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This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories ofmeaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories ofmeaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying (...) the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non-circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion ofmeaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions. (shrink)

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There are two basically different sorts oftheory ofmeaning and the sort oftheory one adopts has a great deal to do with the view one takes of the learning of language. Corresponding to the two kinds oftheory ofmeaning two theories of the learning of language are delineated and the issues that are disputed by them clarified. The logical question of whether eachtheory is intelligible in itself is first discussed, and, (...) it being concluded that both are genuine empirical hypotheses, an examination is made of psychological grounds for preferring one or the other. While no final decision is arrived at, it is argued that there are grounds for preferring one of the theories. (shrink)

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This paper endeavors to delineate the salient features of thetheory ofmeaning and to show howmeaning converges with metaphysics. For the British classical linguistic philosophers,meaning concerns only autonomous propositions, which allegedly in isolation clarify thought and facilitate understanding of language. But for the American philosophers W. V. O. Quine and Donald Davidson,meaning is inextricably related to human life and its problems. According to them, our experiences are interrelated and cannot be separated (...) from one another. A statement cannot be meaningful in isolation; that is to say, it cannot havemeaning without holistic connections and metaphysical presumptions. (shrink)

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The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very originaltheory ofmeaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. Thetheory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s DirectivalTheory ofMeaning. In the first section I present a version of thistheory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of (...) the directivaltheory and show how they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directivaltheory and later theories ofmeaning. In the third section I argue that using the directivaltheory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories ofmeaning employ. (shrink)

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Donald Davidson has claimed that for every logical truth 5 of a language L, atheory ofmeaning for L will entail that S is a logical truth of L. Jim Edwards has argued (2002) that this claim is false if we take 'entails' to mean 'has as a logical consequence. In this paper, I first show that, pace Edwards, Davidson's claim is correct even under this strong reading. I then discuss the argument given by Edwards and offer (...) a diagnosis of where he went wrong. (shrink)

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This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s DirectivalTheory ofMeaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that thetheory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can (...) deliver a new solution to the problem of defining linguisticmeaning and that thetheory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presentsmeaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTMmeaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of thetheory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

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To begin with the former, representation is as familiar as it is puzzling. The English sentence ‘ Santiago is east of Sacramento’ represents the world as being a certain way. So does my belief that Santiago is east of Sacramento. In these examples, one item—a sentence or a belief—lays claim to something else, a state of affairs, which may be far removed in space and time. This is the phenomenon that naturalist theories ofmeaning aim to explain. How is (...) it possible for one thing to stand for something else in this way? (shrink)

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This chapter highlights that what is today perhaps most commonly called a “theory ofmeaning” (i.e., one where there is a robust sense of “theory” not exemplified in Wittgenstein's work) will in most cases be “pure” in Rorty's sense (i.e., it will have no direct epistemological concerns) and can (in Dummett's sense) only be a modest one, since it does not explain what “being in command of a concept” consists in. It typically treats a logical system of (...) the kind developed by Frege as a point of comparison to shed light on some aspects of natural languages. Aspects of language that might be brought into focus by such a comparison are the “calculus” side of language (the side to which our “algebraic understanding” applies). (shrink)

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Journal Name: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Volume: 2013 Issue: 196 Pages: 521-532.

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This Book Offers A Fresh Exposition Of The BuddhistTheory OfMeaning (Apohavada) Against The Backdrop Of Indian Linguistic Thought And Shows How ThisTheory Is Positioned Vis-A-Vis Current Issues And Assumptions In Language. Consists A Very Useful Glossary.

