Works by Sanford C. Goldberg
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- Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg -2017 -Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that (...) S knows that p, and S fails to know that p. The controversial claim is that these three conditions are sometimes jointly satisfied. I will spend the majority of my time defending the controversial claim. I will argue that there are two main sources of legitimate expectations regarding another’s epistemic condition: participation in a legitimate social practice ; and moral and epistemic expectations more generally . In developing my position on this score, I will have an opportunity to defend the doctrine that there are “practice-generated entitlements” to expect certain things, where it can happen that the satisfaction of these expectations requires another’s having certain pieces of knowledge; to contrast practice-generated entitlements to expect with epistemic reasons to believe; to defend the idea that moral and epistemic standards themselves can be taken to reflect legitimate expectations we have of each other; to compare the “should have known” phenomenon with a widely-discussed phenomenon in the ethics literature—that of culpable ignorance; and finally to suggest the bearing of the “should have known” phenomenon to epistemology itself. (shrink)
- Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg -2019 -Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.It has been alleged that the demands of friendship conflict with the norms of epistemology—in particular, that there are cases in which the moral demands of friendship would require one to give a friend the benefit of the doubt, and thereby come to believe something in violation of ordinary epistemic standards on justified or responsible belief :329–351, 2004; Stroud in Ethics 116:498–524, 2006; Hazlett in A luxury of the understanding: on the value of true belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). (...) The burden of this paper is to explain these appearances away. I contend that the impression of epistemic partiality in friendship dissipates once we acknowledge the sorts of practical and epistemic reasons that are generated by our values: value-reflecting reasons. The present proposal has several virtues: it requires fewer substantial commitments than other proposals seeking to resist the case for epistemic partiality ; it is independently motivated, as it cites a phenomenon—value-reflecting reasons—we have independent reasons to accept; it provides a single, unified account of how various features of friendship bear on belief-formation; and makes clear how it is the very value we place on friendship itself that ensures against epistemic partiality. (shrink)No categories
- Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges.Sanford C. Goldberg -2020 - Oxford University Press.Sanford C. Goldberg explores the source, nature, and scope of the normative expectations we have of one another as we engage in conversation. He examines two fundamental types of expectation -- epistemic and interpersonal -- that are generated by the performance of speech acts themselves.No categories
- What is a speaker owed?Sanford C. Goldberg -2022 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 50 (3):375-407.Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 50, Issue 3, Page 375-407, Summer 2022.
- On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg -2016 -Episteme 13 (4):449-470.Elsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of (...) scenario, there is a clash between a subject's higher-order evidence and the evidence she should have had: S's higher-order evidence is misleading as to the existence or likely epistemic bearing of further evidence she should have. In the other, while there is further evidence S should have had, this evidence would only have offered additional support for S's belief that p. The picture I offer derives from two “epistemic ceiling” principles linking evidence to justification: one's justification for the belief that p can be no higher than it is on one's total evidence, nor can it be higher than what it would have been had one had all of the evidence one should have had. Together, these two principles entail what I call the doctrine of Epistemic Strict Liability: insofar as one fails to have evidence one should have had, one is epistemically answerable to that evidence whatever reasons one happened to have regarding the likely epistemic bearing of that evidence. I suggest that such a position can account for the battery of intuitions elicited in the full range of cases I will be considering. (shrink)
- Epistemically engineered environments.Sanford C. Goldberg -2020 -Synthese 197 (7):2783-2802.In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they “tell” us. However, where I have explored the former sort of reliance at great length, I have not done so with the latter. In this paper my aim is to do so. My key notions will be (...) those of our social practices, the normative expectations that are sanctioned by those practices, and the epistemically engineered environments constituted by some of these practices. With these notions in mind, I will argue that one’s reliance on instruments, while relevantly different from one’s reliance on other speakers, can nevertheless manifest a kind of epistemic dependence which epistemological theory can and should acknowledge. (shrink)
- Attitude in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg &Mark Walker (eds.) -forthcoming - Oxford University Press.No categories
- Reductionism and the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge.Sanford C. Goldberg -2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa,The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 127--44.
- Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief.Sanford C. Goldberg -2012 -Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a crucial (...) assumption lying behind the argument I used to establish interpersonal extendedness in testimony cases does not apply to beliefs formed through reliance on instruments. In this respect, at least, there appears to be something epistemically distinctive about relying on another epistemic agent. (shrink)
- Interpersonal epistemic entitlements.Sanford C. Goldberg -2014 -Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...) of testimony, and a more “extended” epistemology—one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects. (shrink)
- On the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire.Sanford C. Goldberg -2020 -Synthese 199 (1-2):1641-1658.In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. (...) Once we reject pragmatic encroachment, it can seem that we are forced to treat practical reasons to inquire as having no distinctly epistemic significance. This is not so; I conclude by sketching an alternative account of what the epistemic significance of such reasons might be. (shrink)No categories
- Testimonial knowledge in early childhood, revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg -2008 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, (...) which is to give a motivated, extensionally-adequate account of the conditions on testimonial knowledge in early childhood. Neither challenge can be met merely by endorsing externalism about knowledge; but we can meet both by reconceiving the process that eventuates in the child’s consumption of testimony. My central thesis is that this process should be seen as implicating features of the child's social environment. The result is a novel anti-individualistic externalism about knowledge. (shrink)
- What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg -2020 -Synthese 197 (10):4407-4423.The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a particular role for ethico-political values in social epistemology research. I begin by describing a research programme in social epistemology—one which I have introduced and defended elsewhere. I go on to argue that by the lights of this research programme, there is an important role to be played by ethico-political values in knowledge communities, and an important role in social epistemological research in describing the values inhering in particular knowledge communities. (...) I conclude by noting how, even as it expands its focus beyond the traditional one to include descriptions of our “knowledge practices,” this sort of project relates to some of the core questions that have been pursued by traditional epistemology. (shrink)No categories
- Normative Expectations in Epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg -2021 -Philosophical Topics 49 (2):83-104.There are all sorts of normative expectations in epistemology—expectations about the epistemic condition of other subjects—that would appear to be relevant to epistemic assessment in ways that do not conform to epistemic standards as traditionally understood. The expectations in question include expectations of inquiries pursued or completed, expectations of certain competences, professional expectations, expectations of having consulted with experts, institutional expectations, moral expectations, expectations of friends, and so forth. My goals in this paper are two. First, I aim to highlight (...) the prevalence of such expectations, and the range of distinct types of circumstance in which they arise. Second, I assess several responses to the allegation that normative epistemic expectations are relevant to epistemic assessment. These range from “explaining away” the appearances to trying to offer one or another positive account of their significance. The former sort of reaction comes at a greater cost than many appear to appreciate, given the prevalence of these expectations and the range of circumstances in which they arise. The latter sort of reaction comes at the cost of having to revise our account of epistemic assessment itself. My own favored view does so in terms of the doctrine of normative defeat; I present my reasons for preferring this view, though I cannot claim in this paper to vindicate it. (shrink)
- Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking.Sanford C. Goldberg -2019 -Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon their (...) extremely interesting reflections on one sort of practical matter that has not received proper attention in the literature: the epistemic significance of double-checking. This is done with an eye towards pointing in the direction of further work. (shrink)
- Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg -2015 -American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.This paper reviews recent philosophical work on assertion, with a special focus on work exploring the theme of assertion's norm. It concludes with a brief section characterizing several open questions that might profitably be explored from this perspective.
- What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science.Sanford C. Goldberg -2021 -Synthese 199 (5-6):12541-12559.The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.
