Results for 'Secondary Qualities'
949 found
Order:
1 filter applied
See alsoSee also:
- Frances Howard-Snyder.SecondaryQualities -1999 -American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3).
- The Subjective View:SecondaryQualities And Indexical Thoughts.Colin McGinn -1983 - New York: Clarendon Press.This book investigates the subjective and objective representations of the world, developing analogies betweensecondaryqualities and indexical thoughts and arguing that subjective representations are ineliminable. Throughout, McGinn brings together historical and contemporary discussions to illuminate old problems in a novel way.
- Locke on primary andsecondaryqualities.Samuel C. Rickless -1997 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):297-319.In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary andsecondaryqualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are (...) simple, valid and (in one case) persuasive as well. (shrink)
- Secondaryqualities.D. Goldstick -1987 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):145-146.LOCKE WAS RIGHT TO SAY PRIMARYQUALITIES "RESEMBLE" OUR\nIDEAS OF THEM IN A WAYSECONDARYQUALITIES DO NOT, BECAUSE\nHAVING THE APPROPRIATE PRIMARY-QUALITY "IDEA" IS LOGICALLY\nSUFFICIENT IN EACH CASE FOR KNOWING HOW SOMETHING MUST BE\n(INTRINSICALLY) IN ORDER FOR THE "QUALITY" TO INHERE IN IT.\nCOMPARE THE WAY A PERSON IS SAID TO "RESEMBLE" A VERBAL\nDESCRIPTION IN THE EVENT OF "ANSWERING TO" IT.
- (1 other version)Smart and thesecondaryqualities.David M. Armstrong -1987 - In John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman,Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart. New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
- SecondaryQualities - Subjective and Intrinsic.Peter Sandøe -1988 -Theoria 54 (3):200-219.
- SecondaryQualities and Self-Location.Andy Egan -2006 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independentqualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependentqualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary andsecondaryqualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard (...) to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling-out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thingto get. (shrink)
- Of primary andsecondaryqualities.A. D. Smith -1990 -Philosophical Review 99 (2):221-254.
- SecondaryQualities in Retrospect.Tim De Mey &Markku Keinänen -2001 -Philosophica 68.Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary andsecondaryqualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntoshs analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different (...) primary-secondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primary-secondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matters otherqualities. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - Perceivingsecondaryqualities.Boyd Millar -2024 -Philosophical Studies 181 (10).Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primaryqualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion ofsecondaryqualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature ofsecondaryqualities than into the nature of primaryqualities. I maintain that neither naïve realism nor the standard (...) Russellian variety of the content view can provide a satisfying explanation; instead, in order to provide a satisfying explanation, we must posit that perceptual experiences represent properties via Fregean modes of presentation. Further, I maintain that we must depart from the standard Fregean variety of the content view in two important respects. First, the relevant modes of presentation must be characterized without appealing to causal relations between perceptual experiences and perceived properties; and second, we must posit that primary andsecondaryqualities are represented via modes of presentation of different kinds. The resulting view is that primaryqualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to highly detailed descriptions, whilesecondaryqualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to impoverished descriptions. (shrink)
- SecondaryQualities and Metaphysical Properties.John Taylor -2024 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political ScienceThe notion ofsecondaryqualities was first introduced by early modern philosophers. Since this concept’s inception speculation has been rife on the veracity and ontology ofsecondaryqualities. With some claiming thatsecondaryqualities don’t exist and others claiming that they do exist as qualia or properties of mind-independent objects (naïve realism). Considering this debate, my essay will aim to put forward a novel argument for the mere reality ofsecondaryqualities in (...) response to a position which denies their reality: calledsecondary quality denialism. I will also argue that given the ontological assumptions ofsecondary quality denialists the best ontological position for them to hold is naïve realism aboutsecondaryqualities. (shrink)
- (2 other versions)Values andSecondary Qualitie.John McDowell -1985 - In Ted Honderich,Morality and Objectivity : A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge. pp. 110-129.J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...) rather, that the very concept of the cognitive or factual rules out the possibility of an undiluted representation of how things are, enjoying, nevertheless, the internal relation to 'attitudes' or the will that would be needed to count as evaluative. On this view the phenomenology of value would involve a mere incoherence, if it were as Mackie says--a possibility that then tends (naturally enough) not to be so much as entertained. But, as Mackie sees, there is no satisfactory justification for supposing that the factual is, by definition, attitudinatively and motivationally neutral. This clears away the only obstacle to accepting his phenomenological claim; and the upshot is that non-cognitivism must offer to correct the phenomenology of value, rather than give an account of it. -/- In Machie's view the correction is called for. In this paper I want to suggest that he attributes an unmerited plausibility to this thesis, by giving a false picture of what one is committed to if one resists it. (shrink)
- Aresecondaryqualities independent of perception?T. Percy Nunn -1910 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 10:191.
