In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary -2017 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.detailsMany meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...) to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. (shrink)
Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities.Stephanie Leary -2017 -Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.detailsThis chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This (...) is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties. (shrink)
Australian University Students' Attitudes Towards the Acceptability and Regulation of Pharmaceuticals to Improve Academic Performance.Stephanie Bell,Brad Partridge,Jayne Lucke &Wayne Hall -2012 -Neuroethics 6 (1):197-205.detailsThere is currently little empirical information about attitudes towards cognitive enhancement - the use of pharmaceutical drugs to enhance normal brain functioning. It is claimed this behaviour most commonly occurs in students to aid studying. We undertook a qualitative assessment of attitudes towards cognitive enhancement by conducting 19 semi-structured interviews with Australian university students. Most students considered cognitive enhancement to be unacceptable, in part because they believed it to be unethical but there was a lack of consensus on whether it (...) was similar or different to steroid use in sport. There was support for awareness campaigns and monitoring of cognitive enhancement use of pharmaceutical drugs. An understanding of student attitudes towards cognitive enhancement is important in formulating future policy. (shrink)
(1 other version)What Is Non-Naturalism?Stephanie Leary -2021 -Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.detailsMetaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely terminological question about how to use the term “non-naturalism”, but a substantive philosophical one about what metaphysical ideology we need to capture the pre-theoretical concerns of non-naturalists. I argue that, contrary to popular (...) opinion, non-naturalism is best characterized not in terms of identity or grounding, but in terms of essence. First, I lay out some desiderata for a good characterization of non-naturalism: it should (i) speak to and elucidate the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical commitments, (ii) render non-naturalism a substantive, local claim about normativity, and (iii) provide the most general characterization of the view possible (iv) in a way that best fits the spirit of paradigm non-naturalist views. I then argue that identity characterizations fail to satisfy the former two desiderata, while grounding characterizations at best don’t satisfy the latter two. So, I propose a new essence characterization of non-naturalism and argue that it does a better job of satisfying all four desiderata. Moreover, I argue that this essence characterization has important implications for both metaethical and metaphysical theorizing. (shrink)
Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary -2021 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):657-676.detailsThe pragmatism—anti-pragmatism debate concerns whether practical considerations can constitute genuinely normative wrong-kind reasons (WKRs) for and against doxastic attitudes, whereas the encroachment—anti-encroachment debate concerns whether practical considerations can affect what right-kind reasons (RKRs) one has or needs to have in order to enjoy some epistemic status. While these are two separate issues, my main aim is to show that pragmatists have a plausible debunking explanation to offer of encroachment cases: that the practical considerations in these cases only generate WKRs against (...) belief, rather than affect the RKRs one has or needs to have, so that the agents in these cases ought to withhold belief, but only in a practical or all-things-considered sense. Moreover, I argue that the pragmatist debunker's explanation of what's going on in encroachment cases is more plausible than the encroacher's because they're structurally identical to cases involving WKRs against other attitudes like admiration and fear. These analogous WKR-cases not only support the surprising conclusion that pragmatists should be anti-encroachers, but they also challenge the encroacher's view independently of whether pragmatism is true. (shrink)
Views of Addiction Neuroscientists and Clinicians on the Clinical Impact of a 'Brain Disease Model of Addiction'.Stephanie Bell,Adrian Carter,Rebecca Mathews,Coral Gartner,Jayne Lucke &Wayne Hall -2013 -Neuroethics 7 (1):19-27.detailsAddiction is increasingly described as a “chronic and relapsing brain disease”. The potential impact of the brain disease model on the treatment of addiction or addicted individuals’ treatment behaviour remains uncertain. We conducted a qualitative study to examine: (i) the extent to which leading Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians accept the brain disease view of addiction; and (ii) their views on the likely impacts of this view on addicted individuals’ beliefs and behaviour. Thirty-one Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians (10 females (...) and 21 males; 16 with clinical experience and 15 with no clinical experience) took part in 1 h semi-structured interviews. Most addiction neuroscientists and clinicians did not uncritically support the use of brain disease model of addiction. Most were cautious about the potential for adverse impacts on individuals’ recovery and motivation to enter treatment. While some recognised the possibility that the brain disease model of addiction may provide a rationale for addicted persons to seek treatment and motivate behaviour change, Australian addiction neuroscientist and clinicians do not assume that messages about “diseased brains” will always lead to increased treatment-seeking and reduced drug use. Research is needed on how neuroscience research could be used in ways that optimise positive outcomes for addicted persons. (shrink)
