Results for 'Stewart Chappell'
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- Extending Voice and Autonomy through Participatory Action Research: Ethical and Practical Issues.Sui Ting Kong,Sarah Banks,Toby Brandon,StewartChappell,Helen Charnley,Se Kwang Hwang,Danielle Rudd,Sue Shaw,Sam Slatcher &Nicki Ward -2020 -Ethics and Social Welfare 14 (2):220-229.Participatory action research always operates in the tension of extending the voice of people who are marginalised and unheard in the society. A workshop, ‘Extending Voice and Autonomy through Participatory Action Research: Ethical and Practical Issues’, was therefore organised to look at the issues arising from this tension. The workshop aimed to examine critically the potential of participatory action research to enable people whose voices are seldom heard and choices are often restricted to be seen, heard and to influence practice (...) and policy relevant to their lives. The paper first outlines the rationale for the workshop and then demonstrates how ‘co-impact’ of participatory action research projects can be achieved through having conversations and reflecting on the ideas of ‘voice and autonomy’, ‘knowledge’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘user involvement and participation’. Through reflecting on the experience of preparing for and delivering the workshop, we seek ways to transform the relationship(s) between service users/community partners and academic and service professionals in the hope of generating practical knowledge ethically. (shrink)
- Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro -2014 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something.Stewart Shapiro explores various such views. He argues that the question of meaning shift is itself context-sensitive and interest-relative.
- Proof and Truth.Stewart Shapiro -1998 -Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
- Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic.Stewart Shapiro (ed.) -2005 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.This Oxford Handbook covers the current state of the art in the philosophy of maths and logic in a comprehensive and accessible manner, giving the reader an overview of the major problems, positions, and battle lines. The 26 newly-commissioned chapters are by established experts in the field and contain both exposition and criticism as well as substantial development of their own positions. Select major positions are represented by two chapters - one supportive and one critical. The book includes a comprehensive (...) bibliography. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Thinking about Mathematics.Stewart Shapiro -2001 - Oxford University Press.
- All Things Indefinitely Extensible.Stewart Shapiro &Crispin Wright -2006 - In Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright,All Things Indefinitely Extensible. pp. 255--304.
- Pandemic ethics: the case for risky research.Richard YetterChappell &Peter Singer -2020 -Research Ethics 16 (3-4):1-8.There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers to a (...) comparable level of risk in the context of promising research into the virus. We apply this principle to three examples of risky research: skipping animal trials for promising treatments, human challenge trials to speed up vaccine development, and low-dose controlled infection or “variolation.” We conclude that if volunteers, fully informed about the risks, are willing to help fight the pandemic by aiding promising research, there are strong moral reasons to gratefully accept their help. To refuse it would implicitly subject others to still graver risks. (shrink)
- The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research.Stewart Cohen -1986 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3):523-528.No categories
- Willpower Satisficing.Richard YetterChappell -2019 -Noûs 53 (2):251-265.Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as "good enough". I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of (...) what counts as "good enough". (shrink)
- Prolegomenon To Any Future Neo‐Logicist Set Theory: Abstraction And Indefinite Extensibility.Stewart Shapiro -2003 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):59-91.The purpose of this paper is to assess the prospects for a neo‐logicist development of set theory based on a restriction of Frege's Basic Law V, which we call (RV): ∀P∀Q[Ext(P) = Ext(Q) ≡ [(BAD(P) & BAD(Q)) ∨ ∀x(Px ≡ Qx)]] BAD is taken as a primitive property of properties. We explore the features it must have for (RV) to sanction the various strong axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The primary interpretation is where ‘BAD’ is Dummett's ‘indefinitely extensible’.1 Background: what (...) and why?2 Framework3 GOOD candidates, indefinite extensibility4 The framework of (RV) alone, or almost alone5 The axioms6 Brief closing. (shrink)
- Intuitionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command.Stewart Shapiro &William W. Taschek -1996 -Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):74.
- Boss, Judith and James M. Nuzum.Judith Boss,Giordano Bruno,VereChappell,John Cottingham,Peter A. Danielson,Rene Descartes,John Finis,R. J. Hollingdale &Vittorio Hösle -1999 -Teaching Philosophy 22 (2):237.
