The Choreography of Group Affiliation.Jorina Zimmermann,StaciVicary,Matthias Sperling,Guido Orgs &Daniel C. Richardson -2018 -Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (1):80-94.detailsWhen two people move in synchrony, they become more social. Yet it is not clear how this effect scales up to larger numbers of people. Does a group need to move in unison to affiliate, in what we term unitary synchrony; or does affiliation arise from distributed coordination, patterns of coupled movements between individual members of a group? We developed choreographic tasks that manipulated movement synchrony without explicitly instructing groups to move in unison. Wrist accelerometers measured group movement dynamics and (...) we applied cross-recurrence analysis to distinguish the temporal features of emergent unitary synchrony and distributed coordination. Participants’ unitary synchrony did not predict pro-social behavior, but their distributed coordination predicted how much they liked each other, how they felt toward their group, and how much they conformed to each other's opinions. The choreography of affiliation arises from distributed coordination of group movement dynamics. (shrink)
The Choreography of Group Affiliation.Jorina von Zimmermann,StaciVicary,Matthias Sperling,Guido Orgs &Daniel C. Richardson -2018 -Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (1):80-94.detailsDance provides natural conditions for studying relationships between coordination patterns and human experience. von Zimmermann and colleagues investigate whether relatively simple or more complex forms of movement coordination are related to pro‐social experiences during group dance. They find that pro‐social experience depends on the degree to which movement patterns are distributed and diversified, but not the degree to which movement patterns are simply unitary.
Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self.Stacy Alaimo (ed.) -2010 - Indiana University Press.detailsHow do we understand the agency and significance of material forces and their interface with human bodies? What does it mean to be human in these times, with bodies that are inextricably interconnected with our physical world? Bodily Natures considers these questions by grappling with powerful and pervasive material forces and their increasingly harmful effects on the human body. Drawing on feminist theory, environmental studies, and the sciences, Stacy Alaimo focuses on trans-corporeality, or movement across bodies and nature, which has (...) profoundly altered our sense of self. By looking at a broad range of creative and philosophical writings, Alaimo illuminates how science, politics, and culture collide, while considering the closeness of the human body to the environment. (shrink)
The great beetle debate: A study in imagining with names.Stacie Friend -2011 -Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.detailsStatements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we are supposed (...) to imagine. Most other theories of thought and discourse about fictional characters either fail to capture the intentionality of our imaginings, or else obscure the differences between imaginings directed toward fictional characters and those directed toward real individuals. I argue that once we have an account of prescriptions to imagine about real individuals, we can adapt the same framework to specify the contents of prescriptions to imagine about fictional characters, and thereby to account for the truth (or falsity) of statements about fictional characters. (shrink)
Material Feminisms.Stacy Alaimo &Susan J. Hekman (eds.) -2008 - Indiana University Press.detailsBy insisting on the importance of materiality, this volume breaks new ground in philosophy, feminist theory, cultural studies, science studies, and other fields where the body and nature collide.
