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Philosophers usually have been anxious to avoid solipsism. A large number of good and great philosophers have tried to refute it. Of course, these philosophers have not always had the same target in mind and, like everything else, solipsism over the centuries has become increasingly elusive and subtle. In this book I undertake to state the position in its most modern and what I take to be its most plausible form. At some points in the history of philosophy the solipsist (...) has been one who denied the existence of everything except himself or even the existence of everything except his own present sensations. At other times, the solipsist instead of doubting these things has merely insisted that there could be no good reason for believing in the existence of anything beyond one's own present sensations. Roughly, this doubt is aimed at reasons rather than at things. A solipsist of this sort appears in Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith. (shrink)

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Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book,Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments (...) dealing with personal identity. He argues, instead, that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive--as long as its vital functions, such as breathing, circulation, and metabolism, continue. (shrink)

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EricLewis - God and Reason in the Middle Ages - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 393-394 Book Review God and Reason in the Middle Ages Edward Grant. God and Reason in the Middle Ages. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 397. Cloth, $64.95. Paper, $22.95. History has not been kind to the vast era we call the "Middle Ages." The name designates an intellectual hiatus between (...) the philosophical and technical genius of ancient Greece and Rome and the "rebirth" of knowledge in the Renaissance. Edward Grant wants this to change. He suggests that we consider the period following the establishment of scholasticism until the sixteenth century the pinnacle of an "Age of Reason." In this vein, Grant's latest book is pure apologetics for the Middle Ages. Grant.. (shrink)

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Understanding Buddhism provides a series of case studies of Asian and modern Western Buddhists, spanning history, gender, and class, whose lives are representative of the ways in which Buddhists throughout time have embodied the tradition. Portrays the foundational principles of Buddhist belief through the lives of believers, illustrating how the religion is put into practice in everyday life. Takes as its foundation the inherent diversity within Buddhist society, rather than focusing on the spiritual and philosophical elite within Buddhism. Its compelling (...) biographical genre reveals how individuals have negotiated the choices, tensions, and rewards of living in a Buddhist society. Case studies have been carefully chosen to cover a range of Asian and modern Western Buddhists. The text convey a full sample of possible Buddhist orientations in contemporary and historical contexts. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 651-664 [Access article in PDF] Walter Charleton and Early Modern EclecticismEricLewis The publication of Michael Albrecht's Eklektik (1994) revived a small amount of scholarly interest in an early modern "movement" with a lineage that can be traced back to Clement of Alexandria, who described a method of constructing a philosophical system by selecting among different philosophical sects. (...) 1 Not surprisingly, the reception of Albrecht's work demonstrated the complexities associated with identifying the "movement" and categorizing those who labeled themselves "eclectic" philosophers; that is, those who seemed to expound a system of philosophy assimilated from ancient and modern sources. The difficulties involved with defining "eclecticism" and applying the term to early modern natural science is further complicated by the tendency for "eclectics" to categorize their contemporaries in ways that are counterintuitive to our modern sensibilities. 2 Nevertheless, the proponents of this patchwork style of natural science are interesting precisely because they give us a glimpse into their interpretation of the state of philosophy and its relation to history during a time when the authority of The Philosopher was falling under ever increasing scrutiny.The recent literature on philosophic eclecticism largely ignored the English context where rising sentiment against sectarianism influenced the formation of the Royal Society. 3 The perceived chaos of a nation divided and redivided by the multiplication of religious associations produced a plethora of proposals for the restoration and maintenance of intellectual and social order. In particular the problems of religious and political order motivated certain members of the [End Page 651] "Newcastle Circle" (largely Royalists) to construct philosophical methodologies at least congruent with their ideological commitments to social stability. Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and her close friend the physician Walter Charleton each offered his and her own style of natural science. 4 Both Hobbes and the Duchess of Newcastle were excluded from participating in the community of natural philosophers formed in 1660; yet Charleton became a founding member of the Royal Society that year. Despite relative neglect, Charleton's importance to understanding the development of modern natural science in England should not be overlooked; and particularly his prescribed method of doing natural philosophy needs more attention. 5 Like the radically different methods developed by Margaret Cavendish and Thomas Hobbes, Charleton's eclecticism should be viewed as an exhaustive effort to prescribe a remedy to the perceived threat of rampant sectarianism. 6 Unlike Hobbes and Cavendish, however, Charleton saw authoritarianism and dogmatism as the greatest challenge to order, and found the solution to that challenge in mitigated skepticism and a style of philosophy that did not make an epistemic differentiation between the novel philosophies of his day and those of the ancients.Despite being a prolific writer, having a considerable reputation as a physician and placing himself in the center of the English community of natural scientists, Walter Charleton has been mostly ignored by modern scholars. In part this lack of attention can be attributed to the common view that he never developed a comprehensive philosophy nor maintained consistent metaphysical commitments. References to him claim that he was an "intellectual barometer of the age," 7 and his work has been described as "important as a case study in the reception of a mechanical philosophy." 8 His name is virtually absent from discussions concerning scientific methodology, though he is often described as a Renaissance [End Page 652] alchemical philosopher who fell under the influence of mechanistic atomism and the experimental agenda of a fledgling society of natural philosophers. Most accounts simply portray Charleton as a converted follower of the novel philosophy rather than as a novel thinker.The failure to see Charleton as more than a converted empiricist and mechanist likely results from the opinion that eclecticism does not constitute a philosophical method as much as it constitutes the last refuge for scholars during periods of intellectual crisis. The article on eclecticism in Encyclopedia Britannica (fourteenth edition) states: Eclecticism always tends to spring up after a period of vigorous constructive speculation, especially in the later stages of a controversy between... (shrink)