- Horrendous Evils and The Goodness of God.Marilyn McCord Adams &Stewart Sutherland -1989 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):297-323.
- Classical Logic.Stewart Shapiro &Teresa Kouri Kissel -2012 - In Ed Zalta,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Typically, a logic consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-theoretic semantics. The language is, or corresponds to, a part of a natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record which inferences are correct for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions, or possible truth conditions, for at least part of the language.
- Recovery without normalisation: It's not necessary to be normal, not even in psychiatry.ZsuzsannaChappell &Sofia M. I. Jeppsson -2023 -Clinical Ethics 18 (3):298-305.In this paper, we argue that there are reasons to believe that an implicit bias for normalcy influences what are considered medically necessary treatments in psychiatry. First, we outline two prima facie reasons to suspect that this is the case. A bias for ‘the normal’ is already documented in disability studies; it is reasonable to suspect that it affects psychiatry too, since psychiatric patients, like disabled people, are often perceived as ‘weird’ by others. Secondly, psychiatry's explicitly endorsed values of well-being (...) and function are hard to measure directly, which is why we see simpler box-ticking conceptions of recovery used in large research studies. This need not be problematic, but might lead to researchers and clinicians focusing too much on treatments that promote easy-to-measure proxies for recovery, instead of what actually matters to psychiatric patients themselves. Next, we provide examples of treatments and treatment decisions within two areas – self-injury and psychosis – which are hard to explain unless we assume that an implicit and harmful normalcy bias is at work. We conclude with some suggestions for clinicians and future research. (shrink)
- Induction and Indefinite Extensibility: The Gödel Sentence is True, but Did Someone Change the Subject?Stewart Shapiro -1998 -Mind 107 (427):597-624.Over the last few decades Michael Dummett developed a rich program for assessing logic and the meaning of the terms of a language. He is also a major exponent of Frege's version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. Over the last decade, Neil Tennant developed an extensive version of logicism in Dummettian terms, and Dummett influenced other contemporary logicists such as Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for Fregean logicism within (...) a broadly Dummettian framework. The conclusions are mostly negative: Dummett's views on analyticity and the logical/non-logical boundary leave little room for logicism. Dummett's considerations concerning manifestation and separability lead to a conservative extension requirement: if a sentence S is logically true, then there is a proof of S which uses only the introduction and elimination rules of the logical terms that occur in S. If basic arithmetic propositions are logically true-as the logicist contends-then there is tension between this conservation requirement and the ontological commitments of arithmetic. It follows from Dummett's manifestation requirements that if a sentence S is composed entirely of logical terminology, then there is a formal deductive system D such that S is analytic, or logically true, if and only if S is a theorem of D. There is a deep conflict between this result and the essential incompleteness, or as Dummett puts it, the indefinite extensibility, of arithmetic truth. (shrink)
- Rethinking the Asymmetry.Richard YetterChappell -2017 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):167-177.According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fundamental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially similar (...) theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. (shrink)
- The brain circuitry of attention.Stewart Shipp -2004 -Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (5):223-230.
- Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?Richard YetterChappell -2019 -American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):125-134.Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in (...) the non-naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded to, but to "mark" which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Computability, Proof, and Open-Texture.Stewart Shapiro -2006 - In Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski & Robert Janusz,Church's Thesis After 70 Years. Ontos Verlag. pp. 420-455.
