Works by Simon May
63 found
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| Simon May [36] | Simon Căbulea May [26] | Simon James Peter May [2] | Simon Cábulea May [1] |
| Simonc&Abreve May [1] |
- Directed Duties.Simon Căbulea May -2015 -Philosophy Compass 10 (8):523-532.Directed duties are duties that an agent owes to some party – a party who would be wronged if the duty were violated. A ‘direction problem’ asks what it is about a duty in virtue of which it is directed towards one party, if any, rather than another. I discuss three theories of moral direction: control, demand and interest theories. Although none of these theories can be rejected out of hand, all three face serious difficulties.
- Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy.Simon Căbulea May -2005 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):317-348.I argue against the claim that there are principled as well as pragmatic reasons for compromise in politics, even within the context of reasonable moral disagreements such as the abortion controversy.
- Nietzsche's Ethics and His War on 'Morality'.Simon May -1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.Nietzsche famously attacked traditional morality, and propounded a controversial ethics of 'life-enhancement'. Simon May presents a radically new view of Nietzsche's thought, which is shown to be both revolutionary and conservative, and to have much to offer us today after the demise of old values and the 'death of God'.
- Nietzsche on freedom and autonomy.Ken Gemes &Simon May (eds.) -2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.The principal aim of this volume is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re ...
- Nietzsche's Ethics and His War on 'Morality'.Simon May -1999 -Philosophy 76 (297):464-468.Book synopsis: Simon May presents a fresh and wide-ranging critique of Nietzsche's famous attack on traditional morality, and of his controversial ethics of 'life-enhancement'. He reveals Nietzsche as both revolutionary and conservative–as one who repudiates traditional 'moral' conceptions of God, guilt, asceticism, pity, and truthfulness, and yet retains a demanding ethics of discipline, conscience, 'self-creation', generosity, and honesty. In particular, May shows how Nietzsche rejects truthfulness as an unconditional value and yet celebrates it as one of his own highest values, (...) whose worth is determined by who is pursuing it, for what end, and when in their lives. May is strongly critical of various aspects of Nietzsche's thought–his self-defeating conception of justice, his assumption that 'life-enhancement' necessarily demands world-affirmation, his ambition to de-deify the world, and the impossible and undesirable autonomy of the Übermensch. But Nietzsche is shown to offer modernity key elements of a coherent ethic, and to provide moral philosophy with important tools for reassessing some of its most cherished values and concepts. May's book will be illuminating not just for scholars and students of Nietzsche, in philosophy, literature, and history of ideas, but for anyone interested in current debates about ethics and modernity. (shrink)No categories
- Moral Status and the Direction of Duties.Simon Căbulea May -2012 -Ethics 123 (1):113-128.Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a reformulated (...) plain theory can also avoid an insufficiency objection. The hybrid approach consequently has no clear advantage over the plain approach. (shrink)
- Moral Compromise, Civic Friendship, and Political Reconciliation.Simon Căbulea May -2011 -Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (5):581-602.Instrumentalism about moral compromise in politics appears inconsistent with accepting both the existence of non-instrumental or principled reasons for moral compromise in close personal friendships and a rich ideal of civic friendship. Using a robust conception of political reconciliation during democratic transitions as an example of civic friendship, I argue that all three claims are compatible. Spouses have principled reasons for compromise because they commit to sharing responsibility for their joint success as partners in life, and not because their relationship (...) involves strong affective attitudes of goodwill, solidarity, trust, and the like. Since shared responsibility for ends is an inappropriate element in the political relationship between citizens, the members of a divided society may manifest the constitutive attitudes of political reconciliation without any commitment to principled reasons for moral compromise. (shrink)
- Why Nietzsche is still in the morality game.Simon May -unknownBook synopsis: On the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential, provocative, and challenging work of ethics. In this volume of newly commissioned essays, fourteen leading philosophers offer fresh insights into many of the work's central questions: How did our dominant values originate and what functions do they really serve? What future does the concept of 'evil' have - and can it be revalued? What sorts of virtues and ideals does Nietzsche advocate, and are they necessarily incompatible with aspirations to (...) democracy and a free society? What are the nature, role, and scope of genealogy in his critique of morality - and why doesn't his own evaluative standard receive a genealogical critique? Taken together, this superb collection illuminates what a post-Christian and indeed post-moral life might look like, and asks to what extent Nietzsche's Genealogy manages to move beyond morality. (shrink)
- Nietzsche's on the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide.Simon May (ed.) -2011 - New York: Cambridge University Press.On the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential, provocative, and challenging work of ethics. In this volume of newly commissioned essays, fourteen leading philosophers offer fresh insights into many of the work's central questions: How did our dominant values originate and what functions do they really serve? What future does the concept of 'evil' have - and can it be revalued? What sorts of virtues and ideals does Nietzsche advocate, and are they necessarily incompatible with aspirations to democracy and (...) a free society? What are the nature, role, and scope of genealogy in his critique of morality - and why doesn't his own evaluative standard receive a genealogical critique? Taken together, this superb collection illuminates what a post-Christian and indeed post-moral life might look like, and asks to what extent Nietzsche's Genealogy manages to move beyond morality. (shrink)
- Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy.Simon Căbulea May -2009 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):135-68.I argue against Rawls's claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy would be selected in the original position in addition to a democratic principle. Since a religious democracy could satisfy the democratic principle, the parties in the original position would not exclude it as illegitimate.