Lessons for Enhancement From the History of Cocaine and Amphetamine Use.Stephanie K. Bell,Jayne C. Lucke &Wayne D. Hall -2012 -American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (2):24-29.detailsDevelopments in neuroscience have raised the possibility that pharmaceuticals may be used to enhance memory, mood, and attention in people who do not have an illness or disorder, a practice known as “cognitive enhancement.” We describe historical experiences with two medicinal drugs for which similar enhancement claims were made, cocaine in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and amphetamines in the mid 20th century. These drugs were initially introduced as medicinal agents in Europe and North America before becoming more (...) widely used for a variety of purposes, including what would nowadays be considered cognitive enhancement. Their trajectory of use conformed to the typical use cycle of psychotropic drugs. There was an initial steep rise in prescribing for medical use, followed by expanded nonmedical use that was fueled by enthusiasm for the drugs’ effects. As the number of regular users increased, problems related to use (such as addiction) became apparent, societal concern increased, and laws were passed banning nonmedical use and eventually, medical use. This historical experience draws attention to the adverse side effects of enhancement use that only become apparent with regular, wide-scale use of a drug. We highlight the similarities between the enthusiasms for cocaine and amphetamines and the current enthusiasms for using prescription stimulants for cognitive enhancement. We argue bioethicists should not encourage the cognitive enhancement use of drugs such as methylphenidate in the absence of evidence on the efficacy and safety of their use for cognitive enhancement purposes. (shrink)
Trust and the collection, selection, analysis and interpretation of data: A scientist’s view.Stephanie J. Bird &David E. Housman -1995 -Science and Engineering Ethics 1 (4):371-382.detailsTrust is a critical component of research: trust in the work of co-workers and colleagues within the scientific community; trust in the work of research scientists by the non-research community. A wide range of factors, including internally and externally generated pressures and practical and personal limitations, affect the research process. The extent to which these factors are understood and appreciated influence the development of trust in scientific research findings.
Grounding the Domains of Reasons.Stephanie Leary -2019 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):137-152.detailsA good account of normative reasons should explain not only what makes practical and epistemic reasons a unified kind of thing, but also why practical and epistemic reasons are substantively differ...
Homeorhesis: envisaging the logic of life trajectories in molecular research on trauma and its effects.Stephanie Lloyd,Alexandre Larivée &Pierre-Eric Lutz -2022 -History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 44 (4):1-29.detailsWhat sets someone on a life trajectory? This question is at the heart of studies of 21st-century neurosciences that build on scientific models developed over the last 150 years that attempt to link psychopathology risk and human development. Historically, this research has documented persistent effects of singular, negative life experiences on people’s subsequent development. More recently, studies have documented neuromolecular effects of early life adversity on life trajectories, resulting in models that frame lives as disproportionately affected by early negative experiences. (...) This view is dominant, despite little evidence of the stability of the presumably early-developed molecular traits and their potential effects on phenotypes. We argue that in the context of gaps in knowledge and the need for scientists to reason across molecular and phenotypic scales, as well as time spans that can extend beyond an individual’s life, specific interpretative frameworks shape the ways in which individual scientific findings are assessed. In the process, scientific reasoning oscillates between understandings of cellular homeostasis and organisms’ homeorhesis, or life trajectory. Biologist and historian François Jacob described this framework as the “attitude” that researchers bring to bear on their “objects” of study. Through an analysis of, first, historical and contemporary scientific literature and then ethnographic research with neuroscientists, we consider how early life trauma came to be associated with specific psychological and neurobiological effects grounded in understandings of life trajectories. We conclude with a consideration of the conceptual, ontological, and ethical implications of interpreting life trajectories as the result of the persistence of long-embodied biological traits, persistent life environments, or both. (shrink)
Three Essays on Journalism and Virtue.G. Stuart Adam,Stephanie Craft &Elliot D. Cohen -2004 -Journal of Mass Media Ethics 19 (3-4):247-275.detailsIn these essays, we are concerned with virtue in journalism and the media but are mindful of the tension between the commercial foundations of publishing and broadcasting, on the one hand, and journalism's democratic obligations on the other. Adam outlines, first, a moral vision of journalism focusing on individualistic concepts of authorship and craft. Next, Craft attempts to bridge individual and organizational concerns by examining the obligations of organizations to the individuals working within them. Finally, Cohen discusses the importance of (...) resisting the powerful corporate logic that pervades the news media in the United States and calls on journalists to be courageous. (shrink)
Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts.Stephanie Leary -2020 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):455-474.detailsABSTRACT The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors (...) certain ways of acting and valuing. Eklund then offers a metasemantic view that he thinks can provide the best solution to this problem. In this reply to Eklund, I argue that Eklund’s treatment of the problem and his solution re-entangle metaphysical and metasemantic issues that ought to be kept separate. I also argue that there is a purely metaphysical solution to the problem at hand, which Eklund’s own solution seems to implicitly rely upon. While these criticisms do not suggest that Eklund’s positive view is false, they do undermine some of the broader lessons that Eklund hopes to draw from the view. (shrink)
Trope analysis and folk intuitions.Stephanie Rennick -2021 -Synthese 199 (1-2):5025-5043.detailsThis paper outlines a new method for identifying folk intuitions to complement armchair intuiting and experimental philosophy, and thereby enrich the philosopher’s toolkit. This new approach—trope analysis—depends not on what people report their intuitions to be but rather on what they have made and engaged with; I propose that tropes in fiction reveal which theories, concepts and ideas we find intuitive, repeatedly and en masse. Imagination plays a dual role in both existing methods and this new approach: it enables us (...) to create the scenarios that elicit our intuitions, and also to mentally represent them. The method I propose allows us to leverage the imagination of the many rather than the few on both counts—scenarios are both created and consumed by the folk themselves. (shrink)
Potential for Bias in the Context of Neuroethics: Commentary on “Neuroscience, Neuropolitics and Neuroethics: The Complex Case of Crime, Deception and fMRI”.Stephanie J. Bird -2012 -Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):593-600.detailsNeuroscience research, like all science, is vulnerable to the influence of extraneous values in the practice of research, whether in research design or the selection, analysis and interpretation of data. This is particularly problematic for research into the biological mechanisms that underlie behavior, and especially the neurobiological underpinnings of moral development and ethical reasoning, decision-making and behavior, and the other elements of what is often called the neuroscience of ethics. The problem arises because neuroscientists, like most everyone, bring to their (...) work assumptions, preconceptions and values and other sources of potentially inappropriate bias of which they may be unaware. It is important that the training of neuroscientists, and research practice itself, include open and in-depth discussion and examination of the assumptions that underlie research. Further, policy makers, journalists, and the general public, that is, the consumers of neuroscience research findings (and by extension, neurotechnologies) should be made aware of the limitations as well as the strengths of the science, the evolving nature of scientific understanding, and the often invisible values inherent in science. (shrink)
Can you remember silence? Epigenetic memory and reversibility as a site of intervention.Stephanie Lloyd,Pierre-Eric Lutz &Chani Bonventre -2023 -Bioessays 45 (7):2300019.detailsJust over 20 years ago, molecular biologists Leonie Ringrose and Renato Paro published an article with a provocative title, “Remembering Silence”, in BioEssays. The article focused on how epigenetic elements could return to their silent state, operationally defined as their epigenetic status before their modulation by experimental or environmental factors. Though Ringrose and Paro's article was on fruit flies and factors affecting embryological growth, the article asked a question of considerable importance to rapidly expanding research in neuroepigenetics on the correlation (...) between trauma and neuropsychiatric risk: If you experience a traumatic event and, as a result, acquire an epigenetic trait that is considered pathological, can you free yourself of that trait? Ultimately, we are interested in how a return to silence is envisioned in neuroepigenetics research, how interventions purported to bring about that silence might function, and what this might mean for people who live in the aftermath of trauma. (shrink)
Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary -2022 -Synthese 200 (3):1-22.detailsPluralist pragmatists claim that there are both practical and epistemic reasons for belief, but should they also claim that there are both kinds of reasons for action? I argue that the pluralist pragmatist faces a puzzle here. If she accepts that there are epistemic reasons for action, she must explain a striking asymmetry between action and belief: while epistemic reasons play a large role in determining which beliefs one all-things-considered ought to have, they don’t play much of a role in (...) determining which action one all-things-considered ought to perform. But if the pluralist pragmatist denies that there are epistemic reasons for action, she has trouble explaining why there are no such reasons. After motivating this puzzle, I propose a solution to it. I argue that the pluralist can accept that there are epistemic reasons for action while nonetheless explaining why they don’t matter much to how we all-things-considered ought to act because, if there are epistemic reasons for action, they are so ubiquitous that in most choice situations we have equally strong epistemic reasons for doing anything, which makes any action epistemically permitted, but not required. (shrink)
définition de la pseudoscience chez Sven Ove Hansson.Stéphanie Debray -2023 -Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 10 (1):13-23.detailsTrois stratégies furent principalement adoptées par les philosophes pour résoudre le problème de la démarcation : 1° la recherche d’un critère de démarcation unique et anhistorique, 2° la recherche de listes à critères multiples, 3° la recherche d’une définition de la pseudoscience. En analysant la proposition de Sven Ove Hansson (2013), cet article est principalement focalisé sur la troisième stratégie. L’article poursuit un triple objectif : i) exposer chacun des critères qui composent la définition de la pseudoscience de Hansson en (...) 2013, et les difficultés que l’auteur tente de dépasser, ii) mettre en exergue les limites de cette définition, iii) dégager in fine des propositions permettant d’avancer sur la question de la pseudoscience. (shrink)
