Results for 'Samuel Wintermute'
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- Imagery as compensation for an imperfect abstract problem representation.SamuelWintermute &John E. Laird -2009 - In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn,Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.Export citation
Bookmark - Exploring the Functional Advantages of Spatial and Visual Cognition From an Architectural Perspective.Scott D. Lathrop,SamuelWintermute &John E. Laird -2011 -Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (4):796-818.We present a general cognitive architecture that tightly integrates symbolic, spatial, and visual representations. A key means to achieving this integration is allowing cognition to move freely between these modes, using mental imagery. The specific components and their integration are motivated by results from psychology, as well as the need for developing a functional and efficient implementation. We discuss functional benefits that result from the combination of multiple content-based representations and the specialized processing units associated with them. Instantiating this theory, (...) we then discuss the architectural components and processes, and illustrate the resulting functional advantages in two spatially and visually rich domains. The theory is then compared to other prominent approaches in the area. (shrink)
- Moral Relativity.Samuel C. Wheeler Iii -1987 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):664-670.No categories
- Berkeley's Argument for Idealism.Samuel Charles Rickless -2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.Samuel Rickless presents a new account of Berkeley's controversial argument, and suggests it is the philosopher's greatest legacy: not only is it valid, but it may well be sound.
- Accuracy of medicare expenditures in the medical expenditure panel survey.Samuel H. Zuvekas &Gary L. Olin -2009 -Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing 46 (1):92-108.
- History in the Abstract: ‘Brahman-ness’ and the Discipline of Nyāya in Seventeenth-Century Vārāṇasī.Samuel Wright -2016 -Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (5):1041-1069.Over the last fifteen years, studies on Sanskrit intellectual history between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries have produced a body of scholarship that has fundamentally reshaped our understanding of the period. Yet, despite significant advances in the understanding of the social-historical circumstances of authors and disciplines as well as success in elucidating major features of intellectual thought, a main point of difficultly has been in combining both the intellectuality and sociality of Sanskrit scholars. By examining a debate within the discipline (...) of nyāya during the seventeenth century about how one cognizes the universal property ‘Brahman-ness ’ and by connecting it with a social debate that is found in available historical documents of the period, this essay attempts to combine the sociality of the Brahman scholarly community in Vārāṇasī with their intellectuality and offer a larger analysis of nyāya intellectual history for this period. The essay concludes by considering the ways in which the social world impinged upon nyāya argumentation and nyāya argumentation upon the social world. (shrink)
- A Guide to Comparing Health Care Expenditures in the 1996 MEPS to the 1987 NMES.Samuel H. Zuvekas &Joel W. Cohen -2002 -Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing 39 (1):76-86.
- The Moral Permissibility of Using RU‐486 as an Abortifacient of the Preimplanted Zygote.Samuel Zinaichjr -2002 -Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2):211-220.
- Mekka in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century.Samuel M. Zwemer,C. Snouck Hurgronje &J. H. Monahan -1932 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 52 (4):383.No categories
- The Ethics and Law of Omissions.Dana Kay Nelkin &Samuel Charles Rickless (eds.) -2017 - Oup Usa.This volume explores the principles that govern moral responsibility and legal liability for omissions. Contributors defend different views about the ground of moral responsibility, the conditions of legal liability for an omission to rescue, and the basis for accepting a " for omissions in the criminal law.No categories
- Handbook of proof theory.Samuel R. Buss (ed.) -1998 - New York: Elsevier.This volume contains articles covering a broad spectrum of proof theory, with an emphasis on its mathematical aspects. The articles should not only be interesting to specialists of proof theory, but should also be accessible to a diverse audience, including logicians, mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Many of the central topics of proof theory have been included in a self-contained expository of articles, covered in great detail and depth. The chapters are arranged so that the two introductory articles come first; (...) these are then followed by articles from core classical areas of proof theory; the handbook concludes with articles that deal with topics closely related to computer science. (shrink)
- The hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.Samuel I. Mintz -1962 - Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press.Mintz examines seventeenth-century reactions to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.