- Nihilism and the free self.Simon May -2009 - In Ken Gemes & Simon May,Nietzsche on freedom and autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 89.Book synopsis: The principal aim of this volume is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re-think these crucial concepts. A related aim is to examine how Nietzsche connects these concepts to his thoughts about life-affirmation, self-love, promise-making, agency, the 'will to nothingness', and the 'eternal recurrence', as well as to his search for a 'genealogical' understanding of morality. These twelve essays by leading Nietzsche scholars ask such key questions (...) as: Can we reconcile his rejection of free will with his positive invocations of the notion of free will? How does Nietzsche's celebration of freedom and free spirits sit with his claim that we all have an unchangeable fate? What is the relation between his concepts of freedom and self-overcoming? The depth in which these and related issues are explored gives this volume its value, not only to those interested in Nietzsche, but to all who are concerned with the free will debate, ethics, theory of action, and the history of philosophy. (shrink)
- Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy.Simonc&Abreve May & Bulea -2009 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):136-170.
- Compromise.Simon Căbulea May -2021 - In Hugh LaFollette,International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.Compromise is an inescapable part of human coexistence, from the mundane choices of domestic life to the grand stage of world politics. Notwithstanding its ubiquity, compromise raises a number of philosophical puzzles. One kind of problem is conceptual: what is compromise, and how might it differ from similar social phenomena, such as consensus and bargaining? A second kind of problem concerns the murky ethics of compromise, particularly on matters of moral significance. Compromise may have a salutary role in facilitating cooperation, (...) but it can also involve the sacrifice or betrayal of important values. Can there be moral reasons for genuine moral compromise and, if so, what form might they take? Similarly, are there any limits to moral compromise, or are all moral commitments ultimately subject to negotiation? (shrink)
- Exemptions for Conscience.Simon Căbulea May -2016 - In Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon,Religion in Liberal Political Philosophy. New York, NY: oxford university press. pp. 191-203.The Moral Conscience principle claims that a conflict between the demands of a law and the demands of an individual’s sincere moral conscience provides her with a defeasible moral entitlement to an exemption. This chapter argues that this principle is vulnerable to an unfairness objection. There is nothing special about moral conscience that would justify granting an exemption, it claims, that is not shared by a variety of non-moral projects. Thus, there is no principled moral reason for a defeasible entitlement (...) to moral conscience-based exemptions that is not an equally good reason for a defeasible entitlement to non-moral project-based exemptions. Since the chapter assumes that people are not defeasibly entitled to such project-based exemptions, it advocates scepticism about the Moral Conscience principle. (shrink)
- Love: A History.Simon May -2011 - New Haven: Yale University Press.Love—unconditional, selfless, unchanging, sincere, and totally accepting—is worshipped today as the West's only universal religion. To challenge it is one of our few remaining taboos. In this pathbreaking and superbly written book, philosopher Simon May does just that, dissecting our resilient ruling ideas of love and showing how they are the product of a long and powerful cultural heritage. Tracing over 2,500 years of human thought and history, May shows how our ideal of love developed from its Hebraic and Greek (...) origins alongside Christianity until, during the last two centuries, "God is love" became "love is God"—so hubristic, so escapist, so untruthful to the real nature of love, that it has booby-trapped relationships everywhere with deluded expectations. Brilliantly, May explores the very different philosophers