Works by Sarah Stroud
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- Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud -2006 -Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
- Moral overridingness and moral theory.Sarah Stroud -1998 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189.I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently (...) incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them. (shrink)
- Introduction to the Special Issue: The Nature and Implications of Disagreement.Sarah Stroud &Michele Palmira -2019 -American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):15-28.Disagreement and the implications thereof have emerged as a central preoccupation of recent analytic philosophy. In epistemology, articles on so-called peer disagreement and its implications have burgeoned and now constitute an especially rich subject of discussion in the field. In moral and political philosophy, moral disagreement has of course traditionally been a crucial argumentative lever in meta-ethical debates, and disagreement over conceptions of the good has been the spark for central controversies in political philosophy, such as the limits of legitimate (...) state authority and public reason. Philosophers of language have also been keen to take up disagreement as a tool, for instance in motivating or exploring the merits of contextualist or relativist semantics for certain areas of discourse, such as matters of taste, aesthetic evaluation, and epistemic discourse. (shrink)No categories
- Weakness of will and practical irrationality.Sarah Stroud &Christine Tappolet (eds.) -2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role (...) of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields. (shrink)
- Weakness of will.Sarah Stroud -2012 - In Ed Zalta,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Permissible Partiality, Projects, and Plural Agency.Sarah Stroud -2010 - In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham,Partiality and impartiality: morality, special relationships, and the wider world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.This chapter considers whether our moral entitlement to manifest certain kinds of partiality stems from a morally basic permission to be partial, or whether it can be accounted for in some other way. In particular, it explores the possibility of justifying partial conduct via a general moral prerogative to pursue our own projects. On this approach, in contexts of plural agency, where two or more people together pursue a joint project, we would have permission to favour our co-agents — but (...) only in ways that relate to our joint project. While this approach might limit the scope of morally permissible partiality, it seems more faithful to the concerns that animate the partiality debates than the alternative of claiming an unrestricted basic right to be partial to whomsoever we wish. (shrink)
- Is procrastination weakness of will?Sarah Stroud -2010 - In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White,The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-67.
- Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement.Sarah Stroud -2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet,Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 121.A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests that the alleged possibility of (...) global akrasia actually supports the practical‐judgement model over what she considers its main rival, a kind of ‘Humean externalism’ about practical reason. (shrink)
- Weakness of Will and Practical.Sarah Stroud -2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet,Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 121.
- Self-control in action and belief.Martina Orlandi &Sarah Stroud -2021 -Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):225-242.Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the...
- Moral expertise as skilled practice.Sarah Stroud -2024 -Philosophical Issues 34 (1):271-284.Contemporary discussions of moral expertise have raised a host of problems for the very idea of a “moral expert.” This article interrogates the conception of moral expertise that such discussions seem to assume and proposes instead that we understand moral expertise as a species of practical skill. On this model, a skilled moral agent is more similar to a skilled pianist than she is to a theoretical expert (for instance, an expert on the War of 1812). The article argues both (...) that it is more natural to understand the moral “expert” as excelling in a form of skilled practice and that such a conception would render moot many of the concerns which preoccupy contemporary discussions. (shrink)No categories
- They Can’t Take That Away from Me: Restricting the Reach of Morality's Demands.Sarah Stroud -2013 - In Mark Timmons,Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 203-234.This chapter highlights and assesses an important form of argument that has often been deployed in debates over moral demandingness. 'They can’t take that away from me' arguments claim to identify something which morality cannot ask us to give up — something which morality allegedly cannot take away from us. Does any argument of this kind succeed? This chapter investigates that question by sketching and critiquing three such arguments from the contemporary literature, including a well-known argument of Bernard Williams’. It (...) also considers a further impediment to the scope or power of such arguments, namely how little they show even if they succeed. The closing suggestion is that those eager to resist extreme moral demands ought to object at an earlier stage to the arguments which seem to generate such demands. (shrink)
- Dworkin andCasey on Abortion.Sarah Stroud -1996 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):140-170.
- Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons.Sarah Stroud -2007 -Philosophical Studies 134 (3):449 - 456.
- Ethical theory: 50 puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments.Daniel Stroud Munoz &Sarah Stroud -2025 - New York, NY: Routledge. Edited by Sarah Stroud.In this new kind of introduction to ethical theory, Daniel Muñoz and Sarah Stroud present 50 of the field's most exciting puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments. Over the course of 11 chapters, the authors cover a huge variety of topics, starting with the classic debate between utilitarians and deontologists and ending on existential questions about the future of humanity. Every chapter begins with a helpful introduction, and each of the 50 entries includes references for further reading and questions for reflection. (...) Among the entries are such classics as the Ring of Gyges, Jim and the Villagers, the Repugnant Conclusion, JoJo, "One Thought Too Many," the Miners Puzzle, the Gentle Murder Paradox, Nowheresville, the Experience Machine, and the Trolley Problem. The book also explores several more recent topics of interest, such as doxastic wronging and the ethics of AI, so that even advanced students are likely to discover something new. Each entry can be read on its own, and the writing is accessible and conversational throughout, making this an ideal resource for undergraduate teaching. Readers at any level can pick up this book and see for themselves how fascinating-and puzzling-ethical theory can be. (shrink)
- 4.'Race': Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic 'Race': Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic (pp. 525-551).Alan H. Goldman,Harry Brighouse,Adam Swift &Sarah Stroud -2006 -Ethics 116 (3).