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The Pauṣkara briefly discusses themeaning-expressing nature of śabda (constituted of phonemes, varṇa) and the means to the cognition of word and sentencemeaning. According to this dualistic Śaiva Tantra,meaning is denoted by nāda, a capacity of varṇas. Varṇas also are the means to the cognition ofmeaning through a capacity (saṃskāra) manifested in them. Although themeaning-denoting capacity is natural to varṇas, the relation of words (which are nothing but groups of varṇas) with (...) objects is fixed by convention. This article translates and analyzes the relevant passages from the sixth and eighth chapters. Certain arguments of plagiarism levelled against the eighth chapter of the Pauṣkara are examined in the concluding part of the article. (shrink)

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The aim of the thesis is to provide the foundations for a representation-basedtheory ofmeaning, i.e. atheory ofmeaning that encompasses the psychological level of cognitive representations. This is in opposition to the antipsychologist goals of the Fregean philosophy of language and represents the results of a joint analysis of multiple philosophical problems in contemporary philosophy of language, which, as argued in the tesis, stem from the lack of recognition of a cognitive level in (...) language. In the thesis, I first provide and argue a definition of cognitive/mental representations based on results in developmental psychology as well as theoretical considerations. Then, I use the definition to build upon it a richertheory of concepts and apply it to various philosophical conundra. The problems tackled include the problem of proper names (for which a solution is proposed that respects the post-Kripkean criticism), a unifiedmeaning postulate for modalities and the epistemology and ontology of mathematical terms. The thesis concludes with a proposed application of the newly acquired framework to select social aspects of language use. (shrink)

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This useful anthology contains selections from classical as well as contemporary authors on the subject ofmeaning. Although these are not arranged chronologically, the reader is made aware of the difference of purpose and approach between those philosophers trying to bolster and empiricism by atheory ofmeaning and those philosophers and linguists who find an intrinsic interest in the subject. Of particular interest is the juxtaposition of an essay by William Alston in which the shortcomings of (...) the referential, ideational and behavioralmeaning theories are discussed with selections from representative philosophers of each view. Two papers from proponents of the speech-act model of language give a clear introduction to the basics of what is considered by many to be a major breakthrough in the philosophy of language. The last two entries constitute a dialogue of the utility of the analysis of semantic components. Essays on the relation ofmeaning to philosophy and linguistics by the editors are also included.--R. P. M. (shrink)

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A number of important legal theorists have recently argued for metaphysically realist approaches to legal determinacy grounded in particular semantic theories or theories of reference, in particular, views ofmeaning and reference based on the works of Putnam and Kripke. The basic position of these theorists is that questions of legal interpretation and legal determinacy should be approached through semanticmeaning. However, the role of authority (in the form of lawmaker choice) in law in general, and democratic systems (...) in particular, require that these realist solutions to the problem of legal determinacy be rejected, or at least significantly revised. (shrink)

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The general features of a picturetheory ofmeaning (PTM) are stated. The PTM is then applied to a particular ontological perspective, and suggestions are made for generalizing the PTM to most ontological perspectives. Several ways around the classic problem for the PTM-that the language used to describe a situation must have at least one more component than the situation described-are offered.