- Explicit Legg-Hutter intelligence calculations which suggest non-Archimedean intelligence.Samuel Allen Alexander &Arthur Paul Pedersen -forthcoming -Lecture Notes in Computer Science.Are the real numbers rich enough to measure intelligence? We generalize a result of Alexander and Hutter about the so-called Legg-Hutter intelligence measures of reinforcement learning agents. Using the generalized result, we exhibit a paradox: in one particular version of the Legg-Hutter intelligence measure, certain agents all have intelligence 0, even though in a certain sense some of them outperform others. We show that this paradox disappears if we vary the Legg-Hutter intelligence measure to be hyperreal-valued rather than real-valued.
- Another Kind of Spinozistic Monism.Samuel Newlands -2010 -Noûs 44 (3):469-502.I argue that Spinoza endorses "conceptual dependence monism," the thesis that all forms of metaphysical dependence (such as causation, inherence, and existential dependence) are conceptual in kind. In the course of explaining the view, I further argue that it is actually presupposed in the proof for his more famed substance monism. Conceptual dependence monism also illuminates several of Spinoza’s most striking metaphysical views, including the intensionality of causal contexts, parallelism, metaphysical perfection, and explanatory rationalism. I also argue that this priority (...) of the conceptual does not commit Spinoza to forms of idealism or mentalism. The question of how to understand different kinds of metaphysical dependence is quite controversial in Spinoza studies; I address major alternative readings in the notes. But there I also try to draw connections to the growing debate in contemporary discussions about metaphysical dependence, as this topic is a happy point of shared interest between Spinoza and contemporary metaphysicians alike. (shrink)
- Polynomial size proofs of the propositional pigeonhole principle.Samuel R. Buss -1987 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4):916-927.Cook and Reckhow defined a propositional formulation of the pigeonhole principle. This paper shows that there are Frege proofs of this propositional pigeonhole principle of polynomial size. This together with a result of Haken gives another proof of Urquhart's theorem that Frege systems have an exponential speedup over resolution. We also discuss connections to provability in theories of bounded arithmetic.
- Leaving the past alone.Samuel Gorovitz -1964 -Philosophical Review 73 (3):360-371.
- AGI and the Knight-Darwin Law: why idealized AGI reproduction requires collaboration.Samuel Alexander -2020 -Agi.Can an AGI create a more intelligent AGI? Under idealized assumptions, for a certain theoretical type of intelligence, our answer is: “Not without outside help”. This is a paper on the mathematical structure of AGI populations when parent AGIs create child AGIs. We argue that such populations satisfy a certain biological law. Motivated by observations of sexual reproduction in seemingly-asexual species, the Knight-Darwin Law states that it is impossible for one organism to asexually produce another, which asexually produces another, and (...) so on forever: that any sequence of organisms (each one a child of the previous) must contain occasional multi-parent organisms, or must terminate. By proving that a certain measure (arguably an intelligence measure) decreases when an idealized parent AGI single-handedly creates a child AGI, we argue that a similar Law holds for AGIs. (shrink)
- Objects and the Museum.Samuel J. M. M. Alberti -2005 -Isis 96 (4):559-571.This survey outlines a history of museums written through biographies of objects in their collections. First, the mechanics of the movement of things and the accompanying shifts in status are considered, from manufacture or growth through collecting and exchange to the museum. Objects gathered meanings through associations with people they encountered on their way to the collection, thus linking the history of museums to broader scientific and civic cultures. Next, the essay addresses the use of items once they joined a (...) collection, whether classificatory, analytical, or in display. By thus embedding the study of scientific practice in material culture, this approach contributes to constructivist histories of science. The final section addresses the role of objects in the experience of the visitors, emphasizing how fruitful the history of museum objects can be in the study of the public engagement with science. (shrink)
- Intelligence via ultrafilters: structural properties of some intelligence comparators of deterministic Legg-Hutter agents.Samuel Alexander -2019 -Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 10 (1):24-45.Legg and Hutter, as well as subsequent authors, considered intelligent agents through the lens of interaction with reward-giving environments, attempting to assign numeric intelligence measures to such agents, with the guiding principle that a more intelligent agent should gain higher rewards from environments in some aggregate sense. In this paper, we consider a related question: rather than measure numeric intelligence of one Legg- Hutter agent, how can we compare the relative intelligence of two Legg-Hutter agents? We propose an elegant answer (...) based on the following insight: we can view Legg-Hutter agents as candidates in an election, whose voters are environments, letting each environment vote (via its rewards) which agent (if either) is more intelligent. This leads to an abstract family of comparators simple enough that we can prove some structural theorems about them. It is an open question whether these structural theorems apply to more practical intelligence measures. (shrink)