- On the very idea of criteria for personhood.TimothyChappell -2011 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-27.I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes (...) it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre-identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons. (shrink)
- Pandemic Ethics and Status Quo Risk.Richard YetterChappell -2022 -Public Health Ethics 15 (1):64-73.Conservative assumptions in medical ethics risk immense harms during a pandemic. Public health institutions and public discourse alike have repeatedly privileged inaction over aggressive medical interventions to address the pandemic, perversely increasing population-wide risks while claiming to be guided by ‘caution’. This puzzling disconnect between rhetoric and reality is suggestive of an underlying philosophical confusion. In this paper, I argue that we have been misled by status quo bias—exaggerating the moral significance of the risks inherent in medical interventions, while systematically (...) neglecting the risks inherent in the status quo prospect of an out-of-control pandemic. By coming to appreciate the possibility and significance of status quo risk, we will be better prepared to respond appropriately when the next pandemic strikes. (shrink)
- Infinity goes up on trial: Must immortality be meaningless?TimothyChappell -2007 -European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):30-44.Wowbagger has a problem: how to make an infinitely long life meaningful. His answer to this problem is studiedly perverse. Presumably, part of his reason for taking on the project he does is that everyone likes a challenge—and the project of insulting everyone in the universe, in alphabetical order, is really challenging even if you’re immortal. Still, his response to the question ‘How shall I make my life meaningful?’ seems to be not so much an attempt to answer it as (...) to stick two fingers up at it. Can anyone find anything less perverse to say about that question? If the late and lamented Douglas Adams is to be believed, some beings can. The non-accidental immortals, the ‘serene bastards’ of Wowbagger’s envy, have no trouble coping with everlasting life. Adams does not tell us how they manage to cope; which is a pity, because many contemporary philosophers, notably Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore, see a conceptual problem here. They cannot conceive how anyone could cope with immortality, even in the rather minimal sense of ‘cope’ that Wowbagger manages. This paper argues that their arguments fail. An eternal life, I argue, can be meaningful, and under the right circumstances, will be more meaningful than any finite life could be, because free from a threat to meaningfulness that cannot be removed from any finite life. We therefore have reason to want eternal life lived under these circumstances. (shrink)
- A philosopher looks at friendship.Sophie GraceChappell -2024 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.While for centuries friendship has fascinated and puzzled philosophers, they haven't always been able to fit it into their theories. The author explores friendship as something hard to deal with in the neat and tidy ways of philosophical theory - but nevertheless as one of the central goods of human experience.
- Overriding Virtue.Richard Y.Chappell -2019 - In Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer,Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 218-226.If you focus your charitable giving on global causes where it will do the most good, how should you feel about passing by the local soup kitchen? Would the ideally virtuous agent have their (local) empathy still activated, but simply overridden by the recognition that distant others are in even greater need, leaving the agent feeling torn? Or would their empathetic impulses be wholeheartedly redirected towards the greatest needs? This chapter suggests a way to revise an outdated conception of moral (...) virtue to better meet the demands of a cosmopolitan moral outlook. (shrink)
- The Cambridge companion to Locke.VereChappell -1994 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Vere Chappell.Each volume of this series of companions to major philosophers contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, together with a substantial bibliography, and will serve as a reference work for students and non-specialists. One aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker. The essays in this volume provide a systematic survey of Locke's philosophy informed by the most recent scholarship. They cover (...) Locke's theory of ideas, his philosophies of body, mind, language, and religion, his theory of knowledge, his ethics, and his political philosophy. There are also chapters on Locke's life and subsequent influence. New readers and non-specialists will find this the most convenient, accessible guide to Locke currently available. (shrink)
- Negative Utility Monsters.Richard YetterChappell -2021 -Utilitas 33 (4):417 - 421.Many consider Nozick’s “utility monster”—a being more efficient than ordinary people at converting resources into wellbeing, with no upper limit—to constitute a damning counterexample to utilitarianism. But our intuitions may be reversed by considering a variation in which the utility monster starts from a baseline status of massive suffering. This suggests a rethinking of the force of the original objection.
