Works by Sam Wilkinson
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| Sam Wilkinson [39] | Sam Luis John Wilkinson [1] | Samuel T. Wilkinson [1] | Samantha Wilkinson [1] |
- Getting Warmer: Predictive Processing and the Nature of Emotion.Sam Wilkinson,George Deane,Kathryn Nave &Andy Clark -2019 - In Laura Candiotto,The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 101-119.Predictive processing accounts of neural function view the brain as a kind of prediction machine that forms models of its environment in order to anticipate the upcoming stream of sensory stimulation. These models are then continuously updated in light of incoming error signals. Predictive processing has offered a powerful new perspective on cognition, action, and perception. In this chapter we apply the insights from predictive processing to the study of emotions. The upshot is a picture of emotion as inseparable from (...) perception and cognition, and a key feature of the embodied mind. (shrink)No categories
- Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation.George Deane,Mark Miller &Sam Wilkinson -2020 -Frontiers in Psychology 11.
- Accounting for the phenomenology and varieties of auditory verbal hallucination within a predictive processing framework.Sam Wilkinson -2014 -Consciousness and Cognition 30:142-155.Two challenges that face popular self-monitoring theories (SMTs) of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) are that they cannot account for the auditory phenomenology of AVHs and that they cannot account for their variety. In this paper I show that both challenges can be met by adopting a predictive processing framework (PPF), and by viewing AVHs as arising from abnormalities in predictive processing. I show how, within the PPF, both the auditory phenomenology of AVHs, and three subtypes of AVH, can be accounted (...) for. (shrink)
- The Representation of Agents in Auditory Verbal Hallucinations.Sam Wilkinson &Vaughan Bell -2016 -Mind and Language 31 (1):104-126.Current models of auditory verbal hallucinations tend to focus on the mechanisms underlying their occurrence, but often fail to address the content of the auditory experience. In other words, they tend to ask why there are AVHs at all, instead of asking why, given that there are AVHs, they have the properties that they have. One such property, which has been largely overlooked and which we will focus on here, is why the voices are often experienced as coming from agents, (...) and often specific, individualised agents. In this article, we argue not only that the representation of agents is important in accurately describing many cases of AVH, but also that deeper reflection on what is involved in the representation of agents has potentially vital consequences for our aetiological understanding of AVH, namely, for understanding how and why AVHs come about. (shrink)
- Status and constitution in psychiatric classification.Tom Roberts &Sam Wilkinson -2025 -Synthese 205 (2):1-20.Debates surrounding the nature of mental disorder have tended to divide into an objectivist camp that takes psychiatric classification to be a value-free scientific matter, and a normativist camp that takes it to be irreducibly values-based. Here we present an overlooked distinction between _status_ and _constitution_. Questions of the form “What is x?” are ambiguous between status questions (“What gives something the status of an x?”), and constitution questions (“Given that something has the status of an x, what is it (...) made of?”). We elucidate this distinction in detail, and argue that normativism is uniquely well-placed to answer status questions while objectivism provides answers, where they are available, to constitution questions. (shrink)No categories
- The varieties of inner speech questionnaire – Revised (VISQ-R): Replicating and refining links between inner speech and psychopathology.Ben Alderson-Day,Kaja Mitrenga,Sam Wilkinson,Simon McCarthy-Jones &Charles Fernyhough -2018 -Consciousness and Cognition 65 (C):48-58.
