Structure and characterization of a novel chicken biotin-binding protein A (BBP-A).Vesa P. Hytönen,Juha A. E. Määttä,Einari A. Niskanen,Juhani Huuskonen,Kaisa J. Helttunen,Katrin K. Halling,Henri R. Nordlund,Kari Rissanen,Mark S. Johnson,Tiina A. Salminen,Markku S. Kulomaa,Olli H. Laitinen &Tomi T.Airenne -unknowndetailsBackground. The chicken genome contains a BBP-A gene showing similar characteristics to avidin family genes. In a previous study we reported that the BBP-A gene may encode a biotin-binding protein due to the high sequence similarity with chicken avidin, especially at regions encoding residues known to be located at the ligand-binding site of avidin. Results. Here, we expand the repertoire of known macromolecular biotin binders by reporting a novel biotin-binding protein A (BBP-A) from chicken. The BBP-A recombinant protein was expressed (...) using two different expression systems and purified with affinity chromatography, biochemically characterized and two X-ray structures were solved – in complex with D-biotin (BTN) and in complex with D-biotin D-sulfoxide (BSO). The BBP-A protein binds free biotin with high, "streptavidin-like" affinity (Kd ~ 10-¹³ M), which is about 50 times lower than that of chicken avidin. Surprisingly, the affinity of BBP-A for BSO is even higher than the affinity for BTN. Furthermore, the solved structures of the BBP-A – BTN and BBP-A – BSO complexes, which share the fold with the members of the avidin and lipocalin protein families, are extremely similar to each other. Conclusion. BBP-A is an avidin-like protein having a β-barrel fold and high affinity towards BTN. However, BBP-A differs from the other known members of the avidin protein family in thermal stability and immunological properties. BBP-A also has a unique ligand-binding property, the ability to bind BTN and BSO at comparable affinities. BBP-A may have use as a novel material in, e.g. modern bio(nano)technological applications. (shrink)
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Denying the Problem. Deflationists and the Liar Paradox.Paula-PompiliaTomi -2018 -Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia:89-103.detailsDeflationary theories of truth had two different types of responses to the Liar. A first class of deflationists considers that this paradox does not represent a problem for their theories. On the other hand, other deflationists find the Liar to be a serious issue. This article focuses on the first class. Both Grover and Gupta consider that the Liar does not represent a problem for a deflationary theory of truth. For Grover, the paradox is demolished through the construction of the (...) theory and for Gupta, the Liar is not the problem of the deflationist, but rather it concerns a specialist. Dorothy Grover (2005) is an advocate of the prosentential theory of truth. This theory considers that truth works as a prosentence. The sentence resulted by adding the truth predicate to a referring expression has the same content as the sentence picked out by the initial referring expression. A prosentence does not have a meaning by itself; it takes its meaning from its antecedent. Grover considers that the truth predicate used in the Liar fails to pick up an antecedent, thus it does not have operative meaning. The operative meaning comes from using a word in a specific context. Gupta (2005) considers that a specialist – not a deflationist – should give the proper answers to the paradoxes. A deflationist should not be concerned with how the paradoxes can be avoided. His only interest is how the T-schema should be interpreted in order to give the meaning of the truth predicate and how the deflationary conclusions are reached. Paradoxes do not count in as an issue for deflationists, because they are able to answer to their main questions without facing paradoxes. Therefore, the Liar is not a real issue for the deflationist. The main aim of this article is to offer some counterarguments for these two views. Grover’s difference between dictionary and operative meaning seems to make a distinction between accepted and restricted sentences. This distinction is needed in order to escape the problem of paradoxes. If this is the case, the Liar is an issue, but it is solvable. This is quite different from what Grover claims. On the other hand, Gupta’s approach may ease the deflationist’s work but it might destroy his theory. (shrink)
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Time, necessity, and ability.Tomis Kapitan -unknowndetailsI will discuss the so-called “Master Argument” attributed to Diodorus Cronos in the light of some contemporary speculations on indexicals. In one version, this argument goes as follows: Premise 1. The past, relative to any time t, is necessary. Premise 2. The impossible cannot follow from the possible. Therefore.
