Works by Simon Handley
24 found
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| Simon J. Handley [21] | Simon Handley [5] | SimonJ Handley [1] |
- Uncontrolled logic:intuitive sensitivity to logical structure in random responding.Stephanie Howarth,Simon Handley &Vince Polito -2022 -Thinking and Reasoning 28 (1):61-96.It is well established that beliefs provide powerful cues that influence reasoning. Over the last decade research has revealed that judgments based upon logical structure may also pre-empt deliberative reasoning. Evidence for ‘intuitive logic’ has been claimed using a range of measures (i.e. confidence ratings or latency of response on conflict problems). However, it is unclear how well such measures genuinely reflect logical intuition. In this paper we introduce a new method designed to test for evidence of intuitive logic. In (...) two experiments participants were asked to make random judgments about the logical validity of a series of simple and complex syllogistic arguments. For simple arguments there was an effect of logical validity on random responding, which was absent for complex arguments. These findings provide a novel demonstration that people are intuitively sensitive to logical structure. (shrink)
- Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions.Omid Ghasemi,Simon J. Handley &Stephanie Howarth -2023 -Cognition 235 (C):105417.
- Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: A critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002).Jonathan St B. T. Evans,David E. Over &Simon J. Handley -2005 -Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052.
- Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.Jonathan StB. T. Evans,Simon J. Handley,Nick Perham,David E. Over &Valerie A. Thompson -2000 -Cognition 77 (3):197-213.No categories
- Eye Movements, Pupil Dilation, and Conflict Detection in Reasoning: Exploring the Evidence for Intuitive Logic.Zoe A. Purcell,Andrew J. Roberts,Simon J. Handley &Stephanie Howarth -2023 -Cognitive Science 47 (6):e13293.A controversial claim in recent dual process accounts of reasoning is that intuitive processes not only lead to bias but are also sensitive to the logical status of an argument. The intuitive logic hypothesis draws upon evidence that reasoners take longer and are less confident on belief–logic conflict problems, irrespective of whether they give the correct logical response. In this paper, we examine conflict detection under conditions in which participants are asked to either judge the logical validity or believability of (...) a presented conclusion, accompanied by measures of eye movement and pupil dilation. The findings show an effect of conflict, under both types of instruction, on accuracy, latency, gaze shifts, and pupil dilation. Importantly, these effects extend to conflict trials in which participants give a belief‐based response (incorrectly under logic instructions or correctly under belief instructions) demonstrating both behavioral and physiological evidence in support of the logical intuition hypothesis. (shrink)
- When can we say ‘if’?Jonathan StB. T. Evans,Helen Neilens,Simon J. Handley &David E. Over -2008 -Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
- The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments.Stephanie Howarth,Simon Handley &Clare Walsh -2018 -Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):416-448.The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, h...
- : Working memory, inhibitory control and the development of children's reasoning.Simon J. Handley,A. Capon,M. Beveridge,I. Dennis &J. St B. T. Evans -2004 -Thinking and Reasoning 10 (2):175-195.
- Better but still biased: Analytic cognitive style and belief bias.Dries Trippas,Gordon Pennycook,Michael F. Verde &Simon J. Handley -2015 -Thinking and Reasoning 21 (4):431-445.Belief bias is the tendency for prior beliefs to influence people's deductive reasoning in two ways: through the application of a simple belief-heuristic and through the application of more effortful reasoning for unbelievable conclusions. Previous research indicates that cognitive ability is the primary determinant of the effect of beliefs on accuracy. In the current study, we show that the mere tendency to engage analytic reasoning is responsible for the effect of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. The implications of this finding (...) for our understanding of the impact of individual differences on belief bias are discussed. (shrink)
- Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans,Simon J. Handley,Nick Perham,David E. Over &Valerie A. Thompson -2000 -Cognition 77 (3):197-213.No categories
- Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning.Alison Bacon,Simon Handley &Stephen Newstead -2003 -Thinking and Reasoning 9 (2):133 – 168.Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few (...) differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals. (shrink)
- Fluency and belief bias in deductive reasoning: new indices for old effects.Dries Trippas,Simon J. Handley &Michael F. Verde -2014 -Frontiers in Psychology 5.
