Results for 'Sd Andrews'
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- Teaching-the isolated profession.SdAndrews,Rr Sherman &Rb Webb -1983 -Journal of Thought 18 (4):49-57.Export citation
Bookmark - Guardianship Before and Following Hospitalization.Jennifer Moye,Andrew B. Cohen,Kelly Stolzmann,Elizabeth J. Auguste,Casey C. Catlin,Zachary S. Sager,Rachel E. Weiskittle,Cindy B. Woolverton,Heather L. Connors &Jennifer L. Sullivan -2023 -HEC Forum 35 (3):271-292.When ethics committees are consulted about patients who have or need court-appointed guardians, they lack empirical evidence about several common issues, including the relationship between guardianship and prolonged, potentially medically unnecessary hospitalizations for patients. To provide information about this issue, we conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses using a retrospective cohort from Veterans Healthcare Administration. To examine the relationship between guardianship appointment and hospital length of stay, we first compared 116 persons hospitalized prior to guardianship appointment to a comparison group (n (...) = 348) 3:1 matched for age, diagnosis, date of admission, and comorbidity. We then compared 91 persons hospitalized in the year following guardianship appointment to a second matched comparison group (n = 273). Mean length of stay was 30.75 days (SD = 46.70) amongst those admitted prior to guardianship, which was higher than the comparison group (M = 7.74, SD = 9.71, F = 20.75, p. (shrink)
- Setting Ends for Oneself Through Reason.Andrews Reath -2009 - In Simon Robertson,Spheres of reason: new essays in the philosophy of normativity. New York: Oxford University Press.Kantians often talk about the capacity to set ends for oneself through reason and those who do assume that Kant regarded the capacity to set ends as a rational power or a component of practical reason. ‘Natural perfection’, Kant says, ‘is the cultivation of any capacities whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason’, and he refers to ‘humanity’ as the ‘capacity to set oneself any end at all’ or ‘the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends’.¹ ‘Humanity’ comprises (...) the full range of human rational capacities, one of which is the capacity to adopt a wide variety of ends, including ends that are not morally required by pure practical reason.² Likewise Kant refers to ‘culture’ as ‘the aptitude and skill for all sorts of ends for which he can use nature (internal and external)’, or as ‘the production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom).’³ Christine Korsgaard characterizes ‘humanity’ as follows. (shrink)
- Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory: Selected Essays.Andrews Reath -2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of autonomy. Together the essays articulate Reath's original approach to Kant's views about human autonomy, which explains Kant's belief that objective moral requirements are based on principles we choose for ourselves. With two new papers, and revised versions of several others, the volume will be of great interest to (...) all students and scholars of Kant and of moral philosophy. (shrink)
- Infants, too, are global perceivers.Arlene Walker-Andrews -2001 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):244-245.Infants are global perceivers. They detect patterns in stimulation that allow detection of many affordances of the environment. Pick-up of structural patterns across forms of ambient energy awaits maturation of sensory systems and improvements in motor skill, but development proceeds rapidly during the first year. Researchers in perceptual development must devise and refine existing tools to examine infants' abilities.
- Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility. Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination.Andrews Reath -1989 -Kant Studien 80 (1-4):284-302.
- Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls.Andrews Reath,Barbara Herman &Christine M. Korsgaard (eds.) -1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honour. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and (...) Marx. By reconstructing the core of these theories in a way that is informed by contemporary theoretical concerns, the contributors show how the history of the subject is a resource for understanding present and perennial problems in moral and political philosophy. This outstanding collection will be of particular interest to historians of moral and political philosophy, historians of ideas, and political scientists. (shrink)
- ‘A new and hopeful type of social organism’: Julian Huxley, J.G. Crowther and Lancelot Hogben on Roosevelt's New Deal.Oliver Hill-Andrews -2019 -British Journal for the History of Science 52 (4):645-671.The admiration of the Soviet Union amongst Britain's interwar scientific left is well known. This article reveals a parallel story. Focusing on the biologists Julian Huxley and Lancelot Hogben and the scientific journalist J.G. Crowther, I show that a number of scientific thinkers began to look west, to the US. In the mid- to late 1930s and into the 1940s, Huxley, Crowther and Hogben all visited the US and commented favourably on Roosevelt's New Deal, in particular its experimental approach to (...) politics (in the form of planning). Huxley was first to appreciate the significance of the experiment; he looked to the Tennessee Valley Authority as a model of democratic planning by persuasion that could also be applied in Britain. Crowther, meanwhile, examined the US through the lens of history of science. InFamous American Men of Science(1937) and in lectures at Harvard University, he aimed to shed light on the flaws in the Constitution which were frustrating the New Deal. Finally, Hogben's interest in the US was related to his long-standing opposition to dialectical materialism, and when he finally saw the US at first hand, he regarded it as a model for how to bring about a planned socialist society through peaceful persuasion. (shrink)No categories
- Two conceptions of the highest good in Kant.Andrews Reath -1988 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (4):593-619.This paper develops an interpretation of what is essential to kant's doctrine of the highest good, Which defends it while also explaining why it is often rejected. While it is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, The paper gives an account in which neither feature appears. The highest good is best understood as a state of affairs to be achieved through human agency, Containing the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of (...) their permissible ends-I.E., One in which all act from the moral law and in doing so achieve their intended ends. The paper shows that the texts contain two distinct conceptions not distinguished by kant-Both a theological and a secular (political) notion. The standard objections apply to the theological, But the secular conception is consistent with kant's conception of moral conduct. Moreover, That the highest good is introduced as an end to be constructed out of the moral law indicates that the secular version is the essential notion. (shrink)
- Siegfried's Curse the German Journey Form Nietzsche to Hesse. --.WayneAndrews -1972 - Atheneum.Export citation Bookmark
- The primary synopsis of Universology and Alwato.Stephen PearlAndrews -1871 - Weston, Mass.: M & S Press. Edited by Madeleine B. Stern.Reprint of the edition published in 1871 by D. Thomas, New York.No categories
- Human Morality.Andrews Reath -1994 -Philosophical Review 103 (4):731.
- Interpretation based on richness of experience: Theory development from a social-constructivist perspective.Arlene S. Walker-Andrews &Judith A. Hudson -2004 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):128-129.The view that children's understanding of mind is constructed through social interaction is consistent with other social-constructivist models. We provide examples of similar claims in research on emotion perception, pretense understanding, autobiographical memory, and event knowledge. Identification of common elements from such socio-cultural perspectives may lead to greater theoretical integration and provide a new framework for exploring human development.
- Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory.Andrews Reath -1992 -Philosophical Review 101 (4):867.
- Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology.KristinAndrews -2012 - MIT Press.Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and ...
- Ape Autonomy? Social norms and moral agency in other species.KristinAndrews -2013 - In Petrus Klaus & Wild Markus,Philosophical Perspectives on Animals: Mind, Ethics, Morals. Transcript. pp. 173-196.Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships.
- Living in smooth space: Deleuze, postcolonialism and the subaltern.Andrews Robinson &Simon Tormey -2010 - In Simone Bignall & Paul Patton,Deleuze and the Postcolonial. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 20--40.
- It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology.KristinAndrews -2008 -Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...) an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn't endorse, and so could not serve as the target's reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits—who the person is—rather than by beliefs and desires—what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed. (shrink)
- My Body, My Property.Lori B.Andrews -1986 -Hastings Center Report 16 (5):28-38.Two recent cases raise the question: Should the body be considered a form of property? Patients generally do not share in the profits derived from the applications of research on their body parts and products. Nor is their consent for research required so long as the body part is unidentified and is removed in the course of treatment. A market in body parts and products would require consent to all categories of research and ensure that patients are protected from coercion (...) and given the chance to be paid fairly for their contributions. Such a market might force us to rethink our policies prohibiting organ sales. Donors, recipients, and society will benefit from a market in body parts so long as owners—and no one else—retain control over their bodies. (shrink)
- Resolution and the consistency of analysis.Peter B.Andrews -1974 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (1):73-84.