and writers, both skeptics and believers, who dared to think differently: from Aristotle's perfect friendship and Ovid's celebration of sex and "the chase," to Rousseau's personal authenticity, Nietzsche's affirmation, Freud's concepts of loss and mourning, and boredom in Proust. Against our belief that love is an all-powerful solution to finding meaning, security, and happiness in life, May reveals with great clarity what love actually is: the intense desire for someone whom we believe can ground and affirm our very existence. The feeling that "makes the world go round" turns out to be a harbinger of home--and in that sense, of the sacred. (shrink)
- 7. Why Christian love isn’t unconditional.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 95-118.No categories
- Is Nietzsche a Life-Affirmer?Simon May -2016 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78:211-226.The question of how to affirm one's life in view of suffering and loss is central to Nietzsche's philosophy. He shows, I claim, that one can affirm – take joy or find beauty in – one's life as a whole, conceived as necessary in all its elements, while also despising parts of it. Yet he mostly pictures such life-affirmation as achievable only via an atheistic theodicy that relies on a key ambition of the very system of morality that he famously (...) attacks: namely to explain or justify suffering in terms of a higher end to which it is essential. I argue that affirmation of one's life is more powerful without the crutch of any theodicy, and point to Job as a paragon of one who can affirm his life without seeking an answer to the question of the meaning or value of suffering – indeed who can dispense altogether with that question. (shrink)No categories
- Democratic Legitimacy, Legal Expressivism, and Religious Establishment.Simon Căbulea May -2012 -Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):219-238.I argue that some instances of constitutional religious establishment can be consistent with an expressivist interpretation of democratic legitimacy. Whether official religious endorsements disparage or exclude religious minorities depends on a number of contextual considerations, including the philosophical content of the religion in question, the attitudes of the majority, and the underlying purpose of the official status of the religious doctrine.
- Why Strict Compliance?Simon Căbulea May -2021 - In David Sobel, Steven Wall & Peter Vallentyne,Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 227-264.I present an interpretation of ideal theory that is grounded in the idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, which Rawls describes as the most fundamental idea of justice as fairness. A key element of the Rawlsian idea of cooperation, I claim, is that the individual participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme—whatever its scale—are morally accountable to each other for complying with the scheme’s rules. This means that each participant has the moral standing to demand of the others (...) that they comply with the rules. I argue that the logic of these moral demands requires that the scheme’s rules be worked out on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. In justice as fairness, society as a whole is a grand scheme of cooperation. The principles of justice constitute the moral terms of association for this cooperative scheme, and hence define the moral demands that citizens, as such, may make of one another. Thus, these principles of justice must likewise be worked out on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. I contrast this deontic interpretation with the standard telic alternative, which grounds the strict compliance assumption in its role as part of the theory of a realistic utopia, and argue for the possibility of non-utopian ideal theories. (shrink)
- Love: A New Understanding of an Ancient Emotion.Simon May -2019 - New York, NY: Oup Usa.Simon May develops a radically new understanding of love as the emotion we feel towards those we experience as grounding our life--as offering us a promise of home--in a world that we supremely value. He also proposes that the child is supplanting the romantic partner as the supreme object of love.