- Secondaryqualities and representation.D. H. M. Brooks -1992 -Analysis 52 (3):174-179.Secondaryqualities have peculiarities which are thought to threaten physicalism. It is argued that these peculiarities are only to be expected in a physicalist universe in virtue of the essential characteristics of a representing device. Any device representing the world such as a camera will have depictionalqualities.Secondaryqualities are a subset of these.
- andSecondaryQualities.Gary Hatfield -2011 - In Lawrence Nolan,Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 304.No categories
- Concepts ofSecondaryQualities.James Hill -1998 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (Supplement):91-98.The properties ofsecondaryqualities have recently become an object of interest again in analytic philosophy; it is generally assumed thatsecondaryqualities - in the mind at least - tend to be irreducible to the physical: taste, smell, color perception, the aural, & the tactile all seem to be more subjectively perceived than most otherqualities. This is shown to present such topics as realism vs anti-realism, description, & truth-value with a series of problems, (...) which are then discussed. The standard literature (S. A. Kripke, D. M. Armstrong, & C. McGinn) is reviewed; it is concluded that, at least for color perception, a dispositional analysis is somewhat satisfactory;secondaryqualities are ubiquitous. 7 References. A. Cohen-Siegel. (shrink)
- Primary andsecondaryqualities: A return to fundamentals.David Novitz -1975 -Philosophical Papers 4 (October):89-104.The aim of this article is to give an account of the distinction between primary andsecondaryqualities in a way which allows the distinction a useful place in an explanation of scientific enquiry. this is done by modifying certain of locke's criteria for primacy, and by showing that this procedure has certain advantages over keith campbell's account of the distinction. in particular, i argue that primaryqualities cannot be specified in a theory-neutral way, and that this (...) has important consequences for an account of scientific observation and the relation between the scientific and everyday images of the world. (shrink)
- Secondary quality.Lewis White Beck -1946 -Journal of Philosophy 43 (October):599-609.
- SecondaryQualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet.Joseph Levine -2008 -The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
- SecondaryQualities Generalized.Peter Menzies -1998 -The Monist 81.
- Colors and Values:SecondaryQualities Between Knowledge and Moral.Alessio Vaccari -2008 -Rivista di Filosofia 99 (2):198-228.
- Reid on Primary andSecondaryQualities.Keith Lehrer -1978 -The Monist 61 (2):184-191.Reid defends the distinction between primary andsecondaryqualities. He does so in spite of accepting Berkeley’s critique of Locke on this issue and rejecting the Cartesian thesis that the distinction is based on reason. Reid contends that we have a clear, direct, and distinct conception of primaryqualities but not ofsecondaryqualities. We shall attempt to explain how Reid could defend the distinction while rejecting the resemblance theory of Locke and the rationalistic theory (...) of Descartes. (shrink)
- Are ColorsSecondaryQualities?Alex Byrne &David Hilbert -2011 - In Lawrence Nolan,Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties aresecondaryqualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors aresecondaryqualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind ofsecondary quality theory (...) is viciously circular, we discuss three main lines of argument for thesecondary quality theory. The first is inspired by an intuitively compelling picture of perception articulated by Reid; the second is that thesecondary quality theory is a conceptual truth; the third line of argument is presented in Johnston’s influential paper ‘How to speak of the colors’. We conclude that all these arguments fail, and that thesecondary quality theory is unmotivated. Keywords: color,secondary quality, disposition, vision, perception.. (shrink)
- Secondaryqualities and the a priori.Jim Edwards -1992 -Mind 101 (402):263-272.
- (1 other version)The Subjective View:SecondaryQualities and Indexical Thoughts.Edward Wilson Averill &Colin McGinn -1985 -Philosophical Review 94 (2):296.
- Secondaryqualities and moral values: What do we really compare? [REVIEW]Filimon Peonidis -1996 -Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):209-211.The aim of this essay is to reconsider the very analogy betweensecondaryqualities and moral values. It is argued that since the subject matter of moral evaluation are events and not objects, the function and the status of moralqualities should be understood only in terms of the olfactory and auditoryqualities of events. This implies that the common comparison of moral values with colors is no longer possible.
- Valberg'ssecondaryqualities.Roderick Millar -1983 -Philosophy 58 (January):107-109.