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Rather than focusing on political and legal debates surrounding attempts to determine if and when genocidal rape has taken place in a particular setting, this essay turns instead to a crucial, yet neglected area of inquiry: the moral significance of genocidal rape, and more specifically, the nature of the harms that constitute the culpable wrongdoing that genocidal rape represents. In contrast to standard philosophical accounts, which tend to employ an individualistic framework, this essay offers a situated understanding of harm that (...) features the importance of interdependence and relationality and that conceptualizes harms as embodied and contextual. The paper ultimately reveals what is distinctive about this particular crime of sexual violence by exploring the logic of genocidal rape: genocidal rape involves the harm of forced self-betrayal unleashed relationally, causing victims as representatives of their group to participate inadvertently in the destruction of that group. (shrink)

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Intentions and emotions arise together, and emotions compel us to pursue goals. However, it is not clear when emotions become objects of awareness, how emotional awareness changes with goal pursuit, or how psychological and neural processes mediate such change. We first review a psychological model of emotional episodes and propose that goal obstruction extends the duration of these episodes while increasing cognitive complexity and emotional intensity. We suggest that attention is initially focused on action plans and their obstruction, and only (...) when this obstruction persists does focal attention come to include emotional states themselves. We then model the self-organization of neural activities that hypothetically underlie the evolution of an emotional episode. Phases of emotional awareness are argued to parallel phases of synchronization across neural systems. We suggest that prefrontal activities greatly extend intentional states while focal attention integrates emotional awareness and goal pursuit in a comprehensive sense of the self in the world. (shrink)

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Introduction: why an ontology of jazz? -- What does the law hear? James Newton and the Beastie Boys -- Intentions, agency, and improvisation: from machines to the imaginary -- It ain't over till it's over: work completion in improvised music -- Paris, 1969: musical understanding, genres, and aesthetic denseness -- My favorite things: performance, paraphrase, and representation.

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The history of ancient chemistry has been virtually ignored. I examine the foundations of the chemical theories of the Peripatetics and Stoics, in an attempt to glean the motivations for their chemical theories, and how these theories relate to their greater natural philosophies. This involves a detailed examination of ancient theories of mixture. I attempt to relate Aristotle's theory of mixture to his theories of substantial change, the elements and matter. This entails a rejection of the notion of prime matter, (...) and a reevaluation of the status of the contrarieties. I also look at the understudied fourth book of the Meteorologica, which sheds new light on Aristotle's theory of matter. I then turn to Alexander of Aphrodisias, and his development of Aristotle's theory. Next I consider the Stoic theory of body, and how doxographers have misinterpreted this theory. While offering a radically new interpretation of the Stoic theory of mixture, much of Stoic natural philosophy is reconstructed, including their theory of categories and qualities. In the end a Stoic theory free from obvious paradox is presented. (shrink)