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Reason and flexibility in Islam.Tomis Kapitan -unknowndetailsThe role of reason, and its embodiment in philosophical-scientific theorizing, is always a troubling one for religious traditions. The deep emotional needs that religion strives to satisfy seem ever linked to an attitudes of acceptance, belief, or trust, yet, in its theoretical employment, reason functions as a critic as much as it does a creator, and in the special fields of metaphysics and epistemology its critical arrows are sometimes aimed at long-standing cherished beliefs. Understandably, the mere approach to these beliefs (...) through organized philosophical activity, however well-intended, is viewed with suspicion by ecclesiastical authorities and the devout. The attitude towards philosophical inquiry on the part of the Islamic religious community might be thought to typify this reaction. As one of the great prophetic religions, the self-avowed image of Islam is of a tradition which already possesses the truth as set forth in the divine revelation of the Qur'an. What need is there for philosophizing on fundamental matters, e.g., the ultimate nature of reality, the foundations of morality, the modes whereby the divine is connected with the temporal? The structure of creation is already made clear, the "straight path" for living already manifest. how can philosophical activity be anything but a source of divisive controversy, for as it turns its gaze to the foundations upon which the Shari`a' (Islamic Law) rests, or to the grounds for religious belief itself, it cannot avoid turning up alternative viewpoints, different perspectives on divine revelation, noting various weaknesses in received 1 interpretations? In short, isn't the practice of philosophy a threat to Islam's promise of providing a comprehensive way of living devoid of skepticism and uncertainty about the place of a human in God's creation and his or her role in the 'umma (Islamic community)? This problem is not unique to Islam, nor is it a new one within Islam. We know that it has been debated by Islamic thinkers since the translations of the Greek philosophers began to appear in an organized Islamic world during the 8th Century A.. (shrink)
I and you, he* and she.Tomis Kapitan -1992 -Analysis 52 (2):125-128.detailsIn 'You and She*' (ANALYSIS 51.3, June 1991) C.J.F. Williams notes the importance of reflexive pronouns in attributions of propositional attitudes, and claims to improve upon an earlier account of Hector-Neri Castaneda's in [1]. However, to the extent which his remarks are accurate, they reveal nothing that Castaneda hasn't already said, while insofar as they are new, they obliterate distinctions vital to Castaneda's theory. Castaneda called these pronouns quasi-indicators and noted that they function as linguistic devices used for attributing indexical (...) reference to others. For example, in hearing Arthur say 'I am wise' we would report his claim in English with, (1) Arthur thinks that he himself is wise. where 'he himself' is a quasi-indicator used to attribute to Arthur reference to himself qua self -- an expression that Castaneda abbreviated with 'he*.' Note that (1) is quite different from, (2) Arthur thinks that I am wise for 'I', functioning here as an indexical term, represents only the speaker's reference. Nor can (1) be identified with, (3) Arthur thinks that Arthur is wise. for this fails to represent the indexical character of Arthur's thought. Thus, (3) falls short of the informational content of (1). Moreover, as Williams, echoing Castaneda, points out, Arthur might not know that he himself is Arthur, or that he is named 'Arthur.' Hence, (3) might be false even if (1) is true. Williams observes that 'she' can also be used in oratio obliqua to report an indexical 1 usage, e.g., in (4) Arthur told Mary that she ought to talk to Shirley Makepeace's.. (shrink)