- Consequentialism: Core and Expansion.Richard Y.Chappell -forthcoming - In David Copp, Tina Rulli & Connie Rosati,The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.This paper seeks to address two key questions: (1) What is core to consequentialism? and (2) How might consequentialism best be expanded beyond its core commitments? A dizzying variety of consequentialist theories have been proposed in recent years—maximizing, satisficing, or scalar; restrictive, sophisticated, or subjective; global or local; agent-neutral or agent-relative; welfarist, recursive, or violation-minimizing. Through critically exploring these various options, I will dispute two dogmas of contemporary consequentialism: that there’s nothing more to blameworthiness than the question whether it would (...) promote value to express blame, and that the only normative question that arises regarding one’s character (or motive, or decision procedure) is whether it promotes value. One may be a consequentialist—a utilitarian, even—about action, while taking other normative resources to be essential for explaining our moral lives more broadly. I thus argue for a new expanded view, Fitting Consequentialism, that is richer than the extant views on offer. (shrink)
- Introducing Epiphanies.Sophie GraceChappell -2019 -Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 2 (1):95-121.I propose a programme of research in ethical philosophy, into the peak-experiences or wow-moments that I, following James Joyce and others, call epiphanies. As a first pass, I characterize an epiphany as an (1) overwhelming (2) existentially significant manifestation of (3) value, (4) often sudden and surprising, (5) which feels like it “comes from outside” – it is something given, relative to which I am a passive perceiver – which (6) teaches us something new, which (7) “takes us out of (...) ourselves”, and which (8) demands a response. Often the correct response is love, often it is pity, or again creativity. It might also be anger or reverence or awe or a hunger to put things right – a hunger for justice; or many other things. It may be something that leads directly to action, but it may also be something that prompts contemplation; or other responses again. Since epiphanies are what I call a focal-case category, not all of the conditions listed above have to be fulfilled by all instances of epiphanies. In order to allow the reader to get a better grip on which range of phenomena may count as an epiphany, I examine in some detail several examples from literature, in particular from works by Murdoch, Hopkins, Wordsworth, C.S. Lewis, and by James Joyce. (shrink)No categories
- In Defence of the Concept of Mental Illness.ZsuzsannaChappell -2023 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 94:77-102.Many worry about the over-medicalisation of mental illness, and some even argue that we should abandon the term mental illness altogether. Yet, this is a commonly used term in popular discourse, in policy making, and in research. In this paper I argue that if we distinguish between disease, illness, and sickness (where illness refers to the first-personal, subjective experience of the sufferer), then the concept of mental illness is a useful way of understanding a type of human experience, inasmuch as (...) the term is (i) apt or accurate, (ii) a useful hermeneutical resource for interpreting and communicating experience, and (iii) can be a good way for at least some of us to establish a liveable personal identity within our culture. (shrink)
- Group Behaviour and Development: Is the Market Destroying Cooperation?Judith Heyer,FrancesStewart &Rosemary Thorp (eds.) -2002 - Oxford University Press UK.This book focuses on group behaviour in developing countries. It includes studies of producer and community organizations, NGOs, and some public sector groups. Despite the fact that most economic decisions are taken by people acting within groups -- families, firms, neighbourhood or community associations, and networks of producers -- the analysis of group functioning has not received enough attention, particularly among economists. Some groups function well, from the perspectives of equity, efficiency, and well-being, while others do not. This book explores (...) why. It covers groups that perform three types of function: overcoming market failures ; improving the position of their members, and distributing resources to the less well-off. It contrasts three modes of group behaviour: power and control; cooperation; and the use of material incentives. It explores what determines modes of behaviour of groups, and the consequences for efficiency, equity, and well-being. The book includes eleven case studies by different authors, including producers' associations in Brazil, farmers' organizations in Korea and Taiwan, community forestry groups in South Asia, organizations of sex-workers in Calcutta, and health NGOs in Uganda. Claims groups tended to be the most cooperative, cooperation fostering empowerment and self-esteem. Distributive or pro bono groups mostly operated according to power and control, while market failure groups often combined all three modes.The studies show the strong impact of norms in society as a whole on group behaviour. The recent shift towards a stronger role for market incentives has exerted powerful pressures on groups to use more material incentives, undermining the cooperation essential to sustain efficiency and equity. The universal presumption in favour of monetary incentives needs to be abandoned. Non-market behaviour needs to be valued and protected as well. (shrink)No categories
- Y. DEJIMA, S. FUKUDA, S. ICHIJOH, K. TAKASAKA and R. OHTSUKA 203–220.Christy F. Telch,Stewart Agras,Hui-Guang Tian,Gang Hu,Qina Dong,Xilin Yang,Ying Nan,Pirjo Pietinen,Aulikki Nissinen &Tanis Furst -1996 -Human Studies 26 (2).No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Ethics and Experience: Life Beyond Moral Theory.TimChappell -2009 - Routledge."Ethics and Experience" presents a wide-ranging and thought-provoking introduction to the question famously posed by Socrates: How is life to be lived? 'An excellent primer for any student taking a course on moral philosophy, the book introduces ethics as a single and broadly unified field of inquiry in which we apply reason to try and solve Socrates' question. "Ethics and Experience "examines the major forms of ethical subjectivism and objectivism - including expressivism, error theory', naturalism, and intuitionism. The book lays (...) out the detail of the most significant contemporary moral theories - including utilitarianism, virtue ethics, Kantianism, and contractarianism - and reconsiders these theories in the light of two questions that should perhaps be asked more often: Is moral theory, with its tendency to regiment ethical thought and experience, really the best way for us to apply reason to deciding how to live? And, might it not be more truly reasonable to look for less system and more insight? (shrink)
- Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good.Richard Y.Chappell -2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore,The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 498-512.Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, i.e., as better or worse than their alternatives. After surveying the main considerations for and against each of these (...) three views, I argue that the core insights of each are not (despite appearances) in conflict. Consequentialists should be deontic pluralists and accept a maximizing account of the ought of most reason, a satisficing account of obligation, and a scalar account of the weight of reasons. (shrink)
- The Correspondence of Adam Smith.M. A.Stewart -1987 - Wiley-Blackwell.