Backwards counterfactuals.Stephanie Rennick &Neil McDonnell -forthcoming -Philosophical Quarterly.detailsThis paper offers two novel conceptual tools: one concerning the semantics of counterfactuals and what should be held fixed when assessing them (the modal moat), and the other concerning the pragmatics of counterfactual assertions and how to avoid the potential pitfalls of meaning more than we say (antecedent gluttony). These allow us to address existing issues with the assessment of backwards counterfactuals within a framework that applies equally to forwards cases. In addition to solving a thorny problem from the time (...) travel literature, what we learn teaches us something quite general about our evaluation of counterfactuals. (shrink)
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At the Crossroads: Latina Identity and Simone de Beauvoir'sThe Second Sex.Stephanie Rivera Berruz -2016 -Hypatia 31 (2):319-333.detailsSimone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex has been heralded as a canonical text of feminist theory. The book focuses on providing an account of the lived experience of woman that generates a condition of otherness. However, I contend that it falls short of being able to account for the multidimensionality of identity insofar as Beauvoir's argument rests upon the comparison between racial and gendered oppression that is understood through the black–white binary. The result of this framework is the imperceptibility of (...) identities at the crossroads between categories of race and gender. Hence, the goal of this article is to explore the margins of Beauvoir's work in order to decenter the “other” of The Second Sex and make known what is made imperceptible by its architecture, using Latina identity as an interventional guide. I conclude that given the prominence of The Second Sex in feminist theory, this shortcoming must be addressed if feminist theorists are to use it responsibly. (shrink)
“...In the Borderlands You are the Battleground…”: June 12 and the Pulse of the Sacred.Stephanie Rivera Berruz -2022 -Puncta 5 (4):51-70.detailsOn June 12, 2016, the world witnessed one of the deadliest single shooter massacres in U.S. history. Fifty persons were killed and fifty-three were critically injured. Of those fifty, twenty-three were Puerto Rican; 90% of those killed were Latinx. Their faces spanned the racial kaleidoscope of the African, Latinx, and Indigenous diaspora. Most of them were working class and extremely young (Ochoa 2016). However, these particularities went largely omitted from the coverage of the event that swept the nation under the (...) label of an LGBTQ hate crime. The ubiquity of death of color in the U.S. cannot be overstated. Indeed, many pulses have been lost outside of Pulse nightclub. To many, June 12 may seem like a day among many, lost to the memorials of death no one really wants to remember. In this paper I explore June 12 as we turn the page on its sixth year of remembrance. I make the case for a reading of June 12 as more than an LGBTQ hate crime, but rather as emblematic of a battleground of a sacred space (Latin night at the gay bar) for queer bodies of color. The project establishes a more complex framework for understanding what took place on June 12 that can appreciate the ethno-racial, spiritual, and queer dimensions that foregrounded the event. I maintain that the method of analysis necessitates a different model of theorizing, one that can crystalize the sexuality of terrorism, the whiteness of homonationalism, and thereby the importance of creating sacred space for Latinx queer subjects, many of whom, in the context of June 12, form part of the Puerto Rican diaspora. (shrink)
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Quelques jugements portés par les belges sur le présent et l'avenir de leur société.Stéphanie Bernard -1975 -Res Publica 17 (4):589-618.detailsT he article studies the answers collected for seven questions : four of these deal with the present functioning of the socio-political system ; the three last questions concern the future of the system. One has studied respectively : the attitudes towards the basic values of the consumers' society ; the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life in Belgium ; the developments in satisfaction or dissatisfaction during the last four years ; how the various main social categories judge their (...) living conditions ; the attitudes towards an eventual redistribution of national income; the opinions about the probable development of the political system ; those opinions which reveal how one wants the political system to develop. The study of these two last items has allowed to tackle some problems of theoretical interpretation : revolutionary vs. authoritarian risk, dissatisfaction «within the regime» vs. «against the regime», ambivalence of political attitudes, social function of the political power, revolutionary attitudes and rational calculus. (shrink)
Ecofeminist Theory and Grassroots Politics.Stephanie Lahar -1991 -Hypatia 6 (1):28 - 45.detailsThis essay proposes several guiding parameters for ecofeminism's development as a moral theory. I argue that these provide necessary directives and contexts for ecofeminist analyses and social/ecological projects. In the past these have been very diverse and occasionally contradictory. Most important to the core of ecofeminism's vitality are close links between theory and political activism. I show how these originated in ecofeminism's history and advocate a continued participatory and activist focus in the future.