Fiction as a Genre.Stacie Friend -2012 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):179--209.detailsStandard theories define fiction in terms of an invited response of imagining or make-believe. I argue that these theories are not only subject to numerous counterexamples, they also fail to explain why classification matters to our understanding and evaluation of works of fiction as well as non-fiction. I propose instead that we construe fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a cluster of nonessential criteria, and which play a role in the appreciation of particular works. I (...) claim that this proposal captures the intuitions motivating alternative theories of fiction. (shrink)
Elucidating the Truth in Criticism.Stacie Friend -2017 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (4):387-399.detailsAnalytic aesthetics has had little to say about academic schools of criticism, such as Freudian, Marxist, feminist, or postcolonial perspectives. Historicists typically view their interpretations as anachronistic; non-historicists assess all interpretations according to formalist criteria. Insofar as these strategies treat these interpretations as on a par, however, they are inadequate. For the theories that ground the interpretations differ in the claims they make about the world. I argue that the interpretations of different critical schools can be evaluated according to the (...) truth or epistemic merit of these claims. (shrink)
No categories
Getting Carried Away: Evaluating the Emotional Influence of Fiction Film.Stacie Friend -2010 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):77-105.detailsIt is widely taken for granted that fictions, including both literature and film,influence our attitudes toward real people, events, and situations. Philosopherswho defend claims about the cognitive value of fiction view this influence in apositive light, while others worry about the potential moral danger of fiction.Marketers hope that visual and aural references to their products in movies willhave an effect on people’s buying patterns. Psychologists study the persuasiveimpact of media. Educational books and films are created in the hopes of guidingchildren’s (...) and adult’s preferences toward socially acceptable norms.The influencesdiscussed by marketers, psychologists, educators, and philosophers tend to be bothcognitive and affective. It seems that we can be “emotionally persuaded”: ourpreferences can be changed, our feelings about particular people or events can beinfluenced, and so forth. (shrink)
The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds.Stacie Friend -2017 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):29-42.detailsI argue that judgments of what is ‘true in a fiction’ presuppose the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is true is fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work. By contrast with the more familiar Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption is not a rule for inferring implied content from what is explicit. Instead, it provides an array of real-world truths that can be used in such inferences. I claim that the Reality Assumption is essential to our ability to (...) understand stories, drawing on a range of empirical evidence that demonstrates our reliance on it in narrative comprehension. However, the Reality Assumption has several unintuitive consequences, not least that what is fictionally the case includes countless facts that neither authors nor readers could ever consider. I argue that such consequences provide no reason to reject the Reality Assumption. I conclude that we should take fictions, like non-fictions, to be about the real world. (shrink)
Fictional characters.Stacie Friend -2007 -Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.detailsIf there are no fictional characters, how do we explain thought and discourse apparently about them? If there are, what are they like? A growing number of philosophers claim that fictional characters are abstract objects akin to novels or plots. They argue that postulating characters provides the most straightforward explanation of our literary practices as well as a uniform account of discourse and thought about fiction. Anti-realists counter that postulation is neither necessary nor straightforward, and that the invocation of pretense (...) provides a better account of the same phenomena. I outline and assess these competing theories. (shrink)
Undomesticated ground: recasting nature as feminist space.Stacy Alaimo -2000 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.detailsIn Undomesticated Ground, Stacy Alaimo issues a bold call to reclaim nature as feminist space.
Professionalizing early childhood education as a field of practice: a guide to the next era.Stacie G. Goffin -2015 - St. Paul, MN: Redleaf Press.detailsWhere do you begin the important conversation about professionalizing early childhood education (ECE) as a field of practice? This book is the tool you need to advance the conversation and shape the future of ECE. Professionalizing Early Childhood Education As a Field of Practice provides an overview of the topic, a participant guide, a conversation workbook, and a facilitator guide to move the conversation forward. Each section supports deep thought and creative discussions to make the overall conversation meaningful and productive (...) for the entire profession. Don't just sit back and listen; be a part of this important conversation.Stacie Goffin is a widely recognized authority in early childhood education with a passion for raising the competence of ECE as a field of practice. She received a degree in child development from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, followed by her master's in early childhood from George Washington University and her executive education certification from Harvard. Stacie currently serves as Principal of the Goffin Strategies Group, where she uses her experience consulting with educational programs to improve effectiveness and services for young children. (shrink)