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This dissertation is a contribution to the philosophy of language. Its central question is: In virtue of which facts do linguistic expressions mean what they do? E.g. why does “apple” mean apple in English? The question receives a systematic answer; in short: Linguistic expressions mean what they do because among their users, there are linguistic conventions and social norms to use and understand them in certain ways. The answer is clarified and defended as a central thesis. For in this form, (...) it is at best a slogan: What ismeaning? What is it to use and understand expressions? What are conventions and social norms anyway? How does the use and understanding determinemeaning? The goal of the dissertation consists in answering these questions. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Pragmatism and a BehavioralTheory ofMeaning HAROLD N. LEE IT HAS BEEN ALMOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS since the publication of Peirce's article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in the Popular Science Monthly. There Peirce stated what came to be called The Pragmatic Maxim. 1 Since then pragmatism has been developed and expounded by many proponents. Some of the developments have differed markedly from others, and (...) some of these differences are not easily compatible.2 Opponents of pragmatism have differed in their interpretations in step with the proponents. As the century is rounded out, we should be able to review the scene and appraise the maneuvers and sorties. Just what is pragmatism? It has often been held that pragmatism is not the name of a philosophy but only of a loose collection of philosophies having at most a faint family resemblance. It must be admitted that this interpretation received some support from James's genial and hospitable personality. Nevertheless, I think it is incorrect. We can now discern a central, characterizing position which the early proponents of the new movement were setting forth and defending; and we can free it from misunderstandings that have historically beset it. It was apparent from the first that action and the consequences of action were to be regarded as fundamental to the new position, but this characterization is vague enough to cover many incompatible special developments. It can be sharpened now, after a century of discussion and debate, and we can identify the respects in which action is central, thus separating the general position from the special interests belonging to one or another of the individuals who were its early advocates. Such clarification will reveal a pragmatism that is highly relevant to contemporary philosophy. I. Peirce proposed his maxim as atheory ofmeaning: the clear apprehension of an idea is to be obtained by considering the effects or consequences on future possible action that follow from the idea. Meanings consist in the possible effects of present experience on future behavior. In accordance with the pragmatic maxim, I shall take the behavioraltheory ofmeaning and the behavioraltheory of knowledge that issues from it to be the central position of pragmatism. What is either incompatible or unnecessary to this behavioral core is expendable, and if it has contributed to the misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the core, it should be abandoned in the further development of pragmatism. Both Peirce and James presented pragmatism primarily 1 Collected Papers o/ Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1-6 ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; vols. 7-8 ed. by Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-35, 1958), vol. 5, paragraphs 2 and 402. Hereafter cited as CP followed by volume and paragraph number. 2 See A. O. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," Journal o[ Philosophy, V (1908); reprinted in The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsPress, 1963). [435] 436 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY as a method, but in the philosophies of both, and of Dewey as well, the emphasis on method is often obscured by specific doctrines in some field such as ontology, epistemology or ethics; and in the cases especially of James and Dewey, it was the special doetrines that elicited the bulk of the adverse criticism. The pragmatism of all the early pragmatists was so mixed with other advocacies and causes that it was often difficult to distinguish between what should be called pragmatic and what should not. Pragmatism did not emerge full-blown in stark separateness. Certain auxiliary positions that revolve around the behavioraltheory ofmeaning also characterize pragmatism. They are to be found in the writings of all the early pragmatists and both yield and receive systematic support from the behavioraltheory ofmeaning. Together with thetheory ofmeaning they demarcate the core of pragmatism. The list is as follows: (1)Meaning and knowledge are behaviorally defined. (2) The various forms of pragmatism share an evolutionary, naturalistic outlook. (3) They all emphasize, in harmony with the evolutionary outlook, process and time-especially the continuity of passage and temporality. (4) They all show, in harmony with the continuity of process, a tendency to reject Cartesian dualism... (shrink)

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Lewis'theory ofmeaning is barely touched by the contemporary trend to substitute a patient examination of the use of words for theorizing in the traditional manner. By way of contrast, some of his epistemological and ethical writings look as if Lewis had fulfilled the promise of linguistic analysis before it was made by Wittgenstein. Lewis' discussion of the good looks like an anticipation of the linguistic method. The question "what is good?" is answered as if it read (...) "how is the word 'good' used?" In comparison, his discussion ofmeaning has an anachronistic air about it. [...]. (shrink)

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It is suggested that wittgenstein's picturetheory ofmeaning is, In part a synthesis and resolution of the early metaphysics of moore and thetheory of judgment held by russell about 1910. Moore'stheory of the objective existence of concepts and their propositional role is considered. Russell's unsuccessful attempt at the problem of the false proposition is discussed. The ptm offers a more successful solution, Through the concept of logical form, Akin to the russellian concept of (...) order. But this solution still fails because it does not hold for ordinary language. (shrink)

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In this article, I expound and assess two theories ofmeaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one principle, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other principle, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions ofmeaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but (...) that the vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confersmeaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a ‘modern’ western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore and consider some ways they might respond to the objections. (shrink)

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Donald Dvaidson has claimed that atheory ofmeaning identifies the logical constants of the object language by treating them in the phrasal axioms of thetheory, and that thetheory entails a relation of logical consequence among the sentences of the object language. Section 1 offers a preliminary investigation of these claims. In Section 2 the claims are rebutted by appealing to Evans's paradigm of atheory ofmeaning. Evans'stheory is deliberately (...) blind to any relation of logical consequence among the sentences of the object language, and entails only what Evans takes to be a distinct and deeper relation of structural validity among the sentences of the object language. In Section 3 we turn to Evans's motivation in order to compare the two paradigms of atheory ofmeaning. Evans laid down criteria under which atheory ofmeaning gives what he called a ‘transcendent’ semantic classification of the lexicon of the object language, in contrast to a mere ‘immanent’ classification. However, when these criteria are applied we find that, pace Evans, they favour Davidson's paradigm over Evans's. In the final section we show that Evans's conception of structural consequence turns out to be a deeper formulation of logical consequence. (shrink)