- II- Arrogance, Silence, and Silencing.Sanford C. Goldberg -2016 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):93-112.Alessandra Tanesini’s insightful paper explores the moral and epistemic harms of arrogance, particularly in conversation. Of special interest to her is the phenomenon of arrogance-induced silencing, whereby one speaker’s arrogance either prevents another from speaking altogether or else undermines her capacity to produce certain speech acts such as assertions. I am broadly sympathetic to many of Tanesini’s claims about the harms associated with this sort of silencing. In this paper I propose to address what I see as a lacuna in (...) her account. I believe that the arrogant speaker can put those he silences in the morally outrageous position in which their own silence contributes to their oppression. While nothing in Tanesini’s account would predict or explain this, the wrinkle I propose will aim to do so in a way that is in the spirit of her account. To do so, I will need to expand the focus of discussion: instead of concentrating on silencing, I will consider the phenomenon of silence. When one is silent in the face of a mutually observed assertion, one’s silence will be interpreted by others. I argue that under certain widespread conditions, a hearer’s silence in the face of the arrogant speaker’s assertions is likely to be falsely interpreted as indicating her assent to the assertion, and such an interpretation of the hearer’s silence will bring new harms in its wake—in particular, harms to the hearer who was silenced, and also harms to the community at large. When we combine these new harms with the ones Tanesini identified in her paper, we reach the further conclusion that the harms of silencing are potentially far worse than many have imagined. (shrink)
- Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: the Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg -2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen,Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
- The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content.Sanford C. Goldberg -1999 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
- Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program.Sanford C. Goldberg -2020 -Episteme 17 (3):364-383.In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.
- The Promise and Pitfalls of Online ‘Conversations’.Sanford C. Goldberg -2021 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:177-193.Good conversations are one of the great joys of life. Online ‘conversations’ rarely seem to make the grade. In this paper I use some tools from philosophy in an attempt to illuminate what might be going wrong.No categories
- Anonymous assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg -2013 -Episteme 10 (2):135-151.This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...) same of the speaker's relevant epistemic authoritativeness that ordinary assertions do. If this is correct, the phenomenon of anonymity provides us with a lesson regarding ordinary assertions: their aptness for engendering belief in others, and so for communicating knowledge, depends in general on the very publicness of the act of assertion itself. (shrink)
- Coherence in Science: A Social Approach.Sanford C. Goldberg &Kareem Khalifa -2022 -Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3489-3509.Among epistemologists, it is common to assume that insofar as coherence bears on the justification of belief, the only relevant coherence relations are those _within_ an individual subject’s web of beliefs. After clarifying this view and exploring some plausible motivations for it, we argue that this individualistic account of the epistemic relevance of coherence fails to account for central facets of scientific practice. In its place we propose a social account of coherence. According to the view we propose, a scientist (...) _S_’s belief that _p_ is _prima facie_ unjustified if this belief negatively coheres with justified scientific claims in her scientific community. This account of coherence yields an epistemology for scientific belief which, we argue, has all of the benefits and none of the liabilities of its more individualistic predecessor. (shrink)
- Self‐ascription, Self‐knowledge, and the Memory Argument.Sanford C. Goldberg -1997 -Analysis 57 (3):211-219.is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
- Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg -2007 -Noûs 41 (2):178-203.Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...) I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification. (shrink)
- Testimonially based knowledge from false testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg -2001 -Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
- The Asymmetry Thesis and the Doctrine of Normative Defeat.Sanford C. Goldberg -2017 -American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):339-352.It is widely considered a truism that the only evidence that can provide justification for one's belief that p is evidence in one's possession. At the same time, a good many epistemologists accept another claim seemingly in tension with this "truism," to the effect that evidence not in one's possession can defeat or undermine the justification for one's belief that p. Anyone who accepts both of these claims accepts what I will call the asymmetry thesis: while evidence in one's possession (...) can either enhance or detract from justification, evidence not in one's possession can only detract from it. The asymmetry thesis is not uncontroversial; but any epistemologist who endorses the doctrine of normative defeat will be under tremendous pressure to accept it. In this paper I try to motivate the asymmetry thesis in two steps: first, by appeal to a feature that assessments of justification share with evaluative assessments generally, according to which we can distinguish generic expectations in play from the explicit criteria for satisfying the relevant evaluative standard; and second, by arguing that when it comes to epistemic assessments, the generic expectations themselves derive from our roles as epistemic agents in communities in which we depend on one another for knowledge. (shrink)No categories
- Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg -2019 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):952-970.According to anti‐reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption (...) that has not yet been discussed in this connection. (shrink)No categories
- Illocutionary Force, Speech Act Norms, and the Coordination and Mutuality of Conversational Expectations.Sanford C. Goldberg -2023 - In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz,Sbisà on Speech as Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 2147483647-2147483647.Marina Sbisà has long advocated that we think of the illocutionary force of a speech act in terms of the act’s (predictable) systematic effects on the normative relationship between a speaker and her audience. Building on this idea, I argue that the hypothesis of distinctive speech act norms can be used to explain how participants in a conversation coordinate the normative expectations they have of one another in conversation. Such an explanation earns its keep by explaining how speakers render themselves (...) illocutionarily intelligible to their audiences—thereby enabling us to articulate the sense of mutuality that characterizes speech exchanges. One important upshot of my reflections is that we should reject both Austin’s thesis that the successful performance of an illocutionary act depends on audience uptake and Sbisà’s claim that Austin’s thesis is required if we are to make sense of the illocutionary dimension of speech in terms of an act’s systematic effects on participants’ normative expectations of one another. (shrink)No categories
- Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception?Sanford C. Goldberg -2002 -Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
- On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists.Sanford C. Goldberg -2003 -Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
- Fake News and Epistemic Rot; or, Why We Are All in This Together.Sanford C. Goldberg -2021 - In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann,The Epistemology of Fake News. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.No categories
- Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability1.Sanford C. Goldberg -2006 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...) the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such. (shrink)
- What do you know when you know your own thoughts?Sanford C. Goldberg -2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli,New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
- Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement.Sanford C. Goldberg -2013 -Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic (...) significance of disagreement (a topic over which there is some disagreement). After discussing this matter at some length, I conclude, tentatively, that inclusiveness under disagreement can have such epistemic costs. Still, I go on to argue, such costs by themselves would not rationalize substantial limitations on a broad policy of inclusiveness. Insofar as there are grounds for restricting how inclusive one should be in belief-formation, these grounds will not be epistemic, but instead will reflect the practical costs—the time, effort, and resource costs to the subject—of following such a policy. (shrink)
- Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism.Sanford C. Goldberg -2003 -Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...) said regarding e.g. the compatibility of anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge; and more importantly it contains the crux of a response to McKinsey-style arguments against anti-individualism. (shrink)
- Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages.Alessandro Capone,Una Stojnic,Ernie Lepore,Denis Delfitto,Anne Reboul,Gaetano Fiorin,Kenneth A. Taylor,Jonathan Berg,Herbert L. Colston,Sanford C. Goldberg,Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri,Cliff Goddard,Anna Wierzbicka,Magdalena Sztencel,Sarah E. Duffy,Alessandra Falzone,Paola Pennisi,Péter Furkó,András Kertész,Ágnes Abuczki,Alessandra Giorgi,Sona Haroutyunian,Marina Folescu,Hiroko Itakura,John C. Wakefield,Hung Yuk Lee,Sumiyo Nishiguchi,Brian E. Butler,Douglas Robinson,Kobie van Krieken,José Sanders,Grazia Basile,Antonino Bucca,Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri &Kobie van Krieken (eds.) -2018 - Springer Verlag.This volume addresses the intriguing issue of indirect reports from an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributors include philosophers, theoretical linguists, socio-pragmaticians, and cognitive scientists. The book is divided into four sections following the provenance of the authors. Combining the voices from leading and emerging authors in the field, it offers a detailed picture of indirect reports in the world’s languages and their significance for theoretical linguistics. Building on the previous book on indirect reports in this series, this volume adds an empirical (...) and cross-linguistic approach that covers an impressive range of languages, such as Cantonese, Japanese, Hebrew, Persian, Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, Armenian, Italian, English, Hungarian, German, Rumanian, and Basque. (shrink)No categories
- Semantic externalism and epistemic illusions.Sanford C. Goldberg -2007 - In Sanford Goldberg,Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 235--252.
- Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?Sanford C. Goldberg -2017 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):157-170.In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this possibility may go some distance towards explaining several aspects of our (...) group life as epistemic subjects—in particular, groupthink and group polarization. (shrink)
- Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited.Sanford C. Goldberg -2024 -Philosophical Studies 181 (11):3017-3035.Several influential thought experiments from Harman 1973 purport to show that unpossessed evidence can undermine knowledge. Recently, some epistemologists have appealed to these thought experiments in defense of a logically stronger thesis: unpossessed evidence can defeat justification. But these appeals fail to appreciate that Harman himself thought of his examples as Gettier cases, and so would have rejected this strengthening of his thesis. On the contrary, he would have held that while unpossessed evidence can undermine knowledge, it leaves justification intact. (...) In this paper I seek to undermine the viability of Harman’s position. If this is correct, contemporary epistemology faces a choice: either we reject that unpossessed evidence in Harman-style cases bears on knowledge _at all_, or else we must allow that it undermines knowledge _by defeating justification_. The former option must explain why Harman’s thought experiments elicit strong ‘no knowledge’ intuitions; the latter option embraces a minority view about the bearing of social expectations on the assessment of knowledge _and justification_ (= the doctrine of normative defeat). (shrink)No categories
- Telling and the reasons of testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg -2021 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):708-714.No categories
- Epistemic negligence: between performance and evidence.Sanford C. Goldberg -forthcoming -Philosophical Studies:1-19.At first blush, Sosa’s performance-based approach to epistemic normativity would seem to put us in a position to illuminate important types of epistemic negligence – types whose epistemic significance will be denied by standard evidentialist theories. But while Sosa’s theory does indeed venture beyond standard evidentialism, it fails to provide an adequate account of epistemic negligence. The challenge arises in cases in which a subject is negligent in that she knowingly fails to perform inquiries which it was her responsibility to (...) perform, but where she had good (undefeated) reason to believe that had she done so her judgment would only have been reinforced, and where this higher-order judgment was apt. After arguing that these cases will pose problems for Sosa’s view, I diagnose the difficulty as one that will face any view that treats epistemic negligence either in exclusively performance-theoretic terms or exclusively evidential terms. (shrink)No categories
- The Epistemology of Silence.Sanford C. Goldberg -2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock,Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 243--261.
- Testimony as Evidence.Sanford C. Goldberg -2006 -Philosophica 78 (2).Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
- Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and knowledge of content: reply to Brueckner.Sanford C. Goldberg -1999 -Analysis 59 (3):212-217.
- Skepticism and Inquiry.Sanford C. Goldberg -2020 -International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):304-324.In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish the reasons for doubting whether p, one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that is sufficient to undermine the (...) prospect described in. By contrast, ordinary forms of skepticism, which can be identified in connection with, can actually be a boon to inquiry by enhancing. In such cases, having reasons for skeptical doubt is not merely compatible with inquiring further, but also serves to motivate and to help frame such inquiry. (shrink)
- Lackey on the Epistemology of Group Agents.Sanford C. Goldberg -2024 -Res Philosophica 101 (4):811-824.In this paper I argue that treating organized groups as agents, in the way Lackey proposes to do, has implications that are more far-reaching than appears to be recognized in Lackey’s book itself. To bring this out I discuss (1) the epistemic significance of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, (2) a potential counterexample to her Group Epistemic Agent account of group justification, and (3) the bearing of group agency (as understood by Lackey) on the scope of the domain of group epistemology. (...) None of the points I am making is a decisive objection to the general framework Lackey adopts in her book; I offer them, instead, in an attempt to situate Lackey’s epistemology of groups into a more inclusive social epistemology framework. (shrink)No categories
- What is the subject-matter of the theory of epistemic justification?Sanford C. Goldberg -2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco,Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.No categories
- Testimonial Reliance.Sanford C. Goldberg -2024 -Erkenntnis 89 (7):2683-2702.Forming a belief on the basis of accepting another’s testimony often involves a kind of reliance on the (say-so of the) testifier. I argue that this reliance has epistemically relevant features that cannot be represented in most mainstream theories in the epistemology of testimony. The targeted views are those that embrace individualism about testimonial justification.No categories
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