- Egalitarian Family Values?Sarah Stroud -unknown
- Moral Relativism and Quasi-Absolutism.Sarah Stroud -1998 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):189.
- Moral Commitment and Moral Theory.Sarah Stroud -2001 -Journal of Philosophical Research 26:381-398.This paper examines the nature of what I call moral commitment: that is, a standing commitment to live up to moral demands. I first consider what kind of psychological state moral commitment might be, arguing that moral commitment is a species of commitment to a counterfactual condition. I explore the general structural features of attitudes of this type in order to shed light on how moral commitment might function in an agent’s motivational economy. I then use this understanding of moral (...) commitment to respond to charges raised by prominent critics of moral theory; I argue that the counterfactual-condition account of moral commitment can successfully defuse the worries they express about the effects of moral commitment on one’s other attachments. In the final section, I suggest that these attractive general results may not be available to the consequentialist, which, if true, is a count against consequentialism. (shrink)
- “Good For” supra “Good”.Sarah Stroud -2013 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):459-466.
- Irrationality.Sarah Stroud -2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig,Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 489–505.A philosophical treatment of irrationality should at the same time leave space for irrational forms of thought and action and illuminate what is defective about them. While Davidson's analysis of weakness of the will is justly famous, some of Davidson's general philosophical commitments in fact conspire to make it especially difficult for him to account for irrationality. Davidson's conviction that irrationality must involve inconsistency, together with his rather circumscribed understanding of inconsistency, make it questionable whether he can leave the right (...) kind of space for irrational phenomena that seem nonetheless to exist. (shrink)No categories
- Déontologisme et droits.Sarah Stroud -1999 -Philosophiques 26 (1):139-148.RÉSUMÉ Dans ce texte, l'accent est mis sur les contraintes ou restrictions dites déontologiques. Croire en l'existence de telles contraintes, c'est croire qu'il peut être moralement inadmissible de faire quelque chose, même si cette action se révélait la seule manière d'empêcher un résultat encore pire. La question que pose et examine ce texte est celle de savoir pourquoi il est mal de faire des actions qui semblent violer une contrainte déontologique. Plus particulièrement, ce texte étudie l'hypothèse séduisante que nous pourrions (...) expliquer ce qu'il y a de mal dans ce type d'actions en termes de droits. L’article argumente que cette idée, bien que toute naturelle, ne nous permettra pas d'expliquer de manière satisfaisante nos convictions déontologiques. Les droits peuvent être interprétés de plusieurs manières différentes, mais peu importe l'option choisie, nous rencontrons des difficultés. Le problème principal est que l'appel aux droits fait souvent usage des jugements d'admissibilité que nous essayons d'expliquer. Le supposé explanans n'a donc pas l'indépendance requise face à l' explanandum pour en constituer une véritable explication. ABSTRACT The focus of this paper is deontological restrictions or constraints. To believe in the existence of such constraints is to think that it can be morally impermissible to do something even if doing that is the only way to prevent an even worse outcome. The question which this article poses and considers is why it is wrong to perform acts which seem to violate a deontological restriction. In particular, the paper investigates the attractive possibility that we could explain this wrongness in terms of rights. argue that this idea, while natural, will not yield a satisfying explanation of our deontological convictions. Rights can be understood in several different ways, but no matter which option we take we encounter difficulties. The principal problem is that appeals to rights often make use of the very judgments of permissibility which we are trying to explain. The supposed explanans thus lacks sufficient independence from the explanandum to constitute a genuine explanation of it. (shrink)No categories
- La partialité par les projets.Sarah Stroud -2008 -Les Ateliers de L’Ethique 3 (1):41-51.This paper investigates how we can most effectively argue that partiality toward certain people and not others is morally permissible. Philosophers who strongly insist that morality must leave room for partiality have not made explicit their basis for this conclusion; the present paper comparatively assesses a variety of possible argument strategies which could be deployed in this regard. One promising strategy exploits the acknowledged force of the argument from “the personal point of view,” here interpreted as referring specifically to an (...) agent’s projects. If moral demands must be tempered in light of the special significance to an agent of his own projects, then perhaps the agent’s partial attachments to other people should also receive a measure of protection from impartial moral claims. The case is bolstered by noting the ubiquity of plural or collective agency in contexts of close personal relations: often the two agents in such relationships together pursue joint projects and even constitute a plural agent. This approach does justify special moral treatment of one’s co-agents, although it does not match our initial conception of partiality in all respects. (shrink)No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - À la recherche de la source des normes déontologiques.Sarah Stroud -2001 -Philosophiques 28 (1):151-171.La pensée morale ordinaire semble incorporer une adhésion à des contraintes ou des restrictions déontologiques : des interdictions qui restent en vigueur même dans des cas où les actions interdites constituent le seul moyen de prévenir des conséquences encore pires. La source de ces normes déontologiques, cependant, n'est pas évidente. Plusieurs tentatives récentes pour trouver une base aux restrictions déontologiques ou pour expliquer ce qui les génère sont examinées. La plus prometteuse insiste sur la valeur intrinsèque du statut moral protégé (...) que la morale déontologique attribue à chacun de nous. On discutera brièvement les points forts d'une telle approche et les difficultés auxquelles elle fait face.Ordinary moral thought seems to reflect a commitment to deontological constraints or restrictions on conduct: to prohibitions which remain in force even if such actions are the only way to avert still worse consequences. The source of these deontological norms, however, is not clear. Several recent attempts to offer a basis for deontological restrictions or to explain what gives rise to them are examined. The most promising such attempt emphasizes the intrinsic value of the protected moral status which deontological morality ascribes to each of us. The strong points of such an approach and the difficulties facing it are briefly discussed. (shrink)
