Results for 'Sakae Tange'
966 found
Order:
1 filter applied
- Independent and autonomous peasantry beside the great Carolingian domain.SakaeTange -2012 -Revue Belge de Philologie Et D’Histoire 90 (2).No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Kōsaka Masaaki chosaku shū.Masaaki Kōsaka -1964Export citation Bookmark
- Tang Yijie juan.Yijie Tang -1999 - Hefei Shi: Jing xiao xin hua shu dian.Export citation Bookmark
- Tang Wenzhi xing li xue lun zhu ji.Wenzhi Tang -2020 - Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she. Edited by Guoguang Deng.
- Quotation and the use-mention distinction.P. Saka -unknown - Oxford University Press.No categories
- How to Think about Meaning.Paul Saka -2007 - Dordrecht: Springer.According to truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. This book develops a more radical mentalist semantics by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Classical semantics analyzes an abstract sentence or utterance such as "Grass is green"; in attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as "Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green".
- Tang Yongtong xue ji.Yijie Tang &Jianyong Zhao (eds.) -2011 - Beijing Shi: Sheng huo, du shu, xin zhi san lian shu dian.汤用彤先生 , 字锡予, 湖北黄梅人. 中国近现代哲学家、教育家. 从1935年起, 到全国解放, 汤用彤先生一直主持北大哲学系, 因而哲学系的教学和研究方向, 与他的学术领导关系至深, 得以建立起本系自己的学术重点, 形成学术传统, 并且一直影响到今天. 作为一名导师, 在后学者心目中, 汤先生淳直、朴素、不为物累; 待人宽厚、处事公正, 蔼然仁者. 所选录的文章侧重对先生学行有深切认识的回忆与研究文字, 作者大多是其师友、门生及再传弟子.
- Ought Does Not Imply Can.Paul Saka -2000 -American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):93 - 105.Moral philosophers widely believe that it is a part of the MEANING of 'ought' statements that they imply 'can' statements. To this thesis I offer three challenges, and then I conclude on a broader methodological note. (1) Epistemological Modal Argument: for all we know, determinism is true; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore we don’t know that 'ought' implies 'can'. (2) Metaphysical Modal Argument: determinism is conceptually possible; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore “ought implies can” is not an analytic (...) truth. (3) Semantic Argument: “You ought to X” is equivalent to “Do X!”; but “Do X!” does not entail that you can X, according to leading analyses of the imperative. (4) My two modal arguments are epistemologically significant, for they illustrate a general method for refuting a whole class of argument. (shrink)
- v. 4.Sui Tang Wudai juan.Tang Lingyun zhu -2014 - In Lang Ye & Liangzhi Zhu,Zhongguo mei xue tong shi =. Nanjing Shi: Jiangsu ren min chu ban she.Export citation Bookmark
- Tang Yongtong juan.Yongtong Tang &Shangyang Sun -1996 - Shijiazhuang Shi: Hebei jiao yu chu ban she. Edited by Shangyang Sun.Han Wei liang Jin Nan Bei chao fo jiao shi -- Wei Jin xuan xue lun gao -- Ping jin ren zhi wen hua yan jiu -- Wen hua si xiang zhi chong tu yu tiao he.Export citation Bookmark
- Tang Yijie yu "Ru zang" =.Yijie Tang (ed.) -2017 - Beijing: Beijing da xue chu ban she.本书由上编：汤一介谈《儒藏》和下编汤一介与《儒藏》构成，具体收录了《我们为什么要编纂》《回忆汤先生与》《怀念汤一介先生坚持编好》《日本编纂委员会及其工作》《纪念汤一介先生》《汤一介先生与》《怀念汤先生 》等文章。.
- (1 other version)Tang Yongtong xuan ji =.Yongtong Tang -1995 - Changchun Shi: Jilin ren min chu ban she. Edited by Shangyang Sun.《汤用彤全集》收集了我们可以找到的已刊和未刊用彤先生的论著和读书札记、教学讲义及提纲、演讲提纲、信札以及学生的听课笔记，编为七卷。第一卷《汉魏两晋南北朝佛教史》；第二卷《隋唐佛教史稿》；第三卷《印度哲 学史略》；第四卷《魏晋玄学》；第五卷《往日阿稿·西方哲学》；第六卷《校点高僧传》；第七卷《饾饤札记》。在每卷之最后都附有一“编者后记”，对该卷的编辑情况做了一些说明，可供参考。第七卷末载《汤用彤年谱简 编》。.
