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How can criminal punishment be morally justified? Zisman addresses this classical question in legal philosophy. He provides two maybe surprising answers to the question. First, as for a methodological claim, it argues that this question cannot be answered by philosophers and legal scholars alone. Rather, we need to take into account research from social psychology, economy, anthropology, and so on in order to properly analyze the arguments in defense of criminal punishment. Second, the book argues that when such research is (...) properly accounted for, none of the current attempts to justify criminal punishment succeed. But that does not imply that the state should do nothing about criminal wrongdoing. Rather, the arguments that were supposed to justify criminal punishment actually speak in favor of an alternative approach to criminal law: restitution to the victim and restorative justice. That is to say, the state should coerce offenders to provide restitution for the harm inflicted on victims, and whenever possible restorative approaches should be taken to address criminal wrongdoing. (shrink)

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Criminal law abolitionists claim that legal punishment cannot be morally justified and that we should therefore abolish criminal law. While this is still a minority position in the current debate, the number of proponents has been increasing, and even opponents have developed a certain degree of sympathy for such claims in recent years. Yet one of the reasons many remain hesitant regarding the abolition of criminal law appears to be the lack of a thought-through alternative, in addition to abolitionists disagreeing (...) considerably amongst themselves on what an alternative should look like. I will call this the missing alternative objection. To address this central concern, I will argue in this paper that the most prominent versions of abolitionism actually converge on the same alternative core to criminal law — even though they are driven by vastly different motivations. This core that current abolitionist theories converge on is two-fold: first, the claim that the state should compel offenders to provide restitution for the victim; second, the claim that restorative processes should be used wherever possible when addressing criminal wrongdoing. This common core is enough to reject the missing alternative objection. (shrink)

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In recent years, a number of philosophers and social scientists have argued in favor of or against retributive theories of criminal punishment based on empirical findings about folk punitive judgment and decision-making. In this paper, we will argue that these arguments do not succeed. We will raise two objections. First, there are serious gaps between the empirical findings these authors cite and the descriptive premises these findings are meant to support. Second, in many cases, the existing research does not support (...) the specific empirical claims that feature in these arguments. Specifically, a large part of the existing psychological research and some philosophers claim that people are mainly driven by retributive motives. We will show that a large portion of the empirical research is not designed in a way to specifically test this claim, and to the extent that some studies are able to investigate this claim, we show that the evidence suggests that people are motivated by a variety of concerns, including consequentialist motives. We discuss possible responses and implications for the philosophy of criminal punishment, and provide suggestions for improved study designs. (shrink)

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