- SecondaryQualities, Self-Locating Belief, and Sensible Relativism.Andy Egan -unknown
- Reid's Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction in a Broad Context.Adam Weiler Gur Arye -2018 -Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (1):39-62.The paper focuses on Reid's unique epistemological distinction between the primary and thesecondaryqualities and examines it in relation to other facets of his philosophy: his stance vis-à-vis the scientific inquiries ofsecondaryqualities; his aesthetics; his analysis of the perception of the primary quality of hardness; his theory of learning. An inquiry into the primary/secondary distinction which takes into account such a broad context will reveal it to be far more sophisticated, dynamic and (...) flexible than an analysis of the distinction which solely takes into consideration the passages in which the Scottish philosopher directly and straightforwardly introduces it. (shrink)
- Thesecondaryqualities.D. M. Armstrong -1968 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):225 – 241.No categories
- Secondaryqualities and subjectivity.Arthur O. Lovejoy -1913 -Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (8):214-218.
- Democritus andsecondaryqualities.Robert Pasnau -2007 -Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2):99-121.Democritus is generally understood to have anticipated the seventeenthcentury distinction between primary andsecondaryqualities. I argue that this is not the case, and that instead for Democritus all sensiblequalities are conventional.
- The Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction: Berkeley, Locke, and the Foundations of Corpuscularian Science.Arnold I. Davidson &Norbert Hornstein -1984 -Dialogue 23 (2):281-303.Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at (...) the current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory. (shrink)
- SecondaryQualities as Dispositions.Nathan Rockwood -2020 -Locke Studies 20.In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke,secondaryqualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume thatsecondaryqualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primaryqualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, ifsecondary (...)qualities are dispositional properties then objects would retainsecondaryqualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view ofsecondaryqualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., thesecondaryqualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold thatsecondaryqualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us. (shrink)
- Primary andSecondaryQualities.Robert A. Wilson -2015 - In Matthew Stuart,A Companion to Locke. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 193-211.The first half of this review article on Locke on primary andsecondaryqualities leads up to a fairly straightforward reading of what Locke says about the distinction in Essay II.viii, one that, in its general outlines, represents a sympathetic understanding of Locke’s discussion. The second half of the paper turns to consider a few of the ways in which interpreting Locke on primary andsecondaryqualities has proven more complicated. Here we take up what is (...) sometimes called the Berkeleyan interpretation of Locke, the understanding of Locke’s resemblance thesis, and Locke’s views ofqualities and their relationship to powers. (shrink)
- Is Agentive Freedom aSecondary Quality?Terence Horgan &Mark Timmons -2022 -Humana Mente 15 (42).The notion of asecondary property is usefully construed this way: sensory-perceptual experiences that present apparent instantiations of such a quality have intentional content—presentational content—that is systematically non-veridical, because the experientially presented quality is never actually instantiated; but judgments that naively seem to attribute instantiations of this very quality really have different content—judgmental content—that is often veridical. Color-presenting experiences and color-attributing judgments, for instance, are plausibly regarded as conforming to such a dual-contentsecondary-quality account. In this paper we (...) address the comparative theoretical advantages and disadvantages of two alternative versions of compatibilism about agentive freedom. Illusionist compatibilism is a dual-contentsecondary-quality view asserting that free-agency experience has presentational content that is libertarian and systematically non-veridical, whereas free-agency attributing judgments have non-libertarian, compatibilist, content. Uniform compatibilism instead asserts that free-agency experience and free-agency attributing judgments have uniform, compatibilist, content. We argue that uniform compatibilism fully accommodates the directly introspectable features of free-agency phenomenology, and is more plausible than illusionist compatibilism. (shrink)No categories
- Primaryqualities,secondaryqualities and the truth about intention.Alexander Miller -2009 -Synthese 171 (3):433 - 442.In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.