- Tetsugaku no tankyū.Sakae Akaiwa &Sumio Takakuwa (eds.) -1948No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Recognizing Criminal Behavior (Filicide) of Persons Diagnosed with Mental Illness: An Analysis on the Intentionality and a Philosophical Disclosure on Ethics and Morality.Tang B. -2015 -Journal of Clinical Research and Bioethics 6 (5).
- Tetsugaku nyūmon.Masaaki Kōsaka -1952No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Minshu shisō to Nihon minzoku no shōrai.Sakae Masuda -1950Export citation Bookmark
- Nihon kokumin no sho.Sakae Masuda -1938 - Tōkyō: Ōurisabakijo Uedaya.Export citation Bookmark
- Nihon risō shugi.Sakae Masuda -1938 - Tōkyō: Shin Rekishiha Kenkyūkai.Export citation Bookmark
- Improvements in flock-based collaborative clustering algorithms.Esin Saka &Olfa Nasraoui -2009 - In L. Magnani,computational intelligence. pp. 639--672.No categories
- Shakai kagaku jūnikō.Sakae Sugiyama -1930 - Tōkyō: Shinchōsha.Export citation Bookmark
- Kyōiku katei no shinkenkyū.Sakae Yamada -1969Export citation Bookmark
- Tōya risōgaku.Sakae Yamada -1936Export citation Bookmark
- Stakeholder Transformation Process: The Journey of an Indigenous Community.Zhi Tang,Norma Juma,Eileen Kwesiga &Joy Olabisi -2019 -Journal of Business Ethics 159 (1):1-21.The vast majority of indigenous communities are among the world’s poorest and are unlikely to be engaged in a thriving, mutually beneficial partnership with an MNC. While there are increasing studies on CSR initiatives in base of the pyramid communities, few—if any—feature the self-initiated stakeholder transition of an impoverished community. This paper examines the factors that motivated the stakeholder transformation process of an indigenous community, from its position as a non-stakeholder, one lacking in power and legitimacy, to the status of (...) being a primary stakeholder of the firm. We applied a constructivist grounded theory approach to longitudinal data to arrive at the conceptual framework. The findings presented are drawn from an in-depth case study of the Maasai, an indigenous community from East Africa. The findings point to the existence of entrepreneurial alertness that is instrumental in propelling the indigenous community to evolve from one stakeholder category to the next. Our research aims to propose a possible foundation for how communities deep in poverty can coalesce themselves to make their social needs salient to multinational organizations. (shrink)
- Quotation and the use-mention distinction.Paul Saka -1998 -Mind 107 (425):113-135.Quote marks, I claim, serve to select from the multiple ostensions that are produced whenever any expression is uttered; they act to constrain pragmatic ambiguity or indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by showing that the proffered account fares better than its rivals-the Name, Description, Demonstrative, and Identity Theories. Along the way I shall need to explain and emphasize that quoting is not simply the same thing as mentioning. Quoting, but not mentioning, relies on the use of conventional devices.
- Reliability Theories of Justified Credence.Weng Hong Tang -2016 -Mind 125 (497):63-94.Reliabilists hold that a belief is doxastically justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable process. But since such a process is one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs, reliabilism is on the face of it applicable to binary beliefs, but not to degrees of confidence or credences. For while beliefs admit of truth or falsity, the same cannot be said of credences in general. A natural question now arises: Can reliability (...) theories of justified belief be extended or modified to account for justified credence? In this paper, I address this question. I begin by showing that, as it stands, reliabilism cannot account for justified credence. I then consider three ways in which the reliabilist may try to do so by extending or modifying her theory, but I argue that such attempts face certain problems. After that, I turn to a version of reliabilism that incorporates evidentialist elements and argue that it allows us to avoid the problems that the other theories face. If I am right, this gives reliabilists a reason, aside from those given recently by Comesaña and Goldman, to move towards such a kind of hybrid theory. (shrink)
- Quotation and Conceptions of Language.Paul Saka -2011 -Dialectica 65 (2):205-220.This paper discusses empty quotation (‘’ is an empty string) and lexical quotation (his praise was, quote, fulsome, unquote), it challenges the minimal theory of quotation (‘ “x” ’ quotes ‘x’) and it defends the identity theory of quotation. In the process it illuminates disciplinary differences between the science of language and the philosophy of language. First, most philosophers assume, without argument, that language includes writing, whereas linguists have reason to identify language with speech (plus sign language). Second, philosophers tend (...) to think of languages as abstract objects whereas linguists tend to think of them as natural objects. These foundational differences help to explain disagreements in grammaticality judgments and consequent disagreements in semantic theory. (shrink)