- Expressivism about delusion attribution.Sam Wilkinson -2020 -European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):59-77.In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to expressivism in meta-ethics. Just as meta-ethical expressivism accounts for certain key features of moral discourse, so does this expressivism account for certain key features of delusion attribution. And just as meta-ethical expressivism undermines factualism about moral properties, so does this expressivism, if correct, show that certain attempts to (...) objectively define delusion are misguided. I proceed as follows. I start by examining different attempts at defining delusion, separating broadly psychiatric attempts from epistemic ones. I then present a change of approach, according to which we question whether the term “delusion” is in the business of (merely) describing reality. I then support this proposal, first, by borrowing standard lines of argument from meta-ethics (including ontological reluctance, intrinsic motivation, and deep disagreement) but also, by inference to the best explanation of some the features we see when we try to theorise about delusion (namely that it is hard to define, and that our delusion attributions are elicited by a plurality of norms). (shrink)
- Delusions, dreams, and the nature of identification.Sam Wilkinson -2015 -Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):203-226.Delusional misidentification is commonly understood as the product of an inference on the basis of evidence present in the subject's experience. For example, in the Capgras delusion, the patient sees someone who looks like a loved one, but who feels unfamiliar, so they infer that they must not be the loved one. I question this by presenting a distinction between “recognition” and “identification.” Identification does not always require recognition for its epistemic justification, nor does it need recognition for its psychological (...) functioning. Judgments of identification are often the product of a non-inferential mechanism. Delusional misidentification arises as the product of this mechanism malfunctioning. (shrink)
- The Agentive Role of Inner Speech in Self-Knowledge.Sam Wilkinson -2020 -Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2):7-26.Although interpretivists are right to give inner speech a central role in generating self-knowledge, they mischaracterize the precise nature of this role. Inner speech is fundamentally an action, a form of speech, and provides us with self-knowledge not by being something that we perceive (or “quasi-perceive”) and interpret, but by being something that we knowingly do. Once this is appreciated, interpretivism is undermined.
- Predictive Processing and the Varieties of Psychological Trauma.Sam Wilkinson,Guy Dodgson &Kevin Meares -2017 -Frontiers in Psychology 8.
- How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe &Sam Wilkinson -2016 -Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.
- Inner speech is not so simple: a commentary on Cho & Wu.Peter Moseley &Sam Wilkinson -unknownWe welcome Cho and Wu’s suggestion that the study of auditory verbal hallucinations could be improved by contrasting and testing more explanatory models. However, we have some worries both about their criticisms of inner speech-based self-monitoring models and whether their proposed spontaneous activation model is explanatory.
- Distinguishing volumetric content from perceptual presence within a predictive processing framework.Sam Wilkinson -2020 -Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):791-800.I argue for an overlooked distinction between perceptual presence and volumetric content, and flesh it out in terms of predictive processing. Within the predictive processing framework we can distinguish between agent-active and object-active expectations. The former expectations account for perceptual presence, while the latter account for volumetric content. I then support this position with reference to how experiences of presence are created by virtual reality technologies, and end by reflecting on what this means for the relationship between sensorimotor enactivism and (...) predictive processing. (shrink)
- A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson -2016 -Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):389-404.I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and (...) potentially more plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect on how this mental files approach can be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox aetiology, or as suggesting an altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a concern surrounding the explanatory power of mental files. (shrink)
- Derationalizing Delusions.Vaughan Bell,Nichola Raihani &Sam Wilkinson -2021 -Clinical Psychological Science : A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science 9 (1):24-37.
- The speaker behind the voice: therapeutic practice from the perspective of pragmatic theory.Felicity Deamer &Sam Wilkinson -2015 -Frontiers in Psychology 6.
- Levels and kinds of explanation: lessons from neuropsychiatry.Sam Wilkinson -2014 -Frontiers in Psychology 5.
- Introspection, isolation, and construction: Mentality as activity. Commentary on Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey, “Toward a phenomenology of inner speaking”.Joel Krueger,Marco Bernini &Sam Wilkinson -2014 -Consciousness and Cognition 25:9-10.
- Generative processing and emotional false memories: a generation “cost” for negative false memory formation but only after delay.Lauren Knott,Samantha Wilkinson,Maria Hellenthal,Datin Shah &Mark L. Howe -2022 -Cognition and Emotion 36 (7):1448-1457.Previous research shows that manipulations (e.g. levels-of-processing) that facilitate true memory often increase susceptibility to false memory. An exception is the generation effect. Using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, Soraci et al. found that generating rather than reading list items led to an increase in true but not false memories. They argued that generation led to enhanced item-distinctiveness that drove down false memory production. In the current study, we investigated the effects of generative processing on valenced stimuli and after a delayed (...) retention interval to examine factors that may lead to a generation effect that increases false memories. At the immediate test, false recognition rates for both negative and neutral valanced critical lures were similar across read and generate conditions. However, after a one-week delay, we saw a valence differentiation, with a generation effect for false recognition but only for negative stimuli. The roles of item-specific and relational processing during encoding and their interaction with long-term retention are discussed. (shrink)
- Metaphorical Thinking and Delusions in Psychosis.Felicity Deamer &Sam Wilkinson -2021 - In Maxime Amblard, Michel Musiol & Manuel Rebuschi,(In)Coherence of Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. pp. 119-130.This paper explores how metaphorical thinking might contribute to an aetiology of florid delusions in psychosis. We argue that this approach helps to account for the path from experience to the delusional assertion, which, though relatively straightforward for monothematic delusions like the Capgras delusion, has always been difficult to account for in florid delusions in psychosis. Our account also helps to account for double book-keeping and the relative agential inertia of the belief.