Notions of nothing.Stacie Friend -2016 - In Friend Stacie,[no title].detailsBook synopsis: New work on a hot topic by an outstanding team of authors At the intersection of several central areas of philosophy It is the linguistic job of singular terms to pick out the objects that we think or talk about. But what about singular terms that seem to fail to designate anything, because the objects they refer to don't exist? We can employ these terms in meaningful thought and talk, which suggests that they are succeeding in fulfilling their (...) representational task. A team of leading experts presents new essays on the much-debated problem of empty reference and thought. In the 1960s and 1970s Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam initiated a revolution in the then standard conception of reference—a concept at the core of philosophical inquiry. The repercussions of the revolution, particularly felt in metaphysics and epistemology, were soon refined by other influential writers such as Tyler Burge, Gareth Evans, and John Perry. They argued that some linguistic and mental representations have contents individuated by what they are about—by ordinary referents of expressions such as proper names, indexicals, definite descriptions and common nouns, i.e. by planets, people or natural kinds. The view was at odds with a central philosophical presumption at that time: that cognitive and linguistic access to objective reality is indirect and accidental, mediated by general descriptive characterizations, the only constitutive semantic feature of the expressions; hence its ontological and epistemological repercussions. A turning-point in the debate about how linguistic and mental representation reach external contents concerned the nature of empty mental and linguistic representations, framed by means of the very same expressions crucially invoked in the Donnellan-Kaplan-Kripke-Putnam arguments. The papers in this volume address different aspects of reference and thought about the non-existent. (shrink)
Believing in Stories.Stacie Friend -2014 - In Greg Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson,Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 227-248.detailsBook synopsis: The most debated issue in aesthetics today Written by an international team of leading experts Addresses growing methodological concerns in the field Includes an extensive introduction which illuminates key issues Through much of the twentieth century, philosophical thinking about works of art, design, and other aesthetic products has emphasized intuitive and reflective methods, often tied to the idea that philosophy's business is primarily to analyze concepts. This 'philosophy from the armchair' approach contrasts with methods used by psychologists, sociologists, (...) evolutionary thinkers, and others who study the making and reception of the arts empirically. How far should philosophers be sensitive to the results of these studies? Is their own largely a priori method basically flawed? Are their views on aesthetic value, interpretation, imagination, and the emotions of art to be rethought in the light of best science? The essays in this volume seek answers to these questions, many through detailed studies of problems traditionally regarded as philosophical but where empirical inquiry seems to be shedding interesting light. No common view is looked for or found in this volume: a number of authors argue that the current enthusiasm for scientific approaches to aesthetics is based on a misunderstanding of the philosophical enterprise and sometimes on misinterpretation of the science; others suggest various ways that philosophy can and should accommodate and sometimes yield to the empirical approach. The editors provide a substantial introduction which sets the scene historically and conceptually before summarizing the claims and arguments of the essays. (shrink)
Fiction and emotion.Stacie Friend -2016 - In Amy Kind,The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge. pp. 217-229.detailsEngagement with fiction often inspires emotional responses. We may pity Sethe while feeling ambivalent about her actions (in Beloved), fear for Ellen Ripley as she battles monstrous creatures (in Alien), get angry at Okonkwo for killing Ikemefuna (in Things Fall Apart), and hope that Kiyoaki and Satoko find love (in Spring Snow). Familiar as they are, these reactions are puzzling. Why do I respond emotionally if I do not believe that these individuals exist or that the events occurred? If I (...) merely imagine that my best friend has betrayed me, I do not become angry with him; if I did, I would be considered irrational. Yet although beliefs seem to be necessary for emotions in other contexts, we respond to fiction without the relevant beliefs. These observations prompt two questions about our emotional responses to fiction (henceforth: fictional emotions). The first is descriptive: Should fictional emotions be classified as the same kind of emotions we experience in other contexts? The second is normative: Are fictional emotions irrational or otherwise inappropriate? I take each of these debates in turn. (shrink)
Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and Holism in John R. Searle's Philosophy of Mind.Giuseppe Vicari (ed.) -2008 - Rodopi.detailsThis book is a systematic analysis of John R. Searle's philosophy of mind. Searle's view of mind, as a set of subjective and biologically embodied processes, can account for our being part of nature qua mindful beings. This model finds support in neuroscience and offers reliable solutions to the problems of consciousness, mental causation, and the self.