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In many countries, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a period of lockdown that impacted individuals’ lifestyles, in both professional and personal spheres. New problems and challenges arose, as well as opportunities. Numerous studies have examined the negative effects of lockdown measures, but few have attempted to shine light on the potential positive effects that may come out of these measures. We focused on one particular positive outcome that might have emerged from lockdown: creativity. To this end, this paper compared self-reported (...) professional creativity and everyday creativity before and during lockdown, using a questionnaire-based study conducted on a French sample. We expected participants to be more creative during than prior to lockdown, in both professional and everyday spheres. Regarding Pro-C, we did not see any significant differences between the two comparison points, before and during lockdown. Regarding everyday creativity, we observed a significant increase during lockdown. Furthermore, our results suggest that participants with a lower baseline creativity benefited more from the situation than those with a higher initial baseline creativity. Our results provide new insights on the impact of lockdown and its positive outcomes. These measures may have inarguably negative consequences on the physical and mental health of many, but their positive impact exists as well. (shrink)

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The editors of the JRE solicited short essays on the COVID‐19 pandemic from a group of scholars of religious ethics that reflected on how the field might help them make sense of the complex religious, cultural, ethical, and political implications of the pandemic, and on how the pandemic might shape the future of religious ethics.

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This chapter shows that in certain circumstances desires are a guide to possibility, and that, in these circumstances, human beings desire at least one state of affairs for which the existence of God is a necessary condition. It follows that God’s existence is possible; or, more modestly, anyone with the relevant desires has a reason to believe God’s existence is possible. Thus, a new argument in the tradition of C.S.Lewis’s argument from nostalgia is offered, an argument from certain (...) desires to the possibility premise of the modal ontological argument. It is argued, further, that support for the possibility premise does not succumb to the problem of equipollence, a problem that undermines many attempts to support the possibility premise. (shrink)

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The last 50 years of research has taught us that conditionals are non-monotonic in the antecedent. That is, they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening. Many accounts have been developed for such conditionals, starting with Stalnaker andLewis. These accounts converge roughly to Burgess’ conditional logic $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{B}}\,}}$$ B or the non-monotonic reasoning system $$\textbf{P}$$ P. The latter two have Cautious Monotonicity as a weak replacement for Antecedent Strengthening.Lewis weakest conditional logic $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{V}}\,}}$$ V or system $$\textbf{R}$$ R are obtained by adding (...) a stronger proxi for Antecedent Strengthening – the law of Rational Monotonicity. I argue that Rational Monotonicity is too much while Cautious Monotonicity is not enough monotonicity. I investigate two other monotonicity postulates, which are jointly weaker than Rational Monotonicity. This gives rise to three logics in between $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{B}}\,}}$$ B and $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{V}}\,}}$$ V and three other logics in between $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{BN}}\,}}$$ BN and $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{VN}}\,}}$$ VN obtained by strengthening $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{B}}\,}}$$ B and $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{V}}\,}}$$ V by a consistency axiom. In the first part of the paper, I proved soundness, completeness and decidability results for these logics, using set-selection semantics. In the present second part of the paper, I investigate five other semantics for the new logics: order semantics, a new closeness semantics, alternative ranking semantics inspired by Spohn, Huber and Raidl, and two new versions of similarity semantics inspired fromLewis and Burgess. Establishing truth preserving maps between these semantics, the soundness and completeness results from set-selection semantics can be transferred. Overall, the different new semantics provide new insights into why Rational Monotonicity fails. (shrink)

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Günther recently suggested a 'new‘ conditional. This conditional is not new, as already remarked by Wansing and Omori. It is just DavidLewis‘ forgotten alternative 'doctored‘ conditional and part of a larger class termed neutral conditionals. In this paper, I answer some questions raised by Wansing and Omori, concerning the motivation, the logic, the connexive flavor and contra-classicality of such neutralized conditionals. The main message being: Neutralizing a vacuist conditional avoids (some) paradoxes of strict implication, changes the logic essentially (...) only by Aristotle‘s Thesis, makes strong connexivity impossible, and remains in the realm of non-contra-classical logics. (shrink)

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According to Stalnaker’s Thesis, the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability. Under some mild conditions, the thesis trivialises probabilities and conditionals, as initially shown by DavidLewis. This article asks the following question: does still lead to triviality, if the probability function in is replaced by a probability-like function? The article considers plausibility functions, in the sense of Friedman and Halpern, which additionally mimic probabilistic additivity and conditionalisation. These quasi probabilities comprise Friedman–Halpern’s conditional plausibility spaces, as well (...) as other known representations of conditional doxastic states. The paper provesLewis’ triviality for quasi probabilities and discusses how this has implications for three other prominent strategies to avoidLewis’ triviality: Adams’ thesis, where the probability function on the left in is replaced by a probability-like function, abandoning conditionalisation, where probability conditionalisation on the right in is replaced by another propositional update procedure and the approximation thesis, where equality in is replaced by approximation. The paper also shows thatLewis’ triviality result is really about ‘additiveness’ and ‘conditionality’. (shrink)