- Morality's Authority.Sarah Stroud -1994 - Dissertation, Princeton UniversityWhat is the nature and scope of morality's authority? How seriously ought we to take its demands? What would it be like to grant its requirements supreme importance in one's life? This dissertation addresses such questions by considering the nature and extent of morality's authority from several vantage points. ;The first two chapters discuss a charge made by Bernard Williams and others. According to this charge, commitment to modern moral theories would force us to devalue or suppress our personal projects (...) and concerns, leaving life bereft of shape and meaning. This charge poses a serious threat to morality's authority: if it is justified, we have good reason, it seems, not to comply with morality's demands. ;It is argued in response, in Chapter II, that moral commitment need not have such psychologically destructive effects. Drawing on the work of both consequentialist and broadly Kantian moral theorists, the chapter presents a model of moral commitment which can defuse Williams' concerns. The conclusion drawn is that moral commitment as such does not preclude the personal attachments and concerns which make lives worth living. However, it is doubtful whether the benefits of such a model are available to the consequentialist. ;The last two chapters discuss whether morality might be overriding. Does morality supply us with decisive or compelling reasons for action, as many theorists have hoped or assumed? Chapter III articulates a version of the overridingness thesis and considers its implications. The main conclusions of the chapter are that this version of the thesis requires the rejection of a purely instrumental or prudential conception of reasons for action, and that it fits best with an "absorptive" conception of morality. ;Richard Miller's views on these matters are the topic of Chapter IV. While Miller seeks to uphold some versions of the thesis in tandem with his novel theory of rationality, it is argued in Chapter IV that his "internal" conception of reasons cannot secure such claims of morality's rational force. If all reasons stem from the agent's desires and needs, then we will not be able to sustain any very strong position on morality's authority. (shrink)Export citation Bookmark
- Rationalité, humanité, normativité.Sarah Stroud -2004 -Philosophiques 31 (2):405-408.No categories
- The Aim of Affirmative Action.Sarah Stroud -1999 -Social Theory and Practice 25 (3):385-408.
- Introduction.Christine Tappolet &Sarah Stroud -2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet,Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.No categories
- Facts, Values, and Morality. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -1998 -Philosophical Review 107 (4):612.Richard Brandt's last book discusses foundational questions in metaethics and normative ethics. Many of the central views expressed, as well as the topics taken up, will be familiar to those who know Brandt's earlier works, although some parts of the book represent new and welcome additions to his corpus. Brandt was very much a systematic moral philosopher, a theory builder. I can here only sketch the outlines of the theory he developed in the book, and suggest some points at which (...) one might wish to demur. (shrink)
- Truth and Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -2005 -Disputatio 1 (18):197-203.
- Scheffler, Samuel. Death and the Afterlife. Edited by, Niko Kolodny, with commentaries by, Susan Wolf, Harry G. Frankfurt, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, and Niko Kolodny.New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. x+210. $29.95. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -2015 -Ethics 125 (2):605-610.
- Between Universalism and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -1997 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):732-734.
- Acts of will. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -2011 -Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):851-855.
- F. M. Kamm, morality, mortality. Volume II: Rights, duties, and status. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -1999 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (5):481-488.
- Ruwen Ogien, dir., Le réalisme moral, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999, vi + 571 p. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -2001 -Philosophiques 28 (1):219-223.No categories
- Review of James Dreier (ed.),Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -2006 -Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (10).
- Timmons, M. Morality Without Foundations. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -2000 -Philosophical Books 41 (3):206-208.Export citation Bookmark
- The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality. [REVIEW]Sarah Stroud -1997 -Philosophical Review 106 (4):577.The first four chapters develop his account of reason and reasons in general. Baier calls actions, beliefs, and feelings that can be assessed as rational or irrational “performances”. He argues that the aim of the enterprise of reason is to arrive at performances that are as good as possible ; in order to further this aim, societies promulgate guidelines of rationality. Baier thinks that a being cannot be fully rational unless it has the benefit of such publicly available guidelines. Indeed, (...) “a being’s performances cannot be judged rational or irrational until he and his “fellows” have available to them [socially provided] apparatus for determining what … is according and what contrary to reason”. Reason is thus essentially social. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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