- Autonomy And Practical Reason: Thomas Hill's Kantianism.Andrews Reath -1995 -Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik 3.Export citation Bookmark
- Understanding Kantian Autonomy.Andrews Reath -1995 -Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress 1:1185-1191.No categories
- Legislating for a realm of ends: The social dimension of autonomy.Andrews Reath -1997 - In Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman & Christine M. Korsgaard,Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 214--239.
- Calling for a Pro-Love Movement: A Contextualized Theo-Ethical Examination of Reproductive Health Care and Abortion in the United States.Jeanie Whitten-Andrews -2018 -Feminist Theology 26 (2):147-159.In the midst of extreme and dualistic religio-political debates regarding women’s sexual wellness and abortion, one begins to wonder what a new theo-ethical approach might look like which rejects overly-simplistic, harmful understandings of such crucial issues. What might it look like to truly centre women’s full human experiences, loving each other in a way that addresses harm and meets tangible needs? This article examines the complex inequitable structural and institutional realities of sexual wellness and abortion through an intersectional theo-ethical lens. (...) The article then proceeds to suggest a new socio-religio-political ‘Pro-Love’ philosophy, undergirded by foundational theological understandings of justice-oriented love, and situated within the broad fields of Feminist, Liberation, Process, and Queer Theologies, within the Christian tradition. The suggested approach requires systematically addressing root issues affecting the lack of equitable access to sexual wellness and the racist/sexist/classist structures forcing women into under-resourced and unsafe environments, leading to high demand for abortion services. (shrink)No categories
- (1 other version)Animal cognition.KristinAndrews -2010 -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.
- Autonomy and the Idea of Freedom: Some Reflections onGroundwork III.Andrews Reath -2019 -Kantian Review 24 (2):223-248.This article explores a set of questions about the ‘idea of freedom’ that Kant introduces in the fourth paragraph of Groundwork III. I develop a reading that supports treating it as a normative notion and brings out its normative content in some detail. I argue that we should understand the idea as follows: that it is a general feature of reasoning and judgement that it understands itself to be a correct or sound application of the normative standards of the relevant (...) domain of cognition, not influenced by irrelevant or external factors. Reasoning and judgement are thus normatively committed to these standards of correctness. A second and related concern is to explore connections between the idea of freedom and Kant’s conception of autonomy and to identify different points at which autonomy plays a role in the argument of Groundwork III. In the final section, I mine the idea of freedom for a set of normative commitments specific to rational agency that play a foundational role in Kant’s moral conception. (shrink)
- Chimpanzee theory of mind: Looking in all the wrong places?KristinAndrews -2005 -Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept (...) this new approach, and that experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for anomalous behavior should be explored. (shrink)
- Adventure beyond knowledge.Michael F.Andrews -1974 - New York,: J. Norton Publishers.Export citation Bookmark
- Human Values: An Australian Perspective in the Global Context.David J.Andrews -1995 -Journal of Human Values 1 (1):67-74.This paper is a reflection on the emergent directions of Australian culture and values in the context of the process of globalization. It views Australian society as a multi-cultural mosaic where aboriginal cultures coexist with the derived cultures of migrants from Europe, America and Asia. Adding that globalization has meant both greater confusion and conformity to intrusive American culture and practices, the author asks: Will we be able to find and clarify a changing set of shared values in this emergent (...) society? Although Australia still finds itself in the mould of the acquisitive Western society, a transition to the stronger communitarian value system of the East is a distinct possibility. Drawing inspiration from an experiential workshop in India, the author concludes with the hope that ultimately the survival and enrichment of an edifying Australian culture and set of human values will depend on and flow from the hearts, minds and human creativeness of Australians in a continually changing world. (shrink)
- Manifestations of corporate social responsibility as sensemaking and sensegiving in a hydrocarbon industry.NathanAndrews -2021 -Business and Society Review 126 (2):211-234.There is a large body of literature that examines different dimensions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Africa, with many focusing on the false promises of these corporate initiatives. Contrary to simplistic claims of CSR being merely window-dressing, however, this paper reveals that although several rhetorical proclamations underpin the idea, such statements are often given instrumental meaning through diverse mechanisms (e.g., interpretation of cues toward the proactive (re)construction of identity, (inter)subjective discourses on social legitimacy, and acts of “issue selling”) that (...) help to enact particular characteristics of the corporation. The paper specifically employs the organizational concepts of sensemaking and sensegiving to explain how, through CSR activities, hydrocarbon companies in Ghana construct and (re)affirm a particular reality for its stakeholders. The findings suggest that by having significant leverage over the (re)construction of its identity and claims around social legitimacy and performance, the corporation gives sense to and further sustains its authority over societal norms and expectations around what social responsibility entails. The evidence presented contributes to scholarship that considers the corporation as a complex nexus of multiple relations, contested narratives, and practices. (shrink)No categories
- Psychotherapy of depression: A self-confirmation model.John D. W.Andrews -1989 -Psychological Review 96 (4):576-607.