- Descartes's ontology.VereChappell -1997 -Topoi 16 (2):111-127.
- Code of Ethics: A Stratified Vehicle for Compliance.Jennifer Adelstein &Stewart Clegg -2016 -Journal of Business Ethics 138 (1):53-66.Ethical codes have been hailed as an explicit vehicle for achieving more sustainable and defensible organizational practice. Nonetheless, when legal compliance and corporate governance codes are conflated, codes can be used to define organizational interests ostentatiously by stipulating norms for employee ethics. Such codes have a largely cosmetic and insurance function, acting subtly and strategically to control organizational risk management and protection. In this paper, we conduct a genealogical discourse analysis of a representative code of ethics from an international corporation (...) to understand how management frames expectations of compliance. Our contribution is to articulate the problems inherent in codes of ethics, and we make some recommendations to address these to benefit both an organization and its employees. In this way, we show how a code of ethics can provide a foundation for ethical sustainability, while addressing management intentions and employees’ ethical satisfaction. (shrink)
- The Objectivity of Ordinary Life.Sophie GraceChappell -2017 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):709-721.Metaethics tends to take for granted a bare Democritean world of atoms and the void, and then worry about how the human world that we all know can possibly be related to it or justified in its terms. I draw on Wittgenstein to show how completely upside-down this picture is, and make some moves towards turning it the right way up again. There may be a use for something like the bare-Democritean model in some of the sciences, but the picture (...) has no standing as the basic objective truth about the world; if anything has that standing, it is ordinary life. I conclude with some thoughts about how the notion of bare, “thin” perception of non-evaluative reality feeds a number of philosophical pathologies, such as behaviourism, and show how a “thicker”, more value-laden, understanding of our perceptions of the world can be therapeutic against them. (shrink)
- Possibilities, models, and intuitionistic logic: Ian Rumfitt’s The boundary stones of thought.Stewart Shapiro -2019 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):812-825.ABSTRACTAIan Rumfitt's new book presents a distinctive and intriguing philosophy of logic, one that ultimately settles on classical logic as the uniquely correct one–or at least rebuts some prominent arguments against classical logic. The purpose of this note is to evaluate Rumfitt's perspective by focusing on some themes that have occupied me for some time: the role and importance of model theory and, in particular, the place of counter-arguments in establishing invalidity, higher-order logic, and the logical pluralism/relativism articulated in my (...) own recent *Varieties of logic*. (shrink)
- Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics.Sophie GraceChappell (ed.) -2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.What form, or forms, might ethical knowledge take? In particular, can ethical knowledge take the form either of moral theory, or of moral intuition? If it can, should it? A team of experts explore these central questions for ethics, and present a diverse range of perspectives on the discussion.