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Atheory of wordmeaning developed jointly by Adrienne and Keith Lehrer is summarized, which accommodates the empirical facts of natural languages, especially the diversity of types of words. Reference characterizes the application of words to things, events, properties, etc. and sense the relationship among words and linguistic expressions. Although reference and sense are closely connected, neither can be reduced to the other. We use the metaphor of vectors to show how different, sometimes competing forces interact to provide (...) an understanding of what a word in context means. Topics discussed include vagueness, indeterminacy, the role of experts, possible worlds, pragmatic influences, semantic change, semantic networks, fields, and entailments. A formaltheory for understanding the relationship of idiolects, dialects, and communal languages is proposed to account for the dynamic interaction of individuals and communities which occurs continuously. (shrink)

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Meaning in philosophy, by K. Lehrer.--Meaning in linguistics, by A. Lehrer.--Theories ofmeaning, by W. Alston.--Of names, by J. S. Mill.--Of words, by J. Locke.--Of language, by G. Berkeley.--Signs and behavior situations, by C. Morris.--Meaning and verification, by M. Schlick.--Meaning and use, by R. Wells.--Themeaning of a word, by J. Austin.--Meaning and speech acts, by J. R. Searle.--Meaning and linguistic analysis, by C. C. Fries.--The semantic compound of a linguistic description, by (...) J. J. Katz.--Componential analysis and universal semantics, by J. Lyons.--Bibliographical essay (p. 213-216). (shrink)

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Glüer and Pagin (2003) have claimed that autistic speakers are a counterexample to HOT theories ofmeaning and communication. Through analysis of their argument and a re-examination of the literature, I show that autistic speakers are not a counterexample to HOT theories, but, conversely, that such theories are necessary to account for their communicative peculiarities.

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In what follows I shall consider symbols only in their function as conveyors of meanings. That symbols have emotive and volitional properties as well, that they have elaborate and complicated relations to the self which uses them, that they are themselves physical counters, i.e., noises, visual objects, etc.,—all of these facts I recognize but choose to neglect. When symbols are considered merely as instruments for the transfer of meanings, only one important assumption is involved, viz., symbols which are precisely defined (...) are to be preferred to symbols which either are undefined or are defined inadequately. In other words, the task of atheory ofmeaning is that of showing how symbols take on a maximum degree of precision in significance. (shrink)

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According to some critics of liberal individualism, it is fundamentally problematic that individualists focus on rights instead of community and on decision-making processes instead of substantial goods. Among other things, it is claimed that liberal individualism therefore fails to providemeaning to people’s lives. The view has recently gained momentum as it has been incorporated in novel conservative and nationalist arguments. This article presents an individualisttheory ofmeaning in response to a recent nationalist reiteration of the (...) critique. Thetheory is that a continuous pursuit of self-endorsement by a perfected, liberal, version of oneself provides purpose and direction in life. This allows the individual to be the ultimate arbiter inmeaning-building matters, as thetheory locatesmeaning in the individual’s decision-making processes rather than in factors external to her. Thetheory acknowledges the interdependence of human beings but remains loyal to the view that the value of the individual generally trumps competing values, such as that of the collective. (shrink)

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After putting forward his celebrated deflationarytheory of truth (Horwich, 1998a), Paul Horwich added a compatibletheory ofmeaning (Horwich, 1998b). I am calling also this lattertheory deflationism (although it may be a slightly misleading name in that, as Paul himself notes, histheory ofmeaning is deflationary more in the sense of being forced by the deflationarytheory of truth than of being particularly deflationary in itself). In contrast, what I call (...) inferentialism is thetheory ofmeaning which I am going to advocate here – the view, in a nutshell, thatmeaning is a matter of inferential role. Various versions of thistheory have been defended by Wilfried Sellars, Robert Brandom and a couple of other philosophers including myself. And the thesis I wish to present in this paper – to put it as a provocation right off – is that Paul is an inferentialist led astray. (shrink)