- The Power of Cute.Simon May -2019 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.An exploration of cuteness and its immense hold on us, from emojis and fluffy puppies to its more uncanny, subversive expressions Cuteness has taken the planet by storm. Global sensations Hello Kitty and Pokémon, the works of artists Takashi Murakami and Jeff Koons, Heidi the cross-eyed opossum and E.T.—all reflect its gathering power. But what does “cute” mean, as a sensibility and style? Why is it so pervasive? Is it all infantile fluff, or is there something more uncanny and even (...) menacing going on—in a lighthearted way? In The Power of Cute, Simon May provides nuanced and surprising answers. We usually see the cute as merely diminutive, harmless, and helpless. May challenges this prevailing perspective, investigating everything from Mickey Mouse to Kim Jong-il to argue that cuteness is not restricted to such sweet qualities but also beguiles us by transforming or distorting them into something of playfully indeterminate power, gender, age, morality, and even species. May grapples with cuteness’s dark and unpindownable side—unnerving, artful, knowing, apprehensive—elements that have fascinated since ancient times through mythical figures, especially hybrids like the hermaphrodite and the sphinx. He argues that cuteness is an addictive antidote to today’s pressured expectations of knowing our purpose, being in charge, and appearing predictable, transparent, and sincere. Instead, it frivolously expresses the uncertainty that these norms deny: the ineliminable uncertainty of who we are; of how much we can control and know; of who, in our relations with others, really has power; indeed, of the very value and purpose of power. The Power of Cute delves into a phenomenon that speaks with strange force to our age. (shrink)
- Epistemic Peerhood and Moral Compromise.Simon Căbulea May -2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland,Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.Parties to collective decisions in social and political life can have both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons to accept compromise agreements. According to one view, parties sometimes have non-instrumental epistemic reason for moral compromise. The strongest argument for this view asserts that the fact of disagreement between epistemic peers gives them reason to be more tentative about the beliefs in dispute. I argue that this epistemic peerhood argument fails. First, epistemic peerhood is unlikely to imply that parties should be more tentative (...) in their moral beliefs in conditions where the burdens of judgment make reasonable moral disagreement unsurprising. Second, even if epistemic peerhood does sometimes have this implication, this fact would generate reasons for correction rather than reasons for compromise. Reasons for compromise arise from the conflictual nature of disagreement in collective decision making, not from any evidentiary significance that disagreement may or may not have. (shrink)
- Bohman on Domination and Epistemic Injustice.Simon Căbulea May -2012 -Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1):7-12.James Bohman proposes a republican conception of epistemic injustice as an alternative to Miranda Fricker’s virtue theoretical account. The key element in Bohman’s approach is the concept of domination, one of the central concepts in republican political theory more generally. He claims that all cases of epistemic injustice involve forms of domination, and that institutional mechanisms of non-domination are accordingly necessary to remedy epistemic injustice. I agree with Bohman that there are important connections between domination and epistemic injustice. Nevertheless, I (...) am not persuaded by his characterisation of these connections. I briefly set out Bohman’s account of domination and then critically discuss three interpretations of the relationship between domination and epistemic injustice suggested by his discussion. (shrink)
- No Compromise on Racial Equality.Simon Cabulea May -2017 - In Christian F. Rostbøll & Theresa Scavenius,Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory. New York: Routledge. pp. 34-49.I use the example of racial equality to examine the relationship between the ideal of political legitimacy and the idea that there are some moral limits to political compromise. I defend a principle that rules out certain compromises of racial equality as impermissible violations of legitimacy, but that also provides democratic activists with significant moral latitude in undemocratic contexts. Legitimacy sets these limits on compromise, I argue, because of its role in creating a moral framework for political decision making. This (...) role distinguishes compromises of legitimacy from compromises of other requirements of justice. (shrink)
- Address, Interests, and Directed Duties.Simon Căbulea May -2021 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (2):194-201.Rowan Cruft offers an addressive account of directed duties and claim-rights. He claims that the direction of a duty is constituted by two requirements of address between the parties: the right holder must conceive of the action as `to be done to me’ and the duty bearer must conceive of it as to be ‘done to you’. Cruft also argues against accounts of direction and claim-rights that reduce the relation between the parties to nonrelational facts. One such reductive account is (...) the justificatory interest theory. Cruft argues that social authorities can create conventional claim-rights freely, without any constraint imposed by the right holder’s interests. I raise an antecedence objection against the addressive theory as an account of direction. I then argue against Cruft’s claim that conventional claim-rights can be created independently of the right holder’s interests. I conclude that scepticism about the viability of a nonreductive theory of direction is warranted. (shrink)
- Liberal Feminism and the Ethics of Polygamy.Simon Căbulea May -2012 - In Daniela Cutas & Sarah Chan,Families – Beyond the Nuclear Ideal. Bloomsbury Academic.I distinguish two ways that a cultural practice may be inherently objectionable. I reject the claim that polygamy is inherently "vicious" because asymmetric marriages are inevitably inegalitarian. I argue that there is good reason to think polygamy is inherently "bankrupt" insofar as a cultural ideal of asymmetric marriage presupposes stereotypical gender roles.
