Results for 'W. Perrett'
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- Truthtelling and fatal illness.Graham Oddie &Perrett Roy W. -1986 -New Zealand Medical Journal:759-61.Export citation
Bookmark - Truth, relativism and western conceptions of indian philosophy.Roy W.Perrett -1998 -Asian Philosophy 8 (1):19 – 29.We (relatively few) Western analytic philosophers who also work on classical Indian philosophy commonly encounter puzzlement or suspicion from our colleagues in Western philosophy because of our Indian interests. The ubiquity of these attitudes is itself revealing of Western conceptions of Indian philosophy, though their origins lie in cultural history often unknown to those who hold them. In the first part of this paper I relate a small but significant slice of that history before going on to distinguish and illustrate (...) three different Western conceptions of Indian philosophy associated with three different approaches to India: the magisterial, the exoticist and the curatorial. I argue that none of these three approaches gives us an adequate conception of Indian philosophy: the magisterial approach is overly dismissive, the exoticist approach misrepresents the analytical achievements of Indian philosophy, and the curatorial approach fails to take seriously Indian philosophy's concern with truth. I advocate instead a different Western approach to Indian philosophy, an approach suggested by the Indian philosophers' own discussions of the problem of truth. (shrink)
- Confrontations with the Reaper: a Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death.The Metaphysics of Death.Roy W.Perrett -1995 -Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):234-236.
- An Introduction to Indian Philosophy.Roy W.Perrett -2016 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.This wide-ranging introduction to classical Indian philosophy is philosophically rigorous without being too technical for beginners. Through detailed explorations of the full range of Indian philosophical concerns, including some metaphilosophical issues, it provides readers with non-Western perspectives on central areas of philosophy, including epistemology, logic, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. Chapters are structured thematically, with each including suggestions for further reading. This provides readers with an informed overview, whilst enabling them to focus on particular topics if (...) needed. Translated Sanskrit texts are accompanied by authorial explanations and contextualizations, giving the reader an understanding of the argumentative context and philosophical style of Indian texts. A detailed glossary and a guide to Sanskrit pronunciation equip readers with the tools needed for reading and understanding Sanskrit terms and names. The book will be an essential resource for both beginners and advanced students of philosophy and Asian studies. (shrink)
- Hindu Ethics: A Philosophical Study.Roy W.Perrett -1998 - University of Hawaii Press."This philosophical study offers a representation of the logical structure of classical Hindu ethics and argues for the availability of at least the core of this ethical system to Westerners."--Page [4] Cover.No categories
- Regarding Immortality.Roy W.Perrett -1986 -Religious Studies 22 (2):219 - 233.Would personal immortality have any value for one so endowed? An affirmative answer would seem so obvious to some that they might be tempted to go so far as to claim that immortality is a condition of life's having any value at all. The claim that immortality is a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of life seems untenable. What, however, of the claim that immortality is a sufficient condition for the meaningfulness of life? Though some might hold this to be (...) the characteristic religious view, this is certainly disputable. Thus McTaggart reminds us, for instance, that ‘Buddhism... holds immortality to be the natural state of man, from which only the most perfect can escape.’ I want to argue that we can imagine variants of personal immortality which would not be valuable and hence immortality in itself cannot be a sufficient condition for value. What is required for the meaningfulness of life is that life exhibit certain valuable qualities. But then the endless exhibition of these qualities is not only unnecessary for the meaningfulness of life, but the endlessness of a life can even devalue those qualities that would make valuable a single, bounded life. (shrink)
- Buddhist idealism and the problem of other minds.Roy W.Perrett -2017 -Asian Philosophy 27 (1):59-68.This essay is concerned with Indian Yogācāra philosophers’ treatment of the problem of other minds in the face of a threatened collapse into solipsism suggested by Vasubandhu’s epistemological argument for idealism. I discuss the attempts of Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti to address this issue, concluding that Dharmakīrti is best seen as addressing the epistemological problem of other minds and Ratnakīrti as addressing the conceptual problem of other minds.