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Research into logical syntax provides us the knowledge of the structure of sentences, while logical semantics provides a window into uncovering the truth of sentences. Therefore, it is natural to make sentences and truth the central concern when one deals with thetheory ofmeaning logically. Although their theories ofmeaning differ greatly, both Michael Dummett’stheory and Donald Davidson’stheory are concerned with sentences and truth and developed in terms of truth. Logical theories and (...) methods first introduced by G. Frege underwent great developments during the past century and have played an important role in expanding these two scholars’ theories ofmeaning. (shrink)

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Selected writings concerned with a central theme in recent philosophy, the problem of the nature and criteria ofmeaning.

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The object of this paper is to argue that the relationship between intentions andmeaning has been misconstrued by some influential recent theories ofmeaning. The theories I have in mind derive from earlier work by H. P. Grice, but have undergone extensive development and modification in the hands of Grice himself,, Stephen Schiffer, Jonathan Bennett and others. There have been, during much the same period, developments of Austin’s work on speech acts in which the same Gricean influence (...) is unmistakable; indeed, such influence has affected interpretations of Austin’s work itself, by such writers as Strawson, Searle, and Vendler. (shrink)

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The verificationtheory ofmeaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful and also what kind of abstract object themeaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by Rudolph Carnap, one of thetheory's most prominent defenders: If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what itsmeaning is. [...] thus themeaning of a sentence (...) is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence hasmeaning only if such a determination is possible. [4: 420] In short, the verificationtheory ofmeaning claims that themeaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. (shrink)

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Distributional semantics is an area of corpus linguistics and computational linguistics that seeks to model the meanings of words by producing a semantic space that captures the distributional properties of those words within a corpus. In this paper, I provide an overview of distributional semantic models, including a broad sketch of how such models are constructed. I then outline the reasons for and against the claim that distributional semantic models can serve as atheory ofmeaning, paying special (...) attention to those within the field who have defended this claim. Finally, I conclude by arguing that despite the fact that such models are holistic, they nevertheless avoid the objections raised against holistic theories ofmeaning, particularly from Fodor & Lepore (1992) (Holism: a shopper’s guide. Blackwell, 1992) and Fodor & Lepore (1999). (shrink)

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In his essay "on likeness ofmeaning" nelson goodman proposed that two terms have the samemeaning if and only if they have the same primary and secondary extensions. In a later essay "on some differences aboutmeaning" he reformulates his proposal: two terms have the samemeaning if and only if they have the same extension and certain of their parallel compounds have the same extension. First, I argue that because the first but not the (...) second formulation allows for interlinguisticmeaning comparisons, Goodman proposed two theories on synonymy rather than one. Second, I argue that the firsttheory suffers from the fatal defect of entailing that any two coextensive terms are synonymous. (shrink)

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Putnam originally developed his causaltheory ofmeaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causaltheory ofmeaning. In giving an answer I begin (...) with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causaltheory ofmeaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. (shrink)

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In the process of natural language functioning, in the speech communication, new regulations and requirements are constantly emerging that become normative. In the paper, in focus are (1) the interaction ofmeaning and normativity, and 2) the process of norm construal through socio-linguistic practice, namely – through the concept of deference, the phenomenon of borrowing concepts, knowledge, information from other people, linguistic communities and sources of information is considered. With the help of deference, the other side of the meaningful (...) relationship is indicated and described when we rely on other people's thoughts, knowledge that we believe to be true and authoritative. This can happen both consciously (deliberately), and unconsciously (by default). The bearers of the norm we rely on can be individuals, groups and large linguistic communities. The deferential mechanism described in the paper captures the fact that the communication participants can effectively use and reason with the help of concepts, with little or no understanding of their truemeaning. The tendency towards normativisation, unification of language and speech and corrections of all that does not agree with the common usage of words, meanings, norms in society is disclosed in the paper. A distinction is also parsed between how norms work in closed language communities and research expert groups capable of "structural cooperation" and functional definition of norms. Lastly, the author emphasizes that deference substantially complements the language in which we describe guidance, in relation to the real and symbolic worlds, where our view goes, what we remember and what we design; it is our habitual, conscious or unconscious, but not always correct, use of words, which is an important part of living communication between the social and linguistic communities. This is the case where, in some sense, a defect, a violation of norms, or a hindrance of speech communication becomes (may be) a creative means of distinguishing between what is and is not an extension of the term. (shrink)