- Measuring the intelligence of an idealized mechanical knowing agent.Samuel Alexander -2020 -Lecture Notes in Computer Science 12226.We define a notion of the intelligence level of an idealized mechanical knowing agent. This is motivated by efforts within artificial intelligence research to define real-number intelligence levels of compli- cated intelligent systems. Our agents are more idealized, which allows us to define a much simpler measure of intelligence level for them. In short, we define the intelligence level of a mechanical knowing agent to be the supremum of the computable ordinals that have codes the agent knows to be codes (...) of computable ordinals. We prove that if one agent knows certain things about another agent, then the former necessarily has a higher intelligence level than the latter. This allows our intelligence no- tion to serve as a stepping stone to obtain results which, by themselves, are not stated in terms of our intelligence notion (results of potential in- terest even to readers totally skeptical that our notion correctly captures intelligence). As an application, we argue that these results comprise evidence against the possibility of intelligence explosion (that is, the no- tion that sufficiently intelligent machines will eventually be capable of designing even more intelligent machines, which can then design even more intelligent machines, and so on). (shrink)
- (1 other version)Withdrawal of Nonfutile Life Support After Attempted Suicide.Samuel M. Brown,C. Gregory Elliott &Robert Paine -2013 -American Journal of Bioethics: 13 (3):3 - 12.End-of-life decision making is fraught with ethical challenges. Withholding or withdrawing life support therapy is widely considered ethical in patients with high treatment burden, poor premorbid status, or significant projected disability even when such treatment is not ?futile.? Whether such withdrawal of therapy in the aftermath of attempted suicide is ethical is not well established in the literature. We provide a clinical vignette and propose criteria under which such withdrawal would be ethical. We suggest that it is appropriate to withdraw (...) life support, regardless of the cause of the critical illness or disability, when the following criteria are met: (1) Surrogates request withdrawal of care and the adequacy of surrogates is confirmed, (2) an external reasonability standard is met, (3) passage of time, perhaps 72 hours, to allow certainty regarding the patient's wishes, and (4) psychiatric morbidity should be considered as grounds for withdrawal only in truly treatment-refractory cases. Fundamentally, we believe the question to ask is, ?If this were not an attempted suicide, would a request to withdraw care be reasonable?? We believe that under these circumstances, such withdrawal of life support, even in an individual who has attempted suicide, does not constitute physician assistance with suicide and is distinct from physician aid-in-dying in several important respects. (shrink)
- Personal Motivations and Systemic Incentives: Scientists on Questionable Research Practices.Samuel V. Bruton,Mary Medlin,Mitch Brown &Donald F. Sacco -2020 -Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (3):1531-1547.As concern over the use of questionable research practices in academic science has increased over the last couple of decades, some reforms have been implemented and many others have been debated and recommended. While many of these proposals have merit, efforts to improve scientific practices are more likely to succeed when they are responsive to the prevailing views and concerns of scientists themselves. To date, there have been few efforts to solicit wide-ranging input from researchers on the topic of needed (...) reforms. This article is a qualitative report of responses from federally funded scientists to the question of what should be done to address the problem of QRPs in their disciplines. Overall, participants were concerned about how institutional and career-oriented incentives encourage the use of QRPs. Compared to previous recommendations, participants had surprisingly little confidence in the ability of ethics training to improve research integrity. (shrink)
- More Recent Idealist Readings of Spinoza.Samuel Newlands -2011 -Philosophy Compass 6 (2):109-119.In this two-part series, I explore some of the most important and influential interpretations of Spinoza as an idealist. In this second part, I turn to more recent idealistic interpretations of Spinoza, including the important British idealist school (including Pollock, Martineau, Joachim, and John Caird) at the turn of the 20th century to a very recent and important kind of idealist reading found in the work of Michael Della Rocca.