- The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain.Roy W.Perrett -1997 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):49-58.Philosophical defenders of animal liberation believe that we have direct duties to animals. Typically a presumption of that belief is that animals have the capacity to experience pain and suffering. Notoriously, however, a strand of Western scientific and philosophical thought has held animals to be incapable of experiencing pain, and even today one frequently encounters in discussions of animal liberation expressions of scepticism about whether animals really experience pain. -/- The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain responds to this scepticism by (...) claiming that it is just as reasonable for me to believe that animals feel pain, given my only evidence for this is shared behaviour and physiology, as it is for me to believe that other humans feel pain on the basis of similar evidence. In this paper I expound and defend this Argument. (shrink)
- The unreality of words.Roy W.Perrett -2023 -Synthese 201 (1):1-18.Philosophers of language and linguists need to be wary of generalizing from too small a sample of natural languages. They also need to be wary of neglecting possible insights from philosophical traditions that have focused on natural languages other than the most familiar Western ones. Take, for example, classical Indian philosophy, where philosophical concerns with language were very much involved with the early development of Sanskrit linguistics. Indian philosophers and linguists frequently discussed more general issues about semantics, often in ways (...) that are both similar to and interestingly different from Western philosophers.One such issue is the problem of sentential unity: what is the relation of our understanding of the meaning of a sentence to our understanding of the meaning of the words that compose it? If words have meanings, why is the meaning of a sentence not just the meaning of the words that compose it? A challenging Indian response is that of the grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari (fifth-century), who advocated for a kind of sentence-holism according to which words are unreal and sentence-meaning is primary. (shrink)No categories
- Personal Identity, Reductionism and the Necessity of Origins.Roy W.Perrett &Charles Barton -1999 -Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):277-294.A thought that we all entertain at some time or other is that the course of our lives might have been very different from the way they in fact have been, with the consequence that we might have been rather different sorts of persons than we actually are. A less common, but prima facie intelligible thought is that we might never have existed at all, though someone rather like us did. Arguably, any plausible theory of personal identity should be able (...) to accommodate both possibilities. Certain currently popular Reductionist theories of personal identity, however, seem to be deficient in precisely this respect. This paper explores some Reductionist responses to that challenge. (shrink)
- Indian philosophy: a collection of readings.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2001 - New York: Garland.1. Epistemology -- 2. Logic and philosophy of language -- 3. Metaphysics -- 4. Philosophy of religion -- 5. Theory of value.
- Evidence accumulation in cell populations responsive to faces: an account of generalisation of recognition without mental transformations.D. I.Perrett,M. W. Oram &E. Ashbridge -1998 -Cognition 67 (1-2):111-145.
- Rebirth.Roy W.Perrett -1987 -Religious Studies 23 (1):41 - 57.Traditional Western conceptions of immortality characteristically presume that we come into existence at a particular time , live out our earthly span and then die. According to some, our death may then be followed by a deathless post-mortem existence. In other words, it is assumed that we are born only once and die only once; and that – at least on some accounts – we are future-sempiternal creatures. The Western secular tradition affirms at least ; the Western religious tradition – (...) Christianity, Judaism, Islam – generally affirms both and . The Indian tradition, however, typically denies both and . That is, it maintains both that we all have pre-existed beginninglessly, and that we have lived many times before and must live many times again in this world. The Indian picture, then, is that we have died and been reborn innumerable times previous to this life and we will be reborn many times in the future. This is sometimes called the Indian belief in reincarnation. The difficulty with this usage is that the term ‘reincarnation’ suggests a belief in an immortal soul that transmigrates or reincarnates. However Buddhism, while affirming rebirth, specifically denies the existence of an eternal soul. Thus the term ‘rebirth’ is preferable for referring to the generally espoused Indian doctrine. (shrink)
- Tolstoy, Death and the Meaning of Life.Roy W.Perrett -1985 -Philosophy 60 (232):231-245.Questions about the meaning of life have traditionally been regarded as being of particular concern to philosophers. It is sometimes complained that contemporary analytic philosophy fails to address such questions, but there do exist illuminating recent discussions of these questions by analytic philosophers.1Perhaps what lurks behind the complaint is a feeling that these discussions are insufficiently close to actual living situations and hence often seem rather thin and bland compared with the vivid portrayals of such situations in autobiography or fiction. (...) I therefore want to focus on two works by Tolstoy—one autobiographical, one fictional—and try to see what philosophical lessons can be learned from them, particularly with regard to questions about the relation of death to the meaning of life. (shrink)
- Philosophy as Farce, or Farce as Philosophy.Roy W.Perrett -1984 -Philosophy 59 (229):373 - 381.