Polityka historyczna, red. Joanna Lubecka, Maciej Zakrzewski, seria Słowniki Społeczne, red. Wit Pasierbek i Bogdan Szlachta, t. XII (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ignatianum w Krakowie, 2023), ss. 392 (rec.). [REVIEW]Grzegorz Nieć -2024 -Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum 30 (3):497-502.details_Słowniki Społeczne_, wydawane od 2019 roku pod redakcją Wita Pasierbka i Bogdana Szlachty, nawiązują do znanego i dobrze przyjętego _Słownika społecznego _z 2004 roku (red. B. Szlachta). O ile jednak tamten _Słownik _sprzed lat dwudziestu był jednym, choć liczącym 1714 stron, tomem, zawierającym „blisko sto trzydzieści haseł poświęconych głównym zagadnieniom najważniejszych dziedzin szeroko rozumianych nauk społecznych: filozofii politycznej, socjologii, prawa, ekonomii etyki społecznej i katolickiej nauki społecznej, a także metodologii nauk społecznych, zarządzania, psychologii społecznej i pedagogiki”, o tyle w nowej (...) formule są to już tomy tematyczne, poświęcone konkretnym zagadnieniom, ujmowanym w szerokim kontekście interdyscyplinarnym, co zresztą wydaje się w przypadku nauk społecznych nieuniknione, w zasadzie – przyrodzone. Rzecz jasna, od 2004 roku minęło już sporo czasu, wiele się zmieniło, przez cały czas prowadzono badania, pojawili się nowi badacze, nowe koncepcje, zarysowały się nowe linie podziałów. Przyjęta już wtenczas formuła haseł-esejów, a w zasadzie rozpraw została utrzymana, a nawet rozbudowana w nowych _Słownikach _i ujednolicona pod względem struktury. Co ważne, publikacja ma wersję polską oraz angielską i jest dostępna w wersji tradycyjnej (drukowanej) i elektronicznej. (shrink)
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Studia kulturowe, red. Leszek Korporowicz, Agnieszka Knap-Stefaniuk, Łukasz Burkiewicz, seria Słowniki Społeczne, red. Wit Pasierbek, Bogdan Szlachta, t. VIII. [REVIEW]Tomasz Graff -2023 -Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum 29 (3):229-236.detailsRedaktorzy serii _Słowniki Społeczne _w „Słowie wstępu” (s. 7–8) deklarują, że jest ona kontynuacją niegdysiejszego dzieła _Słownik_ _społeczny_ z roku 2004, w którym ponad stu uczonych zarówno z ośrodków krajowych, jak i zagranicznych zaprezentowało w obszernych esejach dorobek nauk humanistycznych i społecznych zgromadzony do początków XXI wieku (s. 7). Tym niemniej nowy projekt zakrojony jest szerzej niż tamten: w liczącej ponad dwadzieścia tomów publikacji zaprezentowany zostanie stan wiedzy humanistycznej i społecznej trzeciej dekady XXI stulecia; wiedzy dotyczącej człowieka rozwijającego się w (...) zróżnicowanych cywilizacjach, kulturach i społeczeństwach, wyznającego rozmaite religie i honorującego różne wzorce postępowania (s. 7). W tym celu poszczególni autorzy w zamiarze pomysłodawców serii napisali obszerne eseje wg tego samego schematu, umieszczone w tematycznych tomach zbudowanych wg „klucza interpretacyjnego”, który ukazuje najistotniejsze zagadnienia poruszanej w danym tomie tematyki (s. 7–8). (shrink)
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Omniprescience and serious deliberation.E. J. Coffman -unknowndetailsLet’s say that you are omniprescient iff you always believe—occurrently and with maximal confidence—all and only truths, including ones about the future. Several philosophers have argued that an omniprescient being couldn’t engage in certain kinds of activity.[1] In what follows, I present and assess the most promising such argument I know of—what I’ll call the Serious Deliberation Argument (SDA). It concludes that omniprescience rules out serious deliberation—i.e., trying to choose between incompatible courses of action once you know that none is (...) conclusively favored by your reasons.[2] The SDA—which (I’ll argue) should disturb many traditional theists—derives from an argument due to Tomis Kapitan[3]; and my favored objection to the SDA—roughly: that it fails because dependent on the alleged incompatibility of omniprescience and freedom—superficially resembles a reply to Kapitan’s argument due to David Hunt.[4] Along the way, then, I’ll briefly discuss Kapitan’s argument, and Hunt’s reply, to show how they differ from the SDA and my favored objection to it. I begin by presenting the Serious Deliberation Argument. (shrink)
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The Modal Theory Of Pure Identity And Some Related Decision Problems.Harold T. Hodes -1984 -Mathematical Logic Quarterly 30 (26-29):415-423.detailsRelative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability of modal quantificational formulae in which “= ” is the sole predicate is undecidable; but if we restrict attention to satisfiability in structures with the expanding domain property, satisfiability relative to the familiar frames (K, K4, T, S4, B, S5) is decidable. Furthermore, relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability for modal quantificational formulae with a single monadic predicate is undecidable ; this improves the result of Kripke concerning formulae with two monadic predicates.