- Reward-Punishment Symmetric Universal Intelligence.Samuel Allen Alexander &Marcus Hutter -2021 - In Samuel Allen Alexander & Marcus Hutter,AGI.Can an agent's intelligence level be negative? We extend the Legg-Hutter agent-environment framework to include punishments and argue for an affirmative answer to that question. We show that if the background encodings and Universal Turing Machine (UTM) admit certain Kolmogorov complexity symmetries, then the resulting Legg-Hutter intelligence measure is symmetric about the origin. In particular, this implies reward-ignoring agents have Legg-Hutter intelligence 0 according to such UTMs.
- Measuring Intelligence and Growth Rate: Variations on Hibbard's Intelligence Measure.Samuel Alexander &Bill Hibbard -2021 -Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 12 (1):1-25.In 2011, Hibbard suggested an intelligence measure for agents who compete in an adversarial sequence prediction game. We argue that Hibbard’s idea should actually be considered as two separate ideas: first, that the intelligence of such agents can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the competitors that they defeat; and second, one specific (somewhat arbitrary) method for measuring said growth rates. Whereas Hibbard’s intelligence measure is based on the latter growth-rate-measuring method, we survey other methods (...) for measuring function growth rates, and exhibit the resulting Hibbard-like intelligence measures and taxonomies. Of particular interest, we obtain intelligence taxonomies based on Big-O and Big-Theta notation systems, which taxonomies are novel in that they challenge conventional notions of what an intelligence measure should look like. We discuss how intelligence measurement of sequence predictors can indirectly serve as intelligence measurement for agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs). (shrink)
- A type of simulation which some experimental evidence suggests we don't live in.Samuel Alexander -2018 -The Reasoner 12 (7):56-56.Do we live in a computer simulation? I will present an argument that the results of a certain experiment constitute empirical evidence that we do not live in, at least, one type of simulation. The type of simulation ruled out is very specific. Perhaps that is the price one must pay to make any kind of Popperian progress.
- Social preferences, homo economicus, and zoon politikon.Samuel Bowles &Herbert Gintis -2006 - In Robert E. Goodin & Charles Tilly,The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis. Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 172--86.
- The commentaries.Samuel Gorovitz,Michael Loughlin &Tim Dare -1994 -Health Care Analysis 2 (3):190-199.
- Voluntary Simplicity and the Social Reconstruction of Law: Degrowth from the Grassroots Up.Samuel Alexander -2013 -Environmental Values 22 (2):287-308.The Voluntary Simplicity Movement can be understood broadly as a diverse social movement made up of people who are resisting high consumption lifestyles and who are seeking, in various ways, a lower consumption but higher quality of life alternative. The central argument of this paper is that the Voluntary Simplicity Movement or something like it will almost certainly need to expand, organise, radicalise and politicise, if anything resembling a degrowth society is to emerge in law through democratic processes. In a (...) sentence, that is the ‘grass-roots’ or ‘bottom up’ theory of legal and political transformation that will be expounded and defended in this paper. The essential reasoning here is that legal, political and economic structures will never reflect a post-growth ethics of macro-economic sufficiency until a post-consumerist ethics of micro-economic sufficiency is embraced and mainstreamed at the cultural level. (shrink)
- Intuitionistic validity in T-normal Kripke structures.Samuel R. Buss -1993 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59 (3):159-173.Let T be a first-order theory. A T-normal Kripke structure is one in which every world is a classical model of T. This paper gives a characterization of the intuitionistic theory T of sentences intuitionistically valid in all T-normal Kripke structures and proves the corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. For Peano arithmetic , the theory PA is a proper subtheory of Heyting arithmetic , so HA is complete but not sound for PA-normal Kripke structures.