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Canonical, system-building philosophers often have a characteristic “way of looking at things,” that is, a specific method for doing philosophy that they apply to a wide array of topics, and which they view as rooted in some basic propositions about, for example, rationality, human nature, or the nature of reality. This is part of what makes them compelling. For contemporary interpreters, however, it raises questions about how much these foundational claims need to impact our ability to understand or learn from (...) other aspects of their thought—especially if we are leery of the foundational claims. Such interpretive vexations are especially urgent with Hegel: Hegel certainly has a characteristic way of looking at.. (shrink)

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The study of anarchism as a philosophical, political, and social movement has burgeoned both in the academy and in the global activist community in recent years. Taking advantage of this boom in anarchist scholarship, Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl have compiled twenty-six cutting-edge essays on this timely topic in New Perspectives on Anarchism.

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Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

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DavidLewis advised essentialists to judge his counterpart theory a false friend. He also argued that counterpart theory needs natural properties. This essay argues that natural properties are all essentialists need to find a true friend in counterpart theory. Section one explains whyLewis takes counterpart theory to be anti-essentialist and why he thinks it needs natural properties. Section two establishes the connection between the natural properties counterpart theory needs and the essentialist consequencesLewis disavows. Section three (...) answers two objections: the first attempts to block the consequences of adding natural properties to counterpart theory; the second grants the consequences, but denies that they amount to essentialism. –Correspondence to:[email protected]. (shrink)

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In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, DavidLewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, Strawman. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses whichLewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. These theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond toLewis, arguing that (...) he underestimates Strawman’s theoretical resources in a variety of important ways. (shrink)

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Atheistic modal realism asserts roughly that there are many concrete possible worlds and that the actual world is entirely godless. Here I will refine this position using the modal realism of DavidLewis. ForLewis, all gods (including the Christian God) are contingent superhuman persons, who inhabit non-actual worlds. Although gods are concrete worldbound particulars, atheistic modal realism has room for impersonal absolutes and ultimates (which are not gods). Since no gods are actual, atheism is true. Yet there (...) are infinitely many non-actual gods. Non-actual gods and worlds provide resources for analysing religious beliefs and practices. Lewisian theology provides a powerful new way for atheists to understand religion. (shrink)

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The last 50 years of research has taught us that conditionals are non-monotonic in the antecedent. That is, they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening. Many accounts have been developed for such conditionals, starting with Stalnaker andLewis. These accounts converge roughly to Burgess’ conditional logic $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{B}}\,}}$$ B or the non-monotonic reasoning system $$\textbf{P}$$ P. The latter two have Cautious Monotonicity as a weak replacement for Antecedent Strengthening.Lewis’ weakest conditional logic $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{V}}\,}}$$ V or its non-monotonic reasoning counterpart system $$\textbf{R}$$ R (...) are obtained by adding a stronger proxi for Antecedent Strengthening – the law of Rational Monotonicity. I argue that Rational Monotonicity is too much while Cautious Monotonicity is not enough monotonicity. I investigate two other monotonicity postulates, which are jointly weaker than Rational Monotonicity. One of them is related to Disjunctive Rationality, the other one is related to the idea of replacing the preservation law encoded in Rational Monotonicity by a pivoting principle – instead of conserving a conclusion when adding a compatible supposition, the principle recommends pivoting from a disjunction to another disjunction when the reason for the first is undermined by such an addition. This gives rise to three logics in between $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{B}}\,}}$$ B and $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{V}}\,}}$$ V and three other logics in between $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{BN}}\,}}$$ BN and $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{VN}}\,}}$$ VN obtained by strengthening $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{B}}\,}}$$ B and $${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{V}}\,}}$$ V by a consistency axiom. I prove soundness, completeness and decidability results for these six new logics, using set-selection semantics, its correspondence theory, and filtrations. In the second follow-up paper, I investigate five other semantics for the new logics: well founded strict order semantics, a new closeness semantics, several weakenings of ranking semantics, and new versions ofLewis’ and Burgess’ similarity semantics. (shrink)