- Indigenous rights and environmental justice.Roy W.Perrett -1998 -Environmental Ethics 20 (4):377-391.The modern environmental movement has a tradition of respect for indigenous cultures and many environmentalists believe that there are important ecological lessons to be learned from studying the traditional life styles of indigenous peoples. More recently, however, some environmentalists have become more sceptical. This scepticism has been sharpened by current concerns with the cause of indigenous rights. Indigenous peoples have repeatedly insisted on their rights to pursue traditional practices or to develop their lands, even when the exercise of these rights (...) has implications in conflict with environmentalist values. These conflicts highlight some important questions in environmental ethics, particularly about the degree to which global environmental justice should be constrained by therecognition of indigenous rights. I explore some of these issues and argue for the relevance of the “capability approach” to environmental justice. (shrink)
- Buddhism and Abortion.R. W.Perrett -1999 -Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (5):424-425.
- Instrumentalist Interpretations of Hindu Environmental Ethics.Roy W.Perrett -2018 -Sophia 57 (4):661-668.Many environmental ethicists believe that any adequate environmental ethic should attribute ‘direct moral standing’ to plants, animals, and the rest of nature. But certain interpretations of Hindu environmental ethics apparently attribute only instrumental value to nature. This places them in direct conflict with the purported adequacy condition on an environmental ethic. So, is such a Hindu ethical view really inadequate? In his recent book Hinduism and Environmental Ethics, Christopher Framarin claims that it is because Hindu instrumentalism about nature is either (...) viciously circular or unacceptably arbitrary. I argue, however, that Framarin’s claim founders in virtue of his misconstruing the logical structure of instrumental value. (shrink)
- Indigenous language rights and political theory: The case of te reo māori.Roy W.Perrett -2000 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):405 – 417.
- Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2000 - New York: Routledge.First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
- The Philosopher as Writer: The Eighteenth Century (review).Roy W.Perrett -1989 -Philosophy and Literature 13 (2):378-379.
- Death and immortality.Roy W.Perrett -1987 - Hingham, MA: Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.INTRODUCTION In The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer writes: Death is the real inspiring genius or Musagetes of philosophy, and for this reason ...
- Philosophical Finesse: Studies in the Art of Rational Persuasion (review).Roy W.Perrett -1990 -Philosophy and Literature 14 (1):157-158.
- Indian Philosophy of Religion.Roy W.Perrett -1993 -International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (1):62-64.