- The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation.Paul Saka &Michael Johnson (eds.) -2017 - Cham: Springer.The chapters in this volume address a variety of issues surrounding quotation, such as whether it is a pragmatic or semantic phenomenon, what varieties of quotation exist, and what speech acts are involved in quoting. Quotation poses problems for many prevailing theories of language. One fundamental principle is that for a language to be learnable, speakers must be able to derive the truth-conditions of sentences from the meanings of their parts. Another popular view is that indexical expressions like "I" display (...) a certain fixity -- that they always refer to the speaker using them. Both of these tenets appear to be violated by quotation. This volume is suitable for scholars in philosophy of language, semantics, and pragmatics, and for graduate students in philosophy and linguistics. The book will also be useful for researchers in other fields that study quotation, including psychology and computer science. (shrink)No categories
- Teōria no shingi to seijigaku.Sakae Ikeda -1966Export citation Bookmark
- Aku no mondai: gendai o shisakusuru tame ni.Shirō Kōsaka (ed.) -1990 - Kyōto-shi: Shōwadō.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Seiyō tetsugaku shi.Masaaki Kōsaka -1971Export citation Bookmark
- Tsuaratsusutora o yomu hito no tame ni.Masaaki Kōsaka -1950No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Meaning and the Ascription of Attitudes.Paul Saka -1998 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignThe present work develops a new theory of meaning---which I call attitudinal semantics---and applies it to solving three concrete problems. ;Chapter 1 notes that theories are to be understood and judged in comparison to their rivals. It accordingly sets out the dominant theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics, which claims that to give the meaning of sentence is to give the conditions under which is true, as in . Chapter 2 articulates my alter native proposal, which claims that to give the (...) meaning of is to give the conditions under which is held under some appropriate propositional attitude by some subject S situated in a given bio/cultural matrix, as in . L'etat c'est moi. "L'etat, c'est moi" is true in French iff I am the state. For any proficient speaker of French S, S thinks "L'etat, c'est moi" iff S thinks that S is the state. Attitudinal semantics thus represents a challenge to the prevailing view of meaning. If it is at all defensible, then it is highly significant. ;Chapter 3. TC semantics claims that the meaning of pejorative statement is given by specifying whether is true or false in various possible worlds. Nietzsche was a kraut. Attitudinal semantics claims that the meaning of is given by specifying the attitudes that various speakers might have toward Nietzsche and Germans more generally. ;Chapters 4, 5 deploy the attitudinal framework to analyze two other phenomena that have resisted TC solutions, ambiguity and the Liar paradox. The Liar paradox, for instance, disproves the naive T-schema and poses difficulties for sophisticated versions. Since the T-schema fails when applied to the Liar sentence, and since the Liar sentence is meaningful, meaning cannot be explicated by means of the T-schema. Instead, the proper analysis of the predicate true, like the analysis of all other predicates, situates language as irrevocably embedded in human thought/use. ;Chapter 6 considers objections to attitudinal semantics, replies to them, and closes with reflections on subjectivity. (shrink)
- Yan yuan lun xue ji: Tang Yongtong xian sheng jiu shi dan chen ji nian.Yongtong Tang (ed.) -1984 - Beijing: Xin hua shu dian Beijing fa xing suo fa xing.Export citation Bookmark
- You you wen zhe zhi jian: Tang Yinan xue shu zhu zuo ji.Yinan Tang -2018 - Tainan Shi: Cheng da chu ban she. Edited by Zongding Li.[1] zhuangzi shu jie -- [2] Wen xin diao long jiang shu -- [3] Fo, dao yu zhu zi-- [4] Ru jia -- [5] Dang dai xin Ru jia.
- On L∞κ-free Boolean algebras.Sakaé Fuchino,Sabine Koppelberg &Makoto Takahashi -1992 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 55 (3):265-284.We study L∞κ-freeness in the variety of Boolean algebras. It is shown that some of the theorems on L∞κ-free algebras which are known to hold in varieties such as groups, abelian groups etc. are also true for Boolean algebras. But we also investigate properties such as the ccc of L∞κ-free Boolean algebras which have no counterpart in the varieties above.
- (1 other version)Quotational Constructions.Paul Saka -2003 -Belgian Journal of Linguistics 17:187-212.