- What We May Demand of Each Other.Simon Căbulea May -2013 -Analysis 73 (3):554-563.In this critical notice of Gerald Gaus's The Order of Public Reason, I reject two arguments Gaus advances for the claim that social moral rules must be publicly justified.
- Bibliography.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 279-284.No categories
- Index.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 285-298.No categories
- 16. Love as terror and tedium: Proust.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 215-234.No categories
- 12. Love as religion: Schlegel and Novalis.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 165-175.No categories
- 10. Love as joyful understanding of the whole: Spinoza.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 143-151.No categories
- Legitimacy as Fairness.Simon Căbulea May -forthcoming - In Blain Neufeld, Micah Schwartzman & Lori Watson,A Theory of Justice in the 21st Century. Oxford University Press.Distributive justice and political legitimacy are different concepts with different roles. In John Rawls’s justice as fairness, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society. The primary subject of legitimacy, in contrast, is the exercise of political power. Rawls claims that legitimacy is weaker than justice—a law may be legitimate even though it is unjust. Rawls also claims that a conception of legitimacy would be selected in the original position and that the argument for its adoption "is (...) much the same as, and as strong as, the argument for the principles of justice themselves." But if the parties in the original position have much the same reason to adopt a conception of legitimacy as they have to adopt a conception of justice, why is legitimacy less demanding than justice? If principles of justice and legitimacy are selected in the same way and for the same reasons, their requirements should not diverge. I propose a solution to this conflation problem. I argue that principles of political legitimacy should be selected in a special session of the original position that differs in key respects from the general session in which the two principles of justice as fairness are selected. I also suggest that insofar as the principles of legitimacy selected in this session do allow for some latitude of injustice, as is likely, the demands of legitimacy should take lexical priority over any competing demands of justice. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - 1. Love plays God.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 1-13.No categories
- Preface.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press.No categories
- 2. The foundation of Western love: Hebrew Scripture.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 14-37.No categories
- The Pocket Philosopher: A Handbook of Aphorisms.Simon May -1999 - Metro Publishing.This collection of aphorisms (composed over many years by a noted philosopher) is an aid to crystallising your own thoughts - there are sectors on truth, love, ambition, religion, ageing, cruelty, friendship and all the other vital issues that we confront in life. Aphorisms can be a more enjoyable stimulus for thought than longer philosophical works - because of their variety, because of their compactness, because they invite different interpretations, and because they provide such clear targets - for agreement or (...) disagreement. (shrink)No categories
- 8. Women as ideals love and the troubadours.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 119-142.No categories
- Acknowledgements.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press.No categories
- Contents.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press.No categories
- Frontmatter.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press.No categories
- 3. From physical desire to paradise: Plato.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 38-55.No categories
- Introduction.Simon May -2009 - In Ken Gemes & Simon May,Nietzsche on freedom and autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Interactive Justice and Democratic Authority.Simon Căbulea May -2019 -Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (4):459-465.I raise two critical points about Emanuela Ceva’s theory of interactive justice. First, I argue the value of individual dignity is insufficient in itself to establish principles of interactive justice, but that the lacuna can be filled by an account of democratic authority. Second, I argue that realising interactive justice in political conflict management is better understood as a form of quasi-pure proceduralism rather than intrinsic proceduralism. This is because the moral quality of a decision procedure can be an essential (...) part of the explanation for why political decisions can possess moral authority. (shrink)
- 14. Love as affirmation of life: Nietzsche.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 188-198.No categories
- 6. Love as the supreme virtue: Christianity.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 81-94.No categories
- 11. Love as Enlightened Romanticism: Rousseau.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 152-164.No categories
- 15. Love as a history of loss: Freud.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 199-214.No categories
- 4. Love as perfect friendship: Aristotle.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 56-68.No categories
- 5. Love as sexual desire: Lucretius and Ovid.Simon May -2011 - InLove: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 69-80.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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