- Are colorssecondaryqualities?Byrne Alex &R. Hilbert David -2011 - In Lawrence Nolan,Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties aresecondaryqualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors aresecondaryqualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind ofsecondary quality theory (...) is viciously circular, we discuss three main lines of argument for thesecondary quality theory. The first is inspired by an intuitively compelling picture of perception articulated by Reid; the second is that thesecondary quality theory is a conceptual truth; the third line of argument is presented in Johnston’s influential paper ‘How to speak of the colors’. We conclude that all these arguments fail, and that thesecondary quality theory is unmotivated. Keywords: color,secondary quality, disposition, vision, perception.. (shrink)
- Composition as asecondary quality.Uriah Kriegel -2008 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.Abstract: The 'special composition question' is this: given objects O1, . . . , On, under what conditions is there an object O, such that O1, . . . , On compose O? This paper explores a heterodox answer to this question, one that casts composition as asecondary quality. According to the approach I want to consider, there is an O that O1, . . . , On compose (roughly) just in case a normal intuiter would, under normal (...) conditions, intuit that there is. (shrink)
- Values andSecondaryQualities.John McDowell -1985 - In Ted Honderich,Morality and Objectivity : A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge. pp. 110-129.J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...) rather, that the very concept of the cognitive or factual rules out the possibility of an undiluted representation of how things are, enjoying, nevertheless, the internal relation to 'attitudes' or the will that would be needed to count as evaluative. On this view the phenomenology of value would involve a mere incoherence, if it were as Mackie says--a possibility that then tends (naturally enough) not to be so much as entertained. But, as Mackie sees, there is no satisfactory justification for supposing that the factual is, by definition, attitudinatively and motivationally neutral. This clears away the only obstacle to accepting his phenomenological claim; and the upshot is that non-cognitivism must offer to correct the phenomenology of value, rather than give an account of it. -/- In Machie's view the correction is called for. In this paper I want to suggest that he attributes an unmerited plausibility to this thesis, by giving a false picture of what one is committed to if one resists it. (shrink)
- Dualism andsecondary quality eliminativism.Emmett L. Holman -2006 -Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of thesecondaryqualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that thesecondaryqualities are physically uninstantiated.
- Philosophical pictures andsecondaryqualities.Eugen Fischer -2009 -Synthese 171 (1):77 - 110.The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless (...) theories. To do so, the paper proceeds from a case-study on a lastingly influential development in early modern philosophy: the adoption of the doctrine ofsecondaryqualities, and its principal consequences. The findings motivate a new approach to an arguably extensive and important class of philosophical problems: to the problems we raise in the grip of philosophical pictures. (shrink)
- Temporality,SecondaryQualities, and the Location of Sensations.Paul Fitzgerald -1982 -PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (Volume One: Contributed Papers):293 - 303.Several philosophers have argued that "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent, a claim they see as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence ofsecondaryqualities. They have tended to assume that the classicalsecondaryqualities are mind-dependent, and also that the close analogue for time of directly experiencedsecondaryqualities is an irreducibly indexical nowness. In an earlier article it was argued that we should reject the second assumption. Here it is shown why there (...) is indeed a genuine problem of the ontological status of directly experienced temporality and spatiality, a problem analogous to the traditional one aboutsecondaryqualities. (shrink)
- Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction.Elżbieta Łukasiewicz -2011 -Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):47-76.In the present paper we shall first focus on Locke’s and Reid’s understanding of primary andsecondaryqualities, as these two approaches mark the main dividing line in interpreting this distinction. Next, we will consider some modern approaches to the distinction and try to answer the question of whether, from theperspective of what we know about perception of sensoryqualities, Locke’s ontological interpretation or Reid’s epistemological approach to the distinction are tenable ideas. Finally, we will concentrate on (...) the relation between language andqualities of objects and, on the basis of some adjectival systems in the world’s languages, see how languages render, or code, certain distinctions andqualities apparently obvious to our cognition. (shrink)
- Proper Sensibles andSecondaryQualities.Stephen Everson -1997 - InAristotle on perception. New York: Oxford University Press.Everson argues that Aristotle does not think of colours, sounds, assecondaryqualities; rather, all sensiblequalities for Aristotle are primaryqualities. This implies a very ‘direct’ notion of perception; for instance, I see red because my eye undergoes a change, a material alteration that can be fully accounted for in non‐perceptual terms. This alteration differs form non‐perceptual alteration in that it involves awareness. Everson concludes that the textual evidence in both the psychological and physical works (...) supports the literalist reading. (shrink)No categories
- Fitting-Attitudes,SecondaryQualities, and Values.Joshua Gert -2010 -Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even forsecondaryqualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive (...) properties as redness. A preliminary conclusion is that the normativity that appears in fitting-attitude accounts of evaluative properties need not have anything to do with the evaluative nature of those properties. It may appear there because evaluative properties—or at least thosefor which fitting-attitude accounts are plausible—really are so much likesecondaryqualities that it might well be appropriate to think of them as a subclass ofsecondaryqualities. In the second half of the paper I discuss the views of three of the philosophers who have been most influential in discussions of response-featuring accounts of evaluative notions and who explicitly distinguish response-dispositional accounts of value from fittingattitude accounts: John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, and Crispin Wright. I highlight some of the theoretical temptations that can be associated with the assumption that the response-dispositional/fitting-attitude distinction parallels thesecondary quality/evaluative property distinction. (shrink)
- On the Analogy between the Sensing ofSecondaryQualities and the Feeling of Values: Landmann-Kalischer’s Epistemic Project, Its Historical Context, and Its Significance for Current Meta-Ethics.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran -forthcoming - In Beatrice Centi, Faustino Fabbianelli & Gemmo Iocco,Philosophy of Value. The Historical Roots of Contemporary Debate: An Overview. De Gruyter.This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing ofsecondaryqualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that (...) Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering work helped to forge a new view of affectivity which became dominant among Brentano’s followers. According to this new view, there is a type of affective experience which is both intentional and cognitive. More precisely, she argued that the affective experience in question is a feeling. The paper also argues that her account can enrich today’s meta-ethical research. It is argued that her account of pure feelings provides arguments against the view that makes emotions responsible for the apprehension of value. Furthermore, it is shown that we need an analysis of how objective knowledge of value can be obtained from our affective intuitions. -/- . (shrink)Export citation Bookmark
- Primaryqualities aresecondaryqualities too.Graham Priest -1989 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):29-37.The paper argues for realism in quantum mechanics. Specifically, the formalism of quantum mechanics should be understood as giving a complete description of quantum situations. When it is understood in this way, traditional primary properties of matter can be seen as similar to traditionalsecondary properties, though at a different level.