Empathy: Each is in the right – hopefully, not all in the wrong.Stephanie D. Preston &Frans B. M. de Waal -2001 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):49-58.detailsOnly a broad theory that looks across levels of analysis can encompass the many perspectives on the phenomenon of empathy. We address the major points of our commentators by emphasizing that the basic perception-action process, while automatic, is subject to control and modulation, and is greatly affected by experience and context because of the role of representations. The model can explain why empathy seems phenomenologically more effortful than reflexive, and why there are different levels of empathy across individuals, ages, and (...) species. (shrink)
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies.Stephanie Rennick -2021 -Philosophies 6 (3):78.detailsCausal loops are a recurring feature in the philosophy of time travel, where it is generally agreed that they are logically possible but may come with a theoretical cost. This paper introduces an unfamiliar set of causal loop cases involving knowledge or beliefs about the future: self-fulfilling prophecy loops (SFP loops). I show how and when such loops arise and consider their relationship to more familiar causal loops.
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Investigating The Effects of The Classroom Learning Environment on Students’ Motivation in Social Studies.Stephanie L. Knight &Hersholt C. Waxman -1990 -Journal of Social Studies Research 14 (1):1-12.detailsThis study examined the effects of students’ perceptions of their classroom learning environment on their motivation to leam in social studies. Setwise multiple regression analyses were employed to determine the effects of psychosocial and learning environment on three different aspects of motivation: achievement motivation, academic self-concept, and social self-concept. Results provide support for the consideration of multiple dimensions of motivations, since several environment variables were found to influence different aspects of motivation. Several classroom environment variables influenced students’ achievement motivation, academic (...) self-concept, and social self-concept. The idea of a relationship between classroom learning environment and student motivation in social studies was supported, with implications for arrangement of the social studies classroom environment. (shrink)
Intellectual Biography of David Lewis (1941–2001).Stephanie R. Lewis -2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer,A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1–14.detailsThis chapter exhibits elements of the origins of David Lewis, philosopher and human being, and whose works we know. It describes important influences on David as a child, as an adolescent, and young man. The chapter begins with the last, and most important, of the forces that shaped the adult David, and made him the philosopher that he was. The chapter dealing with childhood and early adolescence draws partly on Lewis family myth and folklore, but primarily on an autobiography he (...) wrote, at the age of 14, in his next‐to‐last year of high school. David also showed early signs of the high‐mindedness that characterized him for his entire life. The chapter also looks at David's early life. What Australia, and the Australians, did for him was to take him out of himself and make him into a member of community. (shrink)
Foreknowledge, fate and freedom.Stephanie Rennick -unknowndetails“Foreknowledge, Fate and Freedom” is concerned with diagnosing and debunking a pervasive and prevalent folk intuition: that a foreknown future would be problematically, and freedom-hinderingly, fixed. In it, I discuss foreknowledge in and of itself, but also as a lens through which we can examine other intuitions and concepts: the apparent asymmetry of future and past; worries about fate and free will; notions of coincidence and likelihood; assumptions about God, time travel and ourselves. This thesis provides the first philosophical map (...) of a region of conceptual space visited often by the folk and popular culture, and as a result ties together a host of disparate threads in the literature. I make three central claims: 1. The folk intuition is wrong in rejecting foreknowledge wholesale on the basis that it entails a problematically fixed future, and thereby undermines our freedom. 2. Foreknowledge gives rise to new problems, and sheds new light on old ones, but none of these are insurmountable. 3. The same paradoxes thought to plague backwards time travel can arise in foreknowledge cases, and can be defused in the same way. I conclude that foreknowledge is puzzling, but possible: it neither inevitably entails fatalism nor precludes free will. While its consequences may be strange, they are not sufficient to vindicate the folk intuition. (shrink)