- Beyond believing badly.Sam Wilkinson -2013 -Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):105-119.
- What Can Predictive Processing Tell Us about the Content of Perceptual Experience?Sam Wilkinson -2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson,Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-190.
- Voices and Thoughts in Psychosis: An Introduction.Sam Wilkinson &Ben Alderson-Day -2016 -Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):529-540.In this introduction we present the orthodox account of auditory verbal hallucinations, a number of worries for this account, and some potential responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, in particular the question of how different it is supposed to be from AVHs. We then mention two ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices and thoughts in psychosis, and then present the motivation (...) and composition of this special issue. (shrink)
- Forward models and passive psychotic symptoms.Sam Wilkinson -2015 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
- The phenomenology of voice-hearing and two concepts of voice.Sam Wilkinson &Joel Krueger -2022 - In Angela Woods, B. Alderson-Day & C. Fernyhough,Voices in Psychosis: Interdisciplinary Perspective. pp. 127-133.The experiences described in the VIP transcripts are incredibly varied and yet frequently explicitly labelled by participants as "voices." How can we make sense of this? If we reflect carefully on uses of the word "voice", we see that it can express at least two entirely different concepts, which pick out categorically different phenomena. One concept picks out a speech sound (e.g. "This synthesizer has a "voice" setting"). Another concept picks out a specific agent (e.g. "I hear two voices: one (...) is a ten year-old boy…"). This chapter explores how these two concepts are related to one another in the context of voice-hearing. (shrink)
- Hearing Soundless Voices.Sam Wilkinson -2019 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (3):27-34.The phenomenon of 'hearing voices,' often viewed as a symptom of schizophrenia, is commonly called, in the scientific and clinical literature, 'auditory-verbal hallucination.' However, reports of hearing soundless voices, voices that are not auditory, which go as far back as Tuttle and Kraepelin and appear in phenomenological interviews and questionnaires are relatively common. What are we to make of such reports?One option is to dismiss these claims: one cannot hear soundless voices. This dismissal could be due to a combination of (...) the following seemingly reasonable claims, each sufficient to consign the notion of 'hearing soundless voices' to the status... (shrink)
- (1 other version)Toward a Fictionalist Psychiatry?Sam Wilkinson -2024 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 31 (3):337-340.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toward a Fictionalist Psychiatry?Sam Wilkinson, PhD (bio)I am deeply sympathetic to what Giulio Ongaro (2024a, 2024b, 2024c) writes in these three excellent interlocking papers. I will argue that there is a slightly more efficient way of approaching these issues. It involves adopting fictionalism rather than externalism (although fictionalism can accommodate externalist insights). Fictionalism is something that Ongaro briefly, and approvingly, mentions, in the final paper, but there is an (...) implicit realism in the initial approach. I am not sure there is much disagreement, however, and perhaps we end up in the same place, having approached from different starting points. The fictionalist approach is largely compatible with all of the substantive things Ongaro wants to say, but is, strictly speaking, in tension with the most natural interpretation of externalism, namely, construed as a form of descriptivism and realism (two notions I unpack later).Externalism, Evaluativism, and Social IntegrationA major theme of the first paper is that mainstream internalist Western psychiatry is bad at integrating the social dimension of mental illness. I agree. Furthermore, recent externalistic (enactive and predictive processing) approaches, while better, are still lacking in that they collapse the “social” into the “psychosocial.” Again, I agree. But my diagnosis (excuse the pun) is slightly different. The social dimension of illness concerns in large part the evaluative nature of illness, not the need to descriptively, causally capture a complex, objectively real phenomenon called “illness.”Having said this, in integrating this evaluative social dimension, we need to tread carefully lest we fail to meet the “demarcation challenge” (Murphy, 2008). This concerns the challenge of demarcating different kinds of problem. Humans have always had problems, for which they have needed help, accommodation, allowances made, and so on, but how do you distinguish mental health problems, from other kinds of problems? How do you distinguish money woes, or marital strife, both of which certainly cause unhappiness, or even psychological states that look like psychiatric symptoms (e.g., anxiety, low mood), from properly mental health problems?The biomedical “internalist” says: Easy! Either there is something objectively wrong with you, or there is not. However, notice that this is exactly [End Page 337] what externalists can say too, to the extent that they are trying to describe and define disorder in value-free terms. The only difference is that the internalist will talk about what is wrong within the biological boundaries of the organism, whereas the externalist