- Fittingness Objections to Consequentialism.Richard YetterChappell -2018 - In Christian Seidel,Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.New work in the foundations of ethics—extending the fitting attitudes analysis of value to yield a broader notion of normative fittingness as a (or perhaps even the) fundamental normative concept—provides us with the resources to clarify and renew the force of traditional character-based objections to consequentialism. According to these revamped fittingness objections, consequentialism is incompatible with plausible claims about which attitudes are truly fitting. If a theory’s implications regarding the fittingness facts are implausible, then this can be taken to cast (...) doubt on the truth of the theory. After clarifying the general structure of fittingness objections, and establishing how they can make character-based concerns relevant to our assessment of the truth of a moral theory like consequentialism, this chapter surveys some paradigmatic fittingness objections, showing how consequentialism can be defended against them. (shrink)
- Agamemnon at Aulis: On the Right and Wrong Sorts of Imaginative Identification.Sophie-GraceChappell -2024 -Topoi 43 (2):557-573.Williams’ discussion of dilemmas in his classic paper “Ethical consistency” famously focuses on an example that has not bothered commentators on and respondents to Williams as much as it should have bothered them: the example of Agamemnon in Aeschylus’ play. In this paper I try to pick apart what Williams wants to say from what is really going on in the text that he unfortunately chooses for his example. I compare with Williams’ discussion of Agamemnon four other commentators on this (...) crucial passage in Aeschylus’ play: Plato, Socrates, Aristotle—and Bernard Williams’ Greats tutor Eduard Fraenkel, whose epochal Corpus Christi seminars on the play Williams attended (along with Iris Murdoch, Hugh Lloyd Jones, and other rising stars of the time). I shall argue that these commentators led Williams astray. They are surprisingly prone to the same flaws of rationalism, impersonality, and moralism in making sense of Aeschylus’ extraordinarily subtle and brilliant depiction of Agamemnon; and Williams’ discussion inherits these flaws. This is an obviously ironic fact, especially given that a very fruitful reading of the passage—one that I think makes much better sense of what Aeschylus actually says—points a deeply Williamsian moral. It takes Agamemnon at Aulis as a study of a key step in the corruption of a character, a study that gets its power and its horror from its ability to show us how that process looks _from Agamemnon’s own viewpoint._. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Honor.Talal Asad &Frank HendersonStewart -1996 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 116 (2):308.
- Ordinary Language.V. C.Chappell -1966 -Foundations of Language 2 (3):276-277.
- Modesty and the Egalitarian Ethos.S.Stewart Braun -2017 - In Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun,Virtue’s Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-188.Export citation Bookmark
- Reading modern law: critical methodologies and sovereign formations.Ruth Margaret Buchanan,Stewart J. Motha &Sundhya Pahuja (eds.) -2012 - New York, NY: Routledge.Export citation Bookmark
- Essential Brunswik.Kenneth R. Hammond &Thomas R.Stewart (eds.) -2001 - Oxford University Press USA.Egon Brunswik is one of the most brilliant, creative and least understood and appreciated psychologists/philosophers of the 20th century. This book presents a collection of Brunswik's most important papers together with interpretive comments by prominent scholars who explain the intent and development of his thought. This collection and the accompanying diverse examples of the application of his ideas will encourage a deeper understanding of Brunswik in the 21st century than was the case in the 20th century. The 21st century already (...) shows signs of acceptance of Brunswikian thought with the appearance of psychologists with a different focus; emulation of physical science is of less importance, and positive contributions toward understanding behavior outside the laboratory without abandoning rigor are claiming more notice. As a result, Brunswik's theoretical and methodological views are already gaining the attention denied them in the 20th century. The plan of this book is to provide, for the first time, in one place the articles that show the origins of his thought, with all their imaginative and creative spirit, as well as thoughtful, scholarly interpretations of the development, meaning and application of his ideas to modern psychology. Thus, his views will become more understandable and more widely disseminated, as well as advanced through the fresh meaning given to them by the psychologists of the 21st century. (shrink)No categories
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments, or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge. To Which is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Adam Smith &DugaldStewart -1853Export citation Bookmark
- Bookreviews.Stewart Umphrey &William J. Edgar -1978 -Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (1):74-78.
- On the Theme of Plato's Laches.Stewart Umphrey -1976 -Interpretation 6 (1):1-10.Export citation Bookmark
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
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