The Public Philosopher in the Academies: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Eloge de la philosophie.T. Brian Mooney -unknowndetailsRecently we have come to witness an assault on the traditional conception of the university as a centre of detached concern for pure research. The economic rationalist vision which has occasioned this assault has deeply permeated almost every facet of contemporary life and even the specific kind of discourse emanating from this interpretation has managed to ensconce itself within the academies. Philosophers are at particular risk in the uncertain climate that has been created. However philosophers have not addressed the issues (...) which the new ideology has foisted upon the universities with sufficient rigour and clarity. The facility with which economic rationalist considerations have filtered into academic discourse points, I believe, to a deep malaise in academia. The fatalism with which many philosophers have faced the threat has in its own way hypostatised the new ideology and granted it the titanism of some inevitable, irresistible and irrevocable force. The tradition of the public philosopher has not enjoyed the same degree of public approbation in the English-speaking world as has been the case on the European continent, and in particular, in France. One can think of notable exceptions but on the whole the public philosopher in the English-speaking world is a rare breed. Given the radical changes that contemporary universities are undergoing it is clearly worth while to reflect upon the professional philosopher's relationship to other individuals in society, to communities and to the state. Here the meditation will focus on a debate on these issues within France, a country which perhaps more than anywhere else has elevated public philosophy to an art form. Philosophers, perhaps more than any other academics, are prone to a certain hesitancy in attempting to describe what it is they do. Philosophy no doubt employs techniques but it is not itself a technique, nor is there a single problem or series of problems or mysteries which can claim sway over philosophy's subject matter. Such hesitancy, one might say ambiguity, is the very stuff of philosophy and indeed of the philosopher. In Merleau-Ponty's inaugural address to the College de France, later published as Eloge de la philosophie he returns to these perennial philosophical musings, in particular, through attempting to characterise something of the nature of philosophy and the philosopher. (shrink)
Bhāratīẏa darśana kosha.Śrīmohana Bhaṭṭācārya -1978 - Kalikātā: Saṃskr̥ta Kaleja. Edited by Dīneśacandra Bhaṭṭācārya.detailsPrācīnanyāẏa, nabyanyāẏa, o baiśeshika-darśana.
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Bāṅgalapatrāparābhidhā Sāmānyanirukteḥ kroḍa patrikā.Golokanātha Bhaṭṭācārya -2016 - Vārāṇasī: Śāradā-Saṃskr̥ta-Saṃsthāna. Edited by Jī Jayamāṇikya Śāstrī.detailsCommentary on Hetvābhāsasāmānyanirukti, portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, dealing with the definition of fallacies middle term in Navya Nyāya philosophy.
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Kārikāvalī: Muktāvalīsahitā, sā ca Prabhā-Mañjūṣā-Dinakarī-Rāmarudrī-Gaṅgārāmīti vyākhyāpañcakasamanvitā.Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya -1923 - Vārāṇasī: Pradhāna vitaraka Caukhambā Vidyābhavana. Edited by Sī Śaṅkararāma Śāstrī.detailsVerse treatise, with autocommentary and supercommentaries, on the basic concepts and epistemology of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools in Indic philosophy.
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Kārikāvalī, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalīsahitā: anumānopamānaśabdasmr̥timanoguṇakhaṇḍātmikā.Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya -1992 - Vārāṇasī: Caukhambā Surabhāratī Prakāśana. Edited by Lokamaṇi Dāhāla.detailsTreatise also known as Bhāṣāpariccheda on the basic tenets of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools in Hindu philosophy; includes autocommentary.
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