will go beyond that.Externalism about a particular phenomenon, if it is to be a non-trivial position, needs to be sensitive to the distinction between cause and constitution (or what Adams & Azaiwa [2001] call “coupling-constitution confusion”). We see this in externalism about the mind in general. In the Extended Mind Hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998), the claim is not that Otto’s notebook causally contributes to Otto’s mind (his belief about where MOMA is). Nobody would deny that. The interesting claim is that the notebook is constitutive of his belief: it is literally part of his mind. Similarly, nobody is denying that external (e.g., social) factors cause mental health problems, the question is: Do they constitute those problems? Externalism takes this question seriously and answers in the affirmative, at least in some cases. But the articulation of this has to be nuanced.Suppose I have crippling anxiety over financial concerns. Anxiety can be a mental health problem, but if, in this case, you transferring money into my bank account makes my anxiety disappear, then one might think this is not a mental health problem. It is a money problem. Or is it? Enter fictionalism (Wilkinson, 2022).Fictionalism is the view that calling someone mentally ill is not describing them as having a particular property, but involves something like engaging in a fiction, a fiction that has been constructed in order to encourage certain courses of action. According to fictionalism, given the facts, there is a lot of wiggle room about how we are to think of, and respond to, people’s problems.To borrow some insights from meta-ethics, when we examine normative discourse (one canonical domain being ethics) we can ask: what does the discourse do? And what... (shrink)
- The status of delusion in the Light of Marcu's "Revisionary proposals".Sam Wilkinson -2013 -Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (3):421-436.La concepción de Marcus sobre las creencias se aplica al debate centrado en la cuestión: "¿Son creencias los delirios?" Dos consecuencias que se siguen de ello son: i) que la cuestión "¿Son creencias los delirios?" necesita reformularse, y ii) que la respuesta es: "No, algunos pacientes que sufren delirios no creen lo que, "prima facie", parecen creer".
- Counterfactual cognition and psychosis: adding complexity to predictive processing accounts.Sofiia Rappe &Sam Wilkinson -2023 -Philosophical Psychology 36 (2):356-379.Over the last decade or so, several researchers have considered the predictive processing framework (PPF) to be a useful perspective from which to shed some much-needed light on the mechanisms behind psychosis. Most approaches to psychosis within PPF come down to the idea of the “atypical” brain generating inaccurate hypotheses that the “typical” brain does not generate, either due to a systematic top-down processing bias or more general precision weighting breakdown. Strong at explaining common individual symptoms of psychosis, such approaches (...) face some issues when we look at a more general clinical picture. In this paper, we propose an update on the current accounts of psychosis based on the realization that a neurotypical brain constantly generates non-actual, de-coupled, counterfactual hypotheses as part of healthy cognition. We suggest that what is going on in psychosis, at least in some cases, is not so much a generation of erroneous hypotheses, but rather an inability to correctly use the counterfactual ones. This updated view casts “accurate” cognition as more fragile and delicate, but also closes the gap between psychosis and typical cognition. (shrink)
- Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility.Sam Wilkinson -2022 -Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):91-109.I explore the relationship between psychiatric fictionalism and the attribution of moral responsibility. My central claim is as follows. If one is a psychiatric fictionalist, one should also strongly consider being a fictionalist about responsibility. This results in the ‘intrinsic view’, namely, the view that mental illness does not just happen to interfere with moral responsibility: that interference is an intrinsic part of the narrative. I end by discussing three illustrative examples.No categories
- A commentary on: Affective coding: the emotional dimension of agency.David Smailes,Peter Moseley &Sam Wilkinson -2015 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
- Are there auditory objects in the auditory domain, like visual objects in the visual domain?Sam Wilkinson -2010 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):9-11.: One can understand the word “object” as a concrete physical object or as that which is on the receiving end of a subject-object relation, namely, that entity which a particular cognitive state or process is “of.” These latter objects are determined by the way our sensory systems exploit the ways elements of the world impinge upon our bodily surfaces. Our visual system exploits light reflected off the surfaces of objects; therefore, the objects of our visual experiences can be physical (...) objects just sitting still. Our auditory system, on the other hand, exploits sound waves caused by impacts of one sort or another, and these are events. You don’t, strictly speaking, hear a billiard ball or a car: You hear a billiard ball hit another one, or a car drive past. (shrink)
- Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts.Sam Wilkinson -2011 -Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):717 - 721.