- Intentionality and self-awareness.Roy W.Perrett -2003 -Ratio 16 (3):222-235.In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional . The other is the Self-Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the (...) two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them. (shrink)
- Evil and Human Nature.Roy W.Perrett -2002 -The Monist 85 (2):304-19.One familiar philosophical use of the term ‘evil’ just contrasts it with ‘good’, i.e., something is an evil if it is a bad thing, one of life’s “minuses.” This is the sense of ‘evil’ that is used in posing the traditional theological problem of evil, though it is customary there to distinguish between moral evils and natural evils. Moral evils are those bad things that are caused by moral agents; natural evils are those bad things that are not caused by (...) moral agents. Since the existence of evils of both sorts is usually taken to be indubitable, the problem of evil is then construed as the problem of how to square their existence with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. (shrink)
- Computationality, Mind and Value: the case of S¯mkhya-Yoga.Roy W.Perrett -2001 -Asian Philosophy 11 (1):5-14.Associated with the successful development of computer technology has been an increasing acceptance of computational theories of the mind. But such theories also seem to close the gap between ourselves and machines, threatening traditional notions of our special value as non-physical conscious minds. Prima facie, Sāmkhya-Yoga - the oldest school of classical Indian philosophy, with its dualism between purusa and prakrti - seems a case in point. However, Sāmkhya-Yoga dualism is not straightforwardly a mind-body dualism and in order to understand (...) exactly where it stands on the mind-body problem we need a more nuanced characterisation of that problem than is usual. Once this is done, it seems that Sāmkhya-Yoga may well be able to accommodate the most plausible parts of the computational theory of mind. (shrink)
- Ineffability, signification and the meaning of life.Roy W.Perrett -2010 -Philosophical Papers 39 (2):239-255.There is an apparent tension between two familiar platitudes about the meaning of life: (i) that 'meaning' in this context means 'value', and (ii) that such meaning might be ineffable. I suggest a way of trying to bring these two claims together by focusing on an ideal of a meaningful life that fuses both the axiological and semantic senses of 'significant'. This in turn allows for the possibility that the full significance of a life might be ineffable not because its (...) axiological significance is ineffable, but because its semantic significance is ineffable in virtue of the signification relation itself being unsignifiable. I then explore to what degree this claim about signification can be adequately defended. (shrink)
- Solipsism and religious belief.Roy W.Perrett -1981 -Sophia 20 (3):17-26.In "arguments for the existence of god" and "faith and knowledge", john hick argues for the rationality of religious belief on the basis of an analogy between religious and perceptual belief. i reply that the analogy does not obtain because there is no alternative solipsistic interpretation of perceptual belief possible. this is because (a) hick's phenomenology of dreaming is unsatisfactory and (b) wittgenstein's "private language" argument shows solipsism to be an unintelligible option.
- Studies in Buddhist Philosophy by Mark Siderits.Roy W.Perrett -2017 -Philosophy East and West 68 (1):1-5.Over the last few decades Mark Siderits has established himself as a leading philosophical interpreter of Indian Buddhist philosophy. He has published widely in this field, but three of his books are particularly well known: his Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy, a self-styled "essay in fusion philosophy"; his introductory textbook Buddhism as Philosophy ; and–with Shōryū Katsura–his translation and commentary, Nāgārjuna's Middle Way: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Taken together, these three books offer a fuller sense of Siderits' philosophical concerns with Buddhism. The concern (...) with "fusion philosophy" is focused primarily on philosophical problem-solving and energetically quarries Buddhist... (shrink)
- Epistemology: Indian Philosophy.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2001 - New York: Routledge.First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.Export citation Bookmark
- Theory of Value: Indian Philosophy.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2000 - New York: Routledge.No categories
- Issues of representation in object vision.D. I.Perrett,M. W. Oram,J. K. Hietanen &P. J. Benson -1994 - In Martha J. Farah & Graham Ratcliff,Neuropsychology of High Level Vision: Collected Tutorial Essays : Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition : Papers. Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Dualistic and nondualistic problems of immortality.Roy W.Perrett -1985 -Philosophy East and West 35 (4):333-350.