- Baiting bioethics.Samuel Gorovitz -1986 -Ethics 96 (2):356-374.
- A Machine That Knows Its Own Code.Samuel A. Alexander -2014 -Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
- Justifications for common knowledge.Samuel Bucheli,Roman Kuznets &Thomas Studer -2011 -Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (1):35-60.Justification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge. We develop a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge. We define a Kripke-style semantics that is similar to Fitting's semantics for the Logic of Proofs LP. We show the soundness, completeness, and finite model property of our multi-agent justification logic with respect to this Kripke-style semantics. We demonstrate that our logic is a conservative extension of Yavorskaya's minimal bimodal (...) explicit evidence logic, which is a two-agent version of LP. We discuss the relationship of our logic to the multi-agent modal logic S4 with common knowledge. Finally, we give a brief analysis of the coordinated attack problem in the newly developed language of our logic. (shrink)
- Relating the bounded arithmetic and polynomial time hierarchies.Samuel R. Buss -1995 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 75 (1-2):67-77.The bounded arithmetic theory S2 is finitely axiomatized if and only if the polynomial hierarchy provably collapses. If T2i equals S2i + 1 then T2i is equal to S2 and proves that the polynomial time hierarchy collapses to ∑i + 3p, and, in fact, to the Boolean hierarchy over ∑i + 2p and to ∑i + 1p/poly.
- The Archimedean trap: Why traditional reinforcement learning will probably not yield AGI.Samuel Allen Alexander -2020 -Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 11 (1):70-85.After generalizing the Archimedean property of real numbers in such a way as to make it adaptable to non-numeric structures, we demonstrate that the real numbers cannot be used to accurately measure non-Archimedean structures. We argue that, since an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) should have no problem engaging in tasks that inherently involve non-Archimedean rewards, and since traditional reinforcement learning rewards are real numbers, therefore traditional reinforcement learning probably will not lead to AGI. We indicate two possible ways (...) traditional reinforcement learning could be altered to remove this roadblock. (shrink)
- Pseudo-visibility: A Game Mechanic Involving Willful Ignorance.Samuel Allen Alexander &Arthur Paul Pedersen -2022 -FLAIRS-35.We present a game mechanic called pseudo-visibility for games inhabited by non-player characters (NPCs) driven by reinforcement learning (RL). NPCs are incentivized to pretend they cannot see pseudo-visible players: the training environment simulates an NPC to determine how the NPC would act if the pseudo-visible player were invisible, and penalizes the NPC for acting differently. NPCs are thereby trained to selectively ignore pseudo-visible players, except when they judge that the reaction penalty is an acceptable tradeoff (e.g., a guard might accept (...) the penalty in order to protect a treasure because losing the treasure would hurt even more). We describe an RL agent transformation which allows RL agents that would not otherwise do so to perform some limited self-reflection to learn the training environments in question. (shrink)
- The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime.Samuel W. Buell -2018 -Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):471-491.In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening (...) of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability. (shrink)
- Self-referential theories.Samuel A. Alexander -2020 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (4):1687-1716.We study the structure of families of theories in the language of arithmetic extended to allow these families to refer to one another and to themselves. If a theory contains schemata expressing its own truth and expressing a specific Turing index for itself, and contains some other mild axioms, then that theory is untrue. We exhibit some families of true self-referential theories that barely avoid this forbidden pattern.
- Assessing complex problem-solving skills with multiple complex systems.Samuel Greiff,Andreas Fischer,Matthias Stadler &Sascha Wüstenberg -2015 -Thinking and Reasoning 21 (3):356-382.In this paper we propose the multiple complex systems approach for assessing domain-general complex problem-solving skills and its processes knowledge acquisition and knowledge application. After defining the construct and the formal frameworks for describing complex problems, we emphasise some of the measurement issues inherent in assessing CPS skills with single tasks. With examples of the MicroDYN test and the MicroFIN test, we show how to adequately score problem-solving skills by using multiple tasks. We discuss implications for problem-solving research and the (...) assessment of CPS skills in general. (shrink)
- The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.Samuel I. Mintz -1964 -Science and Society 28 (2):240-242.