- Correction to: Distinguishing volumetric content from perceptual presence within a predictive processing framework.Sam Wilkinson -2020 -Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):801-801.The original version of this article unfortunately has missing statement in the Acknowledgments section.
- Egocentric and Encyclopedic Doxastic States in Delusions of Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson -2013 -Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):219-234.A recent debate in the literature on delusions centers on the question of whether delusions are beliefs or not. In this paper, an overlooked distinction between egocentric and encyclopedic doxastic states is introduced and brought to bear on this debate, in particular with regard to delusions of misidentification. The result is that a more accurate characterization of the delusional subject’s doxastic point of view is made available. The patient has a genuine egocentric belief (“This man is not my father”), but (...) fails to have the commonly attributed encyclopedic belief (“My father has been replaced by an impostor”). (shrink)
- If we accept that Mary the colour scientist gains new knowledge when she sees the colour red for the first time must this lead us to a non-physicalist theory of consciousness?Sam Wilkinson -2010 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):12-15.A common and popular option in defending Physicalism against the Knowledge Argument is the “phenomenal concept strategy” . PCS claims that, although ex hypothesi Mary knows all the propositions pertaining to color and experiences of color, there is at least space for the claim that she acquires a new concept, and thereby accesses these propositions under different, phenomenal modes of presentation. In short, Mary acquires new concepts upon her release and that explains her “discovery.” Here I will show there is (...) a way of saving Physicalism that does not appeal to PCS in the standard sense but entails that Mary acquires the ability to think a new kind of singular thought. In acquiring this, she gains a kind of indexical, egocentric knowledge. (shrink)
- Purpose: what evolution and human nature imply about the meaning of our existence.Samuel T. Wilkinson -2023 - New York, NY: Pegasus Books.By using principles from a variety of scientific disciplines, Yale Professor Samuel Wilkinson provides a framework for human evolution that reveals an overarching purpose to our existence. Generations have been taught that evolution implies there is no overarching purpose to our existence, that life has no fundamental meaning. We are merely the accumulation of tens of thousands of intricate molecular accidents. Some scientists take this logic one step further, suggesting that evolution is intrinsically atheistic and goes against the concept of (...) God. But is this true? With respect to our evolution, nature seems to have endowed us with competing dispositions, what Wilkinson calls the dual potential of human nature. We are pulled in different directions: selfishness and altruism, aggression and cooperation, lust and love. When we couple this with the observation that we possess a measure of free will, all this strongly implies there is a universal purpose to our existence. This purpose, at least one of them, is to choose between the good and evil impulses that nature has created within us. Our life is a test. This is a truth, as old as history it seems, that has been espoused by so many of the world's religions. From a certain framework, these aspects of human nature--including how evolution shaped us--are evidence for the existence of a God, not against it. Closely related to this is meaning. What is the meaning of life? Based on the scientific data, it would seem that one such meaning is to develop deep and abiding relationships. At least that is what most people report are the most meaningful aspects of their lives. This is a function of our evolution. It is how we were created"--Dust jacket flap. (shrink)
- The Predictive Mind By Jakob Hohwy.Sam Wilkinson -2015 -Analysis 75 (1):169-172.
- What gets passed in “Chunk-and-Pass” processing? A predictive processing solution to the Now-or-Never bottleneck.Sam Wilkinson -2016 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.No categories
- Mental patient—Psychiatric ethics from a patient's perspective By AbigailGosselin, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 2022. 308pp. $45.00 (Paperback), ISBN: 9780262544313. [REVIEW]Sam Wilkinson -2024 -Bioethics 38 (6):583-584.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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David Chalmers
James Chase
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