- Working memory and reasoning: An individual differences perspective.Alison Capon,Simon Handley &Ian Dennis -2003 -Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):203 – 244.This article reports three experiments that investigated the relationship between working memory capacity and syllogistic and five-term series spatial inference. A series of complex and simple verbal and spatial working memory measures were employed. Correlational analyses showed that verbal and spatial working memory span tasks consistently predicted syllogistic and spatial reasoning performance. A confirmatory factor analysis showed that three factors best accounted for the data--a verbal, a spatial, and a general factor. Syllogistic reasoning performance loaded all three factors, whilst spatial (...) reasoning loaded only the general factor. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of reasoning theories and contemporary accounts of the structure of working memory. (shrink)
- Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.Dries Trippas,Michael F. Verde &Simon J. Handley -2014 -Cognition 133 (3):586-600.No categories
- Supposition and representation in human reasoning.Simon J. Handley &Jonathan StB. T. Evans -2000 -Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):273-311.We report the results of three experiments designed to assess the role of suppositions in human reasoning. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules propose that the ability to make suppositions is central to deductive reasoning. Our first experiment compared two types of problem that could be solved by a suppositional strategy. Our results showed no difference in difficulty between problems requiring affirmative or negative suppositions and very low logical solution rates throughout. Further analysis of the error data showed a (...) pattern of responses, which suggested that participants reason from a superficial representation of the premises in these arguments and this drives their choice of conclusion. Our second experiment employed a different set of suppositional problems but with extremely similar proofs in terms of the rules applied and number of inferential steps required. As predicted by our interpretation of reasoning strategies employed in Experiment 1, logical performance was very much higher on these problems. Our third experiment showed that problems that could be solved by constructing an initial representation of the premises were easier than problems in which this representation was not sufficient. This effect was independent of the suppositional structure of the problems. We discuss the implications of this research for theories of reasoning based on mental models and inference rules. (shrink)
- Suppositions, Conditionals, and Causal Claims.Aidan Feeney &SimonJ Handley -2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck,Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford:: Oxford University Press. pp. 242.
- Autism and performance on the suppression task: Reasoning, context and complexity.Rebecca McKenzie,Jonathan St B. T. Evans &Simon J. Handley -2011 -Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):182 - 196.
- Illusory intuitions: Challenging the claim of non-exclusivity.Simon J. Handley,Omid Ghasemi &Michal Bialek -2023 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e125.A person who arrives at correct solutions via false premises is right and wrong simultaneously. Similarly, a person who generates “logical intuitions” through superficial heuristics can likewise be right and wrong at the same time. However, heuristics aren't guaranteed to deliver the logical solution, so the claim that system 1 can routinely produce the alleged system 2 response is unfounded.
- Alleviating the concerns with the SDT approach to reasoning: reply to Singmann and Kellen.Dries Trippas,Michael F. Verde &Simon J. Handley -2015 -Frontiers in Psychology 6.
- Semifactual: Byrne's account of even-if.Simon J. Handley &Aidan Feeney -2007 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):458-459.Byrne's approach to the semifactual conditional captures the reasoning data. However, we argue that it does not account for the processes or principles by which people arrive at representations of even-if conditionals, upon which their reasoning is said to be based. Drawing upon recent work on the suppositional conditional we present such an account.
- Autism and performance on the suppression task: Reasoning, context and complexity.Rebecca McKenzie,Jonathan St Bt Evans &Simon J. Handley -2011 -Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):182-196.
- Effects of training and instruction on analytic and belief-based reasoning processes.Stephen E. Newstead,Simon J. Handley &Helen L. Neilens -2009 -Thinking and Reasoning 15 (1):37-68.Two studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased and bias eliminated after training on the law of large numbers. Critical thinking problems involving belief-consistent, neutral, and inconsistent conclusions were presented. Belief bias was eliminated when a written justification of argument strength was elicited. However, belief-based responding was still evident when evaluations of the arguments were elicited using rating scales. This finding demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding as a function of (...) response format. In Experiment 2 an instructional condition designed to foster decontextualised reasoning was included but was ineffective in reducing the degree to which judgements were biased by beliefs. It was concluded that training which makes available the analytic strategies necessary to evaluate a problem has the potential to facilitate performance only if the requested response triggers conscious deliberation of the evidence. (shrink)
- Predicting the difficulty of complex logical reasoning problems.Stephen E. Newstead,Peter Bradon,Simon J. Handley,Ian Dennis &Jonathan St B. T. Evans -2006 -Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):62 – 90.The aim of the present research was to develop a difficulty model for logical reasoning problems involving complex ordered arrays used in the Graduate Record Examination. The approach used involved breaking down the problems into their basic cognitive elements such as the complexity of the rules used, the number of mental models required to represent the problem, and question type. Weightings for these different elements were derived from two experimental studies and from the reasoning literature. Based on these weights, difficulty (...) models were developed which were then tested against new data. The models had excellent predictive validity and showed the relative influence of rule based factors and factors relating to the number of underlying models. Different difficulty models were needed for different question types, suggesting that people used a variety of approaches and, at a wider level, that both mental models and mental rules may be used in reasoning. (shrink)
- Investigating reasoning with multiple integrated neuroscientific methods.Matthew E. Roser,Jonathan St B. T. Evans,Nicolas A. McNair,Giorgio Fuggetta,Simon J. Handley,Lauren S. Carroll &Dries Trippas -2015 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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