- U.S. Military Sponsored Vaccine Trials and La Resistance in Nepal.JasonAndrews -2005 -American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):W1-W3.
- Resolution in type theory.Peter B.Andrews -1971 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (3):414-432.
- What Emerged: Autonomy and Heteronomy in theGroundwork and SecondCritique.Andrews Reath -2018 - In Stefano Bacin & Oliver Sensen,The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 176-195.This essay explains Kant’s idea of autonomy of the will and advances a thesis about how it emerges in his moral conception. Kant defines “autonomy” as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself…” and argues that the Categorical Imperative is that law. I take the autonomy of the will to mean that the nature of rational volition is the source of the formal principle that authoritatively governs rational volition. I give a sense to this (...) idea by pointing to an argument form found throughout the Groundwork and the second Critique where Kant moves from a conception of rational volition as a faculty to a statement of its formal principle. This idea of autonomy emerges in Kant’s moral conception (at the time he writes the Groundwork) as his solution to the problem of moral theory. Common sense assumes that moral requirements apply with unconditional necessity, and the problem of moral theory is to show how such requirements are possible. Kant’s resolution to this problem is to argue that the necessity of moral requirement is genuine only if based in autonomy of the will, only if based in a “law that arises from one’s will”. (shrink)
- The Importance of Argument in Education.RichardAndrews -2009 - Institute of Education, University of London.In The importance of argument in education RichardAndrews draws on his practice and research of over 20 years. He begins his lecture with definitions of ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’. He justifies the overall focus on argument by first looking at its function in the social and political spheres and then moving on to a theoretical consideration of argument via the thinking of Vygotsky and Habermas. ProfessorAndrews applies these insights to both school- and university-level contexts. He examines three (...) cases of argumentation in education: that of a group of 6-year-old children in discussion; an essay by an undergraduate literature student; and a dissertation by an engineering student. In a further section, he turns to the question of visual and multimodal argumentation through consideration of a still image, an advertisement and a sequence of images. The lecture concludes that argument is important to education because it allows articulation of thought; engagement with personal, social and political issues; and enfranchisement within a democratic society. (shrink)
- Interpreting autism: A critique of Davidson on thought and language.KristinAndrews -2002 -Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one (...) need not be a speaker in order to be a thinker. The falsity of these theses has consequences for other parts of Davidson's world-view; for example, it undermines his argument against animal thought. (shrink)
- Glock, Hans Johann (2018). Animal rationality and belief. In:Andrews, Kirstin; Beck, Jacob. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. London: Routledge, 89-99.Hans Johann Glock,KirstinAndrews &Jacob Beck (eds.) -2018Export citation Bookmark
- The ground of practical laws.Andrews Reath -2013 - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing,Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 571-582.
- Legislating the moral law.Andrews Reath -1994 -Noûs 28 (4):435-464.
- Kant's Conception of Autonomy of the Will.Andrews Reath -2012 - In Oliver Sensen,Kant on Moral Autonomy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 32-52.
