Works by Thomas M. Crisp
21 found
Order:
1 filter applied
DisambiguationsDisambiguations:
| Thomas M. Crisp [22] | Thomas Michael Crisp [1] |
- (2 other versions)Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction.Michael J. Loux &Thomas M. Crisp -1997 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Thomas M. Crisp._Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction_ is for students who have already completed an introductory philosophy course and need a fresh look at the central topics in the core subject of metaphysics. It is essential reading for any student of the subject. This Fourth Edition is revised and updated and includes two new chapters on Parts and Wholes, and Metaphysical Indeterminacy or vagueness. This new edition also keeps the user-friendly format, the chapter overviews summarizing the main topics, concrete examples to clarify difficult (...) concepts, annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, endnotes, and a full bibliography. Topics addressed include: the problem of universals the nature of abstract entities the problem of individuation the nature of modality identity through time the nature of time the nature of parts and wholes the problem of metaphysical indeterminacy the Realism/anti-Realism debate. Wherever possible, Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp relate contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. As experienced teachers of philosophy and important contributors to recent debates, Loux and Crisp are uniquely qualified to write this book. (shrink)
- Presentism and the grounding objection.Thomas M. Crisp -2007 -Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
- On presentism and triviality.Thomas M. Crisp -2004 -Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.
- Presentism.Thomas M. Crisp -2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman,The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Presentism and "Cross-Time" Relations.Thomas M. Crisp -2005 -American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):5 - 17.
- Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World.Thomas M. Crisp &Ted A. Warfield -2001 -Noûs 35 (2):304-316.
- ‘Wholly Present’ Defined.Thomas M. Crisp &Donald P. Smith -2005 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):318–344.Three-dimensionalists , sometimes referred to as endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being “wholly present” at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The threedimensionalist is free, of course, to take ‘is wholly present at’ as one of her theory’s primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be (...) better off if she could state her theory in terms accessible to all. We think she can. What is needed is a definition of ‘is wholly present at’ that all can understand. in this paper, we offer one. (shrink)
- A dilemma for internalism?Thomas M. Crisp -2010 -Synthese 174 (3):355-366.Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; (...) given the weak construal, internalism is unmotivated; either way, internalism is in serious trouble. I argue for two claims in this article. First, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unmotivated: he’s given no good reason for accepting one of its crucial premises. And second, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unsound: the crucial premise in question is false. (shrink)
- On believing that the scriptures are divinely inspired.Thomas M. Crisp -2009 - In Oliver D. Crisp & Michael C. Rea,Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology. Oxford University Press. pp. 187--213.No categories
- The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta.Thomas M. Crisp &Ted A. Warfield -2000 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-184.Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well known Consequence argument. Critics of theConsequence argument have presented counterexamples to the Consequence argument’s central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the Consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of these counterexamples.
- Presentism, eternalism and relativity physics.Thomas M. Crisp -2004 - In William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith,Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity. Routledge. pp. 262-278.
- Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga.Thomas M. Crisp,Matthew Davidson &David Vander Laan (eds.) -2006 - Dordrecht: Springer.This volume comprises essays presented to Alvin Plantinga on the occasion of his 70th birthday.
- On Naturalistic Metaphysics.Thomas M. Crisp -2015 - In Kelly James Clark,The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 61–74.I raise an epistemic objection to naturalistic metaphysics – the attempt to understand the nature and structure of reality in terms of natural entities, forces, and processes – arguing that we should not expect evolution to have crafted cognitive faculties reliable with respect to recondite metaphysical speculation, and that this gives practitioners of naturalistic metaphysics reason to doubt the deliverances of their work. I conclude by considering some main objections to this kind of skeptical argument.No categories
- Hawthorne on knowledge and practical reasoning.Thomas M. Crisp -2005 -Analysis 65 (2):138-140.
- On coercion, love, and horrors.Thomas M. Crisp -2013 -Religious Studies 49 (2):165-179.In this article, I explain and critique J. L. Schellenberg's atheological argument from horrors. I raise an epistemic objection, arguing that no one could be justified in believing its conclusion on the basis of its premises. Then I adumbrate a notion of the divine which is different in various ways from the God of classical theism and argue that Schellenberg's argument makes no trouble for belief in the existence of God so construed.
- An evolutionary objection to the argument from evil.Thomas M. Crisp -2011 - In Raymond VanArragon & Kelly James Clark,Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford, US: Oxford University Press.
- Gettier and Plantinga's Revised Account of Warrant.Thomas M. Crisp -2000 -Analysis 60 (1):42-50.
- Neuroscience and the Soul.Thomas M. Crisp (ed.) -2016 - Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.It is a widely held belief that human beings are both body and soul, that our immaterial soul is distinct from our material body. But that traditional idea has been seriously questioned by much recent research in the brain sciences.In Neuroscience and the Soul fourteen distinguished scholars grapple with current debates about the existence and nature of the soul. Featuring a dialogical format, the book presents state-of-the-art work by leading philosophers and theologians -- some arguing for the existence of the (...) soul, others arguing against -- and then puts those scholars into conversation with critics of their views. Bringing philosophy, theology, and neuroscience together in this way brings to light new nuances and significantly advances the ongoing debate over body and soul. (shrink)No categories
- Objects and Persons.Thomas M. Crisp -2003 -Philosophia Christi 5 (1):304-307.
- On Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb’s Paradox.Thomas M. Crisp -1999 -Philosophia Christi 1 (2):33-43.
- Psychology and spiritual formation in dialogue: moral and spiritual change in Christian perspective.Thomas M. Crisp (ed.) -2019 - Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, an imprint of InterVarsity Press.Can the phenomena of the human mind be separated from the practices of spiritual formation? Research into the nature of moral and spiritual change has revived in recent years in both the worlds of psychology and theology. Rooted in a year-long discussion held by Biola University's Center for Christian Thought (CCT), this volume bridges the gaps caused by professional specialization among psychology, theology, and philosophy.
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-54b44b69b7-bbztg uwo