- The Argument from Ignorance against Truth-Conditional Semantics.Paul Saka -2007 -American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):157 - 169.According to orthodox semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. Against this view I observe that we typically do not know the truth-conditions of the sentences we understand. We do not know the truth-conditions, for instance, of empty definite descriptions, non-declaratives, subjunctive conditionals, causal ascriptions, belief ascriptions, probability statements, figurative language, category mistakes, normative judgments, or vague statements. Appealing to tacit knowledge does not help, for the problem goes beyond our inability to articulate complete (...) truth-conditions: even full knowledge of the world’s condition would leave us unable to say whether an arbitrary sentence was true or false. (shrink)
- Partial orderings with the weak Freese-Nation property.Sakaé Fuchino,Sabine Koppelberg &Saharon Shelah -1996 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 80 (1):35-54.A partial ordering P is said to have the weak Freese-Nation property if there is a mapping tf : P → [P]0 such that, for any a, b ε P, if a b then there exists c ε tf∩tf such that a c b. In this note, we study the WFN and some of its generalizations. Some features of the class of Boolean algebras with the WFN seem to be quite sensitive to additional axioms of set theory: e.g. under CH, (...) every ccc complete Boolean algebra has this property while, under b 2, there exists no complete Boolean algebra with the WFN. (shrink)
- Kierukegōru kara Sarutoru e.Masaaki Kōsaka -1967Export citation Bookmark
- Kierukegōru kara Sarutoru e.Masaaki Kōsaka -1949No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Nishida Kitarō Sensei no tsuioku.Masaaki Kōsaka -1948 - Kyōto-shi: Ittōen Tōeisha.
- Seiji, jiyū oyobi ummei ni kansuru kōsatsu.Masaaki Kōsaka -1947Export citation Bookmark
- Kotoba no naka de no tankyū: Puraton o yomu.Sakae Shinozaki -1985 - Tōkyō: Keisō Shobō.Export citation Bookmark
- Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang -2015 -Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.A number of philosophers have argued that it is hard for finite agents like us to reason and make decisions relying solely on our credences and preferences. They hold that for us to cope with our cognitive limitations, we need binary beliefs as well. For they think that such beliefs, by disposing us to treat certain propositions as true, help us cut down on the number of possibilities we need to consider when we reason. But using Ross and Schroeder as (...) my stalking horse, I argue that such an appeal to binary beliefs does not work. I begin by explaining why there’s supposedly a problem for an account of reasoning that invokes only credences and preferences. I then argue that Ross and Schroeder’s account of belief—as well as other similar accounts—does not help solve the problem. Finally, I consider an alternative approach to solving the problem. This approach, unlike the accounts I criticise, does not hold that having a disposition to treat a proposition as true is necessary for believing it. (shrink)
- Sticks and clubs.Sakaé Fuchino,Saharon Shelah &Lajos Soukup -1997 -Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 90 (1-3):57-77.We study combinatorial principles known as stick and club. Several variants of these principles and cardinal invariants connected to them are also considered. We introduce a new kind of side by-side product of partial orderings which we call pseudo-product. Using such products, we give several generic extensions where some of these principles hold together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. An iterative version of the pseudo-product is used under an inaccessible cardinal to show the consistency of the club (...) principle for every stationary subset of limits of ω1 together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. (shrink)
- Quotation.Paul Saka -2013 -Philosophy Compass 8 (10):935-949.Understanding quotation is fundamental to understanding the nature of truth and meaning. Quotation, however, is a remarkably complicated phenomenon, and a vigorous literature on the topic has been growing at an increasing rate.§1 To give you a sense of this work, §1 enlarges upon the significance of studying quotation; §2 presents a rudimentary taxonomy of quotation; and §3 critically surveys theories of how quotation works.
- Rarely pure and never simple: Tensions in the theory of truth.Paul Saka -2010 -Topoi 29 (2):125-135.Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want (...) to say that “The Matterhorn is 4,500 m high” expresses the same truth as “The Matterhorn is 14763.7795276 feet high” (or that it is true in the same range of utterance contexts), even though the two are extensionally equivalent. The reason is that they express different intensions. (shrink)
- Reasons as Defaults By John F. Horty.Paul Saka -2014 -Analysis 74 (2):358-360.
- Destructibility of stationary subsets of Pκλ.Sakaé Fuchino &Greg Piper -2005 -Mathematical Logic Quarterly 51 (6):560-569.For a regular cardinal κ with κ<κ = κ and κ ≤ λ , we construct generically a subset S of {x ∈ Pκλ : x ∩ κ is a singular ordinal} such that S is stationary in a strong sense but the stationarity of S can be destroyed by a κ+-c. c. forcing ℙ* which does not add any new element of Pκλ . Actually ℙ* can be chosen so that ℙ* is κ-strategically closed. However we show that such (...) ℙ* itself cannot be κ-strategically closed or even<κ-strategically closed if κ is inaccessible. (shrink)
- Mathematics and Set Theory:数学と集合論.Sakaé Fuchino -2018 -Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 46 (1):33-47.No categories
| 1 — 50 / 966 |
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-54b44b69b7-sq5lk uwo