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We show thatLewis’s modal realism, and his serviceability-based argument for it, cohere with his epistemological contextualism. Modal realism explains why serviceability-based reasoning in metaphysics might be reliable, whileLewis’s contextualism explains whyLewis can properly ignore the possibility that serviceability isn’t reliable, at least when doing metaphysics. This is becauseLewis’s contextualism includes a commitment to a kind of pragmatic encroachment, so that whether a subject knows can depend on how much is at stake with (...) respect to whether the belief is true or false. Accordingly, we suggest thatLewis can count as knowing that serviceability is a reliable guide to truth in metaphysics, since the stakes are generally low there, and so can be justified in believing that modal realism is true based on its serviceability. (shrink)

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Standard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker andLewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties (...) of conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate fromLewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID or even CN are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries. (shrink)

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ABSTRACTI argue that Bernard Suits’ definition of game playing, suitably extended with DavidLewis’ account of coordinating conventions, is robust enough to withstand some common objections made ag...

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In his original semantics for counterfactuals, DavidLewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate (...) all these theories in terms of lower bounds on partial preorders, conceived of as maximal antichains, and I show that treating lower bounds as cutsets does strictly better at capturing our intuitions about the semantics of modals, counterfactuals, and deontic conditionals. (shrink)

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In this paper c ilewis's theory of practical reason is discussed. the purpose is to explicate the role which value experience plays in the thinking of a rational agent who is attempting to determine imperatives of action.lewis, who vehemently opposed noncognitivism in ethics, believed that the objectivity of ethics could be shown to be the result of the logical demands of consistency upon the deliberative consciousness of an active self-determining agent. rightness, forlewis, was not (...) primarily a moral concept but rather a logical concept to be exercised in the critique of any deliberate activity; ethics thus rests on very general features of agent rationality. (shrink)

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I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using “causal models”, and argue that this account is preferable to the currently standard account in terms of “similarity of possible worlds” due to DavidLewis and Robert Stalnaker. I diagnose the attraction of counterfactual theories of causation, and argue that it is illusory.

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In this paper, we clarify, unpack, and ultimately resist what is perhaps the most prominent argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism: the epistemic argument for compatibilism. We focus on one such argument as articulated by DavidLewis: (i) we know we are free, (ii) for all we know everything is predetermined, (iii) if we know we are free but for all we know everything is predetermined, then for all we know we are free but everything is (...) predetermined, (iv) if for all we know we are free but predetermined, then it is really possible that we are, so (v) compatibilism. We uncover how the crucial epistemic modality underlying (iv) must be understood, and contend that, understood this way, the libertarian can resist (iv). Importantly, however, resisting the argument does commit the libertarian to what has been called “flip-flopping”—but we argue that this is perfectly coherent. We conclude by articulating two crucially ways the libertarian can resist the argument, by saying that we can know that determinism is false "from the armchair". (shrink)

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The variably strict analysis of conditionals does not only largely dominate the philosophical literature, since its invention by Stalnaker andLewis, it also found its way into linguistics and psychology. Yet, the shortcomings ofLewis–Stalnaker’s account initiated a plethora of modifications, such as non-vacuist conditionals, presuppositional indicatives, perfect conditionals, or other conditional constructions, for example: reason relations, difference-making conditionals, counterfactual dependency, or probabilistic relevance. Many of these new connectives can be treated as strengthened or weakened conditionals. They are (...) definable conditionals. This article develops a technique to infer the logic for such definable conditionals from the known logic of the underlying defining conditional. The technique is applied to central examples. The results show that a large part of the zoo of conditionals arises from a basic conditional—a constant nucleus of the different contextual and conceptual variations of variably strict conditionals. (shrink)

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For a period of several years the philosopher of science Hasok Chang has promoted various inter-related views including pluralism, pragmatism, and an associated view of natural kinds. He has also argued for what he calls the persistence of everyday terms in the scientific view. Chang claims that terms like phlogiston were never truly abandoned but became transformed into different concepts that remain useful. On the other hand, Chang argues that some scientific terms such as acidity have suffered a form of (...) “rupture”, especially in the case of the modernLewis definition of acids. Chang also complains that the degree of acidity of aLewis acid cannot be measured using a pH meter and seems to regard this as a serious problem. The present paper examines some of these views, especially what Chang claims to be a rupture in the definition of acidity. It is suggested that there has been no such rupture but a genuine generalization, on moving from the Brønsted-Lowry theory to theLewis theory of acidity. It will be shown how the quantification and measurement ofLewis acidity can easily be realized through the use of equilibrium theory and the use of stability constants. (shrink)

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