- Is a spectrum of a non-disintegrated flat strongly minimal model complete theory in a language with finite signature.UriAndrews &Omer Mermelstein -2021 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 86 (4):1632-1656.We build a new spectrum of recursive models (SRM(T)) of a strongly minimal theory. This theory is non-disintegrated, flat, model complete, and in a language with a finite structure.
- Scientia.W. S.Andrews -1915 -The Monist 25:156.Export citation Bookmark
- Direct Practice.Iris Carlton-LaNey &JaniceAndrews -1998 - In Josefina Figueira-McDonough, Ann Nichols-Casebolt & F. Ellen Netting,The role of gender in practice knowledge: claiming half the human experience. London: Garland. pp. 1086--93.
- Effects of stress and anxiety on continuous high-speed color naming.William Z. Davidson,T. G.Andrews &Sherman Ross -1956 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 52 (1):13.
- Keith Miller: outstanding service 2006.KathrineAndrews Henderson -2009 -Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 39 (2):18-19.No categories
- Social Brain, Distributed Mind.Lehmann Julia,Andrews Katherine &Dunbar Robin -2010No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Science and the new civilization.RobertAndrews Millikan -1971 - Freeport, N.Y.,: Books for Libraries Press.
- Why Do They Keep Coming to Get Their Hearts?B. A. StAndrews,Paul Boor,Michael Zack,Norbert Hirschhorn,Jack Coulehan &Robert Carroll -2001 -Journal of Medical Humanities 22 (4):299-310.
- The Neuroscience of Spontaneous Thought: An Evolving, Interdisciplinary Field.Andrews-Hanna Jessica,Irving Zachary C.,Fox Kieran,Spreng Nathan R. &Christoff Kalina -forthcoming - In Kieran Fox & Kieran Christoff,Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought and Creativity. Oxford University Press.An often-overlooked characteristic of the human mind is its propensity to wander. Despite growing interest in the science of mind-wandering, most studies operationalize mind-wandering by its task-unrelated contents. But these contents may be orthogonal to the processes that determine how thoughts unfold over time, remaining stable or wandering from one topic to another. In this chapter, we emphasize the importance of incorporating such processes into current definitions of mind-wandering, and propose that mind-wandering and other forms of spontaneous thought (such as (...) dreaming and creativity) are mental states that arise and transition relatively freely due to an absence of constraints on cognition. We review existing psychological, philosophical and neuroscientific research on spontaneous thought through the lens of this framework, and call for additional research into the dynamic properties of the mind and brain. (shrink)
- Adaptationism – how to carry out an exaptationist program.Paul W.Andrews,Steven W. Gangestad &Dan Matthews -2002 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):489-504.1 Adaptationism is a research strategy that seeks to identify adaptations and the specific selective forces that drove their evolution in past environments. Since the mid-1970s, paleontologist Stephen J. Gould and geneticist Richard Lewontin have been critical of adaptationism, especially as applied toward understanding human behavior and cognition. Perhaps the most prominent criticism they made was that adaptationist explanations were analogous to Rudyard Kipling's Just So Stories. Since storytelling is an inherent part of science, the criticism refers to the acceptance (...) of stories without sufficient empirical evidence. In particular, Gould, Lewontin, and their colleagues argue that adaptationists often use inappropriate evidentiary standards for identifying adaptations and their functions, and that they often fail to consider alternative hypotheses to adaptation. Playing prominently in both of these criticisms are the concepts of constraint, spandrel, and exaptation. In this article we discuss the standards of evidence that could be used to identify adaptations and when and how they may be appropriately used. Moreover, building an empirical case that certain features of a trait are best explained by exaptation, spandrel, or constraint requires demonstrating that the trait's features cannot be better accounted for by adaptationist hypotheses. Thus, we argue that the testing of alternatives requires the consideration, testing, and systematic rejection of adaptationist hypotheses. Where possible, we illustrate our points with examples taken from human behavior and cognition. Key Words: adaptation; ADHD; brain allometry; constraint; epistemology; evolutionary psychology; exaptation; female orgasm ; optimization; special design; waist-hip ratio. Footnotes1 The authors contributed equally to this paper. Order of authorship was determined alphabetically. Correspondence may be addressed to any of the authors. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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