- Philosophical and literary pieces.Samuel Alexander -1939 - Westport, Conn.,: Greenwood Press. Edited by John Laird.
- An axiomatic version of Fitch’s paradox.Samuel Alexander -2013 -Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the (...) paradox. (shrink)
- Propositional consistency proofs.Samuel R. Buss -1991 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 52 (1-2):3-29.Partial consistency statements can be expressed as polynomial-size propositional formulas. Frege proof systems have polynomial-size partial self-consistency proofs. Frege proof systems have polynomial-size proofs of partial consistency of extended Frege proof systems if and only if Frege proof systems polynomially simulate extended Frege proof systems. We give a new proof of Reckhow's theorem that any two Frege proof systems p-simulate each other. The proofs depend on polynomial size propositional formulas defining the truth of propositional formulas. These are already known to (...) exist since the Boolean formula value problem is in alternating logarithmic time; this paper presents a proof of this fact based on a construction which is somewhat simpler than the prior proofs of Buss and of Buss-Cook- Gupta-Ramachandran. (shrink)
- Short-circuiting the definition of mathematical knowledge for an Artificial General Intelligence.Samuel Alexander -2020 -Cifma.We propose that, for the purpose of studying theoretical properties of the knowledge of an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (that is, the knowledge of an AGI), a pragmatic way to define such an agent’s knowledge (restricted to the language of Epistemic Arithmetic, or EA) is as follows. We declare an AGI to know an EA-statement φ if and only if that AGI would include φ in the resulting enumeration if that AGI were commanded: “Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you (...) know.” This definition is non-circular because an AGI, being capable of practical English communication, is capable of understanding the everyday English word “know” independently of how any philosopher formally defines knowledge; we elaborate further on the non-circularity of this circular-looking definition. This elegantly solves the problem that different AGIs may have different internal knowledge definitions and yet we want to study knowledge of AGIs in general, without having to study different AGIs separately just because they have separate internal knowledge definitions. Finally, we suggest how this definition of AGI knowledge can be used as a bridge which could allow the AGI research community to import certain abstract results about mechanical knowing agents from mathematical logic. (shrink)
- Life and Habit.Samuel Butler -1878No categories
- Claude Lefort, Political Anthropology, and Symbolic Division.Samuel Moyn -2012 -Constellations 19 (1):37-50.
- On the computational content of intuitionistic propositional proofs.Samuel R. Buss &Pavel Pudlák -2001 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 109 (1-2):49-64.The paper proves refined feasibility properties for the disjunction property of intuitionistic propositional logic. We prove that it is possible to eliminate all cuts from an intuitionistic proof, propositional or first-order, without increasing the Horn closure of the proof. We obtain a polynomial time, interactive, realizability algorithm for propositional intuitionistic proofs. The feasibility of the disjunction property is proved for sequents containing Harrop formulas. Under hardness assumptions for NP and for factoring, it is shown that the intuitionistic propositional calculus does (...) not always have polynomial size proofs and that the classical propositional calculus provides a superpolynomial speedup over the intuitionistic propositional calculus. The disjunction property for intuitionistic propositional logic is proved to be P-hard by a reduction to the circuit value problem. (shrink)
- The sublime.Samuel Holt Monk -1960 - [Ann Arbor]: University of Michigan Press.
- Philo of Alexandria: an introduction.Samuel Sandmel -1979 - New York: Oxford University Press.Samuel Sandmel's book: Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction, is a basic introductory, supplementing his own teacher' Goodenough: 'An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, ' and foundation to more recent works on Philo.
- Beyond the Wasteland: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline.Samuel Bowles,David Gordon &Thomas Weisskopf -1984 -Science and Society 48 (2):224-229.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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