- (1 other version)Hume on Primary andSecondaryQualities.A. E. Pitson -1982 -Hume Studies 8 (2):125-138.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:125. HUME ON PRIMARY ANDSECONDARYQUALITIES Hume's view of the primary/secondary quality distinction is, I believe, a matter of considerable interest. It bears upon Hume's position in relation to Locke and Berkeley, and has important implications for general features of his epistemology and metaphysics. The central part of my discussion will therefore be taken up with a consideration of those passages from his writings in (...) which Hume refers to the primary/secondary quality distinction. Hume's treatment of this aspect of the 'modern philosophy' may be seen against the background of his discussion of perception and its objects, and it is therefore this with which I begin. HUME'S SYSTEM I refer to Hume's system in relation to perception and the manner in which objects affect the senses. Hume's avowed purpose here is to discuss the way in which objects appear to the senses (in particular, those of sight and touch), rather than to account for their real nature and operations. Our ignorance of the nature of bodies reflects the fact that we are limited in experience to those properties of objects which discover themselves 2 to the senses. In determining the nature of Hume's system there are, I think, two (related) factors to be taken into account: (i) Hume's distinction between perceptions and objects; and (ii) Hume's critique of the Naive or Direct Realist theory of perception. (i) Perceptions and Objects The distinction which Hume wishes to make between perceptions and objects, and his general account of the relation between them, is embodied in his 126. discussion of the idea of external existence (T 6). We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and· ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by the perceptions they 3 occasion. We should note that what Hume is describing here is, in essence, the Indirect Realist account of perception, i.e. that we are acquainted with an external reality only in the form of perceptions ('impressions') which arise from sensory contact with it. That Hume is prepared to speak elsewhere of per4 ceptions in their relation to external objects as images is indicative of his commitment to a Representative theory. There are, of course, severe limitations upon our understanding of the relation between perceptions and objects. As every idea is deriv'd from a preceding perception, 'tis impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other. In so far as external objects are supposed to differ from perceptions in their specific identity, we can form only a relative idea of them (T 68). Nevertheless the idea of bodies or objects is clearly to be distinguished from that of perceptions; while being specifically the same, like ideas and impressions, these items, or rather the ideas involved, are attended with the supposition of a difference, that is unknown and incomprehensible (T 244). As different existences perceptions and objects may be conceived to differ in respect of their relational properties, for example, but otherwise whatever is true of the one must also be true of the other. These two sets of distinctions — between, on the one hand, ideas and impressions and, on the other, perceptions and objects — may usefully be compared and 127. contrasted. In each case the items with which we are concerned are numerically different but specifically identical; and, furthermore, the relation between the items which make up each pair is a causal one. The obvious difference between the two cases is that while both impressions and ideas are objects of experience, the causal dependence of the one upon the other being revealed by the order of their appearance before the mind, we do not directly experience external objects as opposed to perceptions. Questions concerning the 'real nature' of objects or bodies belong to the province of natural - rather than 'moral' - philosophy, which indeed has reasonable hypotheses to offer (T 48). As for our idea of body, this comprises nothing more than the ideas... (shrink)
- SecondaryQualities in Retrospect.M. E. Y. Tim de &Markku KEINÄNEN -2001 -Philosophica 68 (2).No categories
| 1 — 50 / 949 |
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6dc498764b-4pdvg uwo