- Essence and Emptiness.Roy W.Perrett -2015 - In Koji Tanaka, Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest,The Moon Points Back. Oxford University Press USA.Madhyamaka Buddhism is famously centered on the doctrine of emptiness, often glossed as the view that there are no essences. This chapter addresses two interrelated questions about that doctrine. First, is the Madhyamaka doctrine of essencelessness more plausibly to be regarded as a necessary or a contingent truth? Second, is the doctrine of essencelessness in contradiction with the views of those prominent Mādhyamikas who also claim that essencelessness is the essence of all things? The chapter argues that the Madhyamaka doctrine (...) of essencelessness is most plausibly to be regarded as a necessary truth, but that a modern Mādhyamika can safely affirm without contradiction the apparently paradoxical claim that emptiness is the essence of all entities. (shrink)No categories
- Future generations and the metaphysics of the self: Western and indian philosophical perspectives.Roy W.Perrett -2003 -Asian Philosophy 13 (1):29 – 37.Our present actions can have effects on future generations - affecting not only the environment they will inherit, but even perhaps their very existence. This raises a number of important moral issues, many of which have only recently received serious philosophical attention. I begin by discussing some contemporary Western philosophical perspectives on the problem of our obligations to future generations, and then go on to consider how these approaches might relate to the classical Indian philosophical tradition. Although the Indian commitment (...) to pre-existence and rebirth precludes the arising of the Non-Identity Problem, this does not mean that there is not still a problem about justifying our obligations to future generations. The Indian Non-Reductionists about personal identity have difficulties with this that are comparable to the difficulties of their Western counterparts, but the Indian Buddhist Reductionists offer some provocative arguments for impartiality and the rationality of altruism. (shrink)
- Logic and philosophy of language.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2001 - New York: Garland.This anthology examines Love's Labours Lost from a variety of perspectives and through a wide range of materials. Selections discuss the play in terms of historical context, dating, and sources; character analysis; comic elements and verbal conceits; evidence of authorship; performance analysis; and feminist interpretations. Alongside theater reviews, production photographs, and critical commentary, the volume also includes essays written by practicing theater artists who have worked on the play. An index by name, literary work, and concept rounds out this valuable (...) resource. (shrink)
- Metaphysics: Indian Philosophy.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2000 - New York: Routledge.First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.Export citation Bookmark
- Religion and politics in india: Some philosophical perspectives.Roy W.Perrett -1997 -Religious Studies 33 (1):1-14.What is the traditional relation of religion to politics in India? Recent scholarly debate has generated at least two divergent answers. According to one view there is a long standing traditional opposition between religion and politics in India. According to another view a separation of religion from politics is contrary to Indian ways of thinking. I argue that from the perspective of classical Indian philosophy there is no single tradition on the issue of religion and politics. To be able do (...) so, however, I utilize too some work in Western philosophy. (shrink)
- Recognizing and reacting to value.Roy W.Perrett -2003 -Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (1):51-58.
- The bodhisattva paradox.Roy W.Perrett -1986 -Philosophy East and West 36 (1):55-59.
- Theory of value.Roy W.Perrett (ed.) -2001 - New York: Garland.
- Waltz with Bashir and the Definition of Documentary.Roy W.Perrett -2016 -Film and Philosophy 20:106-121.
- Dialogue at the Margins: Whorf, Bakhtin, and Linguistic Relativity (review).Roy W.Perrett -1992 -Philosophy and Literature 16 (2):376-378.
- Sartre's Ethics of Ambiguity (review).Roy W.Perrett -1990 -Philosophy and Literature 14 (2):441-442.
- Taking life and the argument from potentiality.Roy W.Perrett -2000 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):186–197.
- Personal identity, minimalism, and madhyamaka.Roy W.Perrett -2002 -Philosophy East and West 52 (3):373-385.The publication of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons in 1984 revived and reshaped the debate on personal identity in Western philosophy. Not only does Parfit argue forcefully and ingeniously for a revisionary Reductionist theory of persons and their diachronic identity, but he also draws radical normative inferences from such a theory. Along the way he also mentions Indian Buddhist parallels to his own Reductionist theory. Some of these parallels are explored here, while particular attention is also paid to the supposed (...) normative implications of Reductionism. (shrink)
- Is whatever exists knowable and nameable?Roy W.Perrett -1999 -Philosophy East and West 49 (4):401-414.Naiyāyikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable." What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyāya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false.
- The problem of induction in indian philosophy.Roy W.Perrett -1984 -Philosophy East and West 34 (2):161-174.
- (1 other version)Valuing lives.Roy W.Perrett -1992 -Bioethics 6 (3):185–200.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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