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These supporting concepts enable us to much more adequately understand themeaning of apoha. First, a sharp distinction is drawn between the real and the conceptual; the real is particular, unique, momentary and the basis of perception, while the conceptual is universal, general, only supposedly objective and the basis of language. Second, the complex nature of negation discloses the kind of negation meant by apoha. Negation by implication is seen as disclosing the necessary relation between simple affirmations and simple (...) negations. It is in this sense that Dignaga asserts that themeaning of words lies in the negation of the opposite. Third, the idea of apoha as the differentiation of concepts is to be distinguished from the Nyāya-Vaiśe $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ika notion of exclusion as a materially present quality in objects.Ratnakirti, and Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta following him, use the idea of negation by implication to explain apoha as the simultaneity of and logical relation between a positive assertion concerning an epistemological object and a negative assertion concerning all things which are not that epistemological object. For example, Ratnakirti in accordance with thetheory of apoha explains that the term cow “harbors” the negation of non-cow in the same way that blue is harbored in the term blue lotus. The exclusion of the other, i.e., the negation of the non-cow, is held by Ratnakirti to be an actually apprehended attribute of the cow cognized (as distinct from the cow in itself). He says “... discrimination of non-cow inevitably arises simultaneously with the perception of the cow, for (the negation of non-cow) is the qualifier (of the individual).” This interaction between the positive and the negation of the other, i.e., the relation of negation by implication, as a simultaneous interaction is necessary lest when, e.g., asked to tie up a cow one ties up a horse instead.Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta denies three possible interpretations of apoha before putting forth his own definition. The first is that when an external object is conceptualized this is done as “the other (the dissimilar) is discriminated from this.”The second is much the same, only it is in terms of the mental image, i.e., the epistemological object rather than the ontological object as in the first. The third is that apoha means the negation of an assertion, i.e., the simple absence of the other. All three of these interpretations are unacceptable to Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta. He defines apoha as “the affirmation (of a positive entity) qualified by discrimination (of it from all other entities).”Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta goes on to explain this simultaneity more fully: ... those who stress affirmation think that after we have known the cow, we consequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow; those who stress the negative function of apoha are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz., the cow. Thus (both interpretations) are wrong. For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which (negation or affirmation) occurs first. In fact, it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication, or that one having understood the negation later confirms what is discriminated (from the dissimilar). Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.We can see from this that for Ratnakirti and Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta apoha meant the simultaneous affirmation of and negation of the dissimilar from the (epistemological) object. Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta's concern with the “time of judgment” also shows that the idea of apoha was understood by them as being psychologically descriptive. In the process of identifying an epistemological object as some particular thing, neither the negative nor the positive function have priority but are, rather, complementary one to the other. This simultaneity and complementarity are supported by the examination of mind “at the time of judgment,” i.e., it is a psychological description of the process of identification of an epistemological object as some particular thing.It is this fact of apoha describing the process of identification which, as described above, places apoha in the inference category of sources of truth. Apoha is clearly, therefore, involved with words and concepts rather than being on the perception side where it would have to be a metaphysical concept describing the real or absolute.Putting the idea of apoha into contemporary terms we can say that it is a psychological descriptor for the bipolar relation of concepts. Dignaga and the other Buddhist logicians are then to be understood here as being involved in producing a phenomenological description of linguistic thought processes. More broadly, as in the discussion of perception, they are involved in the phenomenological description of consciousness, a favorite Buddhist undertaking. As such, the work of the Buddhist logicians fits into the larger soteriological intention of all Buddhist thinkers, since enlightenment is understood to follow from insight into the nature of consciousness as productive of suffering.Some authors have criticized the logicians as being overly concerned with the un-Buddhist occupation of arguing. However, when their work is seen as expanding our understanding of the nature and working of consciousness, the logicians are certainly worthy of our respect. (shrink)

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