Sustaining Voices: Applying Giving Voice to Values to Sustainability Issues.Stacie Chappell,Mark G. Edwards &Dave Webb -2013 -Journal of Business Ethics Education 10:211-230.detailsWe apply an action-oriented approach to business ethics education, Giving Voice to Values (GVV), to the topic of sustainability. The increasingly problematic impact of unsustainable economic activity is demanding actionable responses from business. However, traditional business ethics education has focussed on awareness and decision-making and neglected action-oriented methods. The GVV curriculum offers an applied and process-driven ethics approach thatcomplements more analytical ethics pedagogies. Because of its focus on action and expressing personal values, GVV can be thought of as largely applicable (...) to the micro-level of interpersonal interactions. This paper illustrates GVV’s potential for much broader application by presenting two caselettes spanning the micro-level of workplace refurbishment to the global-level of the mass dumping of electronic waste. Ways of crafting conversations around these sustainability issues are presented and implications of the GVV approach for both the teaching and practice of sustainability ethics are discussed. (shrink)
Falsehoods in Film: Documentary vs Fiction.Stacie Friend -2021 -Studies in Documentary Film 15 (2):151-162.detailsI claim that we should reject a sharp distinction between fiction and non-fiction according to which documentary is a faithful representation of the facts, whilst fiction films merely invite us to imagine what is made up. Instead, we should think of fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a combination of non-essential features and which influence appreciation in a variety of ways. An objection to this approach is that it renders the distinction too conventional and fragile, (...) undermining our justification for criticising documentaries like Bowling for Columbine or The Hunting Ground for playing fast and loose with the facts. I argue that this objection is misguided, misidentifying the justification for criticising non-fiction films that mislead or deceive. I develop an alternative account that explains why we also criticise many fictions for inaccuracy. (shrink)
Emotion in Fiction: State of the Art.Stacie Friend -2022 -British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2):257-271.detailsIn this paper, I review developments in discussions of fiction and emotion over the last decade concerning both the descriptive question of how to classify fiction-directed emotions and the normative question of how to evaluate those emotions. Although many advances have been made on these topics, a mistaken assumption is still common: that we must hold either that fiction-directed emotions are (empirically or normatively) the same as other emotions, or that they are different. I argue that we should reject this (...) dichotomy. (shrink)
Fictive Utterance And Imagining II.Stacie Friend -2011 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):163-180.detailsThe currently standard approach to fiction is to define it in terms of imagination. I have argued elsewhere that no conception of imagining is sufficient to distinguish a response appropriate to fiction as opposed to non-fiction. In her contribution Kathleen Stock seeks to refute this objection by providing a more sophisticated account of the kind of propositional imagining prescribed by so-called ‘fictive utterances’. I argue that although Stock's proposal improves on other theories, it too fails to provide an adequate criterion (...) of fictionality. I conclude by sketching an alternative account according to which fiction is a genre. (shrink)
Why Care for Others?: How Bill Wilson Made Responsibility to Care a Matter of Life and Death in Alcoholics Anonymous.Stacy Clifford Simplican,Ross Graham,Sarah V. Suiter &Daniel R. Morrison -2023 -Ethics and Social Welfare 17 (1):51-66.detailsJoan Tronto’s new paradigm of caring democracy bases citizenship on the need to ensure that all people receive and provide care equitably. But how exactly are citizens motivated to take up these caring responsibilities? The writings of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) co-founder William ‘Bill’ Wilson provide one answer: he pathologizes the alcoholic – dooming him to inevitable relapse and death – to compel AA members to accept shared vulnerability and mutual care as the bedrock of sobriety and AA society. Wilson returns (...) repeatedly to the threat of death to convince AA members to carry out their newfound caring and democratic responsibilities. We use Wilson’s thinking, as well as Michel Foucault’s work on biopower, to forward the concept of biocaring democracy, in which the acceptance of shared pathology compels people to care for each other but also limits their democratic responsibilities. More broadly, our analysis suggests how hinging democracy to shared vulnerability may constrain the radical possibilities that Tronto envisions. (shrink)
Lives Cut Short: suicide among adolescent females.Meaghan Stacy &Jay Schulkin -2023 -Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 66 (3):437-450.detailsABSTRACT:Suicide is a worldwide public health issue, and suicide ideation and behavior among adolescents, females in particular, have been increasing. Focusing on the risk factors that are unique to adolescents and adolescent females can help tailor and inform prevention strategies. There are unique biological, psychological, social, and societal factors that contribute to suicide ideation and behavior among adolescent females. Some of these include hormonal fluctuations and sensitivity, developing brain systems, impacts of social media, maladaptive coping, and peer influence. These changes (...) do not occur in a vacuum and have recently been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been associated with increased social isolation and decreased mental health. By identifying how these factors coalesce and interact to drive suicide ideation and behavior, we can derive potential solutions to this problem. Given the variability in individuals, families, and communities, and the interacting and reinforcing nature of these risk factors, a multi-pronged approach that incorporates multiple interventions and involves families, schools, and communities is needed. (shrink)
