Scientists as experts: A distinct role?Torbjørn Gundersen -2018 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69:52-59.detailsThe role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that (...) there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts – that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation. (shrink)
Science Advice in an Environment of Trust: Trusted, but Not Trustworthy?Torbjørn Gundersen &Cathrine Holst -2022 -Social Epistemology 36 (5):629-640.detailsThis paper examines the conditions of trustworthy science advice mechanisms, in which scientists have a mandated role to inform public policymaking. Based on the literature on epistemic trust and public trust in science, we argue that possession of relevant expertise, justified moral and political considerations, as well as proper institutional design are conditions for trustworthy science advice. In order to assess these conditions further, we explore the case of temporary advisory committees in Norway. These committees exemplify a de facto trusted (...) and seemingly well-functioning science advice mechanism. Still, this mechanism turns out to poorly realize some central conditions of trustworthy science advice. From this we draw three lessons. Firstly, it remains crucial to distinguish between well-placed and de facto trust. Secondly, some conditions of trustworthy science advice seem more significant than others and there are thresholds for realizing each condition. Thirdly, not only does the institutional design and organization of science advice matter more than often recognized; the trust and trustworthiness of the broader social and political context and institutional environment make a difference as well. (shrink)
The Future Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine: Making Sense of Collaborative Models.Torbjørn Gundersen &Kristine Bærøe -2022 -Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (2):1-16.detailsThis article examines the role of medical doctors, AI designers, and other stakeholders in making applied AI and machine learning ethically acceptable on the general premises of shared decision-making in medicine. Recent policy documents such as the EU strategy on trustworthy AI and the research literature have often suggested that AI could be made ethically acceptable by increased collaboration between developers and other stakeholders. The article articulates and examines four central alternative models of how AI can be designed and applied (...) in patient care, which we call the ordinary evidence model, the ethical design model, the collaborative model, and the public deliberation model. We argue that the collaborative model is the most promising for covering most AI technology, while the public deliberation model is called for when the technology is recognized as fundamentally transforming the conditions for ethical shared decision-making. (shrink)
Towards an environmentally sensitive healthcare ethics: ten tasks and one model.Kristine Bærøe,Anand Singh Bhopal &TOrbjørn Gundersen -2024 -Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (6):382-383.detailsIn the face of environmental crises such as climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss—which all adversely impact on health—Gils-Schmidt and Salloch explore whether physicians can be justified in taking climate issues into account in clinical care.1 While their approach centres on the ‘climate-sensitive’ decisions, physicians can carry out on the micro-level of clinical decision-making, they encourage further discussions on how climate-related issues can be included across different levels of decision-making in healthcare. We propose a list of tasks and a model (...) to assist with navigating the range of factors and structural elements an environmentally sensitive ethics must address. Stephen Gardiner’s notion of a perfect moral storm is central to understanding these issues.2 Gardiner describes how a perfect moral storm occurs in the centre of three overlapping conditions for human action and policymaking in the face of climate change. This storm is driven by: (1) a lack of interest among current generations to meet global needs and accommodate the well-being of future generations, (2) a lack of ecological concerns for other parts of nature than humans and (3) weak ethical and political theories and institutions shaping policy decisions on issues with severe implications across borders and generations. Moreover, these conditions are embedded in the existing, complex world of ethically unjustified power imbalances and social injustice. The growing awareness of healthcare’s climate footprint has amplified and accelerated global, grassroots action to make healthcare more environmentally friendly. This includes incorporating environmental impacts into quality improvement methodologies, building communities of practice to explore how to make …. (shrink)
(1 other version)Trustworthy Science Advice: The Case of Policy Recommendations.Torbjørn Gundersen -2023 -Res Publica 30 (Onine):1-19.detailsThis paper examines how science advice can provide policy recommendations in a trustworthy manner. Despite their major political importance, expert recommendations are understudied in the philosophy of science and social epistemology. Matthew Bennett has recently developed a notion of what he calls recommendation trust, according to which well-placed trust in experts’ policy recommendations requires that recommendations are aligned with the interests of the trust-giver. While interest alignment might be central to some cases of public trust, this paper argues against the (...) significance of interest-alignment to meritorious public trust. First, political bodies and citizens can have a basic kind of well-placed recommendation trust in science advice based on an all-things-considered judgement regarding the possession of relevant competencies, responsible conduct, and a proper institutional design. Moreover, scientists’ policy recommendations can be seen as open-ended and as dynamic proposals that enable inter-institutional reasoning and political deliberation. Finally, by providing conditional recommendations, scientists can expand the scope of feasible policy options from which political bodies can choose, thus making the condition of interest alignment even less significant to the trustworthy provision of recommendations. (shrink)
Value-Free yet Policy-Relevant? The Normative Views of Climate Scientists and Their Bearing on Philosophy.Torbjørn Gundersen -2020 -Perspectives on Science 28 (1):89-118.detailsThe proper role of non-epistemic values such as moral, political, and social values in practices of justification of policy-relevant hypotheses has recently become one of the central questions in philosophy of science. This strand of research has yielded conceptual clarifications and significant insight into the complex and notoriously contentious issue of the proper relationship between science, non-epistemic values, and policymaking. A central part of this discussion revolves around whether scientists should aspire for the value-free ideal, according to which non-epistemic values (...) are unacceptable in the justification of hypotheses. By so doing, scientists can... (shrink)
Ethical Algorithmic Advice: Some Reasons to Pause and Think Twice.Torbjørn Gundersen &Kristine Bærøe -2022 -American Journal of Bioethics 22 (7):26-28.detailsMachine learning and other forms of artificial intelligence can improve parts of clinical decision making regarding the gathering and analysis of data, the detection of disease, and the provis...
A New Dark Age? Truth, Trust, and Environmental Science.Torbjørn Gundersen,Maria Baghramian &Cathrine Holst -2022 -Annual Review of Environment and Resources 47 (5):5-21.detailsThis review examines the alleged crisis of trust in environmental science and its impact on public opinion, policy decisions in the context of democratic governance, and the interaction between science and society. In an inter- disciplinary manner, the review focuses on the following themes: the trust- worthiness of environmental science, empirical studies on levels of trust and trust formation; social media, environmental science, and disinformation; trust in environmental governance and democracy; and co-production of knowledge and the production of trust in (...) knowledge. The review explores both the normative issue of trustworthiness and empirical studies on how to build trust. (shrink)
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