal roles of psychological states. It is also claimed that one can individuate psychological states via their syntactic structure in some internal "language of thought". This syntactic structure is an internal feature of psychological states and thus provides a key to their causal powers. I (...) argue that in fact any syntactic structure deserving the name will require an external individuation no less than the semantic features of psychological states. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Are zombies logically possible? -- And why it matters.William E. Seager -manuscriptA philosophical zombie is a being physically indistinguishable from an actual or possible human being, inhabiting a possible world where the _physical_ laws are identical to the laws of the actual world, but which completely lacks consciousness. For zombies, all is dark within, and hence they are, at the most fundamental level, utterly different from us. But, given their definition, this singular fact has no direct implications about the kind of motion, or other physical processes, the zombie will undergo within (...) its own world. Under quite standard physicalist assumptions, such as certain assumptions about the 'initial conditions' of the zombie's world and that of the causal closure of the physical. (shrink)
- Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism.William Seager -2010 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:217-237.The doctrine of physicalism can be roughly spelled out simply as the claim that the physical state of the world determines the total state of the world. However, since there are many forms of determination, a somewhat more precise characterization is needed. One obvious problem with the simple formulation is that the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism holds that the mental is determined by the physical (and epiphenomenalists need not assert that there are any properties except mental and physical ones, so (...) one can freely add to epiphenomenalism the claim that everything is determined by the physical state of the world). However, the orthodox view, which seems obviously correct, is that physicalists would and should balk at the claim that epiphenomenalism is a form of physicalism. The philosophical zombie thought experiment vividly reveals exactly why epiphenomenalism is not a version of physicalism. According to traditional epiphenomenalism the determination relation in question is causation, and causal relations do not hold with full necessity. They hold with at most nomological necessity. Thus there is a possible world, w, in which the causal laws (or, if one prefers a more Humean approach, where the cosmic regularities) are different in such a way that the physical states which in the actual world cause mental states either cause no mental states at all in w (the zombie option) or cause aberrant mental states (the inverted spectrum option). Why should the physicalist care about this ‘mere possibility’? Because it shows that the mental can vary independently of the physical and there can be no better demonstration of ontological distinctness 1 than independent variation. Therefore, physicalism requires that the sort of determination at issue must exhibit maximum modal force; it must be absolutely impossible for the mental to vary without attendant, determining physical variation (let us label this relation ‘logical determination’). I think the best way to state physicalism which meets this constraint is in terms of what are called minimal physical duplicates (MPDs) of possible worlds (an approach pioneered by David Lewis, see Lewis (1983b); see also Jackson (1998) and Chalmers and Jackson (2001)).. (shrink)
- Reply to Forbes.William Seager &Alonso Church -1982 -Analysis 42 (4):224-226.
- William S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions Reviewed by.William Seager -1990 -Philosophy in Review 10 (6):252-255.Export citation Bookmark
- Whitehead and the revival (?) Of panpsychism.William E. Seager -manuscriptWhitehead’s philosophy is of perennial scholarly interest as one of the relatively few really serious attempts at a systematic metaphysics. But unlike almost all major ‘philosophical systems’ it is not merely an historical curiosity, but retains contemporary supporters actively deploying Whitehead’s viewpoint in discussion of a variety of live philosophical problems. Furthermore, Whitehead’s metaphysics is the sole example of a comprehensive philosophical system which aims to take into account the radical transformation of science which occurred at the beginning of the (...) twentieth century with the development of relativity and quantum mechanics, developments with which Whitehead was, as a first rate mathematician, highly familiar. (shrink)
- Leibniz Lexicon.Reinhard Finster,Graeme Hunter,Robert F. Mcrae,Murray Miles &William E. Seager -1990 - Springer.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Gwen Bradford
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James Chase
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Ezio Di Nucci
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
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Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
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