A definition and ethical evaluation of overdiagnosis: response to commentaries.Stacy M. Carter,Chris Degeling,Jenny Doust &Alexandra Barratt -2016 -Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (11):722-724.detailsOverdiagnosis is an emerging problem in health policy and practice: we address its definition and ethical implications. We argue that the definition of overdiagnosis should be expressed at the level of populations. Consider a condition prevalent in a population, customarily labelled with diagnosis A. We propose that overdiagnosis is occurring in respect of that condition in that population when the condition is being identified and labelled with diagnosis A in that population ; this identification and labelling would be accepted as (...) correct in a relevant professional community; but the resulting label and/or intervention carries an unfavourable balance between benefits and harms. We identify challenges in determining and weighting relevant harms, then propose three central ethical considerations in overdiagnosis: the extent of harm done, whether harm is avoidable and whether the primary goal of the actor/s concerned is to benefit themselves or the patient, citizen or society. This distinguishes predatory, misdirected and tragic overdiagnosis; the degree of harm moderates the justifiability of each type. We end with four normative challenges: methods for adjudicating between professional standards and identifying relevant harms and benefits should be procedurally just; individuals, organisations and states are differently responsible for addressing overdiagnosis; overdiagnosis is a matter for distributive justice: the burdens of both overdiagnosis and its prevention could fall on the least-well-off; and communicating about overdiagnosis risks harming those unaware that they may have been overdiagnosed. These challenges will need to be addressed as the field develops. (shrink)
The Fictional Character of Scientific Models.Stacie Friend -2019 - In Arnon Levy & Peter Godfrey-Smith,The Scientific Imagination. New York, US: Oup Usa. pp. 101-126.detailsMany philosophers have drawn parallels between scientific models and fictions. In this paper I will be concerned with a recent version of the analogy, which compares models to the imagined characters of fictional literature. Though versions of the position differ, the shared idea is that modeling essentially involves imagining concrete systems analogously to the way that we imagine characters and events in response to works of fiction. Advocates of this view argue that imagining concrete systems plays an ineliminable role in (...) the practice of modeling that cannot be captured by other accounts. The approach thus leaves open what we should say about the ontological status of model-systems, and here advocates differ among themselves, defending a variety of realist or anti-realist positions. I argue that this debate over the ontological status of model-systems is misguided. If model-systems are the kinds of objects fictional realists posit, they can play no role in explaining the epistemology of modeling for an advocate of this approach. So they are at best superfluous. Defenders of the approach should focus on developing an account of the epistemological role of imagining model-systems. (shrink)
Fiction and Emotion: The Puzzle of Divergent Norms.Stacie Friend -2020 -British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (4):403-418.detailsA familiar question in the literature on emotional responses to fiction, originally put forward by Colin Radford, is how such responses can be rational. How can we make sense of pitying Anna Karenina when we know there is no such person? In this paper I argue that contrary to the usual interpretation, the question of rationality has nothing to do with the Paradox of Fiction. Instead, the real problem is why there is a divergence in our normative assessments of emotions (...) in different contexts. I argue that explaining this divergence requires a more nuanced account of the rationality of emotion than has previously been proposed. One advantage of my proposal over alternatives is that it helps to explain one way we can learn emotionally from fiction and imagination. (shrink)
Agency vulnerability, participation, and the self-determination of indigenous peoples.Stacy J. Kosko -2013 -Journal of Global Ethics 9 (3):293-310.detailsJournal of Global Ethics, Volume 9, Issue 3, Page 293-310, December 2013.
The pleasures of documentary tragedy.Stacie Friend -2007 -British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2):184-198.detailsTwo assumptions are common in discussions of the paradox of tragedy: (1) that tragic pleasure requires that the work be fictional or, if non-fiction, then non-transparently represented; and (2) that tragic pleasure may be provoked by a wide variety of art forms. In opposition to (1) I argue that certain documentaries could produce tragic pleasure. This is not to say that any sad or painful documentary could do so. In considering which documentaries might be plausible candidates, I further argue, against (...) (2), that the scope of tragic pleasure is limited to works